1963 — Nov 23, Golden Age Nursing Home Fire, Fitchville, Ohio — 63
–63 Anderson & Quarantelli. A Description of Organizational Activities…Fitchville. 8-3-1964.
–63 Juillerat. “The Golden Age Nursing Home Fire.” NFPA Quarterly, 57/3, Jan 1964m p. 207.
–63 National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996.
–63 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 137.
–63 New York Times. “The Century’s Worst Fires,” March 26, 1990.
–63 Norwalk Reflector, Oh. “1963 Fitchville nursing home fire haunts survivors…” 11-23-2013
–63 Ohio Historical Society. “Golden Age Nursing Home Fire.” Remarkable Ohio.
–63 U.S. Senate. Nursing Home Care in the United States. August 1975, pp. 459-460.
Narrative Information
Anderson and Quarantelli: “Fitchville, site of the Golden Age Nursing Home, is a rural village of about 200 inhabitants located in Huron County, approximately 10 miles southeast of Norwalk. The latter is a town of about 10,000 persons. The nearest large city is Cleveland, 50 miles distant.
“Although Fitchville is in a rural area, all the usual disaster agencies are present in nearby Norwalk. For example, in Norwalk there is a State Highway Patrol post, a Red Cross chapter, and a Salvation Army unit. However, they as well as the other local disaster agencies are very small in size and heavily dependent on more distant units or higher headquarters for any but the most highly restricted equipment and personnel needs….Organizations in nearby localities are even more embryonic or informal in structure, Thus, almost all fire departments are of the volunteer type. Fitchville Township, in fact, has no fire department. The scarce resources and limited staffs which characterized these disaster organizations are probably very typical of almost all such organizations in small town and rural America….
“The Nursing Home itself was located on the outskirts of the several scores of clustered houses that constitute the village of Fitchville, farming land dotted here and there by a farm house immediately surrounds the five acres of the Home. State Highway #250 passes 30 to 40 feet directly in front.
“The Home was a rambling, one-story concrete structure with overall dimensions of 186 by 65 feet. Built originally in 1942 as a toy factory, it underwent several ownerships and remodeling in the decade that followed. On March 10, 1959, agents of the State Division of Factory and Building Inspection approved the structure as safe and adequate for nursing home use. It was one of almost 1,200 nursing homes in Ohio.
“At the time of the fire, the Home had 64 patients, two short of its legal bed capacity. It would appear, although the DRC was unable to receive a definite figure, that a slight majority of the patients were completely ambulatory. (At one time in 1962 there had been 80 patients, of which 47 had been ambulatory, 11 bedfast and 22 helpless in various ways). Among the patients, besides the old and the infirm, were many suffering from mild mental disorders; the Home being one of six nursing homes in Ohio taking such cases. Some had been recently transferred there from a state hospital in Cleveland. About 80 percent of the patients were supported by county and state aid. In fact, more than half of the patients had no known relatives and seldom received visitors. Most were in their 70’s or 80’s.
“To take care of this institutionalized population, there was a day staff of about 21. The night of the fire, following the usual pattern, only three staff members were in the Home. This included the night supervisor, and two nurse’s aides. One of the latter was a 19 year old girl who had been on the job only three days.
“The post-disaster technical investigation states that there had been a recurrent series of minor problems with the electric wiring and circuits in the building, particularly with the blowing of fuses and the burning of switches. There was no automatic sprinkler or fire detection system, local manual fire alarm, emergency lighting, or emergency water supply for fire-fighting. However, according to the report of the State Fire Marshal, the Home passed inspections at different times.
“One inspection in 1962, and also one in 1963 reported that there existed an established and documented evacuation plan. The post-disaster investigation, however, noted there was no specific, written, emergency evacuation procedure. In fact, according to the transcribed record of witnesses, no employee had been briefed or given any instruction on how to evacuate the building.
The Disaster
“A post-disaster investigation established that shortly after 4:45 a.m. a series of small fires ignited over a period of a few minutes and quickly merged into one overall blaze in the attic and wall areas. Apparently almost simultaneous ignition occurred at a number of points due to the inadequate and improper wiring of the electric circuits. Strong winds, some combustibles in the building and a tarred roof helped the fire to spread rapidly.
“The three members of the night staff of the Home were all in the kitchen at that time. Following custom, they had started preparing breakfast. In fact, the State Fire Marshal report observed that the ignition of the fire was probably coincident with the plugging in of a heavy duty coffeemaker and an electric steam table used to keep prepared food warm. However, nothing amiss was noticed for a minute or two, and all three staff members went elsewhere in the building.
“The fire appears to have been almost simultaneously noticed by passing motorists on State Route #250 and one of the staff members, who observing an unexpected light in front of the building, opened the front door to look outside. They all saw the roof area above the service entrance ablaze. This was at 4:50 a.m. At this time there was no smoke or flame inside the building, but there was great heat.
“Two passing truck drivers came inside, asked for and were directed to fire extinguishers and returned outside to discharge them at the spreading flames. One of the staff members attempted to use the phone to send in an alarm, but the line having been short-circuited was dead. The electric lights in the Home by now had also started to fail. Another passing motorist drove a fifth of a mile to a nearby house, woke the sleeping householder, and had him make a call to the Village of New London, 7.6 miles away. This call reached the fire department and its chief just before 5 a.m. Thus, less than 15 minutes elapsed from the time of the outbreak of the fire to the time when the first disaster organization was directly notified.
“Still another passing motorist who had stopped upon seeing the blaze offered to drive the night supervisor to a telephone. He drove her to a pay telephone at Olena, approximately 2.9 miles north of the nursing home. Uncertain what department to call, she dialed the operator who connected her with the Norwalk Fire Department. This, according to the fire department’s log, was around 5:13 a.m. The supervisor was told that the nursing home was outside of the department’s jurisdiction. When she said that there were patients inside the burning home, the answering party allegedly hung up. The telephone operator on her own initiative immediately called the New London Department.
“However, in a later newspaper account, the Norwalk Fire Chief said that since the fire was in a jurisdiction outside his own, the call was referred to the New London Fire Department. It was said that if a call had come from the New London Department, the Norwalk Department would have responded since there is a mutual aid agreement between the two departments, an agreement not confirmed by the New London Department. But a direct request for assistance from the New London Department is first necessary. (It should be observed that at least six weeks after the fire, a UPI dispatch from Norwalk had the Norwalk fire chief stating that his department could not answer the call because state law forbids a fire department from going into another area unless it has a written prior agreement with another community). Which, if any, of these three versions of the incident is correct, the DRC has been unable to ascertain. Nevertheless, the Norwalk Fire Department did notify the sheriff’s office a little after 5:20 a.m. that it was not sending men or equipment to the scene.
“Prior to the arrival of any fire equipment, the motorists who had initially stopped at the scene, truck drivers, and the two remaining staff members, attempted to evacuate the patients. Initially four patients were removed from the ward which appeared nearest the fire. The four were taken to one of the hallways near an exit and told to wait there until they could be evacuated. However, as the heat was becoming very intense, other patients were led outside and often put into the cars of motorists who had stopped.
“There was considerable confusion in the attempt to remove patients. One problem was that the passing motorists who were doing most of the rescue efforts were trying to find their way around in darkness and smoke in a building unfamiliar to them. Some tried to remedy this situation by using the flashlights from their cars and trucks.
“Another problem was that with an exception or two, there was little self or mutual help on the part of the patients. Would-be rescuers reported surprisingly little commotion or noise, and characterized the patients as being in a daze or immobilized. A few patients died in their beds four feet from an emergency exit, but it is possible these may have been bedridden cases. There were also several reported instances of patients who after being led outside, went back into the building. Most, however, simply were inactive, not doing anything to get themselves out of the building and eventually died from smoke inhalation. A partial explanation of the inaction, apart from the physical and mental conditions of the patients, is that around three-fourths of them were receiving medication. In fact, it was customary for some of them to be given sedatives and tranquillizers to prevent nocturnal wandering.
“The half dozen or so passing motorists, plus the two staff members evacuated most of the 21 patients who eventually were saved. Apparently the time available for rescue before flame and heat prevented entry into the building was short. The New London Fire Department, for example, the first disaster organization on the scene was there by 5:10 a.m., but none of its men were able to get inside the building….
“A majority of the bodies were still on or near the crumpled frames of the beds on which they had been sleeping. This aided in identification since a floor chart had been drawn by employees of the Home locating each bed position and its occupant. However, all the bodies but one had been charred beyond visual recognition. Also, a number of the victims were away from beds, sprawled in hallways, etc. This, in combination with the movement of bodies during the debris clearance left 16 bodies unidentified at the time of recovery….
“The 16 unidentified bodies were initially brought to the meeting hall of a veteran’s group. There, with the help of the equipment and supplies in a van of the State Highway Patrol arriving from Columbus at 9:30 a.m. on Saturday, further attempts at identification were made during the weekend. All records of the Home had been destroyed, and fingerprints could not have been obtained from the charred remains (many hands were simply missing). However, dental charts and surgical records of the patients were found later on Saturday, apparently at a hospital in Norwalk. Through these records and the help of a nurse from the Home who knew the clothing, jewelry, etc. worn by particular patients, all bodies were identified by 7 p.m. on Sunday (for some reason, newspaper accounts reported five bodies were still unidentified as of Monday).
“Relatives of the victims started to arrive on the scene, but by late Sunday only 29 bodies had been claimed (eventually 41 were claimed)….
“The major investigation, upon order of the Governor, was conducted by the State Fire Marshal. This inquiry conducted over a five week period culminated, after several postponements, in the issuance of a technical report on December 31, 1963. The major findings of this report were that: 1) the probable cause of the fire was extensive shorting along over-fused and improperly wired electrical circuits under an overload; 2) the probable causes of the extensive fire damage was the nearly simultaneous ignition of fires at a number of different points, and delay in turning in the alarm to the fire department having jurisdiction; and 3) the probable cause of the extensive loss of life was lack of prompt evacuation based on an orderly plan since the first five minutes of any building fire are critical. The report also declared that the fire did not result from design but carelessness.
“A similar finding was reached by the Huron County Grand Jury, and as a result no indictment was ever made. It too blamed the heavy loss of life on the lack of a sound evacuation plan. The jury statement also declared existing state fire inspections were valueless, and recommended legislation to tighten regulations covering nursing homes.
“The owner of the Nursing Home disagreed with the report of the State Fire Marshal on the cause of the fire. On January 16 he stated, without giving details, that his insurance investigators had arrived at a different conclusion. Because of all these investigations, it was not until February 14, 1964, that work was commenced on completely clearing the debris at the Home….” (Anderson and Quarantelli. A Description of Organizational Activities in the Fitchville, Ohio Nursing Home Fire. 8-3-1964, pp. 1-5, 7-9.)
Juillerat/NFPA: “During the early morning of Saturday, November 23, 19(63, fire destroyed the Golden Age Nursing Home at Fitchville, Ohio, killing 63 of the 84 elderly patients. The fire, which started from a short circuit in overloaded, improperly installed wiring, spread throughout the undivided attic before it was discovered. Within a few minutes after discovery of the blaze, the building filled with killing smoke, and fire burst down from the attic to trap the victims, most of whom were still in their beds. Most of the 21 who escaped owe their lives to passers-by who stopped to help rescue them. As in many nursing home fires, those who died were victims of a lack of understanding by all concerned of the life hazards from fire in homes for the aged. Since early 1961, the Ohio State Federation of Licensed Nursing Homes and others have, by means of court actions, prevented. state-wide regulations from being placed in effect that would have required automatic sprinklers or a fire detection system in the home and would have required compliance with the National Electrical Code….” [p. 207.]
“No Fire Protection
“The building had no automatic sprinklers or fire detection system. There was no local manual alarm, no emergency lighting, and there was no water supply for fire-fighting. The previous owner had dug a small reservoir in front of the building and filled it with water for fire protection, but the present owners filled it up because of the danger that some patient might fall into it. There were three portable fire extinguishers. There were no specific, written emergency procedures, although the manager said she had shown all the patients where the exits were. The home had been inspected by state authorities in March of 1963 and approved for safety in compliance with state laws.
“The unincorporated township of Fitchville had no fire department, and the trustees of the township had contracted for fire protection with the towns of New London, 7.6 miles east, and Greenwich, six miles south. The New London volunteer fire department, which got most of Fitchville’s calls, had conducted no drills at the home and had never been inside the building before the fire. The New London fire department had a mutual aid agreement with the town of Wellington, but the agreement was to respond only inside the limits of the two towns and did not include Fitchville.
“Night telephone calls to the New London fire department were received at the local funeral home. The funeral director would take the call, turn on the siren, and call the chief. He and another man on duty at the funeral home would then each telephone ten of the 20 volunteers. Response to Fitchville usually took ten to twelve minutes.” [p. 209.]
“When the New London fire fighters arrived at approximately 5:10 A.M., the entire roof and the combustible wing were ablaze, and it was impossible to enter the building. It was all over for the 63 elderly patients still inside….
“The State of Ohio had adopted regulations to go into effect on February 1, 1961, which would have required the Golden Age Nursing Home and similar occupancies to install either automatic sprinklers or a fire detection system. The regulations would also have required compliance with the National Electrical Code. The new regulations would have required a minimum of two attendants and two licensed practical nurses to be on duty in a home having the number of patients that were in the Golden Age Nursing Home. However, the Ohio State Federation of Licensed Nursing Homes and others decided that these regulations would pose a hardship. By means of a series of court actions, the regulations were still being held up at the time of the fire….
“…Similar fires in similarly constructed buildings occur almost every day. Only the great loss of life brought this fire to the attention of the entire nation.” [p. 211.]
(Juillerat, Ernest E. (Fire Record Department Manager). “The Golden Age Nursing Home Fire.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 57, No. 3, Jan 1964, pp. 207-211.)
Norwalk Reflector, OH, 2013: “The screams of trapped residents burning alive in the Golden Age Nursing Home in 1963 forever haunted the residents who survived and the many people who desperately tried to save them. Considered the second worse nursing home fire in the history of the country,[1] the horrific fire changed nursing homes forever — probably the only positive point to come out of the devastation.
“Glass block windows, restraints tying residents to their burning beds and blocked entrances played a part in the loss of 63 lives, said Tom Neel, the president of the New London Area Historical Society.
“The electrical fire began in the upper story attic shortly before 5 a.m. Nov. 23, 1963. The telephone system already had become inoperable due to the fire that broke out quickly and spread with a vengeance. Every fire department in the area started rolling up to the scene on U.S. 250 within 10 minutes of the first call. But, by the time the firefighters got there, boiling tar from the roof already had started falling into the building, making it a very difficult job to get the residents outside….
“A photograph of one of the victims detailed restraints holding her arms down while she burned to death, unable to escape. The metal beds melted, bent and twisted under the intense heat of the fire, Neel said.” (Norwalk Reflector, OH. “1963 Fitchville nursing home fire haunts survivors…50 years ago today, tragedy left 63 local residents dead.” 11-23-2013.)
Ohio Historical Society: “Located one mile north of Fitchville, the Golden Age Nursing Home caught fire and burned to the ground at 4:45 a.m., November 23, 1963, killing 63 of 84 patients. Fire departments from New London, Greenwich, North Fairfield, and Plymouth responded. Ignited by the arcing of overloaded wiring, the incident called for action to require sprinklers, automatic fire detection systems, and electrical wiring compliance to building codes in all nursing homes. The worst tragedy of its kind in the nation, the incident was overshadowed by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and was not widely reported. Twenty-one unclaimed bodies were interred in a 60-foot grave in Woodlawn Cemetery in Norwalk. Those killed in the fire are listed on the reverse.” (Ohio Historical Society. Remarkable Ohio. “Marker #2-39 Golden Age Nursing Home Fire.”)
U.S. Senate: “Originally a toy factory, this building, was converted into a nursing home in 1953, and was constructed of concrete block walls with wood joists and aluminum siding. Again, improper wiring was listed as the cause of fire. At the time of the fire, 5 a.m., three employees were on duty. The only fire protection equipment available consisted of three portable fire extinguishers. The fire department arrived on the scene at 5:10 a.m.” (U.S. Senate. Nursing Home Care, 459.)
Sources
Anderson, William, and E. L. Quarantelli. A Description of Organizational Activities in the Fitchville, Ohio Nursing Home Fire (Research Note #8). Columbus, OH: Disaster Research Center, Ohio State University, 17 pages, 8-3-1964. Accessed 11-14-2014 at: http://udspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle/19716/1317/RN8.pdf?sequence=1
Juillerat, Ernest E. (Fire Record Department Manager). “The Golden Age Nursing Home Fire.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 57, No. 3, Jan 1964, pp. 207-211.
National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996, 2010. Accessed at: http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1
National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.
Norwalk Reflector, Oh. “1963 Fitchville nursing home fire haunts survivors, would-be rescuers. 50 years ago today, tragedy left 63 local residents dead.” 11-23-2013. Accessed 11-14-2014 at: http://www.norwalkreflector.com/article/3804291
New York Times. “The Century’s Worst Fires.” 3-26-1990. Accessed at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE2D9113CF935A15750C0A966958260&n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FF%2FFires%20and%20Firefighters
Ohio Historical Society. Remarkable Ohio. “Marker #2-39 Golden Age Nursing Home Fire.”http://www.remarkableohio.org/HistoricalMarker.aspx?historicalMarkerId=105998
[1] Deadliest was Katie Jane Nursing Home fire, Warrington, MO, Feb 17, 1957, taking 72 lives.