1924 — Jan 3, Starch Dust Explosion, Corn Products Refining Company, Pekin, IL — 42

— 42 Mannan. Lee’s Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (V1/3rd Ed.), 2005, Table A1.2.
— 42 National Fire Protection Association. Fire Protection Handbook. 1954, Table 33.
— 42 National Fire Protection Association. Report of Important Dust Explosions. 1957, p. 66.
— 42 Price, et al. “The Pekin Starch Dust Explosion.” NFPA Quarterly, V17, N4, 1924.

Narrative Information

Price/NFPA: “One of the worst industrial plant dust explosions on record occurred about 3 :35 A. M., January 3, 1924, in the Corn Products Refining Com¬pany’s plant at Pekin, Ill. Forty-two men were killed or died in the hospital from burns received in the explosion, and twenty-two were injured. With one exception, this is the largest number of persons ever killed in an explosion of this character. In 1919 forty-three persons were killed as a result of a starch dust explosion in a factory in Cedar Rapids, Iowa….

“Buildings Affected by the Explosion. The plant consisted of a number of buildings designed for the manu¬facture of corn starch and by-products. The section of the plant affected by the explosion and fire consisted of five building’s known as the table house, annex, starch grinding- house, starch packing’ house, and an ad¬joining building used at the time principally for storage…. Practically all of the buildings were of fire-resistive construction, although a large part of the equipment in the various buildings was of wood or non-fire-resistive material. The older brick buildings had interior woodwork and wooden floors….

“Manufacturing Processes in Damaged Buildings. The nature of the manufacturing processes in the buildings affected by the explosion was such that the fire and explosion hazard was appar-ently limited to certain points where there was a possibility of the dry starch being thrown into suspension….“It was on the first or kiln floor and the southwest corner of the basement where the dry starch conveyors were installed that the greatest fire and explosion hazard in this building existed….In the starch packing house, known as building No. 27, starch was packed into bags holding 100 to 140 pounds, although some of it was carried by conveyor to the starch grinding house…for further treatment. The packing process, which consisted simply of filling the bags from overhead storage hoppers, naturally created a considerable amount of dust and apparently the fire and explosion hazard in this section of the plant was fully realized by both the company officials and the employees.

“In the starch grinding house the starch brought over from the starch packing house was pulverized in mills and bolted through silk clothed reels. It was then transferred back to the starch packing house through a screw conveyor to be packed for shipment in the same way that the pearl starch was handled. A considerable fire and explosion hazard existed in this section of the plant due to the possibility of foreign material entering the pulverizers and the possibility of static electricity accumulating on the silk cloth of the reels. Precautions were taken, however, to reduce as far as possible this hazard.

“Damage Caused by the Explosion. “The damage caused by the explosion…consisted of the total destruc¬tion of the starch packing house; the destruction of the east and west walls and the southeast corner of the annex; the blowing out of many windows and the destruction of tile walls in the table and kiln house; and the destruction of the roof and windows of the starch grinding house. The damage to building No. 33 located south of the starch packing house was caused principally by the fire which followed the explosion….

“Origin and Cause of the Explosion. Engineers of the Bureau of Chemistry of the United States Depart¬ment of Agriculture, who have been studying the dust explosion problem for a number of years, made a thorough investigation of this explosion in conjunction with…[the] State Fire Marshal of Illinois….A study of the path of propagation of the explosion indicated that the explosion had originated in the southwest corner of the basement of the table and kiln house. The tipples which dumped the starch from the wagons were located in this corner of the building on the first floor. An examination of these tipples and the conveyors beneath them indicated that the explosion was caused by a fire in one of the screw conveyors carrying starch from the tipples.

“The fire was ap¬parently caused by an overheated bearing in the conveyor about 15 feet from the tipple and this fire ignited the dust cloud formed when a wagon of starch was dumped in the tipple hopper. This initial explosion propa¬gated back through the tipple to the first floor and spread around the kilns and loading hoppers. In the basement this initial explosion blew down a tile wall near the conveyor and another light tile wall which formed part of an air duct under the kilns. The flames propagated up through the kilns, blew off the doors on the east side of the kilns and then traveled south through the annex to the starch packing house where the second and more violent explosion occurred. From the first floor of the table and kiln house the flames also propagated to the upper floors of the building, but the presence of only a small quantity of dust on these floors prevented the building up of any great pressure. It is believed that the damage to the starch grinding house was caused by the explosions in the starch packing house and the table and kiln house, as there was very little evidence of extensive flame propagation….

“Lessons Learned from the Explosion. The three most important lessons learned from an investigation of this explosion are: the value of the daylight type of building, the necessity of adopting a positive form of lubrication at points where the fire or ex¬plosion hazard is present, and the desirability of isolating buildings in which such hazards exist. If there had not been large window areas in buildings No. 9 and No. 31, the damage in both buildings would undoubtedly have been much greater. The failure of the roof on building No. 31 also helped in re¬ducing the pressure in this unit and prevented greater damage to the interior and the equipment installed.

“An alarm system for indicating hot bearings or a positive system of lubrication is desirable on all equipment where the material being handled is flammable. Such systems are especially necessary on bearings located in places which are not readily accessible.

“It has been shown that the isolation of buildings in which the fire or explosion hazard exists often limits the explosion and fire to the unit in which it started. 1t is, therefore, recommended that in industrial plants where dust explosions are liable to occur all buildings be isolated suffi-ciently to prevent the spreading of a fire or an explosion from one to the others.” (Price, et al. “The Pekin Starch Dust Explosion.” NFPA Quarterly, V17, N4, 1924, p. 354.)

Sources

Mannan, Sam (Ed.). Lee’s Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control (3rd Ed., 3 Vols.). Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005.

National Fire Protection Association. Fire Protection Handbook. 1954, Table 33.

National Fire Protection Association. Report of Important Dust Explosions: A Record of Dust Explosions in the United States and Canada Since 1860. Boston: NFPA, 1957.

Price, D. J., Hylton R. Brown, and Paul W. Edwards. “The Pekin Starch Dust Explosion.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association,” Vol. 17, No. 4, April 1924, pp. 354-359.