2010 — April 5, Gas Explosion, Upper Big Branch Coal Mine, Montcoal, WV — 29

–29  CNN. “Don Blakenship, ex-Massey Energy CEO, sentenced to a year in Prison.” 4-6-2016.

–29  CNN. “Report: Deadliest US Mine Disaster in Decades…Safety Failures.” 5-19-2011.

–29  McAteer. Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel. Upper Big Branch…Report. May 2011.

–29  MSHA.  Performance Coal Co. Upper Big Branch Mine…Single Source Page. 2011.

–29  MSHA. “US Labor Department’s MSHA cites corporate culture as root cause…”12-6-2011.

–29  Reuters. “CEO charged in West Virginia coal mine blast hid violations: prosecutor.” 10-7-2015.

–29  Washington Post. “U.S. mine safety agency faulted on choice of man…” 4-14-2010, A1.

 

Narrative Information

 

CNN, May 19, 2011: “A “perfect storm was brewing” in West Virginia’s Upper Big Branch coal mine in the weeks and days before a fireball tore through it on April 5, 2010, killing 29 miners and injuring one severely, according to a just-released report by the Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel.

 

“The report describes in vivid detail the conditions at Upper Big Branch before, during and after the deadliest U.S. mine disaster in 40 years, and concludes that the explosion was preventable and resulted from “failures in safety systems” at the mine in southern West Virginia.

 

“The findings are based on physical examinations of the mine, regulatory records, the mine’s internal records and more than 300 interviews with current and former mine employees, family members of miners, as well as with state and federal mine regulators. Noticeably absent from the 120-page report: testimony from the top people in charge of the mine. They invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to cooperate with investigators.

 

“Among the key findings: The Upper Big Branch mine lacked adequate ventilation, water sprays on equipment were not properly maintained and failed to function as they should have, and the mining company didn’t meet federal and state safety standards for the application of rock dust, a crucial tool in keeping highly explosive coal dust inert.

 

“How far short did they fall?  Citing internal mining reports, the investigation found that in the 26 days before the disaster, rock dusting was carried out at the Upper Big Branch mine just 11.6% of the time it was requested. Out of 561 dustings requested, only 65 were recorded. The report notes that “extensive tests conducted by the (Mine Safety and Health Administration) after the disaster support miners’ testimony that the Upper Big Branch mine was poorly dusted” and also says “a well dusted mine would have put the brakes on a propagating explosion and the death toll would have been significantly less.”

 

“Massey Energy maintains the explosion was caused by an unforeseen, massive influx of methane or natural gas. But the report rejects that argument, calling the disaster man-made and blaming a corporate “culture in which wrongdoing became acceptable, where deviation became the norm.”

 

“The report says insufficient basic safety measures at Upper Big Branch turned a small fireball into “an enormously powerful blast” that rocketed through more than 2 1/2 miles of the mine, nearly 1,000 feet underground.

 

“While officials with the U.S. Department of Labor and its Mine Safety and Health Administration have repeatedly defended the agency’s performance, the panel’s investigators reached a much different conclusion.  “Despite MSHA’s considerable authority and resources, its collective knowledge and experience, the disaster at the Upper Big Branch mine is proof positive that the agency failed its duty as the watchdog for coal miners,” the report said.

 

“In a statement responding to the report, MSHA Assistant Secretary Joseph A. Main said the agency was playing a “significant role” in mine safety efforts, “yet there are mine operators that don’t get it.”  “They operate differently when MSHA is not there, and they know MSHA cannot be there all the time,” Main said. “That’s why we have called on Congress to provide us with more tools to protect miners. We need to make sure that recalcitrant operators do get it.”  Main added: “While our own investigation is ongoing, it is fair to say that MSHA is in agreement with many of the GIIP findings. Their report echoes many of findings that MSHA has been sharing with victims’ families and the public.”

 

“The panel was commissioned days after the Upper Big Branch explosion by West Virginia’s then-Gov. Joe Manchin, and its report draws extensively on testimony given under oath.

 

“According to investigators, Brent Racer had just entered the mine to begin his shift when the explosion hit.

 

“… it felt like sand picking up, you know, like at the beach, pinging you in the face when it starts blowing real hard. And you couldn’t hear the belt, and all of a sudden you heard this big roar, and that’s just when the air picked up. I’d say it was probably 60-some miles per hour. Instantly black. It took my hardhat and ripped it off my head, it was so powerful.”

 

“Racer was one of the last men to make it out alive.

 

“Adam Jenkins, who was directing traffic in and out of the mine when disaster struck, testified about what he saw on the mine’s surface.

 

“All the dust started, just a white smoke started pouring out the portals, and it sounded like thunder. It was constant. And I didn’t know what happened. And [mine superintendent] Gary May, he said, ‘Oh, Lord … something bad’s happened.’ He said to get ahold of everybody and tell them to get outside now. And I hollered and hollered and hollered for over a half hour.”

 

“Roof bolter Tim Blake, who was ending his shift when the blast hit, described putting on his emergency breathing equipment and trying to help eight fallen miners who were with him, including a large man nicknamed Pee Wee.

 

“I had to manhandle him, get him down, lay him flat down. I put his rescuer (breathing equipment) on him. I went to the next man, which was the boss [Steve Harrah], and he was laying face down. ..I had to roll him over, put his rescuer on him.”

 

“The men were being overtaken by carbon monoxide. Blake realized his fresh air supply was running out and checked on his friends one last time before leaving the mine.  “So I went around to each man again, felt for a pulse. Everybody had a pulse but one man. I couldn’t find no pulse on him.”

 

“Of those seven miners who were still alive when Blake left them, just one survived. Leaving his friends behind, Blake testified, “was the hardest thing” he ever did.

 

“In a statement, Massey Energy’s general counsel Shane Harvey told CNN the company is reviewing the report carefully.  He said Massey Energy agrees that the industry needs to examine whether it can achieve better methane monitoring technology.

 

“At UBB, all methane monitors were functional and yet the mine experienced a massive inundation of methane-rich natural gas that was not detected in time to prevent the explosion,” he said. “We have been examining where improvements in methane monitoring can be made and we hope to develop some better technologies as a result of our investigation.”

 

“Shane said the company disagrees with the report’s conclusion that the explosion was fueled by coal dust. “Again, we believe that the explosion was caused by a massive inundation of methane-rich natural gas. Our experts feel confident that coal dust did not play an important role”.”  (CNN.  “Report: Deadliest US Mine Disaster in Decades…Safety Failures.” 5-19-2011.)

 

McAteer: “At approximately 3:02 p.m. on Easter Monday, April 5, 2010, a powerful explosion tore through the Upper Big Branch mine, owned by Massey Energy and operated by its subsidiary, Performance Coal Company, at the convergence of Boone and Raleigh counties in southern West Virginia.

 

“Twenty-nine miners died and one was seriously injured as the enormously powerful blast rocketed through two and one-half miles of underground work­ings nearly 1,000 feet beneath the surface of the rugged mountains along the Coal River. The disaster has had grave consequences for a mining company, for a com­munity and, most importantly, for the family members who lost men dear to them.

 

“On April 13, 2010, then West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin III asked J. Davitt McAteer, former Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, to conduct an independent investigation into the disaster….

 

“As a result of an inquiry that continued for more than a year, the Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel has reached the following conclusions:

 

• The explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine could have been prevented.

 

• The explosion was the result of failures of ba­sic safety systems identified and codified to protect the lives of miners. The company’s ventilation system did not adequately ventilate the mine. As a result, explosive gases were allowed to build up. The company failed to meet federal and state safe principal standards for the application of rock dust. Therefore, coal dust provided the fuel that allowed the explosion to propagate through the mine. Third, water sprays on equipment were not properly maintained and failed to function as they should have. As a result, a small ignition could not be quickly extinguished.

 

• Three layers of protection designed to safe­guard the lives of miners failed at Upper Big Branch. First, the company’s pre-shift/on-shift examination sys­tem broke down so that safety hazards either were not recorded, or, if recorded, were not corrected. Second, the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) failed to use all the tools at its disposal to ensure that the company was compliant with federal laws. Third, the West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training (WVHST) failed in its role of enforcing state laws and serving as a watchdog for coal miners.

 

• Regulatory agencies alone cannot ensure a safe workplace for miners. It is incumbent upon the coal industry to lead the way toward a better, safer industry and toward a culture in which safety of workers truly is paramount. A genuine commitment to safety means not just examining miners’ work practices and behaviors. It means evaluating management decisions up the chain of command – all the way to the boardroom – about how miners’ work is organized and performed.

 

• The politics of coal must be addressed at both a state and national level. Coal is a vital component in our nation’s energy strategy. The men and women who mine it also are a national resource whose lives, safety and health must be safeguarded.” (WV Governor’s Office on McAteer Report. 2011, 4)

 

“….More than 300 interviews were conducted, with the majority (221) taking place between May and August 2010. Eighteen corporate officials, includ­ing Don Blankenship, chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Massey Energy at the time of the explosion; Performance Coal president Chris Blanchard and Vice President Jamie Ferguson, and Massey Vice President of Safety Elizabeth Chamberlin, invoked their Fifth Amend­ment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to cooperate with investigators….

 

“The Governor’s Independent Investigation report is divided into sections. The first section out­lines the events that led up to the April 5, 2010, disas­ter; reconstructs the disaster itself; and describes the response to the tragedy and the rescue and recovery efforts.

 

“The second section describes in detail the sys­temic failures that allowed the disaster to occur – the faulty ventilation system, the inadequate application of rock dust and the equipment failures.

 

“The third section analyzes government oversight agencies – both state and federal – and asks the painful question posed by family members: how did you let this happen?

 

“The fourth section examines the culture of the mine’s operator, Massey Energy, its prominence in the Appalachian coalfields and its particular influence over the industry in West Virginia. It explores how that cul­ture created a climate in which a disaster such as that at Upper Big Branch could occur.

 

“The fifth section offers summaries, conclusions and recommendations for going forward….

 

“…it is our hope that this frank and unvarnished presenta­tion of what transpired on April 5, 2010, offers a clear picture of the real and constant risks associated with operating coal mines in a reckless manner. We also hope that it causes all mine operators to examine their own dedication to safe mining practices and their attitudes toward safety regulations and regulators. If this type of introspection provides a path for industry and regula­tors to recommit themselves to safe mining practices each and every day in each and every one of this na­tion’s coal mines, then we will have honored the lives of the 29 men lost in the Upper Big Branch mine disaster.”   (McAteer 2011, 5)

 

“`Something bad is going to happen,” Gary Wayne Quarles told at least three people during the Easter weekend, as if he had a deep and abiding premonition about the Upper Big Branch mine. Evidence suggests that, during Easter weekend, as Quarles was giving voice to his fears, trouble was brewing at the mine. Maintenance Superintendent Paul Thompson testified that pumps removing water from the longwall headgate and tailgate had failed during the weekend.  Thompson later changed that testimony, but miners returning to UBB on Easter Monday found high water had filled the entries and impeded the flow of air.  Without air draw­ing across the gob to flush out methane – which occurs naturally in underground coal mines – the deadly gas could build up behind the longwall.

 

“Ventilation was not a new problem at Upper Big Branch, a sprawling drift mine with approximately 2.7 miles of active underground works, located at Montcoal in Raleigh County. The company had experienced prob­lems with airflow since the longwall was returned to UBB from the Logan’s Fork mine in September 2009.

 

“One supervisor said that the air reversed “on the longwall face just real regular,” a problem he attributed to the mine filling up with water and roofing out. Brian “Hammer” Collins, the second shift foreman on the Tailgate 22 section, said the 22 Headgate section “con­stantly had air problems.” Joshua Massey, a roof bolter on the Headgate 22 swing shift crew said, “There wasn’t no air. It’s hard to ventilate a place when you ain’t got nothing to ventilate it with.”  Stanley “Goose” Stewart, who worked in the mines for 34 years, 15 of them at UBB, testified at a congressional hearing that UBB was “a ticking time bomb” because “the ventilation system they had didn’t work.”  (McAteer 2011, 5-6)

 

“Top-level management officials at Performance Coal – the Massey subsidiary that ran UBB – continued to tinker with the air, stealing it from one mining section to ventilate another. But nothing seemed to take care of the problem. Shuttle car operator Bobbie Pauley, who worked the Saturday evening shift before the Easter break, said her crew “didn’t have any air” on Head­gate 22 that night. “I won’t say suffocating,” she said in describing conditions on the Headgate. “But it was hot.” Pauley said she overheard miner James Griffith tell fore­man Brandon Bowling, `You’re going to have to get me some air up here. There’s no air up here, Brandon’.”

 

“The lack of air wasn’t the only chronic problem at UBB. Some veteran miners, including Charles Semen­ske and Timothy Blake, testified about what they felt was inadequate rock-dusting at the mine. Tests conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Mines as early as 1908 proved that, contrary to previously held beliefs, coal dust is highly explosive. The tests also demonstrated that the explosive nature of the dust can be rendered inert by the application of rock dust, which is pulverized limestone rock. A number of witnesses attributed the in­adequate rock dusting at UBB to the fact that a two-man crew was responsible for rock dusting the entire mine on a part-time basis; others pointed out that the dusting equipment at the mine was both outdated and poorly maintained. Tests conducted after the disaster con­firmed that the company failed to meet state and federal standards for rock dusting.

 

“As miners returned to work on April 5, some of them observed that the air was reversed in the mine. Others commented on the lack of airflow in some parts of the mine. It was hot in there, miserably hot, one said. A perfect storm was brewing inside the Upper Big Branch mine – insufficient air, a build-up of methane and enough coal dust to carry an explosion long distanc­es through the mine. All that was needed was a spark.

 

“It came just after 3 p.m., as the day shift was com­pleting work and the second shift was entering the mine, resulting in a massive and violent explosion that tore through Upper Big Branch.

 

“Based on evidence gathered at the mine and testi­mony offered by those who were familiar with practices and conditions at Upper Big Branch, the Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel has concluded that the ignition point for the blast was the tail of the longwall. As the shearer cut into the sandstone mine roof, the resulting sparks ignited a pocket of methane, creating a fireball. The fireball in turn ignited the methane that had accumulated in the gob during the Easter weekend and leaked onto the longwall face. The fireball traveled into the tailgate area, where accumulations of coal dust provided fuel for a second, more deadly, force. This dust-fueled blast ricocheted in multiple directions, traveling across the longwall face, into the tailgate entry, and through more than two miles of the mine.

 

“Twenty-nine men were killed in the blast, including Spanky Quarles, Nicolas McCroskey and the rest of the longwall dayshift crew, making it the most deadly coal mining disaster in the United States in 40 years.”  (McAteer 2011, 16)

 

[Sidebar – “In West Virginia, the Dangers are Double]:

 

“Historically, West Virginia has been among the leading coal producing states in the nation. Unfortu­nately, the state’s coal miners have paid a high price for this production.

 

“West Virginia coal mines have recorded the highest rates of fatal accidents and injuries in the country, and mines in southern West Virginia, where the Upper Big Branch mine is located, have been par­ticularly deadly.

 

“A study by the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration concluded that 70 miners were killed on the job in southern West Virginia in 1996, result­ing in 28 percent of all U.S. mining fatalities in an area that employs just 13 percent of the nation’s miners. A report prepared in 2001 for West Virginia Governor Bob Wise concluded that between 1991 and 2000, 25 percent of the country’s 458 coal mining fatalities – 116 deaths – occurred in southern West Virginia. Inde­pendent contractors accounted for nearly 30 percent of those fatalities.

 

“During the past 20 years, coal companies have increased the use of contractors, or contract workers, to augment their workforces. This practice has made it more difficult for federal and state governments to accurate assess and characterize a company’s safety performance. If contractors are killed or injured on the job, the death or injury is attributed to the con­tract company, not to the mine where the accident occurred. One of the victims of the Upper Big Branch disaster was a contractor, not a Massey employee. The death of Joshue Napper, 26, is recorded as a fatality for David Stanley Consultants, LLC, not Massey Energy.”  (McAteer 2011, 18)

 

“The Upper Big Branch miners tolerated haphaz­ard planning and poor engineering to produce coal. In addition, they had to deal with ineffective upper man­agement on a daily basis. The miners understood the significant financial investment needed to operate a longwall. If the UBB miners wanted to keep their jobs they had to produce coal. Leaving the longwall face unattended was not an option unless it was quitting time or an emergency.

 

“The physical evidence compiled and examined by investigators tells us that something dire happened on the longwall in the moments before the explosion. The shearer operators and two other victims (Joel Price, Gary Quarles, Christopher Bell and Dillard Persinger) were found about two-thirds of the way down the longwall face. These men must have seen something ominous and out of the ordinary.”  (McAteer 2011, 22)

 

“The explosion reported in the media as a single event actually was a series of explosions created as the compressed air on the leading edge of the force caused the coal dust to become airborne. Thus, the explosion generated its own fuel with the air/dust mixture behav­ing like a line of gunpowder carrying the blast forward in multiple directions – toward the outside of the mine, deeper into the tailgate and along the longwall face toward Headgate 22, Tailgate 22 and 9 North.”  (McAteer 2011, 23)

 

“If the ventilation system at UBB had been oper­ating properly, lethal gases such as those that triggered the explosion would have been cleared away from the face. An effective ventilation system would have swept contaminated air away from working sections and into the return. It also would have exerted positive pressure on the gob to keep the gases away from the working face. At UBB, much of this air exited from the back of the mine, drawn by the pulling force of the Bandytown fan. Because the ventilation at UBB was disrupted over the Easter weekend when the “de-watering” pumps failed and allowed water to accumulate in the entries leading to the fan, the flow of air was impeded.

 

“Evidence revealed that shortly before the initial explosion, the longwall crew had moved away from the shearer. This unanticipated movement suggests that a member or members of the crew had spotted trouble. In all likelihood, crew members observed the ball of flame at the shearer moving to the tailgate entry, and one of them called out to the shearer operator in the headgate entry (the entry at the longwall face), alerting him to problems. The longwall shearer manual disconnect stop button, located at the longwall headgate, was depressed, cutting power to the longwall at 2:59:38 p.m.

 

“The Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel finds significant the fact that the headgate operator de-energized the longwall through a two-step process and shut off the water to the longwall. This shutdown is standard industry procedure when potentially serious problems occur on a longwall, and it is something that had to be done manually.”  (McAteer 2011, 24)

 

[Sidebar:  “Causes of Death.”]

 

“The bodies of the 29 victims of the Upper Big Branch Mine explosion were found in six differ­ent locations throughout the mine. By combining the results of autopsies performed by the West Virginia Medical Examiner with information about where the victims were found, we could determine the following:

 

• Seven victims in a mantrip at 78 break, heading out of the mine perished as a result of carbon monoxide intoxication. Two men on this mantrip survived the explosion.

 

• One victim, whose body was located near the 6 North Belt, died as a result of injuries suffered in the explosion.

 

• Four victims found on Headgate 2 North outside the longwall panel, were victims of carbon monoxide intoxication. Contributory blast injuries were also present on these victims.

 

• Eight victims were located in the longwall area. Three died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning, with contributory injuries caused by the blast. Five victims died from injuries sustained in the explosion, with two of the five also having con­tributory carbon monoxide intoxication.

 

• Six victims were found on a mantrip in the Headgate 22 area of the mine. Five of the six were victims of carbon monoxide intoxication. The sixth died as a result of injuries suffered in the explosion, with contributory carbon monoxide intoxication.

 

• Three victims were located on Headgate 22, away from the mantrip and inby the section. Their deaths were attributed to injuries sustained in the blast.

 

“Of the 29 men killed, 19 died as result of carbon monoxide intoxication, and the remaining ten died as a result of injuries suffered in the explo­sion.”  (McAteer 2011, 28)

 

[Sidebar]  “Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis and the UBB miners.

 

“Coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (CWP), also called black lung disease, develops when respirable coal mine dust is inhaled and deposits in the lungs. It is a chronic, fibrotic, and irrevers­ible disease that robs miners of their breath and life. CWP is wholly preventable with diligent use of dust control measures including proper ventila­tion, water sprays and dust collectors.

 

“Autopsies of the 29 men who lost their lives in the Upper Big Branch explosion were performed by the West Virginia Medical Exam­iner. Lung examinations, necessary to determine the presence or absence of CWP is a specialized review, requiring physicians with expertise, ad­ditional training and practice. At our request a recognized expert in occupational diseases and with experience in lung examinations of this sort reviewed the autopsy reports and determined the presence or absence of CWP.

 

“Of the 29 victims, five did not have suf­ficient lung tissue available to make a determina­tion relating to CWP: two due to massive injury and three due to autolysis.[1] The remaining 24 victims had sufficient tissue for examination.

 

“Seventeen of the 24 victims’ autopsies (or 71 percent) had CWP. This compares with the national prevalence rate for CWP among active underground miners in the U.S. is 3.2 percent, and the rate in West Virginia is 7.6 percent.  The ages of the UBB victims with CWP ranged from 25 to 61 years.

 

“Of the seven not identified as having CWP, four had what was characterized as “anthracosis” on their autopsy report. This term is often used in lieu of the term pneumoconiosis, or may refer to a black pigment deposition without the fibrosis and other characteristics needed to make a firm diagnosis of pneumoconiosis. Consequently, it is possible that upon further expert review, these four miners could have had pneumoconiosis. Three of the 24 victims had no pneumoconiosis or anthracosis noted.

 

“Of the 17 UBB victims with CWP, five of them had less than 10 years of experience as coal miners, while nine had more than 30 years of mining experience. At least four of the 17 worked almost exclusively at UBB. All but one of the 17 victims with CWP began working in the mines after the 2.0 milligram coal mine dust limit was put in affect in 1973. This was an exposure limit that was believed at the time sufficient to prevent black lung disease. It has since been determined ineffective to protecting miners’ health.

 

“The victims at UBB constitute a random sample of miners. The fact that 71 percent of them show evidence of CWP is an alarming find­ing given the ages and work history of these men.”  (McAteer p, 32) (Gov’s [WV] Ind. Investigation Panel [McAteer]. Upper Big Branch…Report.  May 2011.)

 

MSHA, May 9, 2011: “Arlington, Va. — Joseph A. Main, assistant secretary of labor for mine safety and health, today issued the following statement regarding the release of the Upper Big Branch Independent Investigation Report:

 

“Maintaining a safe mine is the responsibility of the mine operator. The tragedy at the Upper Big Branch Mine was entirely preventable, and basic safety practices were not followed by Massey Energy. Those were the major findings in the Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel’s report on Upper Big Branch, released today.

 

“GIIP agrees with much of the evidence analyzed by MSHA to date. It reveals that methane was ignited at the tail of the longwall as the longwall shearer, which had faulty water sprays, cut into sandstone in the mine roof, the likely source of the ignition. The ignition then transitioned into a major coal dust explosion.

 

“The GIIP report found that ‘Massey failed to properly examine the mine to find and fix hazards and violations; control the accumulation of coal dust in the mine by adequately rock dusting; maintain water spray systems on the longwall cutting shearer; submit an effective mine ventilation plan; and comply with approved plans.’

 

“Massey knew it was having serious compliance problems and failed to effectively fix them. However, as the GIIP report points out, Massey did more than fail to act. Massey promoted a culture that ‘prized production over safety’ and where ‘wrongdoing became acceptable.’ As such, it violated the law and disregarded basic safety practices.

 

“As part of this culture, the GIIP report found that Massey employed tactics to intimidate miners from speaking out about unsafe conditions. As we heard from congressional testimony of miners last spring, Massey also hid violations from government enforcement agencies, such as through advance notice of inspections, which is prohibited under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.

 

“We are playing a significant role in making mines safer. Yet, there are mine operators that don’t get it. They operate differently when MSHA is not there, and they know MSHA cannot be there all the time. That’s why we have called on Congress to provide us with more tools to protect miners. We need to make sure that recalcitrant operators do get it.

 

“While our own investigation is ongoing, it is fair to say that MSHA is in agreement with many of the GIIP findings. The panel’s report echoes many of the findings that MSHA has been sharing with victims’ families and the public.” (MSHA, U.S. Dept. of Labor. “Statement by MSHA Assistant Secretary Joseph A. Main on release of Upper Big Branch Independent Investigation Report,” 5-19-2011.)

 

MSHA, Dec 6, 2011: “Arlington, Va. — The U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration today announced that it has imposed a fine of $10,825,368, the largest in agency history, following its investigation into the April 2010 explosion at the Upper Big Branch-South Mine, which was operated by Performance Coal Co., a subsidiary of Massey Energy Co. The investigation followed an explosion that killed 29 miners and injured two – the worst U.S. coal mining disaster in 40 years. A report concludes that Massey’s corporate culture was the root cause of the tragedy. MSHA has issued Massey and PCC 369 citations and orders, including for an unprecedented 21 flagrant violations, which carry the most serious civil penalties available under the law.

 

“Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis, Solicitor of Labor M. Patricia Smith, MSHA Assistant Secretary Joseph A. Main and MSHA Administrator for Coal Kevin Stricklin met with families today to share the agency’s findings.

 

“”The tragic explosion at Upper Big Branch left dozens of families without husbands, fathers, brothers and sons,” said Secretary Solis. “I made a pledge to the families of those we lost, and the entire mining community, to conduct the most complete and thorough investigation possible in order to find the cause of this disaster. The results of the investigation lead to the conclusion that PCC/Massey promoted and enforced a workplace culture that valued production over safety, and broke the law as they endangered the lives of their miners. By issuing the largest fine in MSHA’s history, I hope to send a strong message that the safety of miners must come first.”

 

“The agency’s presentation of findings follows a non-prosecution agreement reached today among the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of West Virginia, the U.S. Department of Justice, Alpha Natural Resources Inc. and Alpha Appalachia Holdings Inc., formerly known as Massey Energy Co. The agreement — which includes nearly $210 million for remedial safety measures at all Alpha mines, a trust fund for improvements in mine safety and health, payment of outstanding civil penalties for all former Massey mines and restitution payments for the victims’ families — resolves criminal liability for Alpha but does not provide protection against criminal prosecution of any individuals.

 

“”This agreement can go a long way toward changing a safety culture that was clearly broken at Massey’s mines,” said Secretary Solis. “Although this agreement is significant, it in no way absolves any individuals responsible for this terrible tragedy of their criminal liability. We will continue to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to ensure that the responsible parties will be brought to justice.”

 

“MSHA concluded that the 29 miners died in a massive coal dust explosion that started as a methane ignition. While the investigation found the physical conditions that led to the coal dust explosion were the result of a series of basic safety violations at UBB, which PCC and Massey disregarded, the report cites unlawful policies and practices implemented by PCC and Massey as the root cause of the explosion – including the intimidation of miners, advance notice of inspections, and two sets of books with hazards recorded in UBB’s internal production and maintenance book but not in the official examination book. The investigation found that the operator promoted and enforced a workplace culture that valued production over safety, including practices calculated to allow it to conduct mining operations in violation of the law.

 

“”Every time Massey sent miners into the UBB Mine, Massey put those miners’ lives at risk. Massey management created a culture of fear and intimidation in their miners to hide their reckless practices. Today’s report brings to light the tragic consequences of a corporate culture that values production over people,” said Main. “The secretary and I are committed to improving the health and safety of America’s miners. To honor the memory of the lives lost at UBB, we will use the lessons learned from this terrible tragedy to fulfill that commitment.”

 

“MSHA issued PCC and Massey 12 citations and orders deemed contributory to the cause of the accident, and nine of those violations were assessed as flagrant, which carry the highest possible penalties. Violations include illegally providing advance notice to miners of MSHA inspections; failing to properly conduct required examinations; allowing hazardous levels of loose coal, coal dust and float coal dust to accumulate; failing to adequately apply rock dust to the mine; failing to adequately train miners; and failing to comply with approved ventilation plans and approved roof control plans. MSHA also issued 357 citations and orders to PCC and Massey that did not contribute directly to the explosion, including 11 assessed as flagrant. Additionally, MSHA issued two contributory and two non-contributory violations to David Stanley Consulting LLC — a contractor that supplied examiners and other miners to work at UBB — for its examiner’s failure to properly conduct examinations. These violations carry penalties of $142,684.

 

“MSHA conducted its investigation under the authority of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, which requires that authorized representatives of the secretary of labor carry out investigations in mines for the purpose of obtaining, utilizing and disseminating information relating to the causes of the accidents.

 

“MSHA conducted the underground investigation in coordination with the West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training, the Governor’s Independent Investigative Panel and Massey Energy. The United Mine Workers of America participated in the investigation in its capacity as a representative of miners designated pursuant to the Mine Act, as did Moreland & Moreland l.c.

 

“The accident investigation report, along with supplementary documents, is available on the agency’s UBB single source page at: http://www.msha.gov/PerformanceCoal/PerformanceCoal.asp.”

 

(MSHA News Release 11-1703-NAT. “US Labor Department’s MSHA cites corporate culture as root cause…”12-6-2011.)

 

WV Gov. Statement, May 19, 2011: “I want to thank Davitt McAteer and his team for their hard work and dedication in presenting the Report to the Governor on the Upper Big Branch mine disaster (“Report”). With the information presented in the Report, we are steps closer to identifying the cause of this horrific incident and also to identifying potential reforms to improve mine safety.

 

“My staff, along with the experts at the West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety & Training (“OMHS&T”), has already begun our review of the Report and will continue that review in the coming days. The Report, along with the reports that will be issued by the OMHS&T and the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) in the coming months, will provide my administration the information necessary to develop regulatory and statutory changes necessary to improve mine safety in West Virginia. The Report, along with the final conclusions by our OMHS&T and MSHA, should also provide significant insight as to the cause of this disaster and help us prevent future mine disasters. Just as was the case with the Sago and Aracoma disasters, I remain strongly committed to improving mine safety in our State. My office will continue to work closely with all involved to make West Virginia’s mines the safest in the nation.

“I do want to note that the State has already taken several steps to address recommendations that are contained in the Report for the OMHS&T. Specifically, the State has begun to address inspector staffing issues. During this past Legislative Session, we added $750,000 to the budget of OMHS&T for a $5,004 pay raise for all mine inspectors. This will aid in recruitment and retention of qualified inspectors.

“We have recently hired new inspectors to focus on making sure that mines are properly rock dusted. Those inspectors are currently in training. The OMHS&T’s lab for rock dust analysis is in place and is expected to begin operating around July 1 of this year, once training has been completed. For the first time in the history of our State, the OMHS&T will undertake a scientific analysis of the rock dust present in mines. It is my hope this action will further improve mining safety.

“Furthermore, the OMHS&T has already shifted resources to provide additional inspector time for larger mines, like the one at UBB. Our inspectors are now working more frequently on the weekends, allowing for inspections, as the Report suggests, at any hour and on any day.

“Finally, the Report also suggests several improvements relating to communications and technological advancements. I am certainly interested in using proven, reliable, and available technology to improve mine safety and communications. That is why I was so proud of the State’s acquisition of the Command Unit Rapid Response Task Force 1 and Mine Rescue Truck. The first of its kind, this truck significantly improves our ability to communicate and analyze conditions at a mine site. I believe we can and will do more for the safety of our miners.

“Today is no doubt another difficult day for the family and friends of the brave men we lost on the afternoon of April 5, 2010. I hope that the Report will bring some closure to their families. They and all West Virginians have my commitment that we will do all we can to make sure that a disaster like this never happens again. In honor of those we lost, I ask that all West Virginians take a moment of silent reflection in their honor.” (WV.gov. “Statement from the Governor: On Release of J. Davitt McAteer’s Investigation Report on the Upper Big Branch Mine Accident.” 5-19-2011.)

 

ABC News, April 7, 2010: “Coal mining companies have successfully thwarted tough new safety rules that were intended to help prevent a disaster like the one that killed 25 [29] West Virginia miners Monday, top labor and mine safety officials said, by overloading the regulatory system with appeals. The companies, including the massive coal producer Massey Energy, which owns the Upper Big Branch mine, developed a novel strategy to respond to more aggressive safety regulations that were imposed by Congress after two deadly mining accidents in 2006, the officials say. The companies now appeal twice as many citations as they did just four years ago.

 

“As federal safety regulators began to impose more fines, the companies responded by contesting the citations. Each challenge chewed up more time and resources. The result is an enforcement system bogged down and behind schedule, said U.S. Rep. George Miller, a California Democrat who began investigating the problem earlier this year.

 

“As the contested cases sit and wait to be reviewed the companies don’t have to pay fines, and they don’t face closer scrutiny – or risk being shut down — for having a pattern of violations that put workers in danger. In 2005, before increased penalties took effect, mine operators appealed one in three fines, and the commission that reviewed the cases carried a backlog of about 2,100 cases. Now, Miller said, mine operators contest two-thirds of all fines, with some of the largest mine owners – including Massey Energy — challenging the vast majority of the citations they receive.

 

“The backlog of appeals has shot up to 16,000 cases. And federal safety officials are waiting out appeals over $210 million dollars in contested fines….” (ABC News (Matthew Mosk and Brian Ross). “Coal Mining Industry Ducks Punishment for Safety Sins by ‘Clogging the system’ with Appeals, Critics Say.” 4-7-2010.)

 

Reuters, Oct 7, 2015: “Charleston, W.Va. (Reuters) . The former Massey Energy Co chief executive being tried over a 2010 coal mine explosion that killed 29 people was a hands-on boss who covered up widespread safety violations, a U.S. prosecutor said on Wednesday in the trial’s opening arguments. But a defense lawyer for the executive, Don Blankenship, described him as a scapegoat who was unfairly blamed for the blast at West Virginia’s Upper Big Branch Mine.

 

“Blankenship faces three felony counts in U.S. District Court for allegedly ignoring hundreds of safety breaches and conspiring to cover up violations. The blast was the worst U.S. mine disaster in four decades. Assistant U.S. Attorney Steve Ruby said Blankenship was personally involved in low-level details at the mine. He knew of hundreds of safety violations but participated in taking steps to avoid getting caught by inspectors, he said. Ruby said evidence would show that Blankenship ordered workers to fake coal dust samples and alerted miners of surprise inspections. He also approved the firing of miners who ensured safety standards. He said recorded phone calls and letters hand-written by Blankenship would back up the charges….

 

“The opening arguments followed four days of jury selection. The trial was moved by Judge Irene Berger to Charleston from Beckley after Blankenship’s attorneys complained he could not get a fair trial there because of pre-trial publicity. Blankenship, who led Massey from 2000 to 2010, faces up to 30 years in prison if convicted of all charges. Four Massey employees have been sentenced in the case. The death toll at Upper Big Branch was the highest since 91 miners were killed in a 1972 fire at an Idaho silver mine….” (Reuters. “CEO charged in West Virginia coal mine blast hid violations: prosecutor.” 10-7-2015.)

 

CNN/Dana Ford, April 6, 2016: “….Family members shouted as former Massey Energy CEO Don Blankenship walked to a waiting car Wednesday, shortly after being sentenced to a year in federal prison for conspiracy to willfully violate mine health and safety standards….

 

“Massey was the fourth-largest coal producer in the United States and the largest mine operator in Appalachia at the time of the explosion, which was one of the worst U.S. mine disasters in decades. It had racked up an extensive list of violations before the explosion, and a 2011 report by the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration found that Massey had a history of “systematic, intentional and aggressive efforts” to evade safety regulations. The company kept two sets of books to mislead miners and inspectors, tipped off crews before surprise inspections and intimidated workers to prevent them from reporting violations, the report found….

 

“Acting U.S. Attorney Carol Casto described Wednesday’s sentence as a victory for workers and workplace safety. In addition to time behind bars, Blankenship was ordered to pay a $250,000 fine…. ‘It lets companies and their executives know that you can’t take chances with the lives of coal miners and get away with it. Putting the former chief executive officer of a major corporation in prison sends a message that violating mine safety laws is a serious crime and those who break those laws will be held accountable,’ Casto said.

 

“Massey was bought by another company, Alpha Natural Resources, after the disaster. In December 2011, it settled with the Justice Department for a record $209 million in fines, penalties and compensation for families of the men killed at Upper Big Branch….” (CNN (Dana Ford). “Don Blakenship, ex-Massey Energy CEO, sentenced to a year in Prison.” 4-6-2016.)

 

Sources

 

ABC News (Matthew Mosk and Brian Ross). “Coal Mining Industry Ducks Punishment for Safety Sins by ‘Clogging the system’ with Appeals, Critics Say.” 4-7-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/coal-mining-industry-ducks-punishment-safety-sins-clogging/story?id=10302187

 

CNN (Dana Ford). “Don Blakenship, ex-Massey Energy CEO, sentenced to a year in Prison.” 4-6-2016. Accessed 4-7-2016 at: http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/06/us/former-massey-energy-ceo-don-blankenship-sentenced/index.html

 

CNN. “Report: Deadliest U.S. Mine Disaster in Decades Due to Safety Failures.” 5-19-2011. At:  http://www.kaj18.com/news/report-deadliest-u-s-mine-disaster-in-decades-due-to-safety-failures/

 

McAteer, J. Davitt and associates. Upper Big Branch — The April 5, 2010, explosion: a failure of basic coal mine safety practices (Report to the Governor, Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel). May 2011, 129 pages. Accessed 6-14-2015 at: http://www.npr.org/documents/2011/may/giip-massey-report.pdf

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Performance Coal Company Upper Big Branch Mine – South Massey Energy Company, Mine ID46-08436, Single Source Page.  Arlington, VA:  MSHA, United States Department of Labor. Accessed 5-19-2011 at:  http://www.msha.gov/PerformanceCoal/PerformanceCoal.asp

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration. “Statement by MSHA Assistant Secretary Joseph A. Main on release of Upper Big Branch Independent Investigation Report,” 5-19-2011. Arlington, VA: MSHA, United States Department of Labor, MSHA News Release Number 11-767-NAT.  Accessed at: http://www.msha.gov:80/media/PRESS/2011/NS110519.asp

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration. “US Labor Department’s MSHA cites corporate culture as root cause of Upper Big Branch Mine disaster…” (MSHA News Release). Arlington, VA:  MSHA, 12-6-2011. Accessed 6-14-2015 at: http://www.msha.gov/Media/PRESS/2011/NR111206.asp

 

Reuters (Kara Van Pelt). “CEO charged in West Virginia coal mine blast hid violations: prosecutor.” 10-7-2015. Accessed 10-9-2015: http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0S12LO20151007

 

Washington Post (Steven Mufson and David A Fahrenthold). “U.S. mine safety agency faulted on choice of man to lead probe into explosion.” 4-14-2010, A1. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/13/AR2010041304643.html

 

West Virginia Governor’s Office. “Statement from the Governor: On Release of J. Davitt McAteer’s Investigation Report on the Upper Big Branch Mine Accident.” 5-19-2011. At:  http://www.wv.gov/news/Pages/StatementfromtheGovernorOnReleaseofJDavittMcAteer’sInvestigationReportontheUpperBigBranchMineAccident.aspx

 

Additional Reading

 

Associated Press (Dena Potter and Peter Prengaman). “4 missing W.Va. miners dead; final toll at 29.” Knoxville News Sentinel, 4-10-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.knoxnews.com/news/state/4-missing-wva-miners-dead-final-toll-at-29-ep-408696707-358805841.html

 

Associated Press. “Lawmaker names 48 mines that could face scrutiny.” Gazette-Mail, Charleston, WV, 4-14-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.wvgazettemail.com/News/201004140895

 

Associated Press (Tim Huber and Sam Hananel). “Promises, Promises: Mine safety fixes fall short.” 4-8-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://archive.boston.com/business/articles/2010/04/08/promises_promises_mine_safety_fixes_fall_short/

 

Globe and Mail, Toronto, Canada (Konrad Yakabuski). “West Virginians’ identity forged by successive mining disasters.” 4-8-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/west-virginians-identity-forged-by-successive-mining-disasters/article621951/

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration. “6 Kentucky coal mines forced to halt production during inspection blitz. MSHA seeks injunction against 2 mines for interference with inspectors’ duties.” News Release. Arlington, VA: MSHA, U. S. Department of Labor, 6-6-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: https://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/MSHA20100648.htm

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration. “Hazard complaints result in surprise inspections at 3 Massey-owned mines.” Arlington, VA: MSHA, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 4-27-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/hazard-complaints-result-in-surprise-inspections-at-3-massey-owned-mines-92196589.html

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration. “MSHA announces series of public meetings to bolster transparency in investigation of Upper Big Branch explosion.” News Release 10-651-NAT. Arlington, VA: MSHA, U. S. Department of Labor, 5-6-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://arlweb.msha.gov/Media/PRESS/2010/NR100506a.asp

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration. “MSHA launches inspection blitz in nation’s coalfields. Federal inspectors focus on mines with history of ventilation, methane violations” (News Release 10-520-NAT (231). Arlington, VA: OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor, 4-21-2010. Accessed 5—18-2016 at: http://arlweb.msha.gov/Media/PRESS/2010/NR100421.asp

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration. “Statement of Joseph A. Main, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health before the Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, July 13, 2010.” Accessed 5-18-2016 at: https://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/congress/20100713_JMain.htm

 

New York Times (Ian Urbina and Michael Cooper). “Mine Rescue Continues as Owner Faces Questions.” 4-7-2010.

 

O’Keefe, Ed. “A conversation with Mike Davis of the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration.” Washington Post, 4-8-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/07/AR2010040704986.html

 

Washington Post (Steven Mufson). “Massey Energy has litany of critics, violations.” 4-6-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040601531.html

 

Washington Post (Jerry Markon, David A. Fahrenthold and Kimberly Kindy). “Mine company faulted on safety issues, regulators say.” 4-8-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604984.html

 

Washington Post (Dan Eggen). “Mining interests are heavily invested in Capitol Hill.” 4-8-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/07/AR2010040704707.html

 

Washington Post (David Montgomery and Dan Zak). “Profile: Don L. Blankenship, the self-assured chief executive of Massey Energy.” 4-8-2010. Accessed 5-18-2016 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/07/AR2010040704835.html

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] “The destruction of cells through the action of its own enzymes.”