2004 — Oct 9, MCI Motorcoach Crash, I-55 near Turrell, AR — 15

—  15  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. FARS 1975-2010 Fatality Analysis.

—  15  NTSB. HAB. Motorcoach Run-Off-the-Road…Rollover…Near Turrell, AR, Oct 9, 2004.

 

NTSB: “Accident Description

 

“On October 9, 2004, about 5:02 a.m., a 1988 Motor Coach Industries, Inc. (MCI), 47‑passenger motorcoach was southbound on Interstate 55 (I-55) near Turrell, Arkansas, transporting 29 passengers to a casino in Tunica, Mississippi. Witnesses following the motorcoach prior to the accident estimated that it had been traveling about 70 mph. At the exit 23A interchange, the motorcoach veered to the right and entered the grassy area between the exit ramp and the entrance ramp. (See figure 1.) As it rotated in a clockwise direction, the motorcoach struck an exit sign, overturning onto its left side and sliding in a southwesterly direction. The left side of the vehicle struck the westernmost side of a 2-foot-deep earthen drainage ditch, and the motorcoach continued to roll over. As it rolled, the roof opened up, allowing passengers to be thrown from the open top. The motorcoach landed 65 feet from the drainage ditch and came to rest upside down. Its roof was laying on the ground (top side up), still hinged to the right side of the vehicle.

 

“At the time of the accident, it was dark and there was no highway safety lighting. The roadway was wet from a misting rain, but there was no standing water.

 

“Survival Aspects

 

“The rollover and partial detachment of the roof resulted in the ejection of all 30 occupants. The motorcoach driver was not wearing his lap belt; the passenger seats were not equipped with seat belts. In total, 14 passengers and the driver, who was partially trapped under the roof, were killed; 5 of the fatally injured passengers had been trapped under the roof. Thirteen passengers were seriously injured, one of whom had been trapped under the roof; and two passengers received minor injuries. One of the three passengers found under the motorcoach body survived…

 

“The Crittenden County Sheriff’s Department Communications Center served as the primary public safety communications center, with the West Memphis Fire Department providing support. Three police agencies, 3 local fire departments, and 18 ambulances (12 were used) responded to the accident. The Crittenden County Sheriff’s Department was notified of the accident at 5:04 a.m. and immediately dispatched two deputies, who arrived on scene at 5:12 a.m. with a Crittenden County Game and Fish Conservation officer. The first ambulance from the Crittenden County Ambulance Service was dispatched at 5:13 a.m. and arrived at 5:25 a.m. The West Memphis Fire Department was dispatched at 5:18 a.m. and arrived at 5:35 a.m.

 

“Three months after the accident, a Safety Board investigator met with staff from the Crittenden County Sheriff’s Department to review its role in the accident and to examine the related policies and operation of the communications center. On February 22, 2005, Safety Board investigators identified several deficiencies and organizational failures concerning the emergency response to the accident. On April 5, 2005, the Crittenden County sheriff outlined the progress that had been made in improving the emergency response system.

 

“Vehicle

 

“….During the investigation, it was discovered that—2 years prior to the accident—the motorcoach had sustained fire damage to its roof and interior as a result of a fire in a facility in which it was parked. Postcrash inspection revealed 14 additional panels of sheet metal attached on top of the original 14 panels on both sides of the roof along its curvature… The new roof panels were 35 by 60 inches. The panels were glued and riveted using Magna-Lock rivets on top of the original roof panels, which ran horizontally from window line to window line and measured 106.25 inches in length and 62 inches in width. Rivet holes drilled to attach the new roof panels were misaligned with the original rivet holes. The investigation also revealed corrosion of several roof vertical posts, roof rails, roof bows, and sash rails along both sides of the motorcoach. Stick welding (oxyacetylene) found in the right-rear upper structure of the roof was also indicative of previous repairs.

 

“Although the Inter-Industry Conference on Auto Collision Repair and the National Institute for Automotive Service Excellence have uniform procedures for automobile and light truck roof repair, there are no set standards for buses. Likewise, bus manufacturers and bus repair facilities have no set standards or best practices for repairing motorcoaches. MCI said that this type of repair is not what it would have recommended, though it has no written repair procedures.

 

“There are no roof crush or rollover standards for motorcoaches; however, the Safety Board has recommended that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration develop performance standards for motorcoach roof strength (Safety Recommendation H-99-50) and then require newly manufactured motorcoaches to meet the standards (Safety Recommendation H-99-51). Both of these recommendations are classified “Open—Acceptable Response.”

 

“Accident Reconstruction

 

“The precrash lane position of the motorcoach was unknown because no pavement evidence was found on the main travel lanes of the interstate, and the passengers were asleep prior to the accident event. However, analysis of the vehicle’s approach based on the tire marks and furrow marks suggests that, prior to leaving the roadway, the motorcoach had been traveling in the left southbound lane. Possible interaction with the rumble strips was also considered when determining the precrash lane position. Evidence indicated that the motorcoach traveled in a curved path and, based on the degree of curvature, the vehicle would have just come into contact with the rumble strips and then started a directional change to the right. The motorcoach departed the road at an 11-degree angle. As the vehicle continued forward and over the right arrow sign, it began to roll longitudinally onto its left side. At final rest, the motorcoach had rotated about 540 degrees, or about one and one-half times over….

 

“Motor Carrier

 

Walters Bus Service, Inc. (Walters), was an interstate “for-hire” carrier of passengers. Walters operated one motorcoach and had one driver. Annual mileage reported for 2002 was 30,000 miles. The company operated passenger charter tours throughout the continental United States as well as shuttle service for events in the Chicago and Detroit areas. At the time of the accident, Walters had had no reported driver or vehicle inspections or reportable accidents in the 30 previous months for which data were available.

 

“Walters was rated “satisfactory” on October 15, 1987, following its only Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration compliance review in 19 years of operation. A postaccident compliance review resulted in an unsatisfactory rating. Walters was found to be noncompliant with requirements for drug/alcohol random testing, driver qualification files, driver logs, maintenance and inspection programs, and periodic inspection of commercial motor vehicles. Walters lost its only commercial vehicle in this accident and elected to cease operation by accepting the unsatisfactory safety rating.

 

“Driver Information

 

“….The driver had been awake for nearly 19 hours at the time of the accident. He had been on duty for 9 hours, of which the last 8 hours were spent driving. He had made two brief stops, the first one about 3 hours into the trip. The accident occurred on October 9 about 5:02 a.m., a time at which he usually was not driving but asleep—and a time of maximal sleepiness. Although the driver had obtained a full night’s sleep on October 7 and had taken a nap during the day, the scheduling of the trip deprived him of his customary nighttime sleep period. He normally went to bed between 10:00–10:30 p.m., but on October 8 he left Chicago at 9:00 p.m. for an estimated 10-hour trip.

 

“Research has revealed an association between time on task and increased risk of crash involvement.[1] A North Carolina study showed that drivers in sleep-related crashes had been driving for longer periods of time compared to those who were in nonsleep-related crashes. Driving between midnight and 6:00 a.m. and driving after being awake for more than 15 hours significantly increased a driver’s risk of being involved in a sleep-related motor vehicle accident.[2] The accident driver took two restroom breaks, but it is unlikely that they provided much benefit from fatigue. Research has shown that such breaks provide only a short-term benefit for drivers who are already tired.[3]

 

“The accident occurred about 5:02 a.m. Studies have shown that crashes caused by drivers falling asleep at the wheel are far more likely to occur at night. For example, an analysis of interstate truck crashes found that about twice as many occurred between midnight–8:00 a.m. as compared to other times, and about half of all single-vehicle crashes occurred in the early morning hours.[4] Research has shown that maximal sleepiness occurs between 3:00–5:00 a.m., with a lower peak in sleepiness between 3:00–5:00 p.m. Drivers working through the night are awake at a time when their body is programmed to sleep.[5]

 

“Based on reconstructed vehicle dynamics, the motorcoach made a directional change to the right, most likely after contacting the milled rumble strips adjacent to the left pavement edge lane. Rumble strips are designed to provide tactile or auditory alerts for the driver. In most situations, rumble strips are effective in reducing the number and severity of run-off-the-road accidents.[6] However, in this case, the vibration and noise made by the tires on the rumble strips may have startled the driver, causing him to steer abruptly and excessively (as evidenced by the vehicle’s path) and sending the motorcoach off the right side of the road, which likely initiated the rotation of the vehicle.

 

“Probable Cause

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the motorcoach driver’s fatigued condition, which led him to drift from the left side of the roadway, contact rumble strips, oversteer to the right, and then move off the roadway. The detachment of the motorcoach roof was a contributing cause to the severity of injuries and the number of ejections.” (NTSB. HAB. Motorcoach Run-Off-the-Road…Rollover…Near Turrell, AR, Oct 9, 2004.)

 

Sources

 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Partial Data Dump of Crashes Involving 10 or More Fatalities, by Year, Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 1975-2009 Final and 2010 ARF. Washington, DC: NHTSA, pdf file provided to Wayne Blanchard, 1-26-2012.

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Highway Accident Brief. Motorcoach Run-Off-the-Road and Rollover Interstate 55 Near Turrell, Arkansas, October 9, 2004 (NTSB/HAB-08.04).  Wash., DC: NTSB, August 22, 2008. At:  http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2008/HAB0804.htm

 

 

 

 

[1] Cites:  W. Harris, R. Mackie, and others, A Study of Relationships Among Fatigue, Hours of Service, and Safety Operations of Truck and Bus Drivers, Report No. BMCS-RD-71-2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1972). (b) I. S. Jones and H. S. Stein, Effect of Driver Hours of Service on Tractor-Trailer Crash Involvement (Washington, DC: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 1987).

[2] Cites:  J. C. Stutts, J. W. Wilkins, J. S. Osberg, and B. V. Vaughn, “Driver Risk Factors for Sleep-Related Crashes,” Accident Analysis and Prevention Vol. 35 (2003): 321–331.

[3] Cites: N. Haworth, “The Role of Fatigue in Setting Driving Hour Regulations,” Fatigue and Driving: Driver Impairment, Driver Fatigue, and Driving Simulation, ed., L. Hartley (Bristol, PA: Taylor & Francis, 1995).

[4] Cites:  W. Harris, “Fatigue, Circadian Rhythm, and Traffic Accidents,” Vigilance Theory, Operational Performance, and Physiological Correlates, ed., R. R. Mackie (New York: Plenum, 1977) 133–146.

[5] Cites:  T. Roth, T. A. Roehrs, M. A. Carskadon, and W. C. Dement, “Daytime Sleepiness and Alertness,”  Principles and Practice of Sleep Medicine, eds., M. H. Kryger, T. Roth, and W. C. Dement (Philadelphia, PA: Sanders, 1994).

[6] Cites: Research Record, 1573 (Washington, DC: National Research Council/Transportation Research Board, 1997). (b) D. A. Morena, “Rumbling Towards Safety,” Public Roads Vol. 67, No. 2 (2003). (c) R. R. Marvin and D. J. Clark, An Evaluation of Shoulder Rumble Strips in Montana, FHWA/MT-03-008/8157 (Washington, DC: Federal Highway Administration, 2003).