1947 — April 16-17, Grandcamp Ammonium Nitrate Explos./Fire, Texas City, TX –581-600
Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-7-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/
–581-600 Blanchard estimated fatality range.[1]
— ~1,000 Country Beautiful. Great Fires of America. 1973, p. 99.[2]
–600-800 Minutaglio. City on Fire: The Explosion That Devastated a Texas… 2004, p. xii.[3]
— <800 Smith, Roger. Catastrophes and Disasters. Edinburgh/NY: Chambers, 1992, p. 131.[4]
— 600 Nat. Fire Protect. Assoc. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003).
–500-600 Moore Mem. Pub. Lib. 1947 Texas City Disaster April 16 & 17, 1947. “Aftermath”[5]
— 581 History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, April 16, 1947. “Fertilizer Explosion…
— 581 Sizer. Texas Disasters. 2005, p. 134. (“The total official number [deaths] was placed at 581.”)
— >581 Stephens. The Texas City Disaster, 1947. 1997, p. 100.
— 576 Robinson, Kathleen. “Fire Down in Texas.” NFPA Journal, May/June 2012, p. 112.
–408-575 Benson. The Greatest Explosions in History. 1990, p. 97.
–468-568 NFPA. “The Texas City Disaster – A Staff Report.” Quarterly, 41/1, July 1947, p.25.
— 468 known lives lost
—>100 missing
–>568 total lives known lost and still missing
–468-568 Sanders, D.E. The Management of Losses Arising from Extreme Events. 2002, 168.[6]
–405 identified dead according to ARC and TX Dept. of Public Safety
— 63 unidentified dead “ “
–468 total dead “ “
—100 “believed missing” “ “
–568 dead and missing
–433-568 Fire Prevention and Engineering Bureau of Texas. Texas City, Texas, Disaster. 1947.[7]
— 568 Gunn. Encyclopedia of Disasters, V2. “Texas City, Texas, Explosion, April 16 1947,” p406.
— 567 History Channel. Wrath of God: Explosions! Texas City. DVD, 1999.
— 561 USCG. Record…Proceedings…Board… Investigation…Grandcamp. 9-24-47, 547.
–433 dead
—128 missing
–561 total
— 552 Holen, Arlene. “The History of Accident Rates in the United States.” 1995, p. 102.[8]
— 552 Khan, Abbasi. “Major Accidents in Process Industries…” LPPI Journal, V12, 1999.
— 552 Mannan. Lee’s Loss Prevention…Process Industries (3rd Ed.). V3, 2005. Appen. 1, 29
— 552 Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours. 1977, p. 660.
— >516 Drabek, Thomas E. The Human Side of Disaster. CRC Press, 2010, p. 34.
— 512 American National Red Cross. Texas City Explosion, April 16, 1947. 1948, p. 1.
–399 Identified dead
—113 Missing
–512 Total
— 468 National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996.[9]
Narrative Information
American Red Cross: “For horror concentrated within a few city blocks nothing in the annals of the American Red Cross surpasses the Texas City, Texas, explosion. Other disasters have taken a greater toll of human life. over a much greater area. The Texas City catastrophe occurred at 9:12 a. m., April 16, 1947. The dead and missing numbered 512, more than 2,000 were injured, and property losses were approximately 50 million….” (American National Red Cross. Texas City Explosion, April 16, 1947. 1948, p. 1.)
Country Beautiful: As ammonium nitrate fertilizer continued to be loaded into the Grandcamp from the day before when “[b]y nightfall…1,400 tons of fertilizer had been packed into the ship’s lower decks.… trickles of red-orange smoke came from the direction of the hold. Shifting of the bags of fertilizer revealed a small fire there. An officer ordered everyone off the ship and ordered that no more water be used for fear that the cargo would be damaged. The fire department was called to the heavy industrial area near the pier. (Country Beautiful. Great Fires of America. 1973, p. 99.)
“The ship exploded at 9:12 a.m. with a tremendous roar and killed four hundred people outright, including most of the fire fighters. Airplanes literally were blown from the sky, and a tidal wave was created which lifted a docked barge several feet inland. Children located over a mile from the blast were injured. The Monsanto Chemical Works near the docks caught fire; oil storage tanks blew up. Fire fighters, who could only approach the area wearing gas masks, attempted to free the ships and send them out to sea.
“The blaze became uncontrollable and firemen were forced to withdraw. Fire raged throughout Texas City for two days. Death tolls could only be guessed since many of the victims were migrant workers, but one estimate was that one thousand people died.” (Country Beautiful. Great Fires of America. 1973, p. 100.)
History.com: “A giant explosion occurs during the loading of fertilizer onto the freighter Grandcamp at a pier in Texas City, Texas, on this day in 1947. Nearly 600 people lost their lives and thousands were injured when the ship was literally blown to bits.
“Ammonium nitrate was used as an explosive by the U.S. Army in World War II and, after the war ended, production of the chemical continued as its use as a fertilizer became accepted. However, the precautions used in its transport became far more lax in the post-war years.
“On April 16, the Grandcamp was being loaded with ammonium nitrate as well as tobacco and government-owned ammunition…Cigarette smoking, although officially banned, was a common practice by longshoremen on the docks. Just two days prior to the explosion, a cigarette had caused a fire on the docks. On the morning of April 16, smoke was spotted deep within one of the Grandcamp’s holds.
“Some water and an extinguisher were used to fight the fire, but hoses were not employed for fear of ruining the cargo; there were already 2,300 tons loaded on the ship. While the ammunition was removed from the ship, the crew attempted to restrict oxygen to the hold in hopes of putting out the fire. Apparently they did not realize that because of ammonium nitrate’s chemical composition, it does not require oxygen in order to burn.
“By 9 a.m., flames had erupted from the hold and within minutes it exploded. The blast was heard 150 miles away and was so powerful that the ship’s 1.5- ton anchor was found two miles away. The force of the explosion lifted another ship right out of the water. People working at the docks were killed instantly.
“Pieces of flaming debris damaged the oil refineries in the area. A nearby Monsanto chemical storage facility also exploded, killing 234 of the 574 workers there. Nearly all of the survivors were seriously injured. A residential area of 500 homes was also leveled by the blast. Another ship, the High Flyer, which was carrying similar cargo, was pushed completely across the harbor. The crew fled when it came to rest, failing to notice that a fire had started and the next day their ship also exploded. Two people died.
“In all, 581 people died and 3,500 were injured. The explosion caused $100 million in damages. A long-disputed court case over the cause of the blast was resolved when Congress granted compensation to 1,394 victims. They received a total of $17 million in 1955. The port was rebuilt to handle oil products only.” (History.com. This Day in History…April 16, 1947. “Fertilizer Explosion Kills 581 in Texas.”)
Mannan: “At about 8:10 a.m. on 16 April 1947 fire was observed in bagged ammonium nitrate fertilizer on board the ship Grandcamp in the harbour at Texas City. There were 880 tons of ammonium nitrate in the hold affected and a further 1400 tons in another hold. Frantic efforts were made to extinguish the fire, but the quantity of water used initially was too small and by the time hose lines had been connected to supply larger quantities, the fire was so well established that the crew was ordered to abandon the ship. At 9:15 a.m. the Grandcamp disintegrated with a tremendous thunderclap, killing all persons in the dock, including firemen and a crowd of spectators.
“Another ship, the High Flyer, which also had ammonium nitrate on board, was 700 ft away and was blown free of its hawsers. On account of the danger of another explosion, volunteers could not be found to move the High Flyer out of the burning area. At 6:00 p.m. ignition of its sulfur cargo occurred. At 1:10 a.m. the next day the High Flyer was ripped apart by the expected explosion.
“The report of the National Board of Fire Underwriters (1948) states:
When the Grandcamp blew up, the cargo of peanuts, tobacco leaves, balls of sisal twine, and oil-well drilling equipment were blown in all directions. Shrapnel-like fragments of the ship were hurled in high trajectory, 2000-3000 feet into the air; some travelled more than 10,000 feet from the point of origin. Some of the oil-well drill rods (30 feet in length and 7 inches in diameter, weighing close to 1½ tons) were hurled almost 2 miles and buried 8 ft into the ground, like twisted hairpins….
“It was virtually impossible to separate the effects of the two successive explosions, but, the report continues:
Daybreak revealed a sickening scene of devastation – demolished concrete structures, masses of twisted wreckage, crippled refineries with battered storage tanks, some crumpled like tin-foil, and sidings of distant warehouses blown apart as if ripped by a tornado. Pitch black columns of smoke from the burning oil tanks spiraled skyward for 3000 feet or more, and were visible for 30 miles. They burned continuously for almost a week. Insurance inspection showed blast damage to over 3,300 dwellings and 130 business buildings, to more than 600 automobiles and some 360 box cars. Approximately 50% of some 250 storage tanks, ranging from 5,000 to 80,000 barrels capacity, were substantially damaged either by concussion, missile or intense fire.
There were 55 deaths and over 3000 injuries in a community of some 15,000 people.”
Cites: “Kintz, Jones and Carpenter (1948 BM RI 4245);[10] National Board of Fire Underwriters (1948);[11] Wheaton (1948);[12] Blocker (1949);[13] Blocker and Blocker (1949);[14] J.R. Nash (1976);[15] V. C. Marshall (1983 LPB 52, 1987).” (Mannan. Lee’s Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (Vol. 3, 3rd Ed., 2005). Appendix 1, pp. 28-29.)
Moore Memorial Public Library: “The high school gymnasium was converted into a temporary morgue, and McGar’s garage was used as an embalming room. A number of morticians, including some students, volunteered their services as well. In the days after the explosions, 150 embalmers worked on the bodies in the garage.[16] Students from local dental schools were called in to aid with the identification of the dead through dental records.
“While sources disagree on the exact number of deaths, it is estimated that 500-600 people died in the explosion. The wounded numbered into the thousands. An exact count of the dead would have been difficult to get because of the condition of many of the bodies. There were also a number of foreign seamen and non-census laborers present who may have gone unaccounted for.
“The work of identifying bodies continued through mid-June of 1947, carried out by the Houston Identification Bureau, The Department of Public Safety, Vic Landig (the chair of the city’s Burial Committee), Judge G.P. Reddell, and citizens of Texas City.”[17] (Moore Memorial Public Library. 1947 Texas City Disaster April 16 & 17, 1947. “Aftermath.”)
Sizer: “….The official number of identified dead rose to 405. The number listed as missing was 113, but so many people living in the Mexican Barrio and the Bottom, where the black folk lived, were recorded nowhere in America or on earth. Those two areas, scheduled for development, had been wiped out.
“Likewise, the bodies of children were especially difficult to locate. Burned, blown apart, crushed under debris, their very existence was gone if their parents were also killed. Sixty-three bodies were so badly damaged that no one could identify what was left. The total official number was placed at 581.” (Sizer, Mona D. Texas Disasters: Wind, Flood, and Fire. 2005, p. 134.)
United States Coast Guard: “After full and mature deliberation, the board finds as follows:
“Findings of Fact
“1. On April 16th at about 9:15 a.m. an explosion occurred in cargo on board the S.S. Grand Camp while moored to pier ‘0’ Texas City, Texas. Subsequently the piers, warehouses, industrial plants, tank farms and two other ocean going vessels became involved….
“2. Shipments of the material involved in the explosion on board the S.S. Grand Camp originated at three ordnance plants of the U.S. Army as follows:
Iowa Ordnance Plant, West Burlington, Iowa….
Cornhusker Ordnance Plant, Coplant, Nebraska….
Nebraska Ordnance Plant, Firestone, Nebraska….
“Shipped described as: ‘Fertilizer Compound…(Fertilizer grade Ammonium Nitrate)’….
“9. “The S.S. High Flyer…moored alongside the warehouse of Pier ‘0’ had accepted part cargo of 961 tons of this fertilizer and stowed same in lower hold #3. Upon completion of loading the High Flyer was moved to Pier ‘A’ which is about 700 to 800 feet south of Pier ‘0’ to received additional cargo consisting principally of ‘knocked down’ railroad freight cars. At the time the High Flyer received its cargo of fertilizer it had on board in lower hold #2 1050 tons of sulphur…There was also 950 tons of sulphur in lower hold #4…..
“13. No specific instructions to longshoremen were issued with respect to smoking on the Grand Camp during loading operations at Texas City. There was general understanding among the longshoremen that no smoking on deck or in the holds was permitted, but was not respected. Prohibitions against smoking were painted in the French language on various parts of the exterior of the ship. No such signs in English were posted. Control of smoking on deck and in the holds was lax. Smoking on the main deck near #4 hatch during loading was committed.
“14. No specific instructions on the stowage of the ammonium nitrate were issued to the longshoremen but storage was in accordance with the primary practice of the port, at which this material had been loaded in ships at Texas City for a period of more than a year. Bags, containing ammonium nitrate, which were broken or torn during loading into the Grand Camp were stowed in the holds in violation of Section 146.02-14 of the Coast Guard ‘Regulations Governing Explosives or Other Dangerous Articles on Board Vessels.’
“15, Hardly without exception all persons concerned with the handling, stowage and transportation of the cargo displayed a lack of knowledge of the provisions of regulations governing the safety of the operations either by land or water.
“16. At 5:00 p.m. 15 April 1947, #4 main hatch was closed when loading through that hatch was secured for the night. The tween deck hatch was left open at this time.
“17. The longshoremen gangs working #4 hatch reported for resumption of loading at 8:00 a.m. on Wednesday 16 April uncovered the hatch and entered the hold. There were two gangs working at stowage of cargo in #4 lower hold, one starboard and one port. At quitting time the previous evening a draft of bags was lowered into the hold too late to be stowed and this draft rested upon cargo already stowed in the square of the hatch, when the morning shift entered the hold. The port side gang began to stow the bags constituting this draft while the other gang on the starboard side sat down awaiting a draft from topside. Between 8:15 and 8:20 a.m. one of the members of the idle gang noted smoke on the starboard side of the hold about opposite the center of the square of the hatch and appearing to come up to the top of the cargo from below and in the space between the shell of the vessel and the cargo battens. No flames were visible at this time. The Longshoremen called attention to smoke in the hold and four portable fire extinguishers were reported lowered into the hold. How many were used and their type could not be definitely established. Several members of the crew entered the hold and assisted the longshoremen in applying the contents of the extinguishers to the cargo in the area of the smoke. The smoke did cease temporarily, but immediately thereafter appeared again and at this time small flames showed. After applying the contents of four extinguishers with doubtful effect, flames and smoke made their appearance at other points forward and aft along the shell of the vessel. An alarm was sounded on the ship’s whistle. A ship’s fire hose was partially lowered into the hatch but at no time was water turned on into this hose. The Second Captain (First Officer) ordered that no water be used although other ship’s hose was available and the ship’s fire pump was operating at full working pressure. Upon orders from the Captain all persons came up out of the hold, the hatch was covered and tarpaulin put in place and wet down. It is indicated steam was introduced into the hold through the steam smothering system, although this fact is not clearly established. Vent cowls were sealed off using canvas for this purpose. Ammunition stowed in #5 tween deck [missing]…away from the forward bulkhead and three cases were moved up [missing]…and deposited aft of the deck house. The contents of the boxes that were moved to the deck were small arms ammunition. The contents of the remaining boxes are not yet identified. No smoke or heat was observed in #5 hold during the removal operations.
“18. After battening down the hatch, the tarpaulin began to billow and later ripped in the area of a corner of the hatch displacing several hatch covers. These covers were not replaced. The fire apparently continued to spread and the volume of smoke, described as orange in color, increased. Up to this time no water was applied directly upon the burning cargo. The crew left the vessel on orders passed by word of mouth and assembled at the outer end of Pier ‘0’. Of the forth-one members of the crew including officers of the Grand Camp only seven survived. Of these, fire are known to have left the pier prior to the explosion. In response to the alarm fire apparatus and personnel arrived at the scene. Several pictures of the fire department preparing for action, the ship burning, and the firemen applying water form part of the record. It is not determined how many hoses were eventually brought to bear. How effective those efforts were or how effective they ever would be, with the greater portion of #4 hatch covers in place is doubtful.
“19. All personnel of the Texas City Fire Department that responded were lost (27 in number) and only portions of four bodies have been recovered and identified. Four pieces of fire apparatus were destroyed to the extent that only parts of one piece could be identified. The Texas City Fire Department was a volunteer organization having only two or three paid personnel. The terminal dies not have a manually operated fire alarms system. There are no fire alarm boxes on Pier ‘0’. There was an 8” water main to the pier with risers at intervals along the pier. Water was supplied from tower tanks and a pump of the Texas City Terminal Railway Co. The water supply system of Texas City could be ‘cut into’ the companies fire line.
“20. About 9:15 a.m. approximately fifty-five (55) minutes after the discovery of the fire the eight hundred and eighty two (882) tons of fertilizer in #4 lower hold detonated and in close sequence caused the fourteen hundred (1400) tons in #2 lower hold to detonate, resulting in the complete destruction of the SS Grand Camp.
“21. The explosion generated tremendous pressure but appears to have lacked the shattering destructive characteristics of an equivalent amount of a nitro-high explosive. The board’s observations at the scene, were that within a radius of one-half mile from Pier ‘0’ the missile pattern was a missile to every 2 square feet. Missiles ranged in size from a rivet head to a portion of ships structure estimated to weigh 60 tones. Missiles indicated a shearing tearing type of rupture to the vessels’ structure and equipment. Missile travel indicates excessive force at point of origin. The location of identifiable missiles indicating high trajectory. 60% of Pier ‘0’ was demolished. The remaining 40% was damaged beyond repair. The nitrate in the warehouse on Pier ‘0’ may have detonated. However an undetermined amount remained intact in the debris. All of the above indicates an explosion of high order.
“22. The explosion on the Grand Camp initiated a series of incidents. Fire broke out at various points in the marine terminal including warehouses ‘0’, ‘A’, ‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’. Fire in the plant of the…[unclear] Chemical Co. caused a dense black smoke to be carried over and blanket the pier area throughout the day and night. The fires in warehouse ‘0’ and ‘A’ carried fumes of burning sulphur stored in warehouse ‘A’ across the SS High Flyer and SS Wilson B. Keene.
“23. On the morning of 16 April, 1947, and prior to the explosion of the Grand Camp, the SS High Flyer was moored at pier ‘A’ with its star-anchor underfoot. The vessel was portside to the pier, bow out, its stern close up to the bulkhead. The High Flyer was a ‘dead ship’ its turbine casing being lifted for purpose of inspection. Twenty four to thirty hours would be required to make the engine operable. With knowledge of the fire on the Grand Camp, loading of the High Flyer was suspended, hatches were closed and tarpaulins laid, assumed fire stations in response to the vessels alarm, water pressure was put on the fire mains, fire-hose was led out and tarpaulins and other parts of the ship wet down.
“24. Similar action with reference to security was taken on board the SS Wilson B. Keene which was moored to Pier ‘B’ on the south side of the slip in which the High Flyer was berthed. The Keene was berthed ‘bow in’ with her bow approximately opposite the bow of the High Flyer. The vessel had been loading a cargo consisting only of flour and had on board 445 tons. In an extreme emergency it would have been possible for this vessel to get under way in thirty minutes but would require assistance of tugs to get clear of the harbor.
“25. The blast of the Grand Camp explosion caused the mooring lines of the Keene to part leaving the vessel adrift. The port anchor was dropped and that brought the bow in toward the dock. A bow and a stern line were then run to the pier. Considerable damage occurred to the light structural parts of the vessel especially throughout the quarters. Decks were buckled, hatch covers blown off, steam lines ruptured and engine room filled with steam making entrance hazardous if not impossible and preventing determination of extent of damage therein. Personnel in engine room made their escape by shaft tunnel and escape trunk reported line shaft bearings and pedestals dislodged.
“26. The blast the Grand Camp explosion caused some of the mooring lines of the High Flyer to part and the vessel to drift away from the pier. The mooring lines remaining were let go and the vessel fetched up alongside the Keene with her #3 hatch about opposite hatch #4 of the Keene. Both vessels remained in this position until the second explosion occurred.
“27. The High Flyer sustained damage as a result of the explosion on the Grand Camp. Electric power was lost by reason of circuit breakers tripping. Generators stopped dead. Light steel bulkheads in living quarters were split; ripped open and projected into the passageways. Doors were jammed. Furniture was dislodged. Cargo in holds #3 and #4 was displaced and mixed together. Hatch covers of the pontoon type were blown off.
“28. After the explosion considerable confusion naturally existed on both the High Flyer and the Keene. Effort was made to locate and aid the injured crew members. The power plant of the High Flyer was secured. Necessity of medical attention for the injured, the shock and dazed condition of many of the crew, and the presence of smoke together with fumes of burning sulphur made it mandatory that all personnel leave the ships. By 10:30 a.m. all of the crews had departed. There was no evidence of fire on board either ship at this time.
“29. Prior to the explosion, the steel barge Longhorn II was moored at the bulkhead end of pier ‘0’ at a slight angle to the straight line of the pier. This barge is a bulk hydrochloric acid carrier having four unfired pressure vessel type of tanks in her hold. The barge is 150’ long .x 28 beam x 8′ depth. After the explosion the barge was found on shore about 100 feet from its berth with its long axis at approximately right angle to the line of Pier “0”, inshore of a railroad track bumper which stood about four feet high. The side of the barge rested against the bumper. Damage to the barge appeared negligible. Against the opposite side of the barge and in line with the railroad track bumper a section of the stern of a vessel, (presumably that of the Grand Camp) estimated to weigh fifty tons, was resting.
“30. As of 8:00 A.M. April 24, 1947 out of a crew’ of forty in the SS Wilson B. Keene two are dead…and five missing…
“31. As of 8:00 A.M. April 24, 1947 out of a crew of thirty-nine in the SS High Flyer one is dead …and one is missing….
“32. In response to a phone call from Texas City, by an unidentified person, the G and H Towing Co. dispatched tugs Albatross and Propeller which tugs departed Galveston 8:50 A.M. 16 April 1947 for Texas City. Prior to arrival an explosion was heard. Upon arrival at approximately, 9:50 a.m. found it impossible to enter the harbor; sighted and removed survivors from the soil bank forming east bank of turning basin. Both tugs took survivors aboard, some being severely injured and returned to Galveston with these survivors. This was the only activity at Texas City by commercial tugs until late that evening.
“33. At about 8:00 p.m. that evening the Vice-President of the Texas City Terminal Railway Co. called Mr. … [blacked out] of Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. explaining that rumors of another explosion likely to occur because of the presence of the High Flyer had caused rescue workers to leave the pier area and requested that tugs be sent to remove the vessel from the slip. …[blacked out] called the G & H Towing, Co. Difficulty was experienced in securing immediate dispatch of tugs. The manning of the tugs, men to go aboard and handle lines on the High Flyer, gas masks, oxy-acetylene burning equipment and other conditions required many telephone conferences and final assembly of all hands at Pier 10, Galveston, where agreement to proceed vas reached and four tugs departed for Texas City at about 10:15 P.M. Two representatives of Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. were aboard one of the tugs to supervise the operation.
“34. Tugs arrived at slip A Texas City from 11:00 to 11:20 P. M.. Sparks and burning embers were observed coming from one of the forward holds of the High Flyer. No fire was observed on this vessel earlier than 6:00 P.M. at which time fire in the vicinity of #4 hatch was seen by rescue workers that were searching the vessel. Securing a tow line to the stb’d anchor chain two tugs in tandem attempted to tow the High Flyer out of the slip resulting in parting of tow line without moving the ship. One tug then went alongside the vessel and Lykes representatives, the pilot and men to man the lines boarded the vessel. Another tug moored up to the starboard bow and the oxy-acetylene crew burned off the anchor chain. A ten-inch hawser wan passed from the ship to one of the tugs. In tandem another attempt was made to tow the High Flyer from the slip. The work-crew on board the vessel had cut all lines forward and all lines abaft #4 hatch, smoke and fumes preventing examination or access to the midship portion of the starboard side of the vessel. At, this time cargo in #2 and #4 hatches was on fire. A white smoke was issuing from #3 hatch.
“35. Because of smoke, fire and fumes of burning material conditions aboard the ship became untenable and one of the tugs took the personnel off the High Flyer and all tugs proceeded out of the area. One tug remained in the basin to observe conditions. At this time, about 12:55 A.M. 17 April 1947, the area was ordered evacuated. The order was being complied with when the High Flyer exploded about 1:10 A.M. The observing tug (J. R. Guyton) was damaged, some of the persons on board were injured, and a tug. returned and towed the Guyton to Galveston. The loss of life as a result of this explosion is reported as one. The injured reported as from 35 to 100.
- The explosion completely destroyed the High Flyer and that portion of the Wilson B. Keene abaft #2 hatch, and wrecked the remaining portion of this vessel. Warehouse “B” was completely demolished except for a short section at the shore end which was severely damaged. A considerable section of Pier “B” was demolished. The explosion was of a high order, duplicating the characteristics and end results of the explosion of the Grand Camp.
- Immediately following the first explosion all Coast Guard craft available in Galveston proceeded to Texas City. Upon arrival they participated in fire and rescue efforts and were instrumental in caring for many of the injured and later transporting them to Galveston. A number of bodies were also recovered and cared for. Later in the day Coast Guard craft were augmented by Coast Guard Auxiliary craft and personnel from Houston, Texas, members of the Coast Guard Auxiliary of Galveston reported to the Galveston Lifeboat Station and were assigned duty on Coast Guard boats, increasing the personnel on these boats to efficient strength.
- The CGC Iris arrived at Texas City about 10:40 A.M. Took injured and dead on board. Received orders by radio to evacuate area. Transported injured to Galveston. Returned Texas City 1500. The Commanding Officer deemed it impossible at any time while at Texas City to enter the slip and attempt to extinguish reported fire on board vessels or to tow the vessels out due to smoke, acid fumes and debris in and under water in slip. At 19:40 received message from Army authorities to evacuate waterfront, area due to expectation of explosion. At this time impossible to determine conditions inshore due to increasing volume of dense smoke and fumes. Departed for Galveston. Upon arrival departed by automobile for Texas City to determine if possible, actual conditions in marine terminal. While at Texas City was advised fire on board vessels was extinguished and vessels were being removed by commercial tugs….
“40. No personnel of the Coast Guard was guilty of any neglect or inattention to duty.
“41. None of the licensed or certificated personnel of the SS High Flyer and the SS Wilson B. Keene committed any act of misconduct, inattention to duty, negligence or willful violation of any law or regulation.
“42. The shipping officers of the U.S. Army, Iowa Ordnance Plant, West Burlington Iowa; the Cornhusker Ordnance Plant, Coplant, Nebraska; and the Nebraska ordnance Plant, Firestone, Nebraska; violated Section 417 of the Interstate Commerce Commission regulations governing the Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles, dated 7 January 1941, and in effect at time of shipment, by describing the substance offered for transportation by rail under a shipping name not authorized by subject regulations.
“43. Ammonium nitrate has been named as a dangerous substance, in Coast Guard regulations governing Transportation of Dangerous Articles on Board Vessels, since April 9, 1941. The regulations classify the nitrate as an oxidizing material. Despite these and other provisions
of said regulations the J. D. Latta representative did not consider it as hazardous cargo. The manager of the Galveston, Texas, office of J. D. Latta, Mr. …[blacked out] violated provision of Section 146.05-13(a) and (b) by not advising the vessel operator in writing, in advance, regarding the characteristics of the shipment in conformity with the applicable regulations.
“44. The officer of the SS Grand Camp normally designated as responsible for the supervision of loading cargo, i.e. the cargo officer, violated provisions of Section 146.02-14 (a). of the U.S. Coast Guard regulations governing Explosives or Other Dangerous Articles on Board Vessels by permitting damaged containers of ammonium nitrate to be placed in stowage on board the vessel.
“45. The fire on the SS Grand Camp which preceded the explosion was of undetermined origin.
“46. Smoking on board merchant ships in many United States ports is difficult to control by ships’ officers. Smoking on deck and in the holds while cargo is being handled is not uncommon. Efforts to strictly enforce no smoking restrictions are met with threats by longshoremen to walk off the ship.
“47. The methods of combating the fire on the Grand Camp in its early stages were futile. The procedure of closing the hatch and sealing the ventilators increased the danger potentiality of the fires and caused a serious delay in the later introduction of water into this hold. The introduction of steam resulted in raising the temperature of the mass of the cargo in the hold. The action of the Second Captain of the Grand Camp in ordering that no water from the ships fire hose be applied to the fire in its early stages resulted in eliminating all opportunity of the city fire department to combat the fire upon their arrival.
“48. At Texas City within a radius of 7000 feet from the berth at which the Grand Camp lay were located the plants of the Monsanto Chemical Company, Humble Oil and Refining Co., Stone Oil Co., Republic Oil Refining Company, 11 warehouses, 9 piers, one grain elevator, and two thirds of the residential area of Texas City. Outward from this sector and within a radius of 3 miles were located the plants of the Tin Processing Corporation, Pan-American Refining Corporation, Carbide and Carbon Chemical Company and the remainder of the residential area. Within this congested area were hundreds of oil tanks, stills, connecting pipe lines, and supply lines to tanker loading and discharge piers.
“49. As is usual under circumstances involving explosions, testimony of persons involved varied and many witnesses were in a plainly shocked or dazed condition when appearing before the board. In some instances their testimony was of small value. Important witnesses that would lave been best qualified to testify to events on the Grand Camp up to the time of the explosion were either killed or so seriously injured as to be unavailable to the board.
“50. The number of casualties resulting from the explosion of the SS Grand Camp up to and including 24 April 1947 are as follows:
Dead 433
Missing 128
Urged on by natural curiosity many persons employed in the area or residing in Texas City came to the scene to observe the fire. This contributed in no small measure to the high casualty total.
“51. Under the stress of circumstances following the outbreak of fire on the Grand Camp the lack of an organized disaster plan was plainly evident. Unauthorized persons assembled close to the burning vessel. Following the explosion many heroic persons volunteered for and performed herculean efforts to rescue the injured and carried out many other tasks of mercy. However the Coast Guard vessels were in receipt of conflicting orders requesting action on the waters of the port which were followed by orders to evacuate the area. Coordination of shore and floating facilities left much to be desired. As an illustration, at 7:40 P.M. 16 April 1947 one authority, by radio, ordered all vessels to leave the waterfront because of danger of an explosion, yet approximately fifteen minutes later another authority requested by phone that tugs be sent to remove the SS. High Flyer….” (USCG. Record of Proceedings of Board of Investigation …Grandcamp…24 Sep 1947, 538-550.)
Sources
American National Red Cross. Texas City Explosion, April 16, 1947. Washington, DC: ARC, 1948.
Benson, Ragnar. “Ship explodes at Monsanto pier; turns Texas City into virtual battle zone.” Pp. 87-97 in: The Greatest Explosions in History: The Fire, Flash and Fury of Natural and Man-Made Disasters. Carol Publishing Group, A Citadel Press Book, 1990.
Country Beautiful Editors. Great Fires of America. Waukesha, WI: Country Beautiful, 1973.
Drabek, Thomas E. The Human Side of Disaster. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010.
Fire Prevention and Engineering Bureau of Texas (Dallas) and The National Board of Fire Underwriters (NYC). Texas City, Texas, Disaster, April 16, 17, 1947. 4-29-1947. Accessed 11-23-2017 at: http://www.local1259iaff.org/report.htm
Gunn, Angus M. Encyclopedia of Disasters, V2. Chapter 113: “Texas City, Texas, Explosion, April 16 1947,” pp. 406-414.
History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, April 16, 1947. “Fertilizer Explosion Kills 581 in Texas.” Accessed 12-06-2008 at: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=tdihArticleCategory&displayDate=04/16&categoryId=disaster
History Channel. Wrath of God: Explosions! Texas City. A&E Home Video DVD, 1999.
Holen, Arlene. “The History of Accident Rates in the United States.” Chapter 9 in Simon, Julian Lincoln. The State of Humanity. Blackwell Publishing, 1995. Digitized by Google. Accessed 11-23-2017 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=DrgN0AvFGL0C&dq=1917+Eddystone+PA+Munitions+Plant+Explosion&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0
Khan, Faisal I. and S.A. Abbasi. “Major Accidents in Process Industries and an Analysis of Causes and Consequences.” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 12, 1999, pp. 361-378. At: http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:http://202.38.89.99/Loss_prevention/99503.pdf
Mannan, Sam (Ed.). Lee’s Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control (3rd Ed., 3 Vols.). Burlington, MA: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann, 2005.
Minutaglio, Bill. City on Fire: The Explosion That Devastated a Texas Town and Ignited a Historic Legal Battle. Perennial (paperback), 2004.
Moore Memorial Public Library. 1947 Texas City Disaster April 16 & 17, 1947. “Aftermath.” Accessed 5-29-2012 at: http://www.texascity-library.org/TCDisasterExhibit/tc1947p15.html
Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Pocket Books, Wallaby, 1977, 792 pages.
National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at: http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1
National Fire Protection Association. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003). (Email attachment to B. W. Blanchard from Jacob Ratliff, NFPA Archivist/Taxonomy Librarian, 7-8-2013.)
National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.
National Fire Protection Association. “The Texas City Disaster – A Staff Report.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 41, No. 1, July 1947, pp. 25-56. At: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/TexasCity.pdf
National Fire Protection Association (John Hall, Jr.). U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 31 pages, December 2008.
Robinson, Kathleen. “Fire Down in Texas.” NFPA Journal, May/June 2012, p. 112.
Sanders, D.E.A. (Chair), et al. The Management of Losses Arising from Extreme Events. GIRO, 2002, 261 pgs. At: http://www.actuaries.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/18729/Sanders.pdf
Sizer, Mona D. Texas Disasters: Wind, Flood, and Fire. Lanham: A Republic of Texas Press Book, 2005.
Smith, Roger. Catastrophes and Disasters. Edinburgh and New York: W & R Chambers, 1992.
Stephens, Hugh W. The Texas City Disaster, 1947. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997. Google digital preview accessed 11-23-2017 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=pa4irHC-80YC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
Texas City Library. 1947 Texas City Disaster, April 16 & 17, 1947. “Aftermath.” Accessed 11-23-2017 at: http://www.texascity-library.org/disaster/aftermath.php
United States Coast Guard. Record of Proceedings of Board of Investigation Inquiring Into Losses by Fires and Explosions of the French Steamship Grandcamp and U.S. Steamships Highflyer and Wilson B. Keene at Texas City, Texas 16 and 17 April 1947 (Commonly called Texas City Disaster) (Part 1). Washington: Treasury Department, USCG, 24 September 1947. Accessed at: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/docs/boards/grandcamp.pdf
Also accessed 11-23-2017 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=735172
Additional Reading
FindLaw.com. “Dalehite v. United States (1953), No. 308, Decided: June 8, 1953.” Accessed 11-23-2017 at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/346/15.html
National Fire Protection Association. “Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 41, No. 2, October 1947, pp. 104-107.
United States Congress. Public Law 378, Aug. 12, 1955, “An Act To provide for settlement of claims resulting from the disaster which occurred at Texas City, Texas, on April 16 and 17, 1947.” Accessed 11-23-2017 at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-69/pdf/STATUTE-69-Pg707.pdf
[1] A reading of sources indicates it was never known with any precision how many people died at the time or later from injuries. From our reading of sources we accept the Sizer, Stephens and History.com figure of 581 as the low end of our range. As the high end we accept the Moore Memorial Public Library website estimate of 500-600 deaths, as well as the 2003 estimate of the National Fire Protection Association of 600 deaths. Perhaps there were more than 600 deaths, but the sources which note a higher figure have not sufficiently made that case in our opinion.
[2] Not used as high fatality estimate – too out of keeping with all other sources cited.
[3] Our interpretation based on: “No one will ever know how men, women, and children died inn Texas City. Some say six hundred, some say seven hundred or eight hundred — so many simply vanished that no one knows the real count. There were five thousand injured.” Not used as high estimate due to conjectural nature of this passage.
[4] Cites Red Cross estimate that perhaps 800 people died. He then notes “The number may well have been higher.”
[5] “While sources disagree on the exact number of deaths, it is estimated that 500-600 people died in the explosion. The wounded numbered into the thousands. An exact count of the dead would have been difficult to get because of the condition of many of the bodies. There were also a number of foreign seamen and non-census laborers present who may have gone unaccounted for.”
[6] “the Red Cross and…Texas Department of Public Safety counted 405 identified and 63 unidentified dead. Another 100 persons were classified as ‘believed missing’ because no trace of their remains was ever found.” Pp. 168-169.
[7] “At this date, April 29, 1947, 433 bodies have been recovered and approximately 135 (many of whom were on the dock) are missing….”
[8] Holen, Arlene. “The History of Accident Rates in the United States.” Chapter 9 in Simon, Julian Lincoln. The State of Humanity. Blackwell Publishing, 1995.
[9] Known dead; does not include large number of missing. See, also, NFPA 1984 Fire Almanac, 1983, p. 140; NFPA. U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. Dec 2005, p. 25.
[10] Kintz, G. M., Jones, G. W. and Charles B. Carpenter. Explosions of Nitrate Fertilizer on Board the S.S. Grandcamp and S.S. High Flyer at Texas City, Tex., April 16,17, 1947. Report of Investigations, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, February 1948.
[11] National Board of Fire Underwriters. The Texas City Disaster, Facts and Lessons. NY, 1948.
[12] Wheaton, E. L. Texas City Remembers. San Antonio, TX: Naylor, 1948.
[13] Blocker, V. “The Texas City Disaster. Pattern of injury in 3,000 casualties.” Texas Rep. Biol. Med., 7/ 22, 1949.
[14] Blocker, V. and Blocker, T.G. “The Texas City disaster. A Survey of 3,000 casualties.” American Journal of Surgery, Nov 1949, p. 756.
[15] The Darkest Hour.
[16] Cites: Newsweek. “Disaster: Texas City Diary.” 4-28-1947.
[17] Cites: Texas City Sun. “Burial for Unknown Dead is Postponed.” 6-6-1947, p. 1.