2006 — Oct 31, Arson Fire, Mizpah Hotel on North Lake Street, Reno, NV — 12

— 12  Badger, Stephen G. Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fires for 2006 (NFPA No. MDS06).

— 12  U.S. Fire Administration, FEMA. Twelve-Fatality Hotel Arson, Reno Nevada.  May 2008.

 

Narrative Information

 

Badger/NFPA:  “The largest loss-of-life residential fire [for 2006] killed 12 people. The fire occurred in a 4-story…104-room residential hotel that had complete coverage smoke alarms, smoke detection, and manual pull stations. In the second story hallway, numerous box springs and mattresses were stored as they were removed and replaced in the rooms.

 

“During the evening, an argument ensued between two second-story occupants. Shortly after that, one of the participants in the argument took a mattress and placed it in front of the door of the other person. She set the mattress on fire and returned to her room.

 

“Fire and heat spread rapidly until the hallway flashed over. Smoke and fire spread rapidly throughout most of the building. The smoke detector in the area of ignition activated and notified a central station alarm company, which in turn notified the fire department.

 

“The 12 victims were located in various areas of the U-shaped structure — 6 on the second story, 4 on the third story, and 2 on the fourth story.

 

“Two people involved in the argument survived. The woman who set the fire was arrested and convicted.”[1] (Badger, Stephen G. Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fires for 2006 (NFPA No. MDS06). Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, Fire Analysis and Research Division, Sep 2007, pp. 2-3.)

 

USFA:  “On October 31, 2006, a fire occurred in the four-story Mizpah Hotel located at 214 North Lake Street in downtown Reno, NV. Twelve of the hotel’s residents died in the fire, 31 people were injured, 2 critically, and 70 people had to be rescued from the building by the fire department. More than 80 people were displaced by the fire.

 

“The fire was detected at approximately 10 p.m., when a smoke detector in the second floor hallway of the hotel’s north wing alerted and activated the building’s fire alarm system. The hotel fire detec­tion system was a supervised system of smoke and heat detectors monitored 24 hours a day by ADT Security Services in Rochester, NY. The service immediately notified the Reno Fire Department (RFD).

 

“RFD’s Station 1 was located approximately 500 feet from the rear of the Mizpah Hotel. The engine and ladder truck from Station 1 were the initial units dispatched to investigate the alarm.  As the crews prepared to respond, heavy black smoke was seen coming from the north side of the structure. Prior to leaving the station, the fire officer appraised dispatch of the conditions and requested the incident be upgraded to a working fire assignment for additional assistance.

 

“The first fire units arrived at the scene less than 2 minutes after dispatch. These units were confronted with moderate to heavy black smoke issuing from the windows on the second and third floors of the hotel’s north wing. Numerous people were hanging from their windows yelling for help and threatening to jump. The truck captain established Mizpah Command, which was transferred almost immediately to Battalion Chief 1, who arrived immediately behind the first units.

 

“At the time of the fire, the fire alarm system was reported to have functioned properly. The hotel was not equipped with automatic sprinklers, but did have Class I and II standpipe systems. Class I stand­pipe systems are designed primarily for fire department use, while the Class II system is designed for firefighting by the building occupants until the arrival of the fire department. According to the Incident Commander (IC) one of the hose cabinet lines had been pulled on the second floor.

 

“Many of the hotel residents ignored the fire alarm because alarms had become commonplace in the weeks preceding the fire, and usually were silenced quickly. Many occupants remained in their rooms until they noticed smoke coming under their door, at which time for many it was too late to escape using the interior stairwells or fire escapes. The fire was spreading so rapidly they could no longer leave their rooms safely. Many of those who tried to exit were the first victims. Seven of the 12 victims who perished in the fire were found in the second and third floor hallways.

 

“Offensive fire operations were delayed to permit the first-arriving units to rescue people who could be seen at their windows. According to the IC approximately 70 people either were rescued or were escorted out of the building by the fire department; 31 people were reported rescued from upper floor windows by the fire department using ground and aerial ladders. At the height of rescue opera­tions, the fire department used two bucket trucks (also referred to as cherry pickers) provided by the “Contractor’s Auxiliary,” an organization comprised of local contractors who have agreed to accept the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) fee schedule. The Auxiliary provides a wide variety of heavy and specialized equipment to local jurisdictions during emergencies.

 

“The bucket trucks were used to rescue hotel occupants from their windows in the rear of the build­ing. The decision by the IC to delay offensive fire operations and immediately initiate rescue opera­tions helped to avert additional fatalities and injuries of hotel occupants.

 

“Offensive fire operations lasted for approximately 5 to 10 minutes. Based on the rapid spread and lack of progress at containing the fire, the IC became increasingly concerned as to the structural integrity of the building. He ordered fire crews to evacuate the building immediately, and shifted tactical operations to a defensive strategy. The goal at this point was to prevent the fire from extend­ing from the north wing into the south wing.

 

“Prior to the fire, hotel maintenance personnel had been in the process of replacing mattresses in guest rooms. The old mattresses as well as some new ones were stacked along the walls of the second and third floor hallways waiting to be switched out or disposed of. According to one hotel resident, the mattresses had been positioned along the hallways for about a week. The mattresses significantly contributed to the fire load and spread. According to information on the mattress tags, the padding was 100-percent flexible polyurethane foam, a highly combustible material that can be ignited easily by an open flame such as a lighter or match.

 

“The fire spread rapidly throughout the second and third floors, fed primarily by the polyurethane mattresses stacked along the hallways. The fire extended to the third floor via the stairwells at the west and east ends of the north wing. Virtually all of the rooms on the second and third floors of the north wing were either destroyed or heavily damaged by fire and smoke. Although the annex and south wing suffered little direct fire damage, these areas sustained moderate to heavy smoke damage. The majority of the roof over the north wing was consumed by the fire and eventually collapsed, and a segment of the third floor partially collapsed as well….

 

“The fire eventually required four alarms to bring it under control. In total, 16 pieces of fire apparatus and 72 personnel were involved in rescue and fire suppression operations. The fire resulted in $2.4 million dollars in damages. The post-fire investigation found that the fire had been deliberately set by a resident of the hotel following an argument with another resident. Both individuals lived on the second floor of the hotel, and both survived the fire.” (USFA. Twelve-Fatality Hotel Arson, Reno Nevada.  May 2008, pp. 2-3.)

 

Sources

 

Badger, Stephen G. Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fires for 2006 (NFPA No. MDS06). Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, Fire Analysis and Research Division, Sep 2007. Accessed 7-8-2013: http://www.nfpa.org/~/media/files/research/nfpa%20reports/overall%20fire%20statistics/catastrophic2006.ashx

 

United States Fire Administration, FEMA. Twelve-Fatality Hotel Arson, Reno, Nevada (USFA-TR-164). May 2008. At: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr_164.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Cites:  Bob Duval, NFPA Investigation Report, “The Reno Hotel Fire.”