1958 — Dec 15 Johnson & Johnson executive Learstar, 5 miles SW of Woonsocket, RI– all 7

–7 Aviation Safety Network. Learstar 1 crash 5M SW of Woonsocket RI, 12-15-1958.
–7 Civil Aeronautics Board AAR. Johnson and Johnson, Learstar…near Woonsocket, [RI]…

Narrative Information

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database:
“Date: Monday 15 December 1958
“Time: 09:30
“Type: Lockheed Learstar 1
“Operator: Johnson and Johnson
“Registration: N37500
“MSN: 18-2251
“First flight: 1942
….
“Crew: Fatalities: 2 / Occupants: 2
“Passengers: Fatalities: 5 / Occupants: 5
“Total: Fatalities: 7 / Occupants: 7
….
“Location: 8 km (5 mls) SW of Woonsocket, RI, USA [About 50 miles southwest of Logan IAP.]
“Phase: En route (ENR)
“Nature: Executive
“Departure airport: Linden Airport, NJ…
“Destination airport: Boston-Logan International Airport, MA…
“Narrative: Carburetor icing; crashed.”

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report, Synopsis:

“At approximately 0930, December 15, 1958, a Learstar, N 37500, owned and operated by Jonson and Johnson, crashed in a wooded area during a snowstorm five miles southwest of Woonsocket, Rhode Island. All seven persons aboard including the two pilots received fatal injuries.

“The flight, a nonstop business trip from Linden Airport, New Jersey, to Logan Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, penetrated and continued into icing conditions of unknown severity causing loss of power from both engines.

“The Board, on January 7, 1959, recommended to the Federal Aviation Agency that the adequacy of the carburetor induction heat system for this airplane be re-evaluated and mor specific instructions regarding its use be provided. FAA has advised that it believes the carburetor heat system is adequate, but that portions of the flight manual pertaining to de-icing procedures are now being rewritten so that all pilots will be informed of the most effective de-icing techniques. In addition, as a result of this accident, an alternate fuel source arrangement has been certificated by the FAA which will enable engines to operate even though the carburetor boost venturi and impact tubes are iced over. [p.1.]

“Investigation

“….The estimated flight time was one hour and departure was scheduled for 0830, December 15, 1958….

“Captain Alex S. Sable, according to a witness, made several weather checks on Sunday, the day before the planned flight. These forecasts indicated a poor weather outlook with low ceilings and visibilities.

“At approximately 0700 Monday morning, December 15, Captain Sable was briefed on en route weather conditions, including a forecast of weather at Boston. This forecast indicated an improving trend, but included the probability of light icing in clouds. This weather briefing was given by the chief meteorologist of the National Weather Forecasting Corporation, Newark Airport, a private weather forecasting and briefing service.

“The flight was planned in accordance with instrument flight rules and an IFR clearance was received from New York Air Route Traffic Control Center.

“Captain Alex Sable, Copilot Edward Luidvinaitus, and the five passengers departed Linden Airport at 0834 for Boston, under a departure clearance from Newark departure control….

“Air Route Traffic Control records indicated the flight had reported the Hartford VOR at 0913…Upon passing the Hartford VOR, the flight was instructed by the Boston Center to change to ins communication frequency…The net communication was at 0919 when the pilot advised he had a complete loss of power from the right engine and was declaring an emergency. Asked by Boston Center whether he desired to land at Providence Airport, Rhode Island, or the Boston Airport, the pilot advised he would continue to Boston, his destination….At approximately 0926, the pilot advised Boston Center that he was experiencing a loss of power in the remaining engine and the Boston Center controller asked him if he desired to land at Green Airport, Providence, Rhode Island, located 16 nautical miles from Sterling intersection, or North Central State Airport at Smithville, Rhode Island, 18 nautical miles from Sterling intersection. The controller’s interpretation of the pilot’s answer indicated that the flight intended to land at North Central, and the aircraft was further cleared to descend to and maintain 4,000 feet. The aircraft was cleared further to the North Central radio beacon, direct course, to maintain 4,000 feet and to advise Boston Center when able to pick up the North Central radio beacon. The pilot then stated that he preferred to continue to Boston, and was advised that the original clearance was correct…

“Subsequent to this transmission, Boston Center asked the pilot if he was over the Franklin intersection, and he replied that they were coming up on Franklin at 0930….At 0935 no communication had been received from N 37500 by Boston approach control. Subsequent calls to the aircraft…produced negative results. The aircraft was not heard from again.

“Although the aircraft was not seen just prior to the accident, numerous witnesses located along the last few miles of the flightpath heard the aircraft traveling in a northeasterly direction. They described the sound as that of a single engine, ‘sputtering, quitting, starting again and running intermittently.’ Other witnesses described the sound as surging from low power to high power. Some of these witnesses heard the aircraft crash.

“At 1220, the wreckage site of N 37500 was identified from the air by a searching aircraft, five miles southwest of Woonsocket, Rhode Island. The aircraft struck the ground at a very steep angle, while inverted, and most of the wreckage was confined to an area no larger than the aircraft….One tree, about 12 inches in diameter, was struck and severed about seven feet from the ground….

Analysis

“An analysis of the weather reveals that fling at 5,000 feet the crew would have been on instruments beginning in western Connecticut and continuing for the remainder of the flight. Moderate to heavy snow aloft would have been encountered from central or eastern Connecticut to the crash site. Weather information indicated temperatures at flight level would have been about minus 10 degrees c. to minus 8 degrees c. through Connecticut becoming minus 5 degrees to minus 3 degrees c. through Rhode Island. This latter range is especially favorable for ice formation. The air was close to saturation at the 5,000-foot level and, in general, below freezing at all levels throughout New England. In view of the temperature and moisture conditions that existed, the aircraft would have encountered severe icing conditions over eastern Connecticut and Rhode Island. These icing conditions were not covered adequately in the U.S. Weather Bureau forecast pertinent to the time and route, nor were they covered in the weather briefing supplied by National Weather Forecasting Corporation. This represented a serious deficiency in the weather forecasting and briefing service provided for this flight.

“…the Weather Bureau area forecasts and flash advisories issued well in advance of departure time had drawn attention to ceilings of less than 1,000 feet in New England and visibilities of less than 3 miles in snow. Yet no mention of these advisories was apparently made in the briefing supplied by National Weather Forecasting Corporation. This likewise was a serious deficiency….

“The pilot was misled by the inadequate weather forecast and briefing which he received prior to departure. The nature of this weath4r service was such that it would have led to a false sense of security in that no mention was made of anticipated adverse weather of any kind en route….

“When the Boston Center controller asked whether the pilot intended to land at any nearby airports following the loss of power on first the right, then the left engine, he was advised each time that the flight would continue to Boston.

“The Board believes the crew, after experiencing loss of power of the right engine, used poor judgment in continuing flight toward Boston, into weather conditions less favorable than those from which they came. There were several airports that could accommodate the aircraft in the Hartford, Connecticut, area.

“Although the weather forecast obtained at the start of the flight was inaccurate, the crew should have been aware of the onset of carburetor and induction icing difficulties at the time of the first power loss. This power loss occurred approximately six minutes’ flight time from Hartford, It is difficult to understand the reasoning which led to the decision to continue the flight toward Boston after this power loss instead of landing at Hartford or one of the two other available airports in the immediate area….

“The facts suggest induction system icing and it is concluded this was the cause of failure of both engines to produce power. There was no physical failure of the engines, propellers, or essential accessories….

“Probable Cause

“The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s decision to continue on to his destination in freezing weather after total power loss of one engine from induction icing. Contributing causal factors were the serious deficiency in weath4r briefing and inadequate information in the Airplane Flight Manual for the most effective use of carburetor anti-icing and deicing.”
Sources

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database. Learstar 1 crash 5M SW of Woonsocket RI, 12-15-1958. Accessed 7-8-2023 at:
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19581215-0

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Johnson and Johnson, Learstar, N 3750 Near Woonsocket, Rhode Island, December 15, 1958. Released 9-11-1959. Accessed 7-8-2023 at: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Aircraft_Accident_Report/mfg5AQAAMAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=johnson+and+johnson+learstar+woonsocket+RI+December+15+1958&pg=RA20-PA1&printsec=frontcover