1972 — May 2, Fire and CO Gas Asphyxiation, Sunshine Silver Mine, Kellogg, Idaho  —     91

—  92  Cole, Jesse P. (MSHA District 4 Manager). History of MSHA, slide 30.[1]

—  91  Fromm, James Richard. Wallace, Idaho. The First 100 Years: 1884-1984.  1984.

—  91  Hall/NFPA. U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. December 2008, p. 21.

—  91  Mine Safety & Health Administration. Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the US. 2008

—  91  National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Key Dates in Fire History.  1996.

—  91  NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1972,” Fire Journal, Vol. 67, No. 3, May 1973, p. 71.

—  91  Smith, Roger. Catastrophes and Disasters. Edinburgh & NY: Chambers, 1992, p. 126.

—  91  U.S. Mine Rescue Association. Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the United States.

—  91  U.S. Senate. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. 5-16-1977.)

 

Narrative Information

 

Bureau of Mines Abstract: “Smoke was detected in the main haulageway near the electric shop on the 3700 level of the Sunshine Mine, Kellogg, Idaho, about 11:40 a.m., May 2, 1972. The volume of smoke, accompanied by carbon monoxide, increased rapidly and was also detected in the 3100 level main haulageway. Both the 3100 level and 3700 level haulage drifts served as main fresh air intakes to the stope area below 3700 level near No. 10 shaft, where most of the 173 men in the mine that shift were assigned. Mine supervisors, after attempting to locate the fire, ordered evacuation of workmen from the mine about 12:03 p.m. Before the evacuation was halted by the death of the No. 10 shaft hoistman, 80 men escaped from the mine. An intensive rescue operation, organized by industry and Bureau of Mines personnel resulted in the rescue of 2 men. The remaining 91 men died of carbon monoxide poisoning. None of the survivors reported seeing fire or flames. [p. 2.]

 

“The Bureau of Mines believes the probable cause of the fire was spontaneous combustion of refuse near scrap timber used to backfill worked out stopes. The fire occurred in an abandoned stoping area near the intersection between the 3400 level exhaust airway and the 09 vein. Extensive ground falls and caving occurred in the immediate area when timber supports were consumed, making investigation of the entire fire area impossible.

 

“It is not possible to single out any one fact as the chief cause for the large loss of life. However, the Bureau of Mines believes that the following major factors contributed to the severity of the disaster:

 

  1. The emergency escapeway system from the mine was not adequate for rapid evacuation.

 

  1. Top mine officials were not at the mine on the day of the fire and no person had been designated as being in charge of the entire operation. Individual supervisors were reluctant to order immediate evacuation or to make a major decision such as stopping the 3400 level fans.

 

  1. Company personnel delayed ordering evacuation of the mine for about 20 minutes while they searched for the fire.

 

  1. The series ventilation system used in the mine caused all persons inby the fire, which contaminated the main intake airways, to be exposed to smoke and carbon monoxide.

 

  1. Most of the underground employees had not been trained in the use of the provided self rescuers and had difficulty in using them. Some self-rescuers provided by the company had not been maintained in useable condition. [p. 3.]

 

  1. Mine survival training, including evacuation procedures, barricading, and hazards of gases, such as carbon monoxide, had not been given mine employees.

 

  1. The emergency fire plan developed by the company was not effective. The company had not conducted evacuation drills.

 

  1. Abandoned areas of the mine had not been sealed to exclude contaminated air from entering the ventilation airstreams.

 

  1. The controls built into the ventilation system did not allow the isolation of No. 10 Shaft and its hoist rooms and service raises or the compartmentalization of the mine. Smoke and gas from this fire was thus able to move unrestricted into almost all workings and travelways.” [p. 4.]

 

(Bureau of Mines. Final Report of Major Mine Fire Disaster, Sunshine Mine, Sunshine Mining Company, Kellogg, Shoshone County, Idaho, May 2, 1972.)

 

Cole: Cause of death, carbon monoxide poisoning.  (Cole. History of MSHA, slide 30)

 

Fromm: “Sunshine Mine Disaster. There were 91 men killed in the underground fire. Two miners were found alive and were rescued from underground seven days after the start of the fire.”  (Fromm, James Richard.  Wallace, Idaho. The First 100 Years: 1884-1984.  1984.)

 

NFPA: “The worst loss of life from a single fire [in 1972] occurred in the Sunshine Mine in Kellogg, Idaho, on May 2. Ninety- one men died in this fire. The fire itself did not burn rapidly or involve a large area. Most of the men died because the mine’s ventilation system carried toxic gases from the fire to them, and their self-rescue breath­ing aids provided inadequate protection.”

(Hall/NFPA. U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State.  December 2008, p. 21.)

 

US Senate: “At the Sunshine Silver Mine in Idaho, in May, 1972, 91 miners died of carbon monoxide asphyxiation because they did not know how to use self-rescuers or because the failure of mine management to provide a secondary escape route trapped miners as much as a mile underground.” (U.S. Senate. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. 5-16-1977.)

 

For a list of the victims of the Sunshine Mine disaster go to:

https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/sunshine_victims.pdf

­­­­­­

Sources

 

Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior. Health and Safety Report: Final Report of Major Mine Fire Disaster, Sunshine Mine, Sunshine Mining Company, Kellogg, Shoshone County, Idaho, May 2, 1972. Alameda, CA: Bureau of Mines, Metal and Nonmetal Mine Health and Safety Western District. Accessed 2-25-2020 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/sunshine_report.pdf

 

Cole, Jesse P. (MSHA District 4 Manager). “History of MSHA,” Leadership Intensive Course Mine Safety and Health Administration. No date. 48 slides. Accessed 1-11-2009 at:  http://www.usmra.com/repository/category/mining/modified_History_of_MSHA.ppt#256,1

 

Fromm, James Richard. Wallace, Idaho. The First 100 Years: 1884-1984.  1984. Accessed at:  http://www.3rd1000.com/history3/events/wallace.htm

 

Hall, John Jr. U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. National Fire Protection Association Quincy, MA: NFPA, 31 pages, December 2008.

 

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the United States. Arlington, VA: MSHA, U.S. Department of Labor. Accessed 10-5-2008 at:  http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCT8.HTM

 

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at:  http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

 

National Fire Protection Association. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1972,” Fire Journal, Vol. 67, No. 3, May 1973, pp. 71-74 & 102.

 

Smith, Roger. Catastrophes and Disasters. Edinburgh and New York: W & R Chambers, 1992.

 

United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Sunshine Mining Company, Sunshine Mine Fire. USMRA. Accessed October 5, 2008 at: http://www.usmra.com/saxsewell/historical.htm

Also, 2-25-2020 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/sunshine.htm

 

United States Senate. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Report No. 95-181, 95th Congress, 1st Session, Calendar No. 154). Washington, DC: US Senate, 5-16-1977. Accessed 9-4-2018 at: https://arlweb.msha.gov/SOLICITOR/COALACT/leghist2.htm

 

 

 

[1] Not using in the tally in that we have not been able to locate another source which would substantiate.