— 21 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 140.

— 20 NFPA. “The Major Fires of 1968.” Fire Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3, May 1969, p. 13.

— 20 National Safety Council. Accident Facts 1970 Edition. Chicago, IL: NSC, 1970. p. 63.

— 20 NTSB. HAR. Interstate Bus—Automobile Collision Interstate Route 15, Baker… 1968.

— 20 NTSB. Wrong-Way Driving. Highway Special Investigation Report. 2012, p. 12.

— 19 National Fire Protection Assoc. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003).

— 19 National Transportation Safety Board. “Safety Recommendation,” February 26, 1999.

Narrative Information

NFPA: “Nineteen bus passengers were killed in an automobile-bus collision in Baker, California, on March 7, when the driver of the automobile rammed into the bus. There were 30 passengers aboard the bus, which caught fire when the hydraulic lines from the power steering were severed and the fluid was ignited by damaged electrical wiring. The fire quickly spread to involve the diesel oil spilled from the ruptured fuel tank of the bus. The 19 victims aboard the bus died because of the rapid propagation of the fire, the inaccessibility of escape facilities, and the general confusion after the bus had come to rest on its side. The driver of the automobile was intoxicated and had been driving on the wrong side of a divided highway. He was killed by the impact of the collision.” (NFPA. “The Major Fires of 1968.” Fire Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3, May 1969, p. 13.)

NTSB, 1968: “On March 7, 1968, at 3:50 p.m., a 1964 Chevrolet two-door sedan driven by a man under the influence of alcohol and carbon monoxide, traveling west (wrong way) in the eastbound lanes of Interstate 15, 3 miles east of its intersection with California route 127, near Baker, California, collided with an interstate bus. Both vehicles were being driven at normal freeway cruising speed. The bus overturned and was subsequently gutted by fire, resulting in the death of 19 of the 30 passengers. The 11 survivors suffered injuries that varied from minor to severe. The automobile driver was killed instantly by impact forces and then ejected from the car. The automobile caught fire from the bus fire and was also gutted.

“Just prior to the accident, the bus driver, in the process of passing a slower moving eastbound vehicle, suddenly realized that the vehicle 150 to 200 yards ahead of him in his lane of traffic, was traveling toward him. The bus driver made a severe brake application and steered hard to his

left toward the wide, clear median, in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid a collision.

“The automobile driver, described by his roommate as “too drunk to drive,” left Baker at approximately 3:40 p.m., driving east towards Las Vegas on Interstate 15. At some point east of Baker, the driver reversed his direction of travel from eastbound to westbound so that he was then driving in the wrong direction on the eastbound roadway. It was too late when he realized that the eastbound bus was approaching in the same lane. He made a severe brake application and steered hard to his right toward the median. His evasive action was too late to avoid the collision.

“Rapid propagation of the ensuing fire and inaccessibility of escape facilities gave the passengers in the middle of the bus little or no opportunity to be evacuated or rescued.” (Synopsis, iii-iv.)

“….The Injuries to the bus occupants were caused by the forces of impact and subsequent bus overturn in the absence of crash injury prevention facilities such as occupant safety belts.

“The Fire was caused by power-steering oil being discharged under high pressure from a broken fitting damaged by the collision, and ignited by exposed electrical circuits in the front of the bus. This fire then ignited the diesel oil spilled from the ruptured fuel tank of the bus.

“The 19 bus passenger Fatalities were caused by the rapid propagation of fire and inaccessibility of escape facilities, coupled with injuries and disorientation, preventing escape or rescue of the non-fatally injured bus passengers.” (pp. iv-v)

“Contributing causes to the occurrence of the collision were:

The automobile driver was under the influence of alcohol and carbon monoxide, resulting in his failure to realize that he was on a one-way divided highway and not on a two-way highway.

Lack of traffic control devices (signs, signals, markings) between entrance and exits to the highway in the vicinity of the accident to advise the automobile driver of the proper direction of travel.

Failure of the automobile driver to react to the danger of the approaching bus in sufficient time to take adequate evasive action.

The fact that the bus driver did not identify the direction of travel and potential danger of the wrong’-way vehicle in sufficient time to permit him to take adequate evasive action. [p. v.]

Facts and Circumstances

“A. Description of Accident

Events to Moment of Collision

“The bus, on a through schedule between Los Angeles, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada, departed from the Los Angeles terminal at 12:01 p.m., March 7, 1968, with 30 passengers on board. In accordance with company policy, it was operating with its headlights burning. The bus passed the second of two interchanges serving Baker, California, at approximately 3:45 p.m. Continuing eastbound on Interstate 15, in the outside (right) lane, the bus came upon a slower-moving vehicle, a pickup truck pulling a camper trailer, and changed to the inside (left) or passing lane, to overtake and pass this vehicle. The bus, traveling at 60 to 65 m. p. h. , slowly pulled abreast of the vehicle. The bus was in the passing lane, in the process of passing this vehicle, for a period of a minute or two before the collision.

“Suddenly, the bus driver realized that the vehicle in his lane, 150 to 200 yards ahead of him, was not traveling in the same direction but was driving in the wrong direction, coming towards him. Due to the speeds of the two vehicles and the short distance between them, there was insufficient time for the bus driver to take adequate evasive action to avoid a collision.

“One passenger, who identified himself as a race car driver, was seated on the left side of the bus at the aisle, two sections behind the bus driver. This passenger indicated that he did not trust other people’s driving; therefore, he was continually monitoring the bus driver and the roadway. When he saw the wrong-way driver approaching, he did not think that the bus driver had observed him. He was just starting to yell at the driver when he saw the driver begin to pump the brakes and sharply turn the bus toward the median strip.

“Deciding that he would be unable to move to his right because of the slower-moving vehicle, the bus driver made a severe brake application and steered hard to his left toward the wide-clear median. The rear wheels of the bus left tire marks on the pavement, 123 feet for the right wheels and 47 feet for the left rear wheels, to the point of impact. At the moment of impact, the speed of the bus had been reduced to between 20 to 30 m.p.h.

“Michael Leo Barry, the driver of the wrong-way automobile, left Baker at approximately 3:40 p.m., headed for Las Vegas, which is 94 miles east on Interstate 15. The driver had been drinking for a period of 6 1/2 hours prior to the accident, and in the opinion of those who observed him and were with him, he was intoxicated.

“The driver of the wrong-way automobile was employed as a short-order cook by Pike’s Cafe in Baker. He reported for work on the day before the accident (March 6), and was not allowed to work because it was felt he was intoxicated. He returned to Pike’s Cafe at 9 a.m. on the day of the accident. He was still in an intoxicated condition and was suffering from a “hangover” which was so severe that he could not hold a cup of coffee in his hand. He told the manager that he wanted to quit his job and be paid off, but was told to go home and sleep it off and to come back at 2:30 p. m. Between 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m., the driver consumed a quart of wine and drank at least two, and possibly more, cans of beer at the local bus station.

“Accompanied by his roommate, he returned to Pike’s Cafe at 2:30 p. m. and was given the pay he had coming. They went to a local bar where Barry drank at least two more cans of beer. While they were at the bar, Barry left to go to the trailer to pick up some records he wanted to return to a girl-friend in Las Vegas, and then returned to the bar. The roommate reported later that during this visit to the trailer, Barry stole $48 of his personal funds. They separated and Barry was last seen sitting in the automobile in front of the bar at about 3:40 p.m. This time could not be verified.

“During the day of the accident, Barry drove about the town of Baker. Those he came in contact with were cognizant of his intoxicated condition, and several people knew that he intended driving to Las Vegas. He was described as mean drunk, argumentative, and loud. A fellow employee, and Barry’s roommate declined to accompany him to Las Vegas with the comment that Barry “was too drunk to drive.” Of those who were cognizant of his condition, no one except his roommate made any effort to dissuade or prevent Barry from driving about town or to Las Vegas. The manager of Pike’s Cafe admonished him for the reckless manner in which he drove in the parking lot, but did not suggest that he not drive in his condition. Police services were available if anyone wanted them. Baker has a constable and access to the sheriff and Highway Patrol.

“At about 3:40 p.m. Barry left Baker for Las Vegas. At some point east of Baker, Barry reversed his direction of travel from eastbound to westbound so that he was then driving in the wrong direction on the eastbound roadway….

“Between the unknown point where he changed his direction of travel and the point of impact (this distance is known to have been at least 3 miles), the wrong-way vehicle forced at least five eastbound vehicles to take evasive action in order to avoid it. Five witnesses testified that they were driving east on Interstate 15, and that they saw the wrong-way automobile when it was 2 to 3 miles east of the point of collision. Each encounter was separate from the other. These vehicles were in the inside (left) lane, attempting to pass slower-moving vehicles, when they saw the automobile approaching them. They saw the vehicle while it was far enough ahead of them to enable them to reduce speed, change lanes to the right, and avoid a collision. The drivers of these vehicles also had time to try to attract the wrong-way driver’s attention (blowing horns, flashing headlights, waving arms, shouting) to the fact that he was driving in the wrong direction. All of these efforts were to no avail. The witnesses said the wrong-way driver was driving at highway speed (70 m.p.h. posted speed limit) and acted unconcerned “as though he was out on a Sunday afternoon drive.”

“As the driver approached the eastbound bus, he apparently realized that the bus was not going to get out of his way. He made a severe brake application and steered to his right toward the wide, clear median in an unsuccessful attempt to miss the bus. The car left tire marks on the pavement, 84 feet for the left wheels and 22 feet for the right wheels, to the point of impact. At the moment of impact, the speed of the automobile had been reduced to between 50 and 60 m.p.h.

The Collision Phase

“The bus and automobile collided head-on as indicated by damage to the front of the bus from its left headlights through the right front corner…and to the frontal area of the automobile….The automobile was driven backward approximately 45 feet by the bus and was rotated in a clock-wise direction (as seen from above) along the right side of the bus. As the bus slid to a stop in the sandy median, it overturned onto its right side, perpendicular to the roadway, 53 feet from the point of impact…

“The front of the bus was severely damaged by the impact in increasing severity from the left through its right front corner, primarily in the area below its windshield. The right front wheel assembly, including suspension members, was pushed rearward through a bulkhead, penetrating and compressing the fuel tank (located immediately to the rear of the right front wheel well), and contributing to damage and distortion of the plywood floor of the passenger compartment. The fuel tank contained approximately 115 gallons of diesel fuel. The battery compartment, which was located immediately to the rear of the fuel tank, was also partially crushed and displaced. Both sections of the windshield were ejected from their mountings upon impact….” (pp. 1-6)

“….The bus driver and passengers in the bus were unrestrained in their seats. The bus, like typical intercity buses, was not equipped with seat belts. The passengers and the bus driver were thrown forward and slightly to the right upon impact. Due to the mass of the bus and the partial collapse of its frontal area, they experienced fairly low rates of deceleration.

“When the bus veered sharply to its left and then overturned onto its right side, some of the right windows were broken as passengers lurched and fell against them. During the process of overturn, the bus body was twisted causing some of the emergency exit type windows to be sprung open. Portions of bodies, such as legs, arms, and hands protruded through the window openings. As the bus came to rest on its right side, at least three persons were pinned by the weight of the bus lying on their protruding extremities. As the bus turned over onto its right side,

those passengers who were seated on the left side were thrown toward the right side. An evaluation of the injuries sustained by the surviving passengers indicated that one was critical, five were moderate, and five were minor.

“Upon impact, the bus driver was thrown forward against the steering wheel and instrument panel and then toward the right side of the bus. He suffered a broken leg, one broken rib, and second-degree burns to both hands. His injuries prevented his rendering any assistance to the passengers in their attempts to escape from the bus interior.

“Upon impact, the automobile driver struck the steering wheel and column, which were forced upward, the dashboard, and the left A-pillar, and was ejected through the left door as the automobile rotated along the right side of the bus. He was killed instantly upon impact. His body was found near the rear of the bus, adjacent to its roof. The automobile was equipped with seat belts which were not in use at the time of the accident. The coroner’s report stated that death was immediate and resulted from multiple lacerations of the heart from fractured ribs. His body subsequently received second- and third-degree burns of the head, hands, and forearms as a result of the ensuing fire.” (pp. 7-8.)

Events Following Collision

“During the collision phase, fire immediately broke out in the front area of the bus, fueled initially by vaporized power-steering oil, and shortly thereafter by diesel fuel. The power-steering oil was discharged from a fitting at the base of the bus steering column which was broken in the collision…The diesel fuel was sprayed, splashed, and spilled over a large area of the bus, including the baggage and passenger compartments. The fire spread and grew rapidly in intensity.

“The bus driver and six passengers escaped through the right windshield area, some with assistance. Five passengers escaped through the rear window of the bus which was opened forcibly by one of the passengers, who then rendered assistance to others.

“The passengers who were seated near the front and near the rear of the bus, and on the left side, comprised the majority of the escapees. Of 11 surviving passengers, nine had been seated on the left side of the bus within four rows of the front and three rows of the back. The two surviving passengers in the right-hand seats were seated in the aisle seats of the first and fourth rows…

“The 19 passengers who did not escape, either due to injuries sustained, shock, or disorientation, combined with limited routes of escape, were quickly overcome by smoke, lack of oxygen, and fire. They died in the bus. Autopsies were not performed on the non-surviving passengers. The intense fire damage to the victims made normal identification impossible….” (p. 9.)

“B. Description of the Accident Site

The Highway – Interstate 15

“The accident occurred on Interstate Highway 15, the main arterial route between Los Angeles, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada. It has a high accident frequency rate. The accident occurred in the eastbound lane, 3 miles east of the intersection of Interstate 15 and California Route 127, near Baker, California, which is located 192 miles northeast of Los Angeles, California. The highway at this location is a full four-lane, divided freeway, with two eastbound traffic lanes….” (p. 10)

Traffic Control Devices

“The maximum speed authorized is posted at 70 m.p.h….

“”Wrong Way” and “Do Not Enter” signs, supplemented by white directional arrows painted on the road surface, are in place at the Baker off-ramp and entrance….” (p. 11.)

“D. The Background, Experience, and Condition of the Drivers

“….2. The Automobile Driver

“….Inquiries of all the States in which Barry is known to have resided produced…evidence of only one traffic arrest, a conviction for a speeding offense in Nevada, on February 13, 1968,. more than a month after his driver’s license had expired. It is not known why his expired driver’s license did not come to the attention of the authorities at that time.

“Barry had a criminal arrest record dating back to 1953, including five arrests for passing bad checks, two for public intoxication, one for burglary, and one for grand larceny. On December 10, 1962, under the alias of Raymond L. Decker, Barry was fined $25 and spent 5 days in jail after a conviction for being drunk and vagrant in San Bernardino, California.

“Barry, a habitual, heavy drinker of alcoholic beverages, has had an alcohol problem for quite some time. His family described him as an unstable personality….” (pp. 15-17.)

“Federal Regulations: Department of Transportation….There is no Federal regulation establishing criteria for the anchoring of passenger seats in a bus.” (p. 23.)

“III. Analysis of Causal Factors

“….Using a conservative estimate of the speed of the bus as 60 m.p.h. and of the automobile as 65 m.p.h., the closing speed of the two vehicles was 125 m.p.h. or 184 feet per second. Using the closer estimate of 150 yards (450 feet), the two vehicles would close this distance to the point of impact in 2.4 seconds. If the distance was 200 yards (600 feet), the closing time would have been 3.3 seconds….” (p. 25.)

“Since this accident, there has been another accident involving wrong-way driving on the same highway near Baker. The driver in this subsequent accident was sober. So, clearly, there is a need for more effective traffic control devices to advise motorists that they are driving the wrong way on highways of this type. Had such signs been in place along Interstate 15, it is possible that Barry would have reacted to them and avoided the accident….” (p. 32)

“The bus was not equipped with emergency exits in its roof or floor, and the fire spread too rapidly for all of the passengers to exit from the bus through the front windshield area or the rear window….

“It is possible that if driver and passenger restraining devices had been provided and used, the occurrence and severity of injuries would have been reduced. If the passengers on the left side of the bus had not fallen into the luggage rack and on top of the passengers on the right side during the time of turnover, there would have been fewer injuries and much less confusion and disorientation. Passengers restrained in their seats on the left side of the bus may have been able to open and escape through the windows designed as emergency escape routes. If the driver had been restrained in his seat, he would not have been thrown against the instrument panel, nor would he have fallen into the heavily damaged right front corner of the bus as it turned over. Had the driver been less seriously injured, he could have assisted in the rescue of passengers and, because of his familiarity with the bus, been effective in the evacuation of more passengers than were saved. Also, if additional, accessible emergency escape facilities were available, the evacuation and/or escape opportunities of the passengers in the middle of the bus would have been improved.” (pp. 36-37.) ….

“Recommendations

“1. The Safety Board recommends that the Federal Highway Administrator expedite the proceeding initiated under Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, docket Ex Parte No. MC-69, dated May 27, 1966, “to inquire into the operations of motor carriers of passengers in order to determine whether it is necessary or desirable to adopt regulations and establish standards which would require carriers to install, provide, and maintain seat belts for the use of passengers and drivers.” The experience in this case indicates definitely that restraint of drivers and occupants in their seats under rollover conditions is necessary to reduce initial injury, disorientation, and thus insure more likelihood of timely post-crash escape from the vehicle. This report and the Safety Board’s conclusion should be seriously considered by the Federal Highway Administrator in reaching his decision concerning a requirement that seat belts be available in buses. The Safety Board urges that a decision be made on this important matter which had been under consideration for more than 22 months at the time this accident occurred, and more than 30 months prior to the date of this report.

“2. The Safety Board recommends that the Federal Highway Administration, in its development of motor vehicle safety performance standards, review all motor vehicle fuel systems, including diesel fuel; and power steering, and brake systems. Also, in the establishment of crash barrier criteria, full consideration should be given to intrusion factors and flammability of fuels and fluids used in these systems.

“3. The Safety Board recommends that the Federal Highway Administration review those characteristics of floors intended to be required by Federal Regulation 293. 85 (49 Code of Federal Regulations) with a view to rewriting the requirement in terms of specific and verifiable performance tests. This accident reveals that the fire resistance requirement for floors does not insure isolation of fires to any specific degree.

“4. The Safety Board recommends that the Federal Highway Administration revise Regulation 293.65 as it applies to liquid fuel tank requirements to specify crash impact resistance to rupture and intrusion in terms of performance tests that are applicable to all types of liquid fuel tanks — including diesel fuel — not just gasoline.

“5. The Safety Board recommends that the Federal Highway Administration include in its motor vehicle safety performance standards a performance requirement concerned with the prevention or control of discharge from fuel tanks subject to compression ruptures or mechanical intrusion. Consideration should be given to existing means, such as liners of the self- sealing type, flexible bladders, and reticulated foam-filled tanks. A similar recommendation, applying primarily to tank trucks carrying flammable fluids, was made to the Federal Highway Administration in the Safety Board’s report, released March 7, 1968, on the railroad-highway grade-crossing accident which occurred in Everett, Massachusetts, on December 28, 1966. This recommendation refers to Docket 3-2 of the National Highway Safety Bureau as well as to Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.

“6. The Safety Board recommends that the Federal Highway Administration continue its support of State Highway Department research and application of remedial measures to avert or redirect wrong-way traffic movements at expressway, freeway, and multilane divided highway ingress and egress points. This research effort should be expanded and consideration given to the development and application of measures to avert or redirect wrong-way traffic movements which occur on a roadway at points other than those used for ingress and egress. Directional arrows applied at regular intervals, rumble strips, signs, and other signal systems might be considered.

“The Safety Board further recommends that the Federal Highway Administration advise the National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices of the effective measures developed to redirect wrong-way traffic movements which occur on a roadway at points other than those used for ingress and egress; and, urges the National Joint Commission to implement these measures on a National basis in the most expedient manner at its command.

“7. The Safety Board recommends that the Federal Highway Administration, as soon as possible, change the basis of its regulatory requirements intended to insure escape from buses so that they are based upon tests of performance of occupants in escaping from buses standing or lying in all basic attitudes. In the development of test criteria, it is suggested that consideration be given to test procedures presently employed by the Federal Aviation Administration for the regulation of the adequacy of escape techniques and systems. Further, consideration should be given to adopting for buses, the airline practice of placing emergency escape instructions at each passenger location. It is further recommended that necessary regulations be expedited to insure that no new types of buses go into service which have not been tested to insure that all occupants can escape rapidly when the bus is in any of its basic attitudes after a crash. This recommendation refers to Docket Z-10 of the National Highway Safety Bureau, as well as to Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.

“8. The Safety Board recommends that the bus manufacturing industry and the motor carrier bus users consider the lesson of escape in this accident, and initiate their own performance tests of the escape capabilities of buses in each of their basic attitudes.

“9. The Safety Board recommends that the Safety Programs Services of the Federal Highway Administration develop a program designed to produce a sense of individual responsibility in the general public to protect the Nation’s highways from drinking drivers, enlisting in such a program the aid of the news media, the producers of alcoholic beverages, private and public agencies concerned with highway safety, as well as religious, educational, and civic groups to (a) support law enforcement efforts against and the prosecution of drinking drivers; (b) impress upon the public individually, each person’s serious social duty not to drive while under the influence of alcohol; and (c) individually to accept the responsibility of preventing other persons from driving while under the influence of alcohol.” (pp. 47-51.)

(National Transportation Safety Board. Highway Accident Report. Interstate Bus—Automobile Collision Interstate Route 15, Baker, California, March 7, 1968. Washington, DC: NTSB, Department of Transportation, adopted 12-18-1968.)

NTSB, 2012: “The NTSB first addressed the issue of wrong-way driving collisions in 1968, in its investigation of a multiple-fatality wrong-way collision near Baker, California.”^[1] (p. 2.)

“Research on wrong-way driving has a long history, beginning almost with the construction of the Interstate Highway System. The 1968 NTSB report on the Baker, California, collision acknowledged FHWA support of research into “remedial measures to avert or redirect wrong-way traffic movements at expressways, freeways, and multilane divided highway ingress and egress points.” Safety Recommendation H-68-24 from the Baker report called for the FHWA research effort to be expanded.” (p. 4.)

“The NTSB has conducted three major investigations of wrong-way collisions: they took place on March 7, 1968, near Baker, California; on June 9, 1970, near Dulles, Virginia; and on May 14, 1988, near Carrollton, Kentucky. All three collisions involved passenger vehicles that struck buses; consequently, the numbers of injuries associated with those events were relatively high. In addition, from August to October 2011, the NTSB conducted six investigations in support of this report.” (p. 12.)

“Baker, California. On Thursday, March 7, 1968, about 3:50 p.m. Pacific standard time, a 1964 Chevrolet Impala driven by a 39-year-old man was traveling the wrong way (westbound in the eastbound lanes) at a witness-estimated speed of 70 miles per hour (mph) in the number one lane on Interstate 15 (I-15), approximately 3 miles east of California Route 127 near Baker, California. A 1966 Challenger MC 5A motorcoach, operated by a 41-year-old male driver and carrying 30 passengers, was traveling 60–65 mph eastbound on I-15. The motorcoach entered the number one lane to overtake a slower eastbound pickup truck and recreational trailer in the right lane. Approximately 450 to 600 feet before impact, the eastbound motorcoach driver became aware of the westbound Chevrolet, made a hard brake application, and steered strongly to the left as the Chevrolet driver braked and steered sharply to the right in the moments before impact. The motorcoach, traveling at an estimated speed of 20–30 mph, and the Chevrolet, traveling at 52 mph, collided at an oblique angle on the paved left shoulder, After the impact, the motorcoach rotated counterclockwise, overturned, and erupted in flames; the Chevrolet was pushed backward and rotated clockwise before coming to rest adjacent to the motorcoach. The collision caused the death of the Chevrolet driver and 19 motorcoach passengers, as well as injuries ranging from minor to serious for the motorcoach driver and 11 passengers.^[2]

“The Chevrolet driver held an expired Montana driver’s license. Based on a conservative metabolic rate applied to a blood specimen (contaminated with other body fluids) obtained during an autopsy conducted 48 hours after the collision, the Chevrolet driver had a computed BAC^[3] of 0.15. [p. 14]

“The collision occurred on a section of I-15 that runs east and west from Los Angeles, California, to Las Vegas, Nevada. The four-lane controlled-access highway had a posted speed limit of 70 mph. It was predominantly straight with two 12-foot-wide travel lanes in each direction separated by a 78-foot-wide sandy median; each direction had a 10-foot-wide paved right shoulder and a 2-foot-wide paved left shoulder.

“The investigation indicated that at some point east of the town of Baker, the Chevrolet driver reversed his direction of travel to westbound in the wrong direction on the eastbound lanes. Investigators determined that the driver probably entered the highway at the Baker interchange. The Baker exit ramp was equipped with “Do Not Enter” and “Wrong Way” signs, as well as directional pavement arrows.” (pp. 14-15) (National Transportation Safety Board. Wrong-Way Driving. Highway Special Investigation Report. Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted 12-11-2012.)

Sources

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

National Fire Protection Association. “The Major Fires of 1968.” Fire Journal, Vol. 63, No. 3, May 1969, pp. 12-14.

National Fire Protection Association. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003). (Email attachment to B. W. Blanchard from Jacob Ratliff, NFPA Archivist/Taxonomy Librarian, 7-8-2013.)

National Safety Council. “Greatest Number of Deaths in a Single Motor-Vehicle Accident.” Accident Facts 1970 Edition. Chicago, IL: NSC, 1970. p. 63.

National Transportation Safety Board. Highway Accident Report. Interstate Bus—Automobile Collision Interstate Route 15, Baker, California, March 7, 1968. Washington, DC: NTSB, Department of Transportation, adopted 12-18-1968. Accessed 12-12-2013 at: https://ia600501.us.archive.org/14/items/interstatebusaut00netc/interstatebusaut00netc.pdf

National Transportation Safety Board. “Safety Recommendation,” February 26, 1999. Accessed at: http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/1999/H99_9.pdf

National Transportation Safety Board. Wrong-Way Driving. Highway Special Investigation Report (NTSB/SIR-12/01; PB2012-917003). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted 12-11-2012. Accessed 12-12-2013 at: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/safetystudies/SIR1201.pdf

[1] Interstate Bus–Automobile Collision, Interstate Route 15, Baker, California, March 7, 1968, Highway Accident Report NTSB/SS-H/3 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 1968).

[2] Cites: NTSB/SS-H/3.

[3] Blood alcohol content

1968 — March 7, Wrong-side/intoxicated driver’s auto hits Bus, fire, I-15, Baker, CA– 20