1927 — April 23, Explosion and Fire, Briggs Auto Manufacturing Co., Detroit, MI — 21
Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 2-26-2025 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/
–21 Blanchard. We choose to show 21 deaths in that the only source for 23 is the National Fire Protection Association. We show five sources noting 21 fatalities. Our own search of newspaper archives showed seventeen deaths by April 30 (there were reports in newspapers between April 23 and 30 noting the deaths of several men in hospitals, which we do not reproduce). We speculate that four other injured men died afterwards and we were not able to find notices of their deaths, if these existed.
–23 National Fire Protection Association. Fire Protection Handbook (11th Ed.). 1954.
–23 Schuenemann and Fox. “Briggs Body Plant Fire.” Quarterly of the NFPA, V21/N1, 1927.
–21 Detroit News, MI. “Walter O. Briggs, captain of industry, owner of Tigers.” 9-1-2028.
–21 Michilimackinac Historical Society, St. Ignace, MI. “History…The 1927 Briggs…Tragedy.”
–21 Morbidamerica. “Briggs Manufacturing Plant Fire, 1927.” Blog.
–21 Peterson. American Automobile Workers, 1900-1933. 1987.
–21 Rosner and Markowitz 1987, p. 59.
Narrative Information
Peterson: “In April 1927, failure to ground the metal nozzles on the pain sprayers at the Briggs Harper Avenue Detroit plant led to an explosion followed by a fire. Highly flammable chemicals used in mixing auto body lacquer ignited in the third floor paint department, and the fire quickly spread throughout the five-story building. In all, twenty-one workers were burned to death and many more permanently injured, many because their clothes were saturated with paint mixture and instantly went up in flames. Although the Michigan Department of Labor and Industry termed the tragedy ‘an act of Providence,’ auto workers tended to agree with the conclusion of the Auto Workers News that the Briggs Company had been negligent in failing to provide an adequate ventilation system to remove flammable fumes released in lacquering bodies.” (Peterson 1987, 66-67.)
Rosner and Markowitz: “The [Worker’s Health] Bureau was particularly worried that ‘The DuPont Company has been instrumental in pushing the widespread use of the spray painting machine [in the auto industry], operated under air pressure which is replacing hand-brush painting and is responsible for increasing every health hazard in the industry.’ This resulted in one disaster in the Briggs Automobile Factory in Detroit, where an explosion in the spray-painting department caused twenty-one workers to be burned to death and many others to be permanently injured. (Rosner and Markowitz 1987, 59)
Schuenemann and Fox/NFPA: “A lack of appreciation of the needed elementary precautions against the start and spread of fire, inspired by a desire for rapid production, was responsible for the death of twenty-three persons in the fire and incidental explosions which destroyed about one-half of the Harper Avenue Plant of the Briggs Manufacturing Company in Detroit on April 23. The…production of automobile bodies which had been speeded up to supply peak demands has been interrupted for some time….
“Automobile bodies were forced through the spraying and drying operations on conveyor equipment which could speed up the movement of the bodies to meet production demands. The use of this type of infra-factory transportation necessitated the frequent piercing of former fire walls and floors which resulted in the impairment of these fire cutoffs to the point of uselessness. An open body hoist pierced the fourth floor directly over the spraying department….
“The wall board sheathing on the ceiling of…[the] spray room being broken in places… pyroxylin dust had undoubtedly penetrated these concealed spaces. Dust apparently had also settled on the mercury vapor lighting equipment. Under the pressure of forced production, the regular cleaning up of these deposits, and attention to other details of housekeeping were at times known to be neglected.
The fire started as the plant was starting operations. From the accounts of workmen present, the spark which started the fire came from the auxiliary equipment of a mercury vapor lamp. A flash of flame was also seen at one end of the vapor tube. This spark apparently ignited some of the pyroxylin dust or residue. Before the switch controlling the lights could be pulled, a mild explosion occurred at this point, followed by a second explosion of greater violence which blew out the windows, wrecked the sprinkler piping, booth equipment and vents, and probably some of the pipes which supplied lacquer to the booths from tanks on the floor above.
“Apparently the first explosion was enough to shake pyroxylin dust, of which there was considerable on the ceilings and on objects in the rooms, into the air, and the second explosion was probably partly a pyroxylin dust explosion, and partly the explosion of the gases formed by the decomposition of residue from the heat of the first flash.
“Of the 200 employees in the destroyed parts, some 40 or 50 were on the third floors… Several workmen were killed outright by the blasts and most of the other fatalities were cases of workmen who were so badly burned by the furiously spreading fire as not to recover although they got out of the building….
“The fire quickly extended into the fourth and fifth stories through the unprotected body hoist openings, encountering more pyroxylin residues and stock in process. With the sprinkler protection crippled, the spread of fire was rapid in all parts, involving the three upper floors at once and later extending downward to the lower floors.
“Five fire alarms in rapid succession, the first at 8:15 A. M., were sent in for this fire. As the fire had made great headway before the fire department arrived, attempts to check the fire in the burning group of buildings were futile, so efforts were concentrated, with success, on saving the older or west portion of the plant. The physical divisions made it possible for the fire department to do this, although several times the fire threatened to penetrate into the wooden bridge over the roof….
“The residues from pyroxylin spraying materials ignite almost instantly, and frequently flash, spreading the fire over a large area. The result of this is further decomposition of these residues and burning or smoldering which produces huge volumes of smoke and gases. This combination of flash, smolder, smoke and explosion forms successive cycles in a fire of this kind as these phenomena follow each other, sometimes separated only by seconds. Such fires and explosions made possible in congested departments, if not severe enough to disrupt sprinkler systems, are entirely too quick to be controlled by an ordinary automatic sprinkler system. If, added to these conditions, there is found a congestion of combustible stocks, absence of wall and floor divisions, lax housekeeping, then severe losses appear likely to reoccur. The initial cause, while important, is relatively secondary.” (Schuenemann and Fox. “Briggs Body Plant Fire.” Quarterly of the NFPA, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1927, pp. 73-80.)
Newspapers
April 23, Jefferson City Tribune-Post: “Detroit, April 23 (AP). At least a score of men are believed to have been killed and fifty or more others burned and injured, some probably fatally, in a fire that swept the main building of the Brigg’s Manufacturing company plant after an explosion in the paint shop this morning…. Floyd King…working on the third floor of the building…said ‘it was like standing in the mouth of cannon while it was being exploded.’ The first explosion, he said, came without warning and was followed a second later by a searing sheet of flame that engulfed a spraying room where 50 men were working.
Ambulances took a dozen or more loads of injured to various hospitals. At receiving hospital, where 25 injured were brought, Dr. Thomas K. Gruber, superintendent, said probably two-thirds of them would die.
“The dead were believed to be buried under wreckage of the building…. As the fire continued more than an hour and a half after the explosion, occupants of nearby houses and stores were directed to vacate immediately.
“The cause of the explosion was not immediately determined but a workman expressed the belief a short circuited motor was responsible..
“At 1:20 o’clock the walls on the Harper side of the building collapsed and the fire spread to the opposite side of the street..” (Jefferson City Tribune-Post (MO), “20 Dead…” April 23, 1927.)
April 24: “The fire originated on the third floor of the building after the first blast in the painting department.” (Decatur Evening Herald (IL), April 24, 1927.)
April 30, AP: “Detroit, April 30 – (AP) – The death of Clinton Brown, 27, a negro, in Receiving hospital brought the number of deaths in the explosion and fore at the Harpr avenue plant of the Briggs Manufacturing company last Saturday to seventeen today.” (Associated Press. “Factory Explosion Toll Mounts to 27 [sic, 17].” Escanaba Daily Press, MI. 5-1-1927, p. 1.)
May 5, AP: “Lansing, May 5 – (AP) – The department of labor and industry today made public a report declaring that the fire which destroyed the plant of the Briggs Manufacturing company in Detroit recently, was not due to any negligence on the part of the company. ‘Our investigation of the fire at the plat,’ the report reads, ‘indicates that the explosion preceding the fire resulted from ignition of an explosive mixture of air and the vapors of pyroxylin lacquers by a spark due to generation of static electricity in the nozzles of paint guns.’
“The department recommends that all factories and shops using pyroxylin lacquers and varnishes, also known as duco, make immediate provision for the grounding of all nozzles of pain guns.
“The report continues: ‘Our investigation does not indicate that the Briggs Manufacturing company had been negligent. They had taken more than ordinary precautions against fire. An adequate sprinkler system had been installed under competent direction, was at hand. ‘The company was not prepared to cope with an explosion because the possibilities of explosion were not foreseen.’” (Associated Press. “Factory Operators Absolved of Blame in Detroit Blast.” Escanaba Daily Press, MI. 5-6-1927, p. 1.)
Sources
Associated Press. “Factory Explosion Toll Mounts to 27 [sic, 17].” Escanaba Daily Press, MI. 5-1-1927, p. 1. Accessed 2-26-2025 at:
https://newspaperarchive.com/escanaba-daily-press-may-01-1927-p-1/
Associated Press. “Factory Operators Absolved of Blame in Detroit Blast.” Escanaba Daily Press, MI. 5-6-1927, p. 1. Accessed 2-26-2025 at:
https://newspaperarchive.com/escanaba-daily-press-may-06-1927-p-1/
Detroit News, MI. “Walter O. Briggs, captain of industry, owner of Tigers.” 7-30-2016, updated 9-1-2028. Accessed 2-26-2025 at: https://www.detroitnews.com/picture-gallery/news/local/michigan-history/2016/07/29/walter-o-briggs-captain-of-industry-owner-of-tigers/87753044/
Jefferson City Post-Tribune, MO. “20 Dead, 50 Hurt in Explosion at Detroit Plant,” 4-23-1927. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/PdfViewerTags.aspx?img=99141492&firstvisit=true&src=search¤tResult=0
Michilimackinac Historical Society, St. Ignace, MI. “History Hounds. An Auto Disaster: The 1927 Briggs Manufacturing Tragedy.” 2-20-2024. Accessed 2-26-2025 at: https://www.michmackhs.org/events/2024/2/20/history-hounds-an-auto-disaster-the-1927-briggs-manufacturing-tragedy
Morbidamerica. “Briggs Manufacturing Plant Fire, 1927.” Blog accessed 2-26-2025 at: https://morbidamerica.wordpress.com/2011/07/31/briggs-manufacturing-plant-fire1927/
National Fire Protection Association. Fire Protection Handbook (11th Ed.). 1954.
Peterson, Joyce Shaw. American Automobile Workers, 1900-1933. State University of New York Press, 1987, 231 pages. Google preview accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=uLmtiSWD9-wC
Rosner, David and Gerald Markowitz (Eds.). Dying for Work: Worker’s Safety and Health in Twentieth- Century America. Indiana University Press, 1987, 234 pages. Partially digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=I-7VfHOQ-Q0C
Schuenemann, E., and H. B. Fox. “Briggs Body Plant Fire.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 21, No. 1, July 1927. pp. 73-80.