1963 — April 25, Clinchfield Coal Co., Compass No. 2 Mine Gas Explosion, Dola, WV– 22
— 22 Bureau of Mines. Final Report of Major Mine-Explosion Disaster, Compass No. 2 Mine…
— 22 Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “Blast Kills 22 Men Deep in Dola Mine.” 4-27-1963, p. 1.
— 22 NFPA. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003).
— 22 NIOSH, CDC. Mining Disasters (Incidents with 5 or more Fatalities). 2-26-2013 update.
— 22 U.S. Mine Rescue Assoc. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Clinchfield Coal Co. …”
— 22 WV Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present
Narrative Information
Bureau of Mines: “A gas and coal-dust explosion occurred in the Compass No. 2 mine of the Clinchfield Coal Company (Division of the Pittston Company), Dola, West Virginia, about 10:57 p.m., Thursday, April 25, 1963. Twenty-two men were killed by the explosion; all died from burns and/or forces. None of the other 36 men in the mine at the time of the explosion were injured, and they escaped without incident via the Rock Camp and Dola portals….
“Bureau of Mines investigators believe that the explosion originated in the face crosscut of No.5 entry in 3 panel 3 right, where an explosive mixture of methane and air was ignited by electrical arcs or sparks from a loading machine operating at the crosscut face. The loading machine was not in permissible condition. Forces of the explosion extended throughout 2 and 3 panels 3 right, into 1 and 7 panels 3 right, throughout the 3 right entries to the junction of 3 right entries and southeast mains, and were dissipated as they traveled left toward southeast main faces and right along the mains and up the Olive intake air shaft….” [Introduction, p. 1.]
“A total of 214 men was employed; 173 worked underground, 3 shifts a day, 5 days a week, and produced an average of 3,800 tons of coal daily, all of which was loaded mechanically. The mine is opened by 3 active drifts and seven 6-foot and one 7-foot diameter circular shafts into the Pittsburgh coal bed, which averages 96 inches in thickness in this area. The shafts range from 172 to 448 feet in depth.
“Entrance to the Compass No. 2 mine is made by an elevator installed in the Rock Camp portal shaft located on Little Rock Camp Run and by a drift opening at Dola, West Virginia.
“The immediate roof is about 12 inches of coal left to help support a fragile shale that varies in thickness. The main roof is laminated limestone; clay veins, rolls, slips, and horsebacks are encountered. The maximum cover is about 600 feet.
“….Numerous tests by the Bureau of Mines have shown that coal dust having a volatile ratio of 0.12 and higher is explosive. The volatile ratio of the coal in this mine as determined from… analysis is 0.46 percent, indicating that the coal dust is explosive.
“The last regular Federal inspection of the Compass No.2 mine was completed February 25, 1963, and a spot check inspection was made March 21-22, 1963.” [Introduction, p. 2.] ….
“The inadequacy of the ventilating practices was shown clearly during the February 1963 inspection when the analysis of an air sample collected in the immediate return of the 4 right section showed 1.20 percent methane; a check sample collected in this return after the ventilation was improved contained 0.70 percent methane.
“During the February 1963 Federal inspection, 31,720 cubic feet of air a minute was measured at the regulator in No. 1 entry 3 right, and this air current contained 0.35 percent methane as shown with a methane indicator.
“The mine is classed gassy by the State and the Bureau of Mines. Pre shift examinations for gas and other hazards were made by certified officials before the first operating shift each day, and preshift examinations for succeeding shifts were made by the on shift officials during their regular tour of duty. Onshift examinations for gas and other hazards were made by face bosses, mine foremen, shot firers, and operators of face electrical equipment. The section foreman and four other employees in the 3 panel 3 right section had flame safety lamps at the time of the explosion, and the lamps were sent to the laboratories of the Bureau of Mines in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for testing and examination. Four of the lamps did not ignite methane in any of the many tests made, and these lamps were in permissible condition. However, the Wolf lamp found on the bolting machine was determined to be in nonpermissible condition and was not tested. This lamp was dismantled and inspected, and the chimney collapsed into 36 pieces of glass. The chimney had no identification markings, the ends of the chimney were not fire-polished, and it was made of soft glass. The lamp had been subjected to relatively high temperatures, and laboratory analysis of the deposits of coal on the lamp indicated the temperature at which carbonization had occurred was 485⁰ centigrade (905⁰F). Foremen, shot firers, and operators of electric face equipment were assigned flame safety lamps and were required to test for gas at stipulated times and locations. These men usually made such tests with a walking flame, including equipment operators whose lamps were kept on the equipment at the working faces for prolonged periods. Gas wells penetrating the property were protected by blocks of coal left in place; four such wells were known to be in the 3 right area. An abandoned gas well is located slightly more than 400 feet in advance of the 3 panel working faces. This well penetrated two producing sands, the first was a gas sand about 1,000 feet below the Pittsburgh coal bed. Reportedly, the well was drilled and abandoned in 1940. It was plugged poorly, and examination of the well indicated that after the casing was pulled, the hole was filled with tree branches, lumber, fine dirt, and debris. The well was not concreted in the vicinity of the Pittsburgh coal bed, and the well was not vented. Because of the possibility that gas from this well had migrated to the 3 panel workings and entered into the explosion, air samples were collected from the face of No. 5 entry 3 panel on two different occasions and sent to the Pittsburgh laboratories for analysis to ascertain whether hydrocarbons other than methane were present. These results indicate that the hydrocarbon composition of these samples does not differ from that normally found in coal mine atmospheres.
“At the time of the explosion, the 3 right area was ventilated by a continuous current of air…”
[pp. 4-5]
“….Employees and officials stated during the hearing that the main fan was not in operation for a period of 12 minutes about a week prior to the explosion. The underground power circuits were not deenergized during the period the fan was inoperative, and face employees in 2 and 3 panel 3 right sections continued normal production work at the faces. In fact, employees testified that they were not aware that the fan was not operating and did not learn of the nonoperation until a day or more later.
“Dust: During the February 1963 Federal inspection, the mine surfaces varied from dry to wet. Many places, including some face areas and areas in parallel and back entries, were definitely wet at that time0Waterwas used to allay dust during cutting and continuous miner operations and to wet down shuttle-car roadways.
“During the February 1963 Federal inspection, dangerous quantities of loose coal and coal dust were observed at several locations and rock-dusting was inadequate in several relatively small areas. The loose coal and dust were removed promptly, and additional rock-dusting was done in needed areas.
“According to company officials, an employee was used each shift on the conventional loading sections and the continuous miner sections to clean coal spillage from along roadways, shuttle-car routes, and shuttle-car discharge points. This employee was also required to keep such areas wetted down when they became dry and dusty. Beltmen were also employed to service the belts and clean up spillage along the belt lines. However, beltmen at the hearing testified that they did not have time to clean up spillage at any location, except the loading zones, and roadmen testified that their other duties often took so much of their time they were unable to clean up effectively.
“Rock dust in the active sections was applied by hand during the first and second shifts, and generalized rock-dusting of the face areas by machine was done between the second and third shifts. According to company records, 7 pounds of rock dust per ton of coal mined were distributed on the mine surfaces during 1962, and from January 1 to April 25, 1963, 5.5 pounds of rock dust were distributed per ton of coal mined. Dust produced during cutting operations was allayed by water from sprays mounted on the machine; dust produced during other mining operations was not considered excessive. Shuttle-car roadways were wetted down when necessary.” [Intro. P. 6.]
“The first indication of trouble in the mine was noted by the afternoon-shift mine foreman, E. S. Buzzard, who was near the Rock Camp portal, when a strong gust of air swept by him. Buzzard knew something serious had occurred, and he suspected that it had been an explosion. He went to the surface immediately and attempted to contact the four working sections in the mine. The crew in 1 left section just outby[1] Rock Camp portal was contacted without difficulty, and momentary contact was made with the southeast mains section, which was inby[2] 3 right. Both section crews were advised that an explosion had occurred underground and they were to proceed to the surface with caution. The 1 left crew proceeded to the surface without incident, but the southeast mains crew encountered some difficulty escaping from the mine because of smoke and dust near the entrance to 3 right. Furthermore, the portal bus which they were riding and which would descend the prevailing 2 percent grade without benefit of power was derailed by debris from the explosion just inby 3 right, and the men had to go on foot the rest of the way to the Rock Camp portal. Fourteen men in southeast mains, eight in 1 left, and fourteen employed at any needed location throughout the mine escaped. Twenty-two men in 3 right sections were unaccounted for and could not be contacted. Immediately after Buzzard contacted all possible underground employees, advised them of the explosion, and instructed them to proceed to the surface with caution, he contacted higher company officials, who in turn called State and Bureau of Mines personnel and mine rescue teams. Examination of 3 right entries and 2 and 3 panel 3 right sections after the disaster revealed that the explosion originated in the 3 panel section. The afternoon shift crews’ normal worktime began at 3:30 p.m., and ended at 11: 30 p.m.; therefore, the greater part of the shift activities had been completed and part of the 3 panel crew had started to their portal bus when the explosion occurred. The cutting-machine operator and helper, mechanic, and roadman had left the face areas and were on 3 right haulageway where they died; the cutting-machine operator was several hundred feet outby the section apparently proceeding for the portal bus. The two roof-boltmen were just outby the last open crosscut in No. 2 entry with their equipment; the foreman, bratticeman, and shot firer were in the last open crosscut between 2 and 3 entries; the shot firer had apparently just completed blasting at the face of No.3 entry as the blasting cable had not been rolled up. The two shuttle-car operators were at the second crosscut outby the face of No.4 entry; one car was loaded apparently enroute to the unloading point, and the second car was empty and apparently waiting to return to the loading machine as soon as the loaded car passed. The loading-machine operator and his helper had apparently been at the crosscut face in No. 5 entry. The crosscut had almost been cleaned up, about a shuttle car of coal remained at the face. It appeared that the loading machine had been pushing loose coal toward the left side of the face or had just pushed up loose coal and was being stopped when gas was ignited. The Joy operator and his helper moved about 96 feet outby the crosscut face; the operator had covered his mouth and nose with a banana handkerchief, apparently when he observed the ignition. It was obvious that the Joy operator and his helper were the only men on the section who moved more than a few feet after the explosion, and these two men were the only employees in a face area tt the time of the ignition. Also, the loading machine was the only piece of face electric equipment at a working face at the time of the explosion.
“The victims near the 3 panel faces were burned severely, and the coal roof and ribs in the inby parts of the section showed that considerable, intensive gas burning had occurred in these areas….” [pp. 15-16]
“Evidence found during the investigation of this explosion as well as testimony offered at the official hearing showed clearly that in many instances men and officials in this mine, as has been true in nearly every other explosion, failed to follow known safe mining practices. The failure of supervisors and employees to follow and comply with known safe mining practices, company rules and regulations, and State and Federal laws was the basic cause of the explosion. This explosion again demonstrates conclusively that if such catastrophes are to be prevented, mine officials and workmen must be made completely aware of all dangers that might result from the performing of unintentional or deliberate unsafe acts. Management, union officials, and representatives of State and Federal inspection agencies should insist that mine employees and supervisors comply at all times with known safety:pract1ces, regulations, and laws.” [p. 16.]
“Unquestionably, the disaster resulted from the ignition of a large quantity of methane that was liberated in No. 5 entry and possibly No. 4 entry 3 panel. The coal roof and ribs in the face areas of 3 panel showed evidence of intensive gas burning.. [p. 20.]
“Summary of Evidence: Conditions observed in the mine during recovery operations and the investigation following the disaster, together with information available from previous Federal Coal mine inspection reports and that obtained from a hearing and from company officials, workmen, and mine records, provided evidence as to the cause and origin of the explosion. The evidence from which the conclusions of the Federal investigations are drawn in summarized as follows:
“1. There was one explosion in which both methane and coal dust were involved.
“2. The explosion occurred at 10:57 p.m., April 25, 1963…
“3. All the victims working in the 3 right area of the mine at the time of the explosion died in a relatively short time.
“4. No blasting was being done at the time of the ignition.
“5. Methane was being liberated in the face areas.
“6. The explosion was propagated through the adjacent 2 panel section and considerable portion of the 3 right entries by coal dust.
“7. The adequate rock-dusting in the 3 right entries confined the explosion….
“13. Evidence elicited during the formal hearing from employee witnesses who had worked on the other shift in 3 panel verified investigation findings that the rolling up of key check curtains to facilitate the movement of shuttle cars transporting coal was commonplace….
“16. The amount of methane that had accumulated as evidenced throughout the explosion area points to a major ventilation interruption of extended duration….
“22. It is believed that arcing at the exposed commutator brushes of the main motor of the loading machine in operation in the face crosscut of 5 entry 3 panel was the source of ignition….
“24. Considering the amount of methane that was obviously present in 3 panel when the explosion occurred and the fact that five men of the crew were provided with flame safety lamps, it is apparent that gas testing practices were inadequate or gross laxity in making gas tests occurred….
“Cause of Explosion: This disaster was caused by the ignition of a body of methane by a spark or electric arc. The methane was liberated in No. 5 entry and probably No. 4 entry of 3 panel and accumulated because of a prolonged interruption of the face ventilation. The ventilation was interrupted by one or more of the following: A ventilation door at the entrance to 3 panel left open, a man door open in a stopping between the supply road and belt outby 3 panel, one or more temporary stoppings removed for haulage purposes, and backup curtains, check curtains, and/or line curtains tied up for movement of mobile equipment.” [pp. 20-23.]
(Bureau of Mines. Final Report of Major Mine-Explosion Disaster, Compass No. 2 Mine, Clinchfield Coal Company (Division of the Pittston Company), Dola, Harrison County, West Virginia, April 25, 1963. Morgantown, WV: Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior.)
Newspapers
April 26: “Clarksburg (AP) – The Clinchfield Coal Co. announced shortly after noon today that 14 bodies of 22 men trapped by an explosion last night in its Compass No. 2 mine at Dola, six miles from here, have been recovered. There was practically no hope that the other eight — even deeper in the mine — would be found alive.
“Three bodies were found first near the main mine tunnel, about a mile and a half from the main entrance. Eleven others were found a short time later in a lateral working section. Rescue crews were battling their way through rubble and foul air….
“There was nothing on the outside to indicate what had taken place. Fans which circulate air through the mine continued to operate. The shaft was not damaged. The elevator which can carry
10 men down into the working area was still operating.
“About 60 men wise in the way of mine rescue methods took turns in clearing a path to the 22. It was difficult. The air had to be checked constantly to be certain it was clear of any explosive gas. Timms said the trapped men were about 1¾ miles from the shaft when the explosion occurred. All are married men, mostly with families….” (Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “14 W.Va. Miners Dead, 8 Missing After Blast.” 4-26-1963, p. 1.)
April 27: “Clarksburg (AP, Herb Little) – Weary rescue crews, laboring deep inside a coal mine near here, recovered bodies of all 22 victims of Thursday night’s gas-triggered explosion….All 22 men were married. They had 41 children. Thirty of their fellow workers fled unharmed after the blast….
“The sheeted bodies of the first victims were brought to the surface on a mine car. They were identified as William Bullough, 50, Clarksburg; William Fowler, 39, Flemington, and Raymond Swiger, 49. Wallace Fowler left four children; Swiger, two. Officials said they believe the men suffocated. There was no evidence of fire….
“It was the worst disaster in West Virginia’s sprawling mine fields since 22 men died in a similar accident in McDowell County, on Oct. 27, 1958. About 15 miles northeast at Monongah, 361 miners died Dec. 6, 1907, in the nation’s worst mine disaster. Dola is about 60 miles south of Carmichaels, Pa., where an explosion killed 37 men last Dec. 6 in the Robena No. 1 Mine of the U.S. Steel Corp.
“The Clinchfield Coal CO., listed the following as victims of the explosion:
[We insert spacing in order to make it easier to identify differences between two different newspaper spellings of names and notation of ages.]
Adam Aldridge, 52, Smithfield, wife and two dependents.
Gunner Bardorrek, 32, Rt. 3, Clarksburg, wife and three.
William Bullough, 50, Rt. 3…Clarksburg, wife.
Kenneth Burnside, 34… Salem, wife and one.
Ralph Cabo, 45… Clarksburg, wife and two.
Delbert Chapman, 37… Clarksburg, wife and one.
Carsie Crayton, 46, Shinnston, wife.
Dorsey Fincham, 55… Clarksburg, wife.
William Fowler, 39, Rt. 1, Flemington, wife and four.
George Grogg, 42, Lumberport, wife and two.
Roy Hanna, 50, Rt. 1, Brown, wife and three.
Glen Haught, 35… Lumberport, wife and two.
Harold Haught, 45, Lumberport, wife. brother of Glen…
Denzil Hawkinberry, 46, Rt. 1, Mount Claire, wife and two.
Roy Kerns, 44… Lumberport, wife and two.
James Lester, 49… Owens, wife and two.
Ralph McCloy, 45, Box 1, Rosemont, wife and two.
William Maxwell, 54… Galloway, wife and two.
John Reed, 39, Rt. 1, Wilsonberg, wife and four.
Ralph Smith, 58, Centerpoint, wife and one.
Raymond Swiger, 49, Rt. 1, Wallace, wife and two.
Robert Welch, 46, Flemington, wife.”
(Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “Blast Kills 22 Men Deep in Dola Mine.” 4-27-1963, p. 1.)
Another listing of victims found on the United States Mine Rescue Association website, which appears to be from a United Press International story out of Dola, WV, notes names thusly:
Adam Aldridge 53 Smithfield wife, two children
Gunther Bardarrek 33 Clarksburg wife, three children
William Bullough 34 Clarksburg wife
Kenneth Burnside 35 Salem wife, one child
Ralph Cabo 46 Clarksburg wife, one child
Delbert Chapman 38 Clarksburg wife, one child
Carsie Crayton 47 Shinnston wife
Dorsey Fincham 56 Clarksburg wife, four children
William Fowler 40 Flemington wife, four children
George Grogg 49 Lumberport wife, two children
Roy R. Hanna 51 Brown wife, three children
Glenn Haught 35 Lumberport wife, two children
Harold Haught 45 Lumberport wife
Denzel Hawkenberry 47 Mt. Clare wife, two children
Roy Kerns 45 Lumberport wife
James Lester 50 Owings (foreman) wife, two children
Jim Maxwell 55 Galloway wife, two children
Ralph McCloy 46 Rosemont wife, two children
John Reed 40 Wilsonburg wife, four children
Ralph Smith 59 Center Point wife, one child
Raymond Swiger 50 Wallace wife, two children
Robert Welch 47 Flemington wife.
“The two Haughts are brothers and Chapman is brother of mine superintendent Harry Chapman.”
Sources
Bureau of Mines, District C. William R. Park, John J. Dougherty, Roy C. Estep). Final Report of Major Mine-Explosion Disaster, Compass No. 2 Mine, Clinchfield Coal Company (Division of the Pittston Company), Dola, Harrison County, West Virginia, April 25, 1963. Morgantown, WV: Bureau of Mines, United States Department of the Interior.
Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “14 W.Va. Miners Dead, 8 Missing After Blast.” 4-26-1963, p. 1. Accessed 11-10-2014 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=46624976&sterm
Charleston Daily Mail, WV. “Blast Kills 22 Men Deep in Dola Mine.” 4-27-1963, p. 1. Accessed 11-10-2014 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=43036912&sterm
National Fire Protection Association. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003). (Email attachment to B. W. Blanchard from Jacob Ratliff, NFPA Archivist/Taxonomy Librarian, 7-8-2013.)
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Mining Safety and Health Research.. Mining Disasters (Incidents with 5 or more Fatalities). NIOSH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2-26-2013 update. At: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/disall.htm > and http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/content/allminingdisasters.html
United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Clinchfield Coal Company, Compass No. 2 Mine Explosion.” Accessed 2-15-2020 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/compass_news_only.htm
West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. WV Mine Disasters 1884 to Present. MHS&T, October 9, 2008 update. At: http://www.wvminesafety.org/disaster.htm
[1] Nearer to the shaft, and hence farther from the working face. Toward the mine entrance.
[2] In the direction of he working face.