crash, Cheshire, CT– 17

lornajarrettblanchard January 18, 1946

Last edit 11-9-2023 by Wayne Blanchard for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–17 Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description, Eastern Air Flight 105, January 18, 1946

–17 CAB, AIR, Eastern Air Lines – Cheshire, Connecticut, January 18, 1946.

–17 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFM&P, 3/1, March 1982, p.53.

–17 National Fire Protect. Assoc. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly, 40/3, Jan 1947, 185.

Narrative Information

Civil Aeronautics Board, Accident Investigation Report (Docket No. SA-112; File No. 144-46):

“The Accident

“Eastern Air Lines Flight 16B, en route from New York, N. Y., to Boston, Massachusetts, crashed near Cheshire, Connecticut, at 1103, January 18, 1946, as a result of failure in flight of the left wing following a fire in the left engine nacelle. All fourteen passengers and three crew members were fatally injured and the Douglas DC-3 was demolished by impact and fire.

“History of the Flight

“Flight 16B, the second section of Flight 16 originating at Miami, Florida, January 17, 1946, departed Miami, at 0143, January 18, 1946. Routine stops were made at Charleston, S.C., Washington, D.C., and New York, N.Y. Upon arriving at New York, the captain of the flight from Miami reported a slight oil leak from the left engine nacelle. Inspection of the engine by Eastern maintenance personnel disclosed a faulty installation of a hose connection to the left vacuum pump. The hose was replaced and the aircraft was certified as satisfactory for completion of its schedule.

“Since crew change is regularly made at New York, a new crew was scheduled to complete the flight to Boston, Mass. ….

“At approximately, 1100, witnesses within and in the close vicinity of Cheshire, Conn., observed the flight approach Cheshire from the southwest at an altitude of about 1500 feet. A wisp of light gray smoke was seen to begin trailing behind the left engine, shortly after which an intense flame was observed coming from the left engine nacelle and trailing almost to the empennage of the aircraft. The flame died down momentarily and then flared up again in increased intensity, continuing to pour from the nacelle. The aircraft banked slightly to the right and left and then, as a cloud of light gray smoke burst from the nacelle, the left wing failed upward and back and the aircraft dived into the ground with a slow rolling motion to the left.

“Investigation

“The wreckage of the aircraft was located on the side of a wooded ravine pointing in a southwesterly direction. Impact marks on trees and the wreckage indicated that the aircraft had struck the ground in an attitude slightly past vertical after having turned approximately 180 to the left while falling….

“The left engine nacelle indicated a severe fire just aft of the firewall at the inboard side of the wheel well. The fire in this region had been sufficiently intense to burn a large hole in the nacelle but was significantly contained in its more intense proportion to this section…It can…be concluded that the more intense, localized fire had occurred while in flight and that the remainder of the evidence of fire had resulted subsequent to impact….

“Discussion

“Inasmuch as the aircraft was observed before and during the time the fire originated and was seen in flight until it crashed, an approximation of the total time during which the engine was afire is possible. While there is a possibility that a fire may have been in progress not apparent either to the crew or to ground observers it is likely that the first indication observed by witnesses places the approximate moment of ignition. It is also likely that the gray smoke or vapor trail described by witnesses before the fire was observed was in reality not smoke but a fine spray of gasoline from the leaking fuel line. Approximately two minutes elapsed from the time flame was first observed until the left wing failed and the aircraft fell to the ground. During this period the fire had burned through the left engine nacelle inboard of the wheel well and the flames extended rearward as far as the empennage. The heat weakened the wing structure, and the lower surface and rear spar flange failed in tension causing the wing to collapse upward and back over the fuselage. In this condition the aircraft became completely uncontrollable and fell to the ground nose first, retaining some of its northwesterly momentum as it rolled slowly to the left.

“Testimony of the witnesses to the accident indicated conclusively that the fire which occurred in the left engine of the aircraft was fed principally by gasoline. The fire path disclosed during the investigation further substantiates the above conclusion and places the origin of the fire at the out-flow side of the fuel pump. The fact that the magnesium starter housing located behind the fuel pump was almost totally consumed by fire prior to impact further indicates that the source of the fire must have been directly forward of that area. It is apparent that the fuel out-line hose, hose connection, or hose clamps failed in flight sufficiently to permit gasoline to spray rearward throughout the accessory section. The possible causes of primary ignition are numerous but, in the absence of definite evidence, the actual cause was not determinable. However, the most likely cause for ignition is the generator or the exhaust manifold, either of which could have ignited the gasoline….

“Although the aircraft and the power plant involved were subjected to exhaustive investigation by the Board, no reason for failure of the fuel line in question has been disclosed. It is significant, however, that the line eventually became totally consumed by fire in flight and it is apparent that the danger of such a condition contributing to the severity of a fire hazard may be obviated by the use of materials of greater fire resistance.

“It is not known at what time the pilots became aware of the fire or if they were aware of its presence at all before the left wing failed. No action apparent to observers had been taken by the flight crew in extinguishing or in any manner controlling the effects of the fire. The aircraft continued in straight and level flight almost until the moment the left wing failed and no discernible descent was established prior to that moment. No evidence was disclosed that the engine fire extinguishers had been used in flight. The fact that both engines appeared to be operating normally until the wing failed indicates that no attempt was made to cut off the fuel flow, feather the propeller or in any other manner stop the left engine. All evidence indicates that fire was of such intensity and of such short duration that even if the pilots had been aware of its existence their efforts to control it undoubtedly would have been ineffective. It is obvious that, under the circumstances of the fire in question, the flight crew could not afford the loss of a single second in initiating emergency procedures. Since the aircraft was not equipped with fire detection apparatus and since the engines are so located with respect to the cockpit that they would not normally be within the line of the pilot’s vision, it would, under otherwise normal circumstances, have necessitated communication from someone in the cabin before action could have been taken. It is readily apparent that an automatic fire detection system would have assured an immediate warning of the presence of fire and avoided the loss of valuable time in such an instance.

“Findings

“Upon the basis of all available evidence the Board finds that:

….

“2. Until observed in the vicinity of Cheshire, Connecticut, the flight had been of a routine nature.

“3. Failure of a fuel line or fuel line connection in the vicinity of the left engine fuel pump caused leakage of gasoline in the left engine nacelle.

“4. Gasoline ignited in flight burning through the engine nacelle and weakening the left wing structure.

“5. The left wing failed in tension of the low4r skin and main spar flange causing the wing to collapse upward and backward rendering the aircraft uncontrollable.

“6. The aircraft fell to the ground in a diving spiral and burned upon impact.

“Probable Cause

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was failure of the left wing in flight due to an engine fire caused by failure of a fuel line of fuel line connection.

“Appendix

“As the result of the investigation of this and other accidents, both prior to and subsequent to this one, the Board has, after months of study and coordination with the parties concerned on the part of the Safety Bureau, promulgated additional fire prevention regulations effective September 20, 1946, which amend Civil Air Regulations Part 04 with respect to airworthiness and which also amend those Parts of the Civil Air Regulations governing operations, namely; Parts 41, 42, and 61 to require retroactive incorporation of the changes in transport aircraft now engaged in passenger service.” (Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report, Eastern Air Lines – Cheshire, Connecticut, January 18, 1946.)

National Fire Protection Association: “Jan. 18, near Cheshire, Conn. Aircraft. Over $250,000.

“A gasoline leak caused by failure of a fuel line or connection in the vicinity of a fuel pump caused a fire in the left engine of an Eastern Air Lines plane, resulting in wing collapse and crash. Fourteen passengers and 3 crew members, the total number aboard, were killed as the aircraft struck ground in a wooded hillside. The fire was seen by ground observers, but apparently the crew had no knowledge of their plight until the wing failed, as there was no evidence of emergency procedures, no radio call for assistance, and the engine fire extinguishing system was not used. Local fire fighters and state police were quick to respond to the crash, but the fuselage was burned so completely that it was several hours before the bodies of the victims could be removed. New fire prevention regulations issued since this crash by the Civil Aeronautics Board will require fire-resistant fuel lines in the power plant and quick-acting fire detectors which will flash a warning to the pilot.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 3, Jan 1947, pp. 185-186 of 179-248.)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database, 1946, p.2. Eastern Air Lines Flight 105 engine nacelle fire, wing collapse and crash, Cheshire CT, 1-18-1946. Accessed 11-9-2023 at: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19460118-0

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Eastern Air Lines – Cheshire, Connecticut, January 18, 1946 (File No. 144-46). Washington, DC: CAB, October 2, 1946. Accessed 11-9-2023 at: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/33264

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.

National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss Fires of 1946.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 3, Jan 1947, pp. 179-248.