1947 — Jan 12, Eastern Airlines Flight 665 too-low/off-course crash, 10M NE Galax, VA–18

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-16-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

—  18  Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Eastern Airlines Flight 665, 12 Jan 1947

—  18  CAB. Accident Investigation Report. Eastern Air Lines, Galax, Virginia – Jan 12, 1947.

—  18  Tryon. “Can Aircraft Crash Fires be Prevented.” NFPA Quarterly, 40/4, Apr 1947, p.261.

Narrative Information

Civil Aeronautics Board Safety Division. Accident Investigation Report:

“The Accident

“Eastern Air Lines Flight 665, NC-88872, a Douglas DC-3, crashed near Galax, Virginia, at 0138, January 12, 1947, during an instrument letdown while en route to Smith Reynolds Airport, Winston-Salem. North Carolina. The aircraft was demolished as a result of impact and subsequent fire, and 15 of the 16 passengers and the crew of 3 were fatally injured. The one surviving passenger was seriously injured. The one surviving passenger was seriously injured.

“History of the Flight

“Flight 665 originated at Detroit, Michigan, January 11, 1947, with its destination Winston-Salem and with routine stops scheduled at Cleveland and Akron, Ohio. That portion of the flight from Detroit to Akron was accomplished without incident. On an instrument flight plan, which specified Raleigh-Durham Airport, Raleigh, North Carolina, as the alternate airport, Flight 665 departed from Akron at 2307 and thereafter made routine position reports over East Liverpool, Ohio, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Elkins, West Virginia. At 0042, January 12, 1947, the flight reported over Roanoke, Virginia, at 10,000 feet, and, in accordance with a previous air traffic control clearance, reported that it was descending to 8,000 feet. Shortly thereafter, a clearance was delivered from Airway Traffic Control requiring the flight to maintain 7,000 feet to the Winston-Salem radio range station and to hold on the southeast leg of the Winston-Salem radio range station and to hold on the southeast leg of the Winston-Salem radio range until further advised. At this time the flight was informed that approach clearance to Smith Reynolds Airport could be expected at 0145.

“Immediately after receipt of the traffic control clearance, the flight requested information concerning ‘essential traffic.’ A complete traffic report was transmitted to Flight 665, immediately following which, the flight requested permission to descent to 3,000 feet. However, because descent to this altitude might have conflicted with other traffic, Airway Traffic Control refused the request.

“The flight reported its position over Greensboro at 7,000 feet at 0100 and five minutes thereafter reported over the Winston-Salem radio range station. At 0121 the flight was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet and it reported reaching that altitude at 0126. The flight was instructed to descend to 4,000 feet at 0127 and six minutes later was cleared to the Winston-Salem tower. Immediately after receipt ot this clearance Flight 665 attempted to contact Winston-Salem tower on the company frequency. Eastern Air Lines’ radio station at Charlotte, North Carolina, called the flight at 0135 in order to advise the pilot that he was transmitting on the wrong frequency. No acknowledgment was received from the flight for this contact and no further radio contacts were had with Flight 665.

“At 0243 the Virginia State Police notified the Civil Aeronautics Administration Winston-Salem Communications Station that the aircraft had crashed near Galax, Virginia, at a point approximately 58 miles northwest of Winston-Salem.

“Investigation

“Investigation disclosed that, while on a magnetic bearing of 295 degrees, the aircraft had struck the ground on the top of a knoll in the Blue Ridge Mountains, 10 miles northwest of Galas, Virginia, at an elevation of 2,479 feet. Five hundred feet beyond the point of initial contact, the aircraft struck large trees which sheared the left wing at a point near the attack angle. At the aircraft continued through the tree tops for an additional 400 feet, the right wing was sheared at the landing light position and the right stabilizer and elevator were torn from the empennage….

“No evidence was disclosed of malfunctioning of the aircraft’s structure, power plants or control system prior to impact. Damage sustained by the engines and propellers indicted that, at the time of initial contact, the aircraft was operating under approximately normal cruise power. The flaps and landing gear were in a fully retracted position…Propeller marks on the ground at the point of initial contact indicate that the aircraft was laterally and longitudinally level immediately before the accident….

“Between the hours of 0054 and 0146, the radio range station at Winston-Salem had been functioning erratically due to intermittent power interruptions. From 0146 until 0244, the power was completely off and since no alternate power system is available at Winston-Salem, the radio range was inoperative during this period. Investigation disclosed that the power interruptions were due to a short circuit in the electrical system of the Duke Power Company….

“The minimum altitude established by the company between Roanoke and Greensboro is 6,000 feet. The minimum altitude for initial approach to the Winston-Salem radio range station if 2500 feet. Smith Reynolds Airport is located at a distance of 5.1 miles northwest of the Winston-Salem radio range station and the minimum indicated altitude specified in Eastern Air Lines’ Airport Specification for crossing Smith Reynolds Airport is 1469 feet. The total distance from Greensboro to Smith Reynolds Airport is slightly in excess of 19 miles and the descent required between these two points is almost 5000 feet. The elevation of the airport in 969 feet….

“Discussion

“….The average ground speed computed on the basis of position reports over Pittsburgh and Roanoke was 44 miles per hour higher than the maximum ground speed possible under the existing conditions. It bust be concluded, therefore, that the position report over Roanoke was in error and that the pilot must have been approximately 53 miles north of Roanoke at the time of this report. It appears, furthermore, that the position reports made ‘over’ Greensboro and Winston-Salem were also in error. At 0115, when the flight reported over Winston-Salem, it was probably 62 miles north of Winston-Salem.

“Had the pilot taken into consideration the existing winds aloft, reports of which were attached to the flight plan,  he could not have reached  conclusion that the flight covered the distance between Pittsburgh and Roanoke at 194 miles per hour nor between Roanoke and Greensboro at 178 miles per hour….

The minimum altitude established by the company between Roanoke and Greensboro in 6,000 feet. It cannot be understood why the pilot deliberately requested clearance from Airway Traffic Control to an altitude of 3,000 feet simply to expedite approach to Winston-Salem. It must be concluded, however, that, in the interest of avoiding a possible delay of a few minutes, the pilot desired to conduct the flight below the minimum altitude prescribed in the Operations Manual for this portion of the route….

“Had the pilot clearly identified his position over Greensboro, there would have been no occasion for him to hold a northwest heading for the length of time necessary to bring him 58 miles northwest of Winston-Salem….

“Since it is hardly conceivable that an airline pilot would maintain a heading toward the Blue Ridge Mountains for 30 minutes and continue a descent below the terrain in this area, it must be concluded that the pilot at no time was over or near Greensboro and that, after passing the point at which he reported ‘over Roanoke,’ the remainder of the flight was conducted with both the direction finding receivers tuned to the Winston-Salem radio.

“The investigation disclosed that fact that the manually operated direction finding receiver was tuned to the Winston-Salem radio range at the time of the accident. If both the manual and the automatic direction finding set were tuned to Winston-Salem for a considerable period of time prior to the accident, a reasonable account of the resulting navigation errors can be made. In the vicinity of Galax and northward for a distance of 40 to 50 miles there existed, for Winston-Salem radio, a skip-distance within which at night there often is a strong overriding of Patterson radio might be aggravated to the extent that a sudden reversal of the direction of the ADF indicator would result. It is very probable that such a reversal would have the appearance of the reversal normally experience during passage over a radio station. At some point north of Winston-Salem the pilot might have experienced such a reversal and been led to believe that he had passed over the Winston-Salem station. This fact may very well account for the pilot having assumed a heading of 295 degrees shortly before the accident….

“In summarizing its investigation of this accident the Board concludes that the flight planning by the pilot of Flight 665 was not adequate. In the course of the flight the pilot must have been to some extent inconvenienced by a substantial amount of static interference with the radio navigational facilities en route. The fact that he requested clearance to Winston-Salem from Roanoke at an altitude 3,000 feet lower than the approved company altitude is sufficiently indicative of the pilots greater interest in arriving at Winston-Salem as close to schedule as possible rather than in conducting the flight according to the en route procedures established by the company. The pilot was without justification in his deviation from standard company route procedures in not flying directly to Greensboro from Roanoke. Instead of following procedures which would have enabled him to use the best radio facilities available, the Captain chose to fly directly to Winston-Salem from Roanoke thereby compromising the safety of the flight in order to gain a few minutes time.

“Findings

….

“3. While en route to Winston-Salem from Pittsburgh, the Captain erroneously reported his position as over Roanoke at 0042, when in fact at this time the flight was approximately 53 miles north of Roanoke.

“4. Shortly after the time of the Roanoke position report, the pilot requested clearance to Winston-Salem at an altitude 3,000 feet lower than the minimum company en route altitude between Roanoke and Winston-Salem.

“5. The pilot chose to deviate from the standard Eastern Air Lines’ routed procedures and fly directly to Winston-Salem.

“6. Because Winston-Salem radio is a medium powered, loop type radio range station, the route from Roanoke to Winston-Salem is via Greensboro radio.

“7. Considerable static interference existed in the low frequency band.

“8. Considerable overriding of Winston-Salem radio is often experienced in the area north of Winston-Salem by Patterson radio.

“9. At 0134, four minutes before the accident, the aircraft was approximately 53 miles northwest of the Winston-Salem radio range station.

“10. At 0134 and 0245 two power interruptions of approximately one minute duration each occurred, which caused a temporary failure of the Winston-Salem radio range station.

“11. In the belief that he was in the close proximity of Winston-Salem, the pilot chose to establish a let-down without positively having identified the aircraft’s position with respect to the Winston-Salem radio range station.

“12. The flight continued its descent toward the Blue Ridge Mountains striking the ground at an elevation of 2,479 feet at a point 63 miles northwest of the Winston-Salem radio range station while on a direction of flight opposite to the direction of Winston-Salem.

“Probable Cause

“The probable cause of this accident was the action of the pilot in attempting a let-down without having positively determined the position of the aircraft. A contributing factor was the erroneous navigation of the pilot which on at least two occasions led him to believe that he was farther south than he actually was.” (CAB. Accident Investigation Report. Eastern Air Lines, Galax, Virginia – Jan 12, 1947.)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Eastern Air Lines Flight 665, 12 Jan 1947.  Accessed 2/8/2009 at:  http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19470112-0

Civil Aeronautics Board Safety Bureau. Accident Investigation Report. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Galax, Virginia – January 12, 1947. Washington, DC: CAB (File No. 1-0005-47), 11-13-1947. Accessed 10-16-2023 at: file:///C:/Users/Wayne/Downloads/dot_33296_DS1.pdf

Tryon, George H. III. “Can Aircraft Crash Fires be Prevented.” NFPA Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4, April 1947, pp. 259-264.