1949 — Jan 2, Seattle Air Charter (Yale students) takeoff crash, Seattle-Boeing Field, WA-14

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard Sep 15, 2023 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 —  14  Aviation Safety Network.  Accident Description. Seattle Air Charter, 2 Jan 1949.

—  14  CAB. Accident Investigation Report. Seattle Air—Seattle, Washington, January 2, 1949.

—  14  NFPA. “Recent Important Fires,” Fire News, No. 378, Feb 1949, p. 6.

 Narrative Information

 Civil Aeronautics Board Accident Investigation Report:

“The Accident

“At approximately 2205, January 2, 1949, a Douglas DC-3…owned and operated by Seattle Air Charter, an irregular air carrier, crashed and burned following an attempted takeoff from Boeing Field, Seattle, Washington. Eleven of the 27 passengers and 3 crew members received fatal injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. The aircraft was destroyed.

“History of the Flight

“A group of Yale University students returning to school following their Christmas vacation arranged with William F. Leland, sole owner and operator of Seattle Air Charter, to transport them from Seattle to New Haven, Connecticut, January 2, 1949. Departure was delayed because a full crew was not available at 1800 as had been originally planned. At approximately 2100 a crew was organized consisting of G. W. Chavers, pilot; K. A. Love, copilot; and W. F. Leland, third crew member.

“The flight taxied to Runway 13 for takeoff at 2138 and held because ground fog conditions restricted the visibility below the one mile minimum required for takeoff. The flight maintained radio contact with the control tower which advised the pilots of the existing weather conditions on the field. When the flight had taxied from the parking ramp, the tower reported, Boeing Field weather is clear, visibility, 1/2 variable to 1/4 mile in all quadrants. The flight asked if they could take off. The tower replied: Roger. We will let you out as far as traffic is concerned. You are cleared into position to hold. A few minutes later, at 2145, the flight requested their weather minimums for takeoff and were told that they were ceiling 300 feet, and visibility one mile. To this, the flight responded, ‘If we take off we will be in violation, won’t we?’ The tower answered, ‘Yes.’ Shortly after this conversation, the tower again reported the visibility which was at that time restricted to 1/8 mile.

“After a period of 10 minutes during which time the flight continued to hold at the end of the runway, the tower remarked: It appears we are getting a little break. Cleared into position and hold. We will have a clearance for you shortly. Immediately following, the flights air route traffic control clearance was transmitted. Then, at 2201, the crew stated that they could see the four green range lights at the end of the runway, and that they were going to take off. These lights are located 5,700 feet from the approach end of runway 13, which is 7,500 feet in length. At 2204 the tower stated, ‘Cleared for take-off report on top.’ At this time the weather as reported by the Weather Bureau was ceiling unlimited, thin obscurement, visibility one fourth of a mile, restricted by fog. The airplane began its take off to the south, and for approximately 1,000 feet it appeared normal to observers who could see the navigation lights of the airplane. It then began to swerve to the left, becoming airborne approximately 1,800 feet down the runway on a heading 35 degrees to the left of the runway. Shortly after leaving the runway, the left wing dropped and the tip dragged on the ground for a distance of 117 feet. The aircraft remained airborne for approximately 750 feet after leaving the runway, and then made contact with the ground in a landing attitude, tail wheel first. Upon contact with the ground, power to the engines was ‘cut’. The aircraft rolled or skidded the remaining distance, approximately 700 feet, into a revetment hangar, immediately after which it was enveloped in flames.

“As the tower watched the airplane’s navigation lights, they realized that a crash was imminent and called the Boeing Field Fire Department which was located 1,300 feet south of the control tower, and 200 feet south of the revetment hangar into which the airplane crashed. The fire captain on duty heard the crash. He and 2 firemen, which comprised the duty crew that night, responded immediately, departing for the scene of the crash with all available equipment. This comprised a crash wagon and 2 pump trucks. The equipment arrived within a minute after the crash.

“Investigation

“It was found that the force of impact had completely crushed the nose of the aircraft and had telescoped it into the fuselage structure to approximately the position of the leading edge of the wing. Fire, which immediately followed, destroyed that portion of the fuselage forward of the main cabin door. During the fire-fighting operation the wings and the aft portion of the fuselage were pulled from the rest of the wreckage, and this resulted in breaking all of the control cables. The landing gear was found in the down and locked position, and the flaps in the up position. Trim tab control settings in the cockpit indicated that all trim tab control surfaces had been in the neutral position at the time of takeoff. Engine switches were found in the on position. Eighty percent of the passenger seats were found broken from their floor attachments. All components of the aircraft were accounted for and no evidence of any structural or mechanical failure prior to impact was found.

“Both engines were disassembled and inspected. This inspection revealed no indication that any of the internal working parts of the engines were not operating properly prior to the time of impact….

“During the day of January 2, while NC-79025 had been parked on the field without wing covers, snow fell from 1600 to 1700, leaving a deposit of 2 to 3 inches on the ground. The surface temperature at the beginning of the period was 39 degrees, but it fell below freezing by 1700. The first snow melted on contact with the aircraft and left a film of water on all its surfaces. With the lowering of temperature the water froze and the snow began to accumulate on the aircraft leaving a rough covering of frozen snow and slush….

“….Between 2100 and the time of takeoff Mr. Chavers made three calls by telephone to the control tower for reports of visibility. At no time did he receive information that visibility on the field was in excess of one-half mile….

“At approximately 1800 an attempt was made to remove the snow and ice from the airplane, by dragging a rope over the wings and the horizontal tail surface. This removed some of the snow but none of the ice. Then a high pressure water hose was used. Loose snow and slush were washed free by the process, but a coating of clear ice formed where the water was applied, and it was at this time that ice accumulated on the under surfaces of the wing. Both temperature and dew point were 29 degrees, and frost began to form on the iced surfaces of the airplane.

“Emmett G. Flood, who had been obtained as one of the pilots to make the flight, arrived at the airport at approximately 1930 and examined the airplane. Because of the ice condition on the airplane he refused to fly. According to Mr. Flood’s statement, he returned home and, at approximately 2150, after which he immediately his superior who resided nearby. During the time that he and his superior were conferring, they received notice that the accident had occurred.

“Shortly after Mr. Flood left the field a third attempt was made to remove the ice from the aircraft by Leland, Chavers and Mr. Minor, a mechanic. This time an alcohol solution was applied to the wings and the tail surfaces of the aircraft. The mechanic testified that all ice was removed by this process; however, no attempt was made to remove ice on the under surfaces of the wings, and the mechanic did not examine this portion of the aircraft.

“At 2115 Mr. Chavers requested the advice of another pilot, a Mr. John Vineyard, concerning the effect of the ice on the aircraft. Mr. Vineyard examined the aircraft and then told Mr. Chavers that if he intended to fly the airplane that night to obtain plenty of air sped before taking off. Mr. Vineyard later stated that when he examined the airplane, which was just before takeoff, he found a layer of clear ice covering the underside of both winds and patches of rime and clear ice on the top surfaces of the left wing. He also stated that he noticed heavy frost was forming rapidly on the top surfaces of the wings.

“The maximum gross allowable takeoff weight for NC-79025 was 25,346 pounds. The average weight of the passengers as determined from the Yale University health records was approximately 160 pounds. Assuming the crew members to be the same weight, total weight of the passengers and crew would be 4,800 pounds. The weight of the fuel would be 3,814 pounds, and the weight of the baggage as shown by the passenger manifest was 533 pounds. The baggage was never weighed by any employee of Seattle Air Charter. Adding this weight to the empty weight of the aircraft, a total weight of 26,847 pounds is arrived at, which is 1,501 pounds greater than permissible takeoff weight. This overload reduced the margin of safety….

“Analysis

“As stated above, a witness who examined the airplane shortly before the attempted takeoff found a coating of ice on the bottom surfaces of the wings. This witness also stated that he found patches of ice and frost on the top surfaces of the left wing. Formation of ice and frost on the wing would account for the failure of the flight to accomplish a normal takeoff, for ice and frost in addition to increasing the weight of the airplane, which was already 1,500 pounds over permissible takeoff weight, would tend to decrease the lifting qualities of the wings. It is also possible that the pilot did not have sufficient visibility to hold the airplane on a straight course; however, his pilot experience included a reasonable amount of instrument training, and in view of this it can be reasonably expected that he would be able to continue the takeoff successfully by reference to instruments if all outside visible references were lost. Accordingly, the most logical explanation of this accident is that the airplane did not become normally airborne because of the ice and frost which is known to have existed on the wings….

“Probable Cause

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the attempt to take off inn an airplane which had formations of ice and frost on the surfaces of the wings.” (CAB. Accident Investigation Report. Seattle Air—Seattle, Washington, January 2, 1949.)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Seattle Air Charter, 2 Jan 1949. Accessed at:  http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19490102-0

Civil Aeronautics Board.  Accident Investigation Report. Seattle Air—Seattle, Washington, January 2, 1949.  Washington, DC:  CAB, May 4, 1949.  Accessed 9-15-2023 at: dot_33357_DS1.pdf

 National Fire Protection Association. “Recent Important Fires, Fire News, No. 378, Feb 1949.

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