1993 — Sep 22, Fog, Barge hits bridge, Amtrak train derails into water/fire, ~Mobile AL-47

lornajarrettblanchard September 22, 1993

— 47 Drabek, Thomas E. The Human Side of Disaster. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010, 33.

— 47 History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, September 22, 1993. Train Derails in AL…

— 47 NTSB. Railroad-Marine AR: Derailment…Amtrak Train No. 2…CSTX Big Bayou…, 1994

— 47 Trainweb. “Amtrak Big Bayou, Alabama Derailment 09/22/93.”

— 47 USFA. The Derailment of the Sunset Limited, Big Bayou Canot, Alabama, Sept. 22, 1993.

— 47 Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).”

Narrative Information

History.com: “An Amtrak train headed to Miami derails near Mobile, Alabama, killing 47 people on this day in 1993. The accident, the deadliest in Amtrak’s history, was caused by a negligent towboat operator and foggy conditions.

“The Sunset Limited train travels from Los Angeles through Texas to New Orleans before arriving in Miami, Florida. It is known for carrying older people who prefer not to make the trip by air or car. In the very early morning hours of September 22, the train was traveling through Alabama. Three locomotives pulling eight cars left Mobile at 1:30 a.m. heading toward Birmingham across a swampy area.

“Meanwhile, the Mauvilla, a towboat operated by the Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, was pulling six barges of coal and wood through the Alabama marshes. Andrew Stabler, the captain, was sleeping as the towboat and barges made their way up the Mobile River. Willie Odeon, another employee of Warrior and Gulf, was driving the boat, but did not know how to use the radar system. The boat had no compass or nautical charts to assist in navigation on the foggy night and, without realizing it, Odeon turned into the Big Bayou Canot, an area where barges are prohibited.

“At 2:45 a.m., the Mauvilla struck a rail bridge. The bridge was only seven to 12 feet above the water (depending on the tides) and was in place so that trains could pass through the swamps. When the boat collided with the bridge, it knocked the tracks out of alignment by three feet. Several minutes later, the Sunset Limited came down the tracks at 70 miles per hour, hit the misplaced tracks and derailed. The three locomotives and the first four cars of the train plunged into the water.

“The crew of the Mauvilla did not make a rescue call until 3:08 a.m., but did manage to pull seven survivors out of the swamp. Those who did not drown were put in even more danger when a fire broke out. Two of the disaster’s 47 victims died from burns. The Coast Guard did not arrive on the scene until 4:25 a.m., and it was another hour before the first helicopter arrived to assist in the rescue efforts.

“The crew of the Mauvilla was severely criticized for their actions but escaped criminal liability.” (History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, Sep 22, 1993. Train Derails in Alabama Swamp.”)

NTSB: “Synopsis

“On September 22, 1993, about 2:45 a.m., barges that were being pushed by the towboat MAUVILLA in dense fog struck and displaced the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge near Mobile, Alabama. About 2:53 a.m., National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train 2, the Sunset Limited, en route from Los Angeles, California to Miami, Florida, with 220 persons on board, struck the displaced bridge and derailed. The three locomotive units, the baggage and dormitory cars, and two of the six passenger cars fell into the water. The fuel tanks on the locomotive units ruptured, and the locomotive units and the baggage and dormitory cars caught fire. Forty-two passengers and 5 crewmembers were killed; 103 passengers were injured. The towboat’s four crewmembers were not injured.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of Amtrak train 2’s derailment were the displacement of the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge when it was struck by the MAUVILLA and tow as a result of the MAUVILLA’s pilot becoming lost and disoriented in the dense fog because of (1) the pilot’s lack of radar navigation competency; (2) Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company’s failure to ensure that its pilot was competent to use radar to navigate his tow during periods of reduced visibility; and (3) the U.S. Coast Guard’s failure to establish higher standards for inland towing vessel operator licensing. Contributing to the accident was the lack of a national risk assessment program to determine bridge vulnerability to marine vessel collision.

“Safety issues discussed in the accident report include towboat operator training and evaluation, bridge risk assessment, bridge identification, emergency response and evacuation procedures, and event recorder crashworthiness.

“The Safety Board makes recommendations addressing these issues to the U.S. Department of Transportation; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; the U.S. Coast Guard; Amtrak; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; The American Waterways Operators, Inc.; the Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company; the Association of American Railroads; and the American Short Line Railroad Association.

“The Safety board concludes that all bridges vulnerable to impact by commercial marine traffic should be required to have appropriate markings so that they can be identified promptly from land and water in the event of an accident or other emergency. The Safety Board believes that the Coast Guard should require such markings and periodically publish a list of them as part of a national bridge register. Such an inventory should be available to emergency response organizations and, following publication, should be included on navigation charts.

“RECOMMENDATIONS

“As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations:

“to the U.S. Department of Transportation:

“Convene an intermodal task force that includes the Coast Guard, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to develop a standard methodology for determining the vulnerability of the Nation’s highway and railroad bridges to collisions from marine vessels, to formulate a ranking system for identifying bridges at greatest risk, and to provide guidance on the effectiveness and appropriateness of protective measures. (Class II, Priority Action) (I-94-3)

“Require that the Federal Railroad Administration and the Federal Highway Administration, for their respective modes, use the methodology developed by the intermodal task force to carry out a national risk assessment program for the Nation’s railroad and highway bridges. (Class II, Priority Action) (1-94-4)

“Require the modal operating administrations to develop and disseminate bulletins, notices, circulars, and other documents that call attention to the need for an employee reporting procedure concerning use of medication (over-the-counter and prescription) while on duty and that urge the transportation industry to develop and implement informational and educational programs related to this subject. (Class II, Priority Action) (1-94-5)

“Consider the use of RACONS, radar reflectors, and other devices to make bridges more identifiable on radar. (Class II, Priority Action) (I-94-6)

“to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:

“Cooperate with the U.S. Department of Transportation in developing a standard methodology for determining the vulnerability of the Nation’s highway and railroad bridges to collisions from marine vessels, formulating a ranking system to identify bridges at greatest risk, and providing guidance on the effectiveness and appropriateness of protective measures. (Class II, Priority Action) (I-94-7)

“Promote, in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, the development and application of low-cost electronic charting navigation devices for inland rivers. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-30)

“to the U.S. Coast Guard:

“Amend 46 CFR 4 and 16 to specify the time limits, not to exceed 8 hours, within which employers must conduct postaccident alcohol testing. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-31)

“In consultation with the inland towing industry, develop radar training course curricula standards for river towboat operations that emphasize navigational use of radar on rivers and inland waters. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-32)

“Upgrade licensing standards to require that persons licensed as Operators of Uninspected Towing Vessels hold valid river-inland waters radar observer certification if they stand navigation watch on radar-equipped towing vessels and to require that employers provide more specific evidence of training. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-33)

“Require that all uninspected towing vessels carry appropriate navigational devices, including charts, in the wheelhouse. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-34)

“Promote, in cooperation with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the development and application of low-cost electronic charting navigation devices for inland rivers. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-35)

“Require that radar be installed on board all uninspected towing vessels except those that operate within very limited areas. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-36)

“Require that all bridges vulnerable to impact by commercial marine traffic bear unique, readily visible markings so that waterway and bridge users are better able to identify bridges involved in an accident when they report such accidents to emergency responders. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-37)

“Periodically publish a list of bridge identification markings in a national register of bridges. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-38)

“to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak):

“Develop and implement a uniform system to effectively apprise passengers of information pertaining to safety features. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-94-6)

“Develop and implement procedures to provide adequate passenger and crew lists to local authorities with minimum delay in emergencies. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-94-7)

“Equip cars with portable lighting for use by passengers in an emergency. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-94-8)

“to the Federal Emergency Management Agency:

“Encourage local authorities to conduct emergency drills that simulate transportation accidents involving railroad operations. (Class II, Priority Action) (I-94-8)

“to The American Waterways Operators, Inc:

“Recommend that member companies equip their tugs and towboats with suitable navigation devices, including charts. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-39)

“Assist the Coast Guard in developing a curriculum for a training course on river radar navigation. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-40)

“Recommend that member companies incorporate into towboat operator evaluations a practical method of assessing proficiency in navigation, including the use of radar. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-41)

“to the Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company:

“Require that company towboat operators complete a recognized training course on river radar navigation after the curriculum for such a course has been developed. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-42)

“Establish a training protocol that requires company towboat operators to demonstrate proficiency in use of radar, compasses, and charts and incorporate into towboat operator evaluations a practical method of assessing proficiency in river navigation techniques. including use of radar. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-43)

“Equip all company towboats with a suitable compass, a complete, up-to-date set of navigation charts for the waters over which the vessel is intended to operate. and other appropriate navigational devices. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-94-44)

“Establish procedures that encourage towboat operators to inform management when they are taking medication, to determine whether such medication may affect performance of their duties, and to arrange for a qualified relief, if necessary. (Class II, Priority, Action) (M-94-45)

“to the Association of American Railroads:

“Immediately begin to collect data on vessel collisions with railroad bridges from your members and, if appropriate, take steps to increase protection for bridges identified as vulnerable. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-94-9)

“Cooperate with the U.S. Department of Transportation in developing a national risk assessment program for railroad bridges. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-94-10)

“to the American Short Line Railroad Association:

“Cooperate with the U.S. Department of Transportation in developing a national risk assessment program for railroad bridges. (Class II, Priority Action) (R-94-12) (NTSB. Railroad-Marine AR: Derailment…Amtrak Train No. 2…CSTX Big Bayou…, 1994.)

Trainweb: “This is by far Amtrak’s worst accident. At 2:53 a.m. on September 22, 1993, the Sunset Limited (#2), Amtrak’s only transcontinental passenger train, plunged into Big Bayou Canot fourteen miles north of Mobile, Alabama, killing 42 passengers and 5 crew members (three in the locomotive and two dining car workers in the dorm car). Eight minutes earlier at 2:45 a.m., a towboat, pushing six barges and lost in a dense fog, unknowingly bumped into Big Bayou Canot Bridge, knocking the track out of alignment, causing the train to derail and plunge into the mucky waters of the bayou. Locomotive P40 #819 was about 3 weeks old when it was destroyed in the accident. The three locomotive, baggage car, trans/dorm, and first two coaches ended up in the swampy waters while the third coach (34040) was left hanging off the end of the bridge.” (Trainweb. “Amtrak Big Bayou, Alabama Derailment 09/22/93.”)

USFA: “This report details the response of the Mobile, Alabama Fire Department (MFD) to the derailment of a passenger train in a remote section of the Big Bayou Canot, nine miles north of Mobile. Two-hundred and twenty people were on board the train when it derailed, caught fire, and, in the case of some cars, became submerged in the Bayou. One-hundred and seventy-three people survived the derailment of the Sunset Limited.

“The majority of the “rescue” work was accomplished in under four hours. However, the incident was protracted because the MFD had to oversee recovery of the 47 deceased. This required sending divers into zero-visibility, subsurface, confined-space conditions. Furthermore, surface operations to support the body recovery required personnel to work in extreme heat and humidity for hours on end….

“The derailment, in the early hours of the morning, of a fully loaded passenger train into a remote waterway in an area without vehicular access might be thought to be the product of the imagination of a disaster exercise planner run wild. Unfortunately, this “worst-case scenario” did

occur and tested the mettle of the MFD and emergency responders from several neighboring jurisdictions. While the actual technical operations were more directed towards recovery rather than rescue, the experiences of the incident managers and responders are instructive about the value of pre-incident planning, exercise, and the use of the Incident Command System.” (USFA. The Derailment of the Sunset Limited, Big Bayou Canot, Alabama, September 22, 1993. FEMA, 10-9-2003 modification.)

Wikipedia: “September 22, 1993 – 1993 Big Bayou Canot train wreck, near Mobile, Alabama, United States: Barges being pushed by an off-course towboat collide with a bridge piling; the bridge shifts out of alignment, creating a kink in the rails on the CSXT’s former Louisville & Nashville Gulfcoast line. Minutes later, Amtrak’s Sunset Limited derails at high speed on the misaligned track and plunges into the water, causing a massive fuel spill and fire. 47 people are killed in Amtrak’s deadliest accident.” (Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).”)

Sources

Drabek, Thomas E. The Human Side of Disaster. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010.

History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, September 22, 1993. “Train Derails in Alabama Swamp.” Accessed 12-08-2008 at: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=tdihArticleCategory&displayDate=09/22&categoryId=disaster

National Transportation Safety Board. Railroad-Marine Accident Report: Derailment of Amtrak Train No. 2 on the CSTX Big Bayou Canot Bridge Near Mobile, Alabama, September 22, 1993 (NTSB/RAR-94/01). Wash., DC: Sep 19 1994, At: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1994/RAR9401.htm

Trainweb. “Amtrak Big Bayou, Alabama Derailment 09-22-93.” Accessed 1-2-2010 at: http://www.trainweb.org/vangab/bigbayou.htm

United States Fire Administration. The Derailment of the Sunset Limited, Big Bayou Canot, Alabama, September 22, 1993 (Technical Rescue Incident Report). Emmitsburg, MD: USFA, FEMA, 10-9-2003 modification. Accessed 3-18-2016 at: https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-163b.pdf

Wikipedia. “List of Rail Accidents (1950-1999).” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_1950-1999_rail_accidents