1926 — Dec 23, two passenger trains collide head-on, near Rockmart, GA       —     19

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 3-10-2025 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–19  AP. “19 Known Dead in Head-on Collision.” Thomasville Times-Enterprise, GA. 12-24-1926, p.1.

–19  US Interstate Commerce Commission File No. 1316, “Rockmart, GA,” January 11, 1927.

Narrative Information

U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission: “On December 23, 1926, there was a head-end collision between two passenger trains on the Southern Railway near Rockmart, Ga., which resulted in the death of 11 passengers, 7 employees and 1 news agent, and the injury of 113 passengers, 4 employees of the railway and 6 Pullman employees. The investigation of this accident was made in conjunction with representatives of the Georgia Public Service Commission…

“This accident occurred on that part of the Atlanta Division extending between Atlanta, Ga., and Chattanooga, Tenn., a distance of 152.7 miles…. It was dark and raining at the time of the accident, which occurred between 6.40 and 6.45 p.m.

“Description:  Southbound passenger train No. 101 consisted of one club car, five Pullman sleeping cars, one dining car and two Pullman sleeping cars, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 1456, and was in charge of Conductor Randall and Engineman Corrie….

“Train No. 101 arrived at Rockmart at 6.35 p.m., at which point a clearance card was received stating that the block would be clear on the arrival of train first No. 2. After water was taken, train No. 101 proceeded southward on the main track at a low rate of speed, waiting for train first No. 2 to arrive and head in on the passing track at the south switch, and had been brought nearly to a stop at a point 883 feet north of the switch when it was struck by train first No. 2.

“Northbound passenger train first No. 2 consisted of one combination car, one coach, one dining car, and seven Pullman sleeping cars, all of steel construction, hauled by engine 1219, and was in charge of Conductor Arwood and Engineman Keith. Before departing from Atlanta the crew received a copy of train order No. 92, previously quoted, written on Form 31. When it stopped at McPherson, 11.4 miles south of Rockmart, for the purpose of meeting an opposing train, Road Foreman of Engines Pearce, who had been riding in the combination car en route to his home at Rome, 21.9 miles north of Rockmart, boarded the engine and took charge of it, Engineman Keith going back to ride in the combination car. Train first No. 2 departed from McPherson at 6.23 p.m., 15 minutes late, passed Braswell, 6.4 miles from McPherson, at 6.35 p.m., 16 minutes late, passed the south passing-track switch at Rockmart and collided with train No. 101 while traveling at a speed believed to have been approximately 50 miles per hour.

“Both engines were derailed, but they remained upright. Engine 1219 was badly damaged while the tender cistern was torn from its frame and thrown down the embankment on the inside of the curve. The combination car in train first No. 2 was telescoped at its head end nearly the length of the baggage compartment, while the coach immediately behind it telescoped the dining car, the third car in the train, about three fourths of its length. Only the club car and the first sleeping car in train No. 101 were derailed, both ends of the club car and the forward end of the sleeping car being badly damaged. The employees killed were the road foreman of engines, fireman, baggage-master, three dining car waiters and one cook, all of train first No. 2.

“Engineman Corrie, of train No. 101, said the operator at Rockmart handed on a clearance card stating that the block would be clear on the arrival of train first No. 2. On being informed by the fireman that that train was not in sight from the left side of the engine, Enginemen Corrie pulled his train ahead for a short distance and stopped for water. He then proceeded slowly on the main track, at a speed of from 4 to 6 miles per hour, with the headlight burning brightly, and finally he saw the reflection of the headlight of the engine hauling train first No. 2, a few seconds before it came in sight through the cut on the curve south of the passing-track switch. Engineman Corrie said he watched the headlight closely and by the time it reached the tangent track approaching the switch he made up his mind that the train was not going to stop; he applied the air brakes on his own train, called to his fireman to get off, and then did so himself. He thought the speed of train first No. 2 must have been close to 60 miles per hour when the accident occurred, although he said he was not looking at it at that particular time, being engaged in getting out of the way, neither did he notice whether there was any fire flying from the brake shoes.

“Baggage master Copeland, of train No. 101, said he received the conductor’s copy of the clearance card for his train at Rockmart and that the train was proceeding slowly toward the south switch when he heard the engineman of train first No. 2 blowing signals at the crew of extra 5243, the accident occurring very shortly afterwards; he did not hear any other whistle signals sounded. After the accident Mr. Copeland assisted in removing Rood Foreman of Engines Pearce from his engine and he said the road foreman asked him how the accident occurred; when told that he had failed to take siding for train No. 101 he replied that Engineman Keith, Fireman Moss and every one concerned had told him that he was to hold the main track, and he then added that when he sounded the station whistle signal he asked Fireman Moss “We hold the main track?” and he said the fireman replied in the affirmative. Baggage-master Copeland was unable to explain what the road foreman had in mind when he used the words “every one concerned.”

“Engineman Keith, of train first No. 2, said his fireman read the orders before the train departed from Atlanta. After stopping on the main track at McPherson to await the arrival of an opposing passenger train he got off and began to oil the engine. While on the ground on the left side of the engine he heard the whistle signal sounded recalling the flagman and supposed that the signal had been sounded by the firemen, but on boarding the engine he found Road Foreman of Engines Pearce sitting on the engineman’s seat box. He asked the road foreman, who appeared to be in normal physical condition, what he was going to do and the latter told him he was going to run the engine as far as Rome, Engineman Keith replying that he would go back and ride in the train. Engineman Keith said the road foreman then asked him what orders he had and that he told the road foreman distinctly that they were to head in at Rockmart and meet train No. 101, which instructions he said were repeated aloud, in their entirely, by the road foreman, who then began to work steam. Engineman Keith immediately got off the engine and was helped aboard the combination car at the door of the baggage compartment by Conductor Arwood, who asked him if he had told the road foremen about the orders. After leaving McPherson the train was operated in a normal manner and Engineman Keith said that finally he heard the road foreman sound the station signal, followed by what appeared to be an answer to a signal, presumable a meeting point signal given by the conductor or some one back in the train, and very shortly afterwards he heard the road foreman whistle signals at the crew of extra 5243; these latter signals he thought were answered by the engineman of the freight train. At about the same time Engineman Keith noticed the train passing the south switch and for the first time he realized that there was something wrong; he said he started to get up for the purpose of opening the conductor’s emergency valve but the accident occurred before this could be done. Engineman Keith estimated the speed of the train at the time of the accident to have been about 45 or 50 miles per hour, and said that to the best of his knowledge the air brakes, which had been working properly at all times, were not applied by the road foreman before the accident occurred.

“Engineman Keith further stated that he understood the road foreman had made a statement when being removed from the wreckage to the effect that he had been told his train was to hold the main truck at Rockmart, but he did not feel that the road foreman would have made such a statement under ordinary circumstances and he said he was absolutely positive that the road foreman understood the situation thoroughly when relieving him at McPherson or he would not have left the engine in his charge. When questioned in connection with the subject of road foremen relieving enginemen while on route, Engineman Keith indicated that it was done occasionally and that it was customary under such circumstances for an engineman so relieved to go back and ride in the train….

“The dining cur in which the majority of the fatalities occurred was built by the Pullman Company in 1917. An examination of the plans covering the end construction of this car and also of the two cars immediately preceding it in train first No. 2 failed to disclose that there was any reason from a construction standpoint why this particular car should have been telescoped; in fact, the end construction of the dining car provided a little more strength than that possessed by the car by which it was telescoped….

“Conclusions:  This accident was caused either by the failure of Road Foreman of Engines Pearce and Engineman Keith, of train first No. 2, to have a thorough understanding as to the contents of train order No. 92, which required their train to take siding at Rockmart for train No. 101, or by the failure of Road Foreman of Engines Pearce to remember the contents of the order….

“Conductor Arwood, of train first No. 2, had finished collecting transportation and was walking through the cars toward the head end of the train at the time of the accident. While he knew the approximate location of his train as it approached Rockmart he did not know its location exactly and was not in position to bring the train to a stop by means of the conductor’s valve when it became apparent that the spend was not being reduced preparatory to stopping. At the south switch. Somewhat similar situations are of frequent occurrence and the net result is that the safe operation of the train depends upon one man, the engineman. Unfortunately, however, as is well illustrated in the present case, the results of a mistake by this one man are apt to be so serious as to make it a matter of necessity that there be someone back in the train in position to take action in the event there is a failure on the part of the engineman to obey orders. This duty, nominally at least, belongs to the conductor, but when the situation on any particular train reaches a point which makes the conductor little more than a ticket collector, then it would appear that some provision should be made to correct the situation by the use of ticket collectors or train auditors rather than by having the conductor depend on the baggagemaster the flagman, or the train porter. Conductor Arwood, however, said his duty to collect transportation was not interfering with his duty to attend to the safe operation of his train; this being the case, he should have made it his business to ascertain the exact location of his train and had he done so he might have been in position to apply the air brakes in time to avert the accident.

“While the mental and physical qualifications of Road Foreman of Engines Pearce are in no way involved is this accident, yet it is a question whether it is good practice to allow a road foreman of engines, or any other official, to relieve an engineman except in case of emergency. In order that enginemen may be properly qualified for their duties it is customary to give them periodic examinations on the operating rules and more or less frequent examinations as to vision, color sense and hearing, while many railroads are adopting the idea of thorough physical examinations when their enginemen attain a certain age in life in order to guard against the possibility of an engineman becoming suddenly incapacitated while at the throttle of his engine; in addition to these precautions, efforts are made to see that they are given an opportunity for adequate rest between trips. On most railroads, however, as with the railway on which this accident occurred, it is true that none of these various precautions is observed with respect to road foremen of engines; apparently it is assumed that as officials they will keep posted on the operating rules, and that their vision color sense and hearing, as well as their general physical condition, will in no way become impaired. If one of these subordinate officials, or any other official, is to be allowed to relieve an engineman at will, then there is no good reason why he should not be required and be known to be as well qualified in every respect as the engineman whose place he is occupying, for it is obvious that a failure upon his part is just as dangerous as a failure upon the part of the regularly qualified and assigned engineman.”  (ICC {W.P. Borland}, File No. 1316, “Rockmart, GA,” January 11, 1927.)

Newspaper

Dec 24, AP: “Atlanta, Ga., Dec 24. (AP) – The Southern Railway announced here this afternoon that the wreckage at Rockmart, GA., had been explored thoroughly and that no more bodies were imbedded there. The known death list from the head on collision last night between north and southbound passenger trains at Rockmart stood at eighteen.

“The four negroes killed in the wreck were from Chattanooga. Their last names were Horne, Thomas, Palmer and Tughey. Their bodies were taken to Chattanooga for burial. All were dining car employes.

“Traffic on the road was resumed this morning, trains using the passing side track until the main line was cleared.

______

“Southern Official Issues Statement

“Washington, D.C., Dec. 24 (AP) – H. W. Miller, vice-president in charge of operations, said today in a formal statement that the wreck last night at Rockmart, Ga., ‘was due to a human failure by an employe whose previous record was clear,’ and that ‘the train order, which was disregarded, is unimpeachable.’…. ‘We are installing automatic train control on the entire line from Chattanooga to Macon, a part of which is completed and in operation and all of which will be completed and in operation by the 31^st day of January next. This was authorized nearly a year ago without any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, but voluntarily on our part, that we might avail ourselves of any device tending to the safety of traffic.’

“Eighteen Persons Known To Be Dead. Rockmart, Ga., Dec. 24 (AP)….The death today of little Goldie Williams of Detroit, in a hospital at Cedartown and of W. H. Brewer, baggage master on the Ponce De Leon, in a hospital at Rome brought the total known dead to 18….Following is a revised list of the dead:

1. L. Dynes, salesmanager of Atlanta real estate firm.
2. R. Moss, Atlanta, fireman on the Ponce De Leion.

Mrs. J. W. Whittiker, Chattanooga.

Lynn Barkley, Evans, 2711 Herschitt avenue, Jacksonville, Fla.

An eight year old girl with the initials H. M. H. on a bracelet, probably the daughter of

Mrs. Georgia Hardy, enroute from Miami to Toronto, Ontario who was taken to an Atlanta hospital

1. H. Brewer, of Atlanta, baggagemaster of the Ponce De Leon.

Goldie Williams, 8, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Steve Williams, 8000 Thaddeus street,

Detroit.

1. E. Foster, 509 Forstner street, Chattanooga.
2. L. Dynes, Atlanta, sales manager for S. P. and George J. Morris.

Dr. P. L. Hale, 1299 Willow avenue, Louisville, Ky.

Four unidentified negro men.

Three unidentified white men.

One unidentified white woman.

One unidentified white boy, about 7 years old.

“One of the unidentified was believed to be De. G. C. Wade, an Atlanta dentist enroute to Cleveland. His pocket book was fund in the wreckage and his office had had no word from him today….” (Associated Press. “19 Known Dead in Head-on Collision.” Thomasville Times-Enterprise, GA. 12-24-1926, p. 1.)

Sources

Associated Press. “19 Known Dead in Head-on Collision.” Thomasville Times-Enterprise, GA. 12-24-1926, p. 1. Accessed 3-10-2025 at:

https://newspaperarchive.com/thomasville-times-enterprise-dec-24-1926-p-1/

United States Interstate Commerce Commission, File No. 1316. “Report of the Director of the Bureau of Safety in RE Investigation of an Accident Which Occurred on the Southern Railway near Rockmart, GA., on December 23, 1926.” Washington, DC: ICC, January 11, 1927.  Reproduced by DOT Library, Special Collections, I.C.C. Historical Railroad Investigation Reports (1911-1994). Accessed at:  http://dotlibrary.specialcollection.net/