1925 – Nov 12, rear-end train collision in fog near Monmouth Junction, NJ — 10
Compiled by Wayne Blanchard; last edit 3-21-2025 for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/
— 10 ICC. Summary of Accident Investigation Reports No. 26, October-December 1925, p. 33.
— 10 United Press. “Probe Starts in Railroad Wreck.” Altoona Mirror, PA. 11-13-1925, p. 1.
Narrative Information
U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission: Pennsylvania Railroad: “Rear-end collision between two passenger trains near Monmouth Junction, N. J., on November 12, 1925, which resulted in the death of 9 passengers and 1 Pullman porter, and the injury of 20 passengers, 11 mail clerks, and 4 employees.
“This accident was caused by failure of an engineman to observe and obey signal indications; a contributing cause was the failure of a flagman to place torpedoes on the rails as required by the rules.
“This accident occurred on a four-track line over which trains were operated by time-table, train orders, and an automatic block-signal system. The signals were mounted on signal bridges which spanned all four of the tracks, the signals involved in this accident being mounted on bridges 448 and 400, located 6,823 and 1,859 feet, respectively, west of the point of accident, .the accident occurring on track 1 at a point about 2.7 miles west of Monmouth Junction. Approaching this point from the west the track was tangent for a considerable distance, while the grade at the point of accident was 0.164 per cent ascending for eastbound trains.
“It was dark and the weather was very foggy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 5.55 a.m.
“Eastbound passenger train No. 166 consisted of two mail cars, one combination mail and baggage car, two coaches, and six Pullman sleeping cars, hauled by engine 3775. It passed Princeton Junction, N. J., 6 miles from Monmouth Junction, at 5.44 a. in., eight minutes late, and was brought to a stop at signal bridge 440, at which point the signal governing track 1 was in stop position. The train proceeded immediately and after moving a short distance was again brought to a stop to extinguish a fusee. It then started ahead again and was moving at a speed of 8 or 10 miles an hour when its rear end was struck by train No. 6.
“Eastbound passenger train No. 6 consisted of one express car, one business car, three Pullman sleeping cars, one coach; one combination passenger and baggage car, two mail cars, and one express car, hauled by engine 3884. It passed Princeton Junction at 5.52 a. m., nine minutes late, and collided with the rear end of train No. 166 near Monmouth Junction while traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 35 or 40 miles an hour.
“The sleeping car on the rear end of train No. 166 was telescoped at its forward end about two-thirds of its length, while the car that telescoped it was damaged to some extent….
“Investigation disclosed that train No. 166 received a caution signal indication at signal bridge 448 and a stop signal indication at signal bridge 440. These signal indications were observed by the engine‑man and train No. 166 was operated in accordance with their requirements. The conditions were such that train No. 6 should have received the same signal indications, but the engineman of that train admitted that he passed signal bridge 448 without seeing its indication.
“Under the rules the caution indication of the signal at that point required that train No. 6 at once reduce speed and approach the next signal prepared to stop. Had the engineman observed and obeyed the indication of that signal the accident would have been prevented. According to the evidence, however, train No. 6 approached signal bridge 440, the signal on which was in stop position, at a speed of 50 or 60 miles an hour. The engineman and fireman both stated positively that they saw the stop indication just as the engine was passing under this signal bridge and that an emergency application of the brakes was made immediately. According to the statements of members of the train crew, however, the emergency application of the brakes was made only a very few seconds before the shock of collision.
“According to the evidence the flagman of train No 166 threw off lighted fusees but did not put down any torpedoes. Had this flagman placed torpedoes on the rails when his train stopped at signal bridge 440, and also when it stopped for the fusee, the engineman of train No. 6 probably would have been warned in sufficient time to enable him to bring his train under proper Control.
(A detailed report covering the investigation of this accident was published by the commission’ under date of Dec. 4, 1925.)” (ICC. Sum. Of Accident Invest. Rpts. # 26, Oct-Dec 1925, 33-34.)
Newspaper
United Press. “Probe Starts in Railroad Wreck.” Altoona Mirror, PA. 11-13-1925, p. 1:
“(By United Press) Trenton, N.J., Nov. 13. Federal and state investigations into yesterday’s wreck near Monmouth Junction, N.J., when the Pennsylvania railroad’s Mercantile express, from St. Louis, crashed into the rear of the Overnight express from Washington, got under way today. The death list reached ten when the last body, that of an unidentified man clad in pajamas, was taken from the twist of steel last night. One of the dead is as yet unidentified in a New Brunswick morgue. Six persons are in hospitals with severe injuries…”
Sources
United Press. “Probe Starts in Railroad Wreck.” Altoona Mirror, PA. 11-13-1925, p. 1. Accessed 3-21-2025 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/altoona-mirror-nov-13-1925-p-1/
United States Interstate Commerce Commission. Summary of Accident Investigation Reports No. 26, October, November, and December 1925. Washington, DC: GPO, 1926. Google digitized at: http://books.google.com/books?id=c3zNAAAAMAAJ&printsec=titlepage&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0