1991 — April 4, Plane/Helicopter Collision (Sen. Heinz Crash), Merion, PA (~Philly) — 7

— 7  NTSB, AAR.  Midair Collision…Lycoming Air…Sun Company… 412.  9-17-1991, 1

— 7  The Intelligencer, Doylestown, PA. “Sen Heinz, six others killed as aircraft….” 4-5-1991, 1.

 

Narrative Information

 

April 5: “The Associated Press. U.S. Sen. John Heinz and six others, including two children, were killed Thursday after a helicopter checking the landing gear on the senator’s plane collided with the plane over a schoolyard in Lower Merion Township.

 

“Heinz and the two pilots in his twin engine [Piper] Aerostar PA60, two pilots in the Sun Co. Bell 412 helicopter, and two children on the ground were killed, police said. Early reports said the children were first-graders. Three children and two school employees were also injured.

 

“The bodies of Heinz and the two pilots were taken to Lankenau Hospital. Officials said the bodies were burned so badly that dental records were being brought in from Washington to identify which one was Heinz.

 

“John Fowler, 48, head custodian at Merion Elementary, said only a few children were outside

at the time.  Most were in class or at lunch. “Fifteen minutes later, there would have been 400 kids where the helicopter came down,” Fowler said.

 

“The collision occurred shortly after noon. Confirmation that Heinz was aboard came nearly two hours later when the senator’s Washington office said he was dead.

 

“David C. Latshaw, township manager, said the two Sun Co. pilots overheard the pilot for Heinz’s plane report to the tower that a warning light was on and that there could be a problem with the landing gear.  They went to investigate.  “This is the day of our board of directors meeting,” said Sun spokesman Dick Jackman.  The helicopter was “shuttling back and forth from the (Philadelphia) airport all day,” taking board members to the company headquarters, he said.  Jackman identified the two Sun pilots as Charles J. Burke, 42, Coatesville, and Michael Pozzano,

43, of Elverson. The two pilots of the Heinz plane were identified as Rick Shreck and Tron Stegan, both of Lycoming County.  Both worked for Lycoming Air Service, based in Williamsport.

 

“Heinz, 52, was in his third term in the U S. Senate.  He was born in Pittsburgh and was an heir to the H. J. Heinz food empire.  He was elected to the U.S. House in a special election in 1971 and was re-elected twice.  He was elected to the Senate in 1976 and was re-elected in 1982 and 1988….”  (The Intelligencer, Doylestown, PA. “Sen Heinz, six others killed as aircraft collide over school.” 4-5-1991, 1.)

 

NTSB: “On April 4, 1991, a Lycoming Air Services Piper Aerostar, PA-60, N3645D, was operating as an on-demand air taxi flight…The airplane had departed the Williamsport-Lycoming County Airport (IPT), Williamsport, Pennsylvania, around 1022 eastern standard time on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan for the Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The captain, first officer, and one passenger were on board.

 

“The takeoff and en route portions of the flight were uneventful.  As it approached PHL, the flight was cleared for an instrument landing system approach to runway 17. While on the approach, at 1201:28, the captain of N3645D reported that the nose landing gear position light had not illuminated to indicate that the nose gear was in the down and locked position and that he might need to cycle the landing gear.  Lycoming Air Service representatives, upon listening to the air traffic control (ATC) recording, identified the captain‘s voice as making the transmissions from the airplane.  Lycoming Air Service officials reported that the PA-60 is normally a single-pilot airplane.  The Safety Board believes that the captain was flying the airplane, as well as making the radio transmissions.

 

Shortly before N3645D began its approach, a Bell 412SP helicopter, N78S, operated by Sun Company Aviation Department, departed from the company‘s helicopter landing pad at PHL on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight to Sun Company corporate headquarters in Radnor, Pennsylvania. The captain and first officer were the only persons on board…. As N78S departed the PHL terminal control area (TCA), the pilots heard the communications regarding the possible unsafe nose gear indication on N3645D.

 

“The crew of N3645D was told to maintain 1,500 feet to allow N78S to pass underneath as the helicopter departed the area.  As he passed under N36450, at 1202:29, one of the pilots of N78S reported to the tower “that Aerostar that went past us, looks like the gear is down.” Sun Company personnel identified the voice making the radio transmissions from the flight to ATC as being that of the first officer.  However, several subsequent transmissions from N78S were made by the captain.  The chief pilot for Sun Company indicated that the flightcrew wore head sets equipped with boom microphones and that there were push-to-talk buttons on the flight controls.  Thus, it would not be unusual for the flying pilot to transmit. The Safety Board believes that the captain was flying the helicopter, but the pilots may have switched flying roles at times during the flight .

 

“The captain of N3645D acknowledged to ATC that he had heard N78S’s transmission and stated that “I can tell it’ s down but I don’t know if it’s locked, that’s the only problem.” A reflection of the nose landing gear can be seen from the cockpit on the propeller spinner. The tower acknowledged the transmission and advised that the helicopter was no longer a factor and that N3645D was cleared to land on runway 17.  The controller later stated that he interpreted N3645D’s situation as justifying an emergency.  The tower supervisor alerted the airport’s air craft rescue and fire fighting units (ARFF).  Additionally, runway 17 arrivals were terminated through a coordinated effort between the tower and approach control, resulting in a relatively clear communications frequency.  The local controller contacted N3645D and requested the number of occupants and amount of fuel on board.

 

“At 1203:35, the controller offered N3645D the option of making a low-altitude pass by the control tower so that the tower personnel could observe the position of the nose gear. The controller further stated that there was “almost no traffic right now – we can do whatever you like.”  N3645D acknowledged that it would do a flyby of the tower.  At 1204:12, the captain of N78S advised the tower that they “could take a real close look at that if you wanted.” The tower acknowledged the transmission.  At 1204:19, the captain replied that N78S was turning back to the airport, presumably to perform an in- flight inspection of N3645D’s nose gear.

 

As N3645D passed by the control tower, the controller advised that the nose gear appeared to be down.  The captain of N3645D responded that he could see the nose gear in the reflection of the propeller spinner and that it appeared to be down, but the indicator light was not green. The controller requested N3645D to make a left turn and enter a downwind leg for runway 17. He further advised that N78S was inbound from the north and that N78S could take a look at the nose gear.  At 1205:30, the captain of N36450 stated “Okay, I appreciate it.” The controller further advised that the ARFF equipment was on the runway.

 

“Sun Company officials reported that it was company policy to be “good neighbors” and that they had offered the services of the company’s aircraft and flightcrews to local communities in the event of emergency situations, such as medical evacuations, and searching for lost persons. Several controllers reported that the Sun helicopter had, on previous occasions, assisted the tower in locating vehicles or people on the airport property.

 

“The chief pilot for Sun Company stated that he was not aware of any previous in-flight inspections of other aircraft by the pilots of N78S or other Sun Company pilots

 

“Commencing at 1205:45, the controller provided directional information to the flightcrew of N78S to assist in visually acquiring N3645D.  This information was acknowledged by the first officer.  By 1207:54, the pilots of each aircraft acknowledged that they had each other in sight and that a speed of 125 knots would be used during the join up.  At that time, the aircraft were joining up on an extended downwind leg for runway 17 at a altitude of about 1,100 feet. The controller advised IC36450 of antenna towers 6 miles ahead and requested the pilot of N3645D to notify the tower when he wanted to turn back toward the airport or make a heading change.

 

“At 1208:21, the captain of N78S contacted N3645D directly on tower frequency and requested that the pilot of N3645D slow down.  At 1208:52, the first officer of N78S contacted N3645D and stated that “we’re going to come up behind you on your left side so just hold your heading.” The captain of N3645D responded that the antenna towers were straight ahead and that he might need to change heading by 15 [degrees] to the left.  At 1209:30, the first officer of N78S stated on tower frequency “Aerostar. We’re gonna pass around your right side now, take a look at everything as we go by.”  The captain of N3645D responded with “Okay.” At 1210:30, there was a transmission from N3645D that was unintelligible because of a transmission from another aircraft.  The controller asked N3645D to repeat the transmission, and the pilot of N3645D again stated that the indicator for the nose gear did not show down and locked.

 

“At 1210:16, the first officer of N78S stated “everything looks good from here. The captain of N3645D replied “Okay, appreciate that we’ll start to turn in.” These transmissions were the last ones received from either N78S or N3545D.  The last transmission was abruptly terminated by considerable noise.  At 1210:51, the controller requested N3645D to make a left turn back to the airport, and he cleared the airplane to land on runway 17. Shortly thereafter, the controller noticed a smoke plume to the north of the airport. Subsequent attempts by the controller to contact either N78S or N3645D by radio were unsuccessful….

 

“Conclusions

  1. Both aircraft were certificated, equipped, and maintained in accordance with Federal regulations and approved procedures.

 

  1. There were no preexisting defects to either aircraft that contributed to the accident. The Safety Board could not determine the functional status of the nose gear down indicating light on N3645D prior to the collision.

 

  1. Both flightcrews possessed the appropriate airmen’s certificates for their respective duties.

 

  1. Weather was not a factor in the accident.

 

  1. The Safety Board found deficiencies in the training program of Lycoming Air Services, Inc., and the flightcrew checking procedures of the FAA principal operations inspector assigned to the operator.

 

  1. The emergency procedures section of the Piper PA-60 flight manual does not contain sufficient information on the actions to take if the nose landing gear down indicating light fails to illuminate.

 

  1. The captain of N3645D could see from the reflection of the nose landing gear in the propeller spinners that the nose landing gear was fully extended and that the gear doors closed over the wheel well area. Therefore, there was no additional information that could be gained by flying by the tower or from an in-flight inspection.

 

  1. None of the flight crewmembers of the two aircraft had experience flying in close proximity to another aircraft.

 

  1. The captain of N3645D, after accepting the offer of the in-flight inspection, did not coordinate with the flightcrew of N78S the maneuvering procedures to be used to ensure the safety of his aircraft.

 

  1. N78S was maneuvered into a position where it could not be seen by the flightcrew of N3645D.

 

  1. The flightcrew o f N78S should have terminated the inspection after they saw that the nose landing gear locking mechanism was concealed in the wheel well.

 

  1. The final movements of both aircraft that led to the midair collision could not be determined, but the pilots of N78S had the responsibility for maintaining safe separation from N3645D.

 

  1. The air traffic controllers at Philadelphia International Airport acted in accordance with approved air traffic control procedures in providing assistance to the two aircraft.

 

  1. The FAA principal operations inspector assigned to Lycoming Air Services, Inc., did not have sufficient time to adequately survey the operator.

 

  1. Probable Cause

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the poor judgment by the captain of the airplane to permit the in-flight inspection after he had determined to the best of his ability that the nose landing gear was fully extended, the poor judgment of the captain of the helicopter to conduct the inspection, and the failure of the flightcrew of the helicopter to maintain safe separation.  Contributing to the accident was the incomplete training and checking that the flightcrew of N3645D received from Lycoming Air Services, Inc., and the FAA principal operations inspector assigned to the operator.”

 

(NTSB. Aircraft Accident/Incident Summary Report: Midair Collision involving Lycoming Air Services Piper Aerostar PA-60 and Sun Company Aviation Department Bell 412 ( NTSB/AAR-91-01/SUM / PB91-910407)  Washington, DC:  NTSB, Adopted 9-17-1991, pp. 1-21.)

 

Sources

 

National Transportation Safety  Board.  Aircraft Accident/Incident Summary Report: Midair Collision involving Lycoming Air Services Piper Aerostar PA-60 and Sun Company Aviation Department Bell 412 (NTSB/AAR-91-01/SUM / PB91-910407)  Washington, DC:  NTSB, Adopted 9-17-1991. Accessed 10-19-2011 at:

http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-summaries/AAR91-01S.pdf

 

The Intelligencer, Doylestown, PA. “Sen Heinz, six others killed as aircraft collide over school.” 4-5-1991, 1. At: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=26998532