2010 — April 20, Drill Rig Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Gulf of Mex., ~50m, LA– 11

—  11  USCG. Report of Investigation…Circumstances…Deepwater Horizon…  Apr 11, 2011.

—  11  USCG. On Scene Coordinator Report. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Sep 2011, p. 1.

 

Narrative Information

 

USCG On Scene Coordinator Report: “On April 20, 2010, 126 workers on the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon were in the process of temporarily closing the exploratory Macondo oil well. That evening, an explosion aboard the drilling unit set off a chain of events that eventually led to the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon. Eleven crewmembers lost their lives and others were seriously injured, as fire engulfed and ultimately destroyed the rig.” (USCG. On Scene Coordinator Report. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Sep 2011, p. 1.)

 

USCG Report of Investigation: “On April 20, 2010, the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) DEEPWATER HORIZON was dynamically-positioned at location 28o-44’ North 088o-21’ West in the Mississippi Canyon Block 252 of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The MODU was performing drilling operations on the Macondo Well, which had been previously started by another vessel. That evening, a series of events began that would result in an explosion and fire, taking 11 lives, injuring 16 others, and ultimately causing the MODU to become severely crippled and sink. The casualty resulted in a continuous flow of hydrocarbons into the Gulf of Mexico for 87 days before the well was capped, causing the largest oil spill in U.S. history and significant environmental damage to the Gulf of Mexico. The tragedy affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who live along the Gulf Coast or rely on the various economies associated with the Gulf of Mexico.” [Prologue, p. 3.] ….

 

“On April 20, 2010 at approximately 2150, hydrocarbons rising up from BP’s Macondo well ignited and caused an explosion on DEEPWATER HORIZON, a mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) that was drilling approximately 40 miles off the coast of Louisiana. A short time later, a second explosion rocked the unit. These explosions triggered a massive fire that burned out of control. Crew members evacuated by lifeboat and liferaft, and some jumped from the burning unit. U.S. Coast Guard and other vessels and aircraft searched for survivors and sought to salvage the vessel. Because DEEPWATER HORIZON had not been able to shut in (close) the well or disconnect from the well head, the hydrocarbons that were fueling the fire continued to flow unabated. At 1026 on April 22, DEEPWATER HORIZON sank into the Gulf of Mexico. 115 people aboard successfully evacuated and survived. However, 11 crew members are missing and presumed deceased, and 16 were injured.

 

“The Joint Investigation Team (JIT) comprised of members from the U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) examined five aspects of this disaster relating to areas of responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard: the explosions, the fire, the evacuation, the flooding and sinking of the MODU, and the safety systems of DEEPWATER HORIZON and its owner-operator, Transocean. Although the events leading to the sinking of DEEPWATER HORIZON were set into motion by the failure to prevent a well blowout, the investigation revealed numerous systems deficiencies, and acts and omissions by Transocean and its DEEPWATER HORIZON crew, that had an adverse impact on the ability to prevent or limit the magnitude of the disaster. These included poor maintenance of electrical equipment that may have ignited the explosion, bypassing of gas alarms and automatic shutdown systems that could prevent an explosion, and lack of training of personnel on when and how to shutdown engines and disconnect the MODU from the well to avoid a gas explosion and mitigate the damage from an explosion and fire. These deficiencies indicate that Transocean’s failure to have an effective safety management system and instill a culture that emphasizes and ensures safety contributed to this disaster.

 

“This investigation also revealed that the oversight and regulation of DEEPWATER HORIZON by its flag state, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), was ineffective in preventing this casualty. By delegating all of its inspection activities to “recognized organizations,” without itself conducting on board oversight surveys, the RMI effectively abdicated its vessel inspection responsibilities. In turn, this failure illustrates the need to strengthen the system of U.S. Coast Guard oversight of foreign-flagged MODUs, which as currently constructed is too limited to effectively ensure the safety of such vessels….” [Executive Summary, p. ix.] (Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon In the Gulf of Mexico April 20-22, 2010 (Vol. 1, MISLE Activity No. 3721503). 4-11-2011.)

 

Sources

 

United States Coast Guard. On Scene Coordinator Report. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Sep 2011, p. 1.  At: https://homeport.uscg.mil/cgi-bin/st/portal/uscg_docs/MyCG/Editorial/20110914/DeepwaterHorizonReport%20-31Aug2011%20-CD_2.pdf?id=06b7f7b019f4a01ad706bd30a17a8a2100fd0c40

 

United States Coast Guard. Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon In the Gulf of Mexico April 20-22, 2010 (Vol. 1, MISLE Activity No. 3721503). 4-11-2011. Accessed 5-27-2011 at: http://homeport.uscg.mil/cgi-bin/st/portal/uscg_docs/MyCG/Editorial/20110422/FINAL%20REDACTED%20VERSION%20DWH.pdf?id=92b79da437ab91031f400185bb8303d67f574b31