1950 — June 5, Westair Transport C-46 engine loss, ditches, 300M E of Melbourne, FL– 28

— 28 Airdisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 06051950.
— 28 Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description, Westair Transport, 05 Jun 1950.
— 28 Baugher. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-70255 to 44-83885). 11-6-2011 rev.
— 28 CAB AIR. Aviation Corp. of Seattle (Westair Transport)…Melbourne, FL, June 5, 1950.

Narrative Information

AirDisaster.com: “A Curtis C-46, registration N1248N with 65 on-board “Crashed into the Atlantic some 190 miles off the Miami coast.” (AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 06051950.)

Baugher: “Curtiss C-46F-1-CU Commando….78673 (c/n 22496) to N1248N, Westair Transport. Ditched in Atlantic Ocean Jun 5, 1950 after engine lost power. 28 out of 65 on board were killed.” (Baugher. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-70255 to 44-83885). 11-6-2011 rev.)

Civil Aeronautics Board: “A Curtiss-Wright C-46F aircraft, N-1248N, was ditched at sea 300 miles east of Melbourne, Florida, at 2203, 1 June 5, 1950 The aircraft was being operated by Westair Transport, and had on board 62 passengers and three crew members. Twenty-eight of the passengers lost their lives as the result of this ditching, and the aircraft sank in one of the deepest portions of the Atlantic Ocean and could not be recovered….

“The flight departed from Isle Grande Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico, at 1724, June 5, 1950, for Wilmington, North Carolina….In addition to the 62 passengers and three crew members, the aircraft carried 8,436 pounds of fuel and 1,363 pounds of baggage, which resulted in a total aircraft weight at the time of takeoff of 48,258 pounds This was 258 pounds in excess of the certificated limit….

“No difficulty was experienced by the crew during the first four hours of flight, and in a report transmitted to the San Juan Communications Station at 2117 the crew estimated that its position at 2148 would be 28 degrees 33’ north latitude and 74 degrees 58’ west longitude This point is 390 miles east of Melbourne, Florida, and 300 miles northeast of Nassau in the Bahamas A few minutes before the flight arrived over this estimated position the crew noticed that the indicated right engine oil quantity had fallen from 32 gallons to 20 Immediately after this was observed, the left engine backfired and lost power.

“Application of carburetor heat and adjustment of fuel mixture and other engine controls were ineffectual, so the left propeller was feathered…the aircraft was headed toward Nassau, the closest island with an adequate landing field…[The Captain] sent a message at 2146 to the Overseas Foreign Aeronautics Communications Station (OFACS) at Miami, which was intercepted by the CAA Communications Station at San Juan, that the left propeller was feathered and the flight was proceeding toward Nassau….

“Shortly before the left engine was feathered, a second C-46, N-1246N, operated by the same corporation, passed this flight flying in the opposite direction toward San Juan The crew in the second aircraft was contacted and requested to stand by This was done, and they were able to give assistance by maintaining communications with shore stations in the rescue operations which were to follow.

“Shortly after the 2146 message that the left propeller was feathered, the crew in N-1248N observed that the indicated oil quantity for the right engine had fallen from 20 to 15 gallons. At about the same time the crew also observed that the right engine was overheating with an indicated cylinder head temperature of nearly 300 degrees centigrade. Because of this condition, Captain Halsey said that he began a voluntary descent to ditch before complete right engine failure occurred. A message was sent at 2154, “Been losing altitude, at 1500” Six minutes later, at 2200, a second message was sent, “200 feet, losing altitude” And then a third, at 2203, “Just about in the drink”

“An attempt was made to hold altitude at 200 feet above the water until shore stations could obtain radio bearings According to the captain, the right engine speed decreased from 2400 to 2250 rpm and could not he increased Air speed was then reduced to between 100 and 110 miles per hour by retarding the right throttle, and the aircraft was ditched about 20 minutes after the malfunctioning of the left engine began The wing flaps and landing lights were not used. At the time, the weather was clear and the wind was from the southwest at approximately 10 miles per hour The moon had not risen, but the visibility was such that whitecaps could he seen.

“As soon as the aircraft came to rest in the water, the crew entered the cabin where they opened the main cabin door and the emergency exits. The emergency exits were not opened prior to the ditching as prescribed in the company’s Operation Manual. Some of the passengers then climbed out onto the wings, and others jumped into the sea. All seven of the 10-man life rafts were thrown overboard, five floated away in the darkness because their retaining ropes were not held, two were inflated. The three crew members and 34 of the 62 passengers were able to swim to and board the two life rafts.

“The captain stated that he was the last person to leave the aircraft. The crew did not take with them the emergency transmitter known as the “Gibson Girl” (which broadcasts on frequencies of 500 and 8280 kilocycles), and it went down with the aircraft. The captain, however, saved a flashlight. Much of the other emergency equipment on the two crowded life rafts was thrown overboard by the passengers.

“During the night five flares were fired at intervals but were not observed. The second C-46, which had remained in the search area, reported at 2321, one hour and eighteen minutes after N-1248N had ditched, that they saw a blinking light on the water. They requested Miami Communications to obtain a fix. At 0018, about one hour after this fix was requested, the Federal Communications Commission reported a “fair” fix had been established on the second aircraft, the position being 28 degrees 10’ north latitude and 75 degrees 12’ west longitude. The following morning a Coast Guard aircraft located the survivors, and shortly afterwards the USS Saufley, a U S Navy destroyer, drew alongside and rescued those in the two life rafts. One survivor, who had clung to an uninflated raft during the night, was located, but was killed by sharks before he could be taken from the water. The position of the rescue was 27 degrees 51’ north latitude and 75 degrees 22’ west longitude….

“All 62 passengers were Puerto Ricans, and since the majority spoke only Spanish, the steward, also a Puerto Rican, was the member of the crew best able to convey instructions to them. He was employed by the company the morning this flight departed, and received a description of his duties at this time. He had no other training. As all seats in the main cabin were occupied, he did not remain with the passengers, but took a seat forward on the flight deck with the crew. According to the surviving passengers, the steward had given them very little instruction for the emergency. Some of the passengers said they were told that a landing was necessary, but that it would be made on land and not at sea. They were not told before the ditching to fasten their safety belts, and the majority said they were not instructed how to inflate and use the life jackets and the life rafts. The steward, however, testified to the contrary At the time of ditching lights were on in the cabin, and the seven 10-man life rafts which were aboard were located near the main cabin door….

“The following search and rescue events are significant. No emergency was declared by the crew in the distressed aircraft. An emergency was inferred by CAA Communications at Miami from the message sent 2154, “Been losing altitude, at 1,500” and they relayed it to the search and rescue coordination center at Miami at 2158. One minute later, at 2159, search and rescue facilities on the coast were alerted through the Coast Guard teletype. At 2203 the last message, “Just about in the drink,” was received. The crew testified that they ditched the aircraft immediately after sending this message. At 2217, 23 minutes after the emergency was known, the Coast Guard Radio Stations at Jacksonville and Miami transmitted on 500 and 8280 kilocycles requesting ships at sea to give their position. Responses to the original broadcast were received from the SS Musa and, later, from the SS Sanca Paula. This latter vessel was approximately 60 nautical miles southeast of the aircraft’s ditching position. Other merchant vessels at greater distances reported to the Coast Guard between the times of 2217 and 2340.

“At 0005 the following morning the rescuing vessel, the USS Saufley, was notified by the Navy of the emergency This vessel was within 30 nautical miles of the aircraft at the time of its emergency Evidence indicates that at the time of the ditching it was 20 miles southwest of the 28 degrees 33’ north latitude and 74 degrees 58’ west longitude It was near this point that the flight turned toward Nassau after the left engine failed The southwesterly course flown during the 18 to 20 minutes between the time of this turn and the ditching would have carried the aircraft near the Saufley, 20 to 25 miles away.

“The Federal Communications Commission and other search and rescue facilities were notified of the emergency at 2158. The first information from the Federal Communications Commission concerning fixes or bearings was transmitted to Search and Rescue two hours and 15 minutes after the ditching and was that a “fair” fix placed the second aircraft, which was circling in the area, at 28 degrees 10’ north latitude and 75 degrees 12’ west longitude….

Analysis

“The passengers and crew were in agreement that the left engine backfired. Accepting the captain’s evaluation of the malfunctioning of this engine, its propeller was feathered because there was continuous backfiring and a definite loss of power. As previously stated, shortly after this trouble began the right engine became overheated, and the captain believed it was necessary to descend and ditch before a complete power failure occurred. Once the right engine began overheating, no attempt was made to unfeather and restart the left engine in an effort to gain additional power, and thus maintain altitude. The captain did not consider it advisable to restart the left engine because of the following possibilities: If an attempt to unfeather and restart the engine had again resulted in the condition as described, it is possible that an engine fire would have resulted. Also, with the propeller unfeathered and the engine malfunctioning a drag condition might have occurred, causing a higher rate of descent. Again, it is possible that under these conditions the propeller might have become uncontrollable, thus creating an additional hazardous condition.

“Since the aircraft sank and could not be recovered, it is impossible to determine what difficulties or failures occurred to result in the loss of power of the left engine, and the loss of oil and subsequent overheating of the right. The only evidence concerning the engines is that given by the crew and the passengers, therefore, there is no basis for questioning the crew’s evaluation of the situation and the decision to ditch.

“Apart from questions involving the powerplants, the investigation indicated that if the company and the crew had complied with existing regulations and recommended procedures, there should have been a substantial saying of lives.

“The company elected to utilize the services of a steward on the flight, and he was listed as an additional crew member. Therefore, instructions pertaining to the duties of stewards, which were written in this company’s required Operations Manual, should have been followed. These instructions were specific regarding training, general duties, and ditching procedures Certainly, the short briefing of these duties given the steward the morning of the flight was not sufficient

“In analyzing this accident, it is apparent that the company and the captain are to be censured for failure to comply with approved operation procedures. The steward had not been properly trained to care for the passengers during an emergency condition. The duties of a steward in an emergency are to look to the passengers’ safety and to assist in the evacuation of the aircraft. His station is in the cabin where he can best perform these duties. No seat was provided in the cabin for him. Had all the passengers put on their life jackets, and had they been properly instructed how to inflate them, and had their seat belts been properly fastened, the confusion which existed at the time of the ditching would probably not have occurred. Subsequent to the ditching operation, there was sufficient time to not only inflate the life rafts, but also to evacuate the passengers and crew. If these emergency procedures had been accomplished, it is quite probable that many more lives would have been saved….

Findings

“On the basis of all available evidence the Board finds

1. The crew, the carrier, and the aircraft properly certificated.
2. While en route, and when near a position of 28⁰ 33′ north latitude and 74⁰ 58′ west longitude, the flight experienced mal-operation of both the engines, which required ditching the aircraft at sea.
3. The company and the captain did not comply with the approved operation procedures, in that they failed to provide necessary instructions to the passengers in the use of emergency equipment.
4. The steward was not properly trained to perform his duties under emergency conditions.
5. Though all search and rescue facilities were notified of the emergency by 2159, the location of the ditched aircraft was not fixed until 0018 the next day. This fix was obtained by the Federal Communications Commission on a second aircraft which remained in the area of the emergency, transmitting on a frequency of 6595 kilocycles.
6. An alert to all ships at sea was transmitted at 2217, however, the USS Saufley, the vessel nearest the scene of the ditching, did not learn of the emergency until 0005 the next day.

Probable Cause

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the malfunctioning of both engines from causes unknown.” (Civil Aeronautics Board Accident Investigation Report. Aviation Corp. of Seattle (Westair Transport)… Melbourne, FL, June 5, 1950.)

Sources

Airdisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 06051950. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=06051950&reg=N1248N&airline=

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database, 1950. Westair Transport Curtiss C-46F Ditching off Florida, 5 June 1950. Accessed 8-26-2023 at:
https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19500605-0

Baugher, Joseph F. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-70255 to 44-83885). Nov 6, 2011 revision. Accessed 12-29-2011 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1944_5.html

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Aviation Corporation of Seattle (Westair Transport), 300 Miles East of Melbourne, Florida, June 5, 1950 (File No. 1-0093). Washington, DC: CAB, July 16, 1951. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*S%3A%5CDOT_56GB%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C060550.pdf