Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 6-9-2024 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

— 20 Bryce. “Explosion Report, July 9, 1942, Pursglove Coal Mining Co…No. 2 Mine.”

— 20 Morgantown Post. “Bodies of 20 Blast Victims are Being Taken from Mine,” 7-10-1942.

— 20 WV Div Culture, History. WV Archives. “On This Day in WV History…[July 9, 1942].”

— 20 WV Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present.

Narrative Information

Bryce, et al.: “An explosion occurred in the Pursglove No. 2 mine of the Pursglove Coal Mining Company, Pursglove,[1] Monongalia County, July 9, 1942, at 4:15 P. M.

“This mine is located on the Monongahela railroad on Scotts Run of the Monongahela River, about seven (7) miles from Morgantown.[2]

“The forces of the explosion…prove that the explosion originated in the Twenty and Twenty-four Face Bleeder Section off Fifteen Butts.

“At the time of the explosion seventy-three (75) men were in the mine. Fifty-three (53) men in areas unaffected by the explosion escaped from the mine without assistance. Twenty (20) men in the affected area were killed by the explosion….

“The Pursglove No. 2 mine is a drift mine operating in the Sewickley seam. The mine is accessible through three (5) drift openings. A shaft opening is maintained for ventilation approximately one and one- half (1 1/2) miles from the mine portal but is not used or equipped for any other purpose.

“The drift openings are air intakes for the mine. The fan, a Jeffrey centrifugal, operates exhausting at the air shaft and circulates approximately eighty-two thousand five hundred (82,500) cubic feet of air throughout the mine. This volume has been substantially increased since the explosion.

“The seam averages about five (5) feet in thickness and the full seam is mined. The immediate roof is generally sandstone, however, in some localities a black shale occurs over the coal but these occurrences do not, as a rule, increase the normal hazard incident to the roof control throughout the mine.

“The mine is worked on the usual room and pillar system, the rooms driven to the required depth and the pillars drawn on a suitable line as soon as possible after the completion of the rooms. Barriers for the protection of the various haulageways and air courses are left for the final mining.

“The coal is cut with shortwall machines and shot with permissible explosives. All coal is mechanically loaded. The roof is supported throughout the mine on posts and crossbars, however, the number of crossbars used and their disposition is generally not in conformance with the standards of the West Virginia Department of Mines.

“Pillar falls are controlled by the use of breaker posts in the conventional manner.

“The Sewickley seam, in which the mine operates, is high volatile and the dust is classed as explosive by the United States Bureau of Mines. The Rock Dust Report of the West Virginia Department of Mines shows a rock-dust application of 1.05 pounds applied throughout the mine for each ton of coal produced during the first six months prior to the explosion. This is below the average for the State and the minimum requirements of the standard recommendations of the West Virginia department of Mines.

“No sprinkling systems as a means of allaying dust are in operation throughout the mine, however, sprinkling has been repeatedly recommended in the standard recommendations of the West Virginia Department of Mines. A State law should be enacted requiring sprinkling systems where dust is constantly in suspension.

“The mine is ventilated by a Jeffrey centrifugal fan which now produces one hundred and two thousand (102,000) cubic feet of air against a water gauge pressure of two and three-tenths (2.3) inches. There are two (2) air splits in the mine which are controlled by the use of regulators.

“Overcasts, doors and stoppings constitute the means by which the sections are ventilated. No line brattice was used to conduct the air to the working faces and air locks were not provided on the section in which the explosion occurred. The absence of air locks caused an intermittent flow of air throughout the section and while the volume of air delivered to the last breakthrough of each entry was above the minimum requirements of the West Virginia Department of Mines at the time of the last inspection, the failure to use check doors substantially decreased the volume of air in circulation at the working faces.

“All coal is gathered and hauled by means of electric locomotives of a nonpermissible type. The coal is cut by both permissible and nonpermissible types of cutting machine. The permissible types, however, are not kept in a permissible condition. This applies also to the loading machines insofar as they are purchased permissible but not maintained as such. Chicago Pneumatic drills are used and maintained in excellent condition, however, permissible plates are not issued for the type of drill being used at this mine.

“Description Of The Explosion

“The explosion, as previously stated, originated in the Twenty and Twenty-four Face Bleeder Section off Fifteen Butts.

“At the time of the explosion the section was idle, however, the explosion occurred at approximately the time when the second shift should have begun work. The man trips had just arrived on the section and though some of the men had left the man-trip stations for their various assignments the positions of the bodies and equipment indicate that production had not begun. One locomotive with five (5) loads had left the immediate working sections on the way to the sidetrack but had stopped at a supply track some five hundred (500) feet from the working faces. There is no positive evidence that any electrical equipment was in operation within the explosion area when the blast occurred, however, there is a possibility that some equipment outby the faces had been moved in preparation for the beginning of the shift.

“As previously stated, the secondary haulage locomotive No. Eleven had left the section for the sidetrack with five (5) loads but had stopped at a supply track on the way out. This is evidenced by the fact that the locomotive was found with the controller in the “off” position and the brake set tight. The locomotive was standing on the supply track switch and the body (No. 2) of Lambert, the motorman, was found inside the breakthrough and along the supply track some thirty (30) feet away. The most probable conclusion as to Lambert’s position is that he went into the supply track to check the available supplies on the section before continuing to the sidetrack as it would have been his duty to bring to the section any additional supplies that may be needed should the occasion arise….

“Dust samples taken and tested after the explosion show the dust in this area is easily ignited and tests made by the United States Bureau of Mines proved that as much as eighty (80) per cent inert material must be mixed with these samples to make an ignition impossible. It is known that the introduction of even a small amount of methane into a dust-laden atmosphere greatly increases its explosibility, consequently it is not unreasonable to believe that had a considerable amount of dust been thrown into suspension in this area and a source of ignition been present an explosion would not have occurred.

“It is known that a fall of roof approximately thirty-six (36) feet long, sixteen (16) feet wide and twelve (12) inches thick occurred at or near the time of the explosion and that this fall brought the trolley wire in contact with the rail, as evidenced by the burn, causing a large arc, and it is also known that a fall of this size would throw a great amount of dust into suspension, therefore, it is most probable that the explosion occurred as the result of this arcing in a dust-laden atmosphere already slightly charged with methane.

“GENERAL CONDITION OF THE MINE

“The hazards that caused this explosion, as well as other explosions, exist and are going on in nearly all of the coal mines in the State every day, every hour and every minute. The miners, the operators, and the members of the West Virginia Department of Mines do not know their responsibilities as to what extent safety should be applied in the coal mines to prevent disasters and other accidents. These responsibilities should be settled by the Legislature, It is not possible at this day and time to entirely eliminate explosions but they can be materially reduced.

“Explosions are generally the result of numerous dangerous conditions and practices which, singly or collectively, culminate in the ignition of gas or dust. All mines are potentially dangerous because of explosion and other accident hazards. Very few, possibly not more than five (5) per cent, are maintained in a reasonably safe condition, measured in the light of present-day knowledge of coal mining safety practices.

“This mine has almost twice the average number of hazards found in mines throughout the State, It is an accepted fact that in almost all explosions a combination of circumstances, any one of which is potentially a source in itself, exists, and generally speaking, the presence of the individual circumstances, with the possible exception of methane, is known well in advance of the catastrophe. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that if the many and varied conditions that contribute to an explosion are corrected singly, the combinations would cease to present a problem.

“The following is a list of the violations of the standard recommendations of the Department of Mines found during the last inspection preceding the explosion:

“Records

(1) Daily reports of conditions and practices in the mine are not made by assistant foremen (or the foreman).

(2) Unsatisfactory conditions and practices reported by mine foremen, assistant foremen, and fire bosses are not repeated on the Daily Reports until corrected.

(3) Mine Foreman Certificates are not held by all mine officials and a record is not kept at the mine.

(4) All persons required to use flame safety lamps do not undergo examinations once each year to check eyesight and competency.

(5) The record of the original examination of machinemen for competency to detect gas is not mailed to the Department of Mines at Charleston.

“General Practices

(6) Two safe travelways, unobstructed and properly drained, from the last breakthrough of each place, to surface outlets, are not maintained for all persons employed in the mine.

(7) Mine officials are not competent to assemble and use flame safety lamps.

(8) The trouser legs, sleeves, and clothing of men working on or around moving machinery are not confined against the body.

(9) Visible locking devices are not kept on arms and chains of loading head on machines — cutting or loading — when not in operating position,

(10) The mine is not kept clean and orderly inside.

(11) Lights, illuminating and signal, are not kept in good condition.

(12) Gears, belts, and revolving parts of stationary machinery are not properly guarded and metal guards are not used inside the mine.

(13) Inside structures, substations, shanties, et cetera, are not constructed of incombustible material,

(14) Rock dust, fire extinguishers, or other fire-fighting equipment are not available in the mine.

(15) Rock dust, fire extinguishers, or other fire-fighting equipment are not available in the tipple.

(16) Oil and grease are not carried into and kept in the mine in substantial covered containers.

“Roof and Timbering

(17) The foremen do not see that working places are properly timbered so that workmen are thoroughly protected at all times.

(18) Loose coal, slate and rock overhead on haulageways and travelways, is not removed or securely timbered. (19) Safety posts or crossbars are not set as the coal is removed.

(20) Safety posts or crossbars are not set when starting new places or slabs.

(21) The roof is not examined and the place is not made safe after each shot.

Explosives

(22) Explosives and blasting caps being taken into or removed from the mine are not carried in nonconducting receptacles in good condition.

(25) Persons return to the face after a shot before the smoke and dust have cleared away.

(24) Magazines for more than a day’s supply are not three hundred (300) feet from mine openings or buildings used or occupied by persons.

“Haulage

(25) Clearance – twelve (12) inches from car on “tight side”, twenty-four (24) inches from car on “safety side” is not maintained along haulageways.

(26) Refuge holes are not maintained along haulageways where clearance from cars is less than six (6) feet.

(27) Refuge holes are more than eighty (80) feet apart.

(28) refuge holes are not provided on both sides of all permanent doors — on “safety side”.

(29) Clearance “on safety side” is not level with the track.

(30) Conspicuous lights are not placed on both front and rear of each mechanically operated trip.

(31) Conspicuous lights are not placed on both front and rear of all equipment trammed or parked on tracks used by other equipment.

(32) A suitable lifting jack and handle, capacity not less than one half the weight of the locomotive, is not provided for each locomotive.

(33) Mine cars are not in good condition.

(34) Inside track is not properly maintained.

(35) Switches on haulageways are not complete with throws.

(36) Standing cars are not blocked made fast – with substantial blocking devices.

(37) Protection, guards or trenching, is not provided for trolley and bare power wires less than six and one-half (6 1/2) feet above the rail where men regularly work or pass under.

(38) Trolley and all other permanent power wires (bare or insulated) are not properly spliced.

(39) Trailing power cables for electrical machinery are not provided with fused nips.

(40) Trailing power cables for electrical machinery are not in good condition and free from extensive cuts or abrasions.

(41) Trailing power cables for electrical machinery are not properly spliced — mechanically strong and adequately insulated.

(42) Hooked nips are used in such manner as to endanger motormen.

(43) Electrical machinery is not provided with switches or controls, covered to protect the operator against arcs.

(44) Grounding is made to unbonded track.

(45) Plugs, junction boxes, or switchboards are not used to make power connections at working faces where two or more electrical units are connected to the same power circuit.

(46) Resistance is not guarded.

(47) Telephone wires at the entrance to the mine are not provided with lightning arrestors.

“Dust and Drainage

(48) The mine, or sections thereof, at working places — inby the last breakthrough is not kept constantly rock dusted where the dust on the floor, ribs, or roof is not thoroughly wet at all times.

(49) The mine, or sections thereof, along haulageways is not kept constantly rock dusted where the dust on the floor, ribs, or roof is not thoroughly wet at all times.

(50) The mine, or sections thereof, in abandoned places is not kept constantly rock dusted where the dust on the floor, ribs, or roof is not thoroughly wet at all times.

(51) Sufficient rock dust is not applied to provide at least sixty-five (65) per cent incombustible material.

(52) Coal dust and other dust in suspension in unusual quantities at working faces is not allayed by sprinkling or by other dust-allaying devices.

(53) Coal dust and other dust in suspension in unusual quantities on haulageways is not allayed by sprinkling or by other dust-allaying devices.

(54) Coal dust and other dust in suspension in unusual quantities in tipples is not allayed by sprinkling or by other dust-allaying devices.

“Ventilation

(55) Ventilation is not conducted through rooms by means of check doors or other means.

(56) Dead-end places are permitted.

(57) Main doors are not constructed in pairs to form air locks.

(58) Doors are provided with latches.

“It is the conclusion of the Department of Mines:

(a) That an explosion of gas and dust occurred, as evidenced by coke and streamers.

(b) That from careful investigation the source of the ignition was an electric arc.

(c) That the are most likely occurred when the trolley wire, pulled from its support by a slate fall, came in contact with the mine track.

“LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

(1) Frequent tests at regular intervals should be made with a methane tester or by sampling throughout the mine, including the working faces.

(2) The mine should be kept free of accumulations of coal dust throughout; haulageways, airways, working places, and abandoned places, and be kept thoroughly rock dusted at all times.

(3) The roof along haulageways should be examined frequently and maintained securely.

(4) Doors should be constructed in pairs to form air locks.

(5) Haulageways should be maintained on intake air.

(6) Places should not be worked on an air current which has passed through abandoned sections not regularly examined.

[Signed]
Alex Bryce, Inspector

J. McGraw, Inspector

Peter T. McLinden, Inspector at large.”

(Bryce, et al. “Explosion Report, July 9, 1942, Pursglove Coal Mining Co…No. 2 Mine.”)

Rakes: “On the afternoon of July 9, 1942, two of Pursglove’s six loading crews were approaching their assigned sections of Twenty and Twenty-four Bleeder. A majority of the men resided in Scotts Run communities and, during the three-and-one-half-mile rides to their working faces, undoubtedly discussed the recent events at Osage [May 12, 1942]. As the Twenty Face crew turned toward their section, they passed under an area of “bad top” that would soon initiate catastrophe.[3]

“At approximately 4:12 p.m., this area of unstable roof fell onto the haulage track. The fall was thirty-six feet long, sixteen feet wide, and one foot thick, and the impact suspended a large amount of Sewickley seam dust into the air. Torn from its hangers, a 550-volt trolley wire fell on the track, creating an intense electrical arc in a methane-charged cloud of coal dust and igniting coal particles. The explosion, fueled by the suspended coal dust, traveled along the same route the Twenty Face crew used moments before, increasing in intensity.[4]

“Pulling available oxygen to its source, the blast developed a horizontal swirling effect as it turned onto Twenty Face, creating a vacuum that accelerated the release of methane from the worked-out areas of both sections. The explosive force gained momentum when it reached Twenty Face; the men there, still putting away their personal items before beginning work, were killed and the man-trip cars blown from the track. In full fury as it came onto Twenty-four Face, the blast caught the members of that crew dispersed at their various assignments. Leaving twenty fatalities in its wake, the explosion exited the section and continued until it reached adequately rock-dusted areas….[5]

“The findings of the coroner’s jury suggested the Pursglove company had failed to maintain the mine properly. One of the governmental criticisms of the operation’s fire precautions proved prophetic. Inspectors noted that “no fire-fighting equipment organization functions at the mine and little or no fire-fighting equipment facilities, excepting rock dust, are available for use in an emergency. . . .” Recent misfortune should have increased the safety awareness of Pursglove officials, but within six months, events at the Pursglove No. 15 mine demonstrated that the warning concerning preparation for fire emergencies went unheeded….”[6]

(Rakes. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.” West Virginia History, Vol. 53, 1994, pp. 95-118.)

Newspaper

July 10: “Bodies of 20 men killed in an explosion at the Pursglove No. 2 mine between 4:30 and 5 o’clock yesterday afternoon were being removed from the mine early this afternoon.

“The blast occurred less than two months after an explosion at the nearby Christopher No. 3 mine in which 56 men were killed on May 12. Generally regarded as one of the safest mines in the State, the Pursglove mine last year was awarded a certificate for its good safety record after 3 million tons of coal had been produced without a fatal accident.

“Six crews were working in the mine at the time of the blast, but only the crews headed by Charles Andy and Albert McDonald were killed. All the other men, numbering more than 50, escaped.

“The explosion came just after the afternoon shift had gone into the mine to work. A foreman who had made the fire boss run between the time the day shift stopped and the afternoon shift started to work was said to have been writing his report at the time of the blast.

“No Previous Explosion

“L. S. McGee, inspector at large in Central West Virginia, said that the Pursglove No. 3 mine was one of the few large mines in the region that have had no explosions in the past few years. Pete McLindon, Fairmont, inspector-at-large in the northern division of the State, said there had been only a slight fire following the blast, with one post being burned….

“The following statement was issued this morning by Samuel Pursglove, 3rd, director of personnel and safety for the Pursglove Coal Mining Company:

“All bodies of the explosion victims will be taken to the Davidson Brothers Funeral Home in Morgantown, to be identified and claimed by the respective surviving families, and for them to designate at that time the undertaker who they wish to take charge of that body.

“We have been advised that Compensation Commissioner C. L. Heaberlin will visit the mine as he did at the time of the Christopher catastrophe. Two field men from the Workman’s Compensation Fund and two field representatives of the Social Security Board will be located in the Pursglove Coal Mining Company general office at Pursglove, beginning Monday, July 13, and will continue in that office helping and assisting the widows and dependents of the explosion victims until all claims are completed.

“Also, all insurance claims will be completed in the Pursglove offices at the same time. All dependents are requested to call in person at the office of the Pursglove Coal Mining Company beginning Monday, July 13, and any time thereafter, to file their claims.”

Plans are being made to set up a disaster relief fund similar to that which was formed following the Osage mine tragedy.

(Morgantown Post (WV) “Bodies of 20 Blast Victims are Being Taken from Mine,” 7-10-1942)

Sources

Bryce, Alex, P.J. McGraw, Peter T. McLinden. “Explosion Report, July 9, 1942, Pursglove Coal Mining Company, Pursglove No. 2 Mine.” Accessed at: http://www.wvculture.org/history/disasters/pursglove03.html

Morgantown Post, WV. “Bodies of 20 Blast Victims are Being Taken from Mine,” 10July1942. Accessed at: http://www.wvculture.org/history/disasters/pursglove02.html

Rakes, Paul H. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.” West Virginia History, Vol. 53, 1994, pp. 95-118. Accessed at: http://www.wvculture.org/history/journal_wvh/wvh53-6.html

West Virginia Division of Culture and History. West Virginia Archives & History. “On This Day in West Virginia History…[July 9, 1942].” Accessed at: http://www.wvculture.org/history/thisdayinwvhistory/0709.html

West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present. MHS&T, October 9, 2008 update. At: http://www.wvminesafety.org/disaster.htm

[1] “Named for the company’s founders, Pursglove, a small village of approximately 350 residents in 1942, lay a short distance upstream from the Monongahela Railroad spur leading to Osage.” (Rakes, Paul H.. “Casualties on the Homefront: Scotts Run Mining Disasters During World War II.” West Virginia History, Vol. 53, 1994, pp. 95-118.)

[2] “Opened in 1918, Pursglove No. 2 mined coal from the Sewickley seam and, by 1942, was fully mechanized.” (Rakes 1994)

[3] Cites: Morgantown Dominion-News, 11 July 1942; Fairmont Times, 11 July 1942; West Virginia Department of Mines, Quarterly Report, Coal Mining Section, July-September, 1942 (Charleston: Department of Mines, 1942), 20-22; Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1942, map of “Mine No. 2.”

[4] Cites: Humphrey, Historical Summary of Coal Mine Explosions, 186; Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1942, 32-33 and map of “Mine No. 2”; United Mine Workers Journal, 15 September 1942.

[5] Cites: Department of Mines, Annual Report, 1942, 28-31.

[6] Cites: United Mine Workers Journal, Sep 15, 1942.

1942 — July 9, Pursglove No. 2 coal mine roof-fall & gas/dust explosion, Pursglove, WV–20