1965 — Feb 8, Near miss takeoff crash, Eastern Air 663, off Jones Beach State Park, NY–84
— 84 AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. “Accident Synopsis 02081965.”
— 84 CAB. AAR. Eastern Air…Atlantic Ocean…Jones Beach, Long Island, NY, Feb 8, 1965.
— 84 Kimura. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Ed., 1946-1993, V.1. 4-11-1994, p. 2-7.
Narrative Information
CAB: “Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Flight 663, a DC-7B, N849D, en route from John F. Kennedy Airport to Richmond, Virginia, crashed in the Atlantic Ocean 6.5 nautical mites south-southwest of Jones Beach, Long Island, New York at 1826 e.s.t., February 8, 1965. The 79 passengers and 5 crewmembers perished in the crash and the aircraft was destroyed.
“Flight 663 was climbing in a southerly direction after departing JFK Airport at 1820. At the same time Pan American Flight 212, a B-707, inbound to JFK from Puerto Rico was descending to land. At 1827 the Pan American crew reported a near miss with another aircraft and that, “It looks like he’s in the bay then, because we saw him. He looked like he winged over to miss us and we tried to avoid him, and we saw a bright, flash about one minute later.”…
“Investigation
Eastern Air Lines, Flight 663, (EAL 663) was a regularly scheduled passenger flight originating at Boston, Massachusetts, and terminating at Atlanta, Georgia, with intermediate stops at New York, Richmond, Virginia, Charlotte, North Carolina and Greenville-Spartanburg, South Carolina. The flight operated between Boston and New York without reported discrepancies.
EAS 663 took off from runway 31L at John F. Kennedy Airport at 1820…. At 1825:36 Departure Control instructed EAL 663 to contact the New York Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC)… The flight replied, “Good night ” This was the last communication from EAL 663.
“During the time that EAL 663 was departing, Pan American World Airways Flight 212 (PAA 212), a Boeing 707 on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan from San Juan, Puerto Rico to New York, was approaching to land at JFK Airport. At approximately 1818, the ARTCC initiated a radar handoff to Kennedy Approach Corn and reported that PAA 212 was then three miles north of the Dutch Intersection.
“PAA 212 was subsequently provided with radar vectors to intercept the final approach course to runway 31R and cleared to descend from 10,000 feet to 3,000 feet. At approximately 1824 Approach Control instructed the flight to turn right to a heading of 020 degrees and inquired if the flight had as yet reached 3,000 feet. Approach Control then instructed the flight to report leaving each 300-foot level down to 3,000 feet and advised the flight of “. . . Traffic at 11 o’clock, six miles southeast bound just climbing out of three (3,000 feet).”
“At the public hearing the captain of PAA 212 testified that he observed the traffic, as reported, moving west to east; that it was identified by its flashing beacon; that the other aircraft (beacon) appeared to be in a normal climb slightly above their flight level coming up into the strip of sky visible above the shore lights. He started a turn to 360 degrees as instructed by Approach Control. At about this time, “. . . the beacon altered direction and to what appeared to be a more southeasterly heading and instead of proceeding from west to east it seemed to alter direction to the right and proceeded in a more southerly direction or an approximate south direction.”
“According to the caption the other aircraft was then about four miles away. He stated, “This caused us to monitor the progress of the beacon, the other flight, a little more continually and as it was approaching, our headings were more or less 180 degrees apart . . . the aircraft got closer, it looked like we may be on a course where this (the other aircraft) would overhead our aircraft, and to keep the aircraft in sight, I moved off, started a turn to the right and started the aircraft down. Somewhere in this right turn . . . (the first officer) whose monitor had been almost continuous on this aircraft, recognized what seemed to us to be a very rapid deterioration of altitude and the aircraft (EAL 663) seemed to no longer be moving where it would come by on our left but was going to cross, and somewhere very shortly after the initial indication of this right turn, . . . made the statement . . . ‘No Bob down. . . at about the same time it seemed to me that something had to be done very quickly to avoid what was becoming an imminent situation, so I pushed the aircraft down forcibly and rolled it hard to the left to roll underneath the target. It was a very short duration because the target was over and gone. At no time while I had the aircraft in sight did it cross the 12 o’clock position.”
“The captain stated further, “The clearest recollection I have at this point is seeing a bright row of cabin window lights, – a great number of them. My impression was that the aircraft was in a vertical bank or close to a vertical bank and that I was looking at the right hand cabin light on the side of the fuselage. I felt as though I saw a silhouette of the aircraft standing on its right wing. The aircraft passed over my aircraft at an altitude of something below 500 and maybe above 200 (feet) . . . shortly after the crossover of the other aircraft we saw a very large red glow emanate from behind . . . while we were still in the left wing-down condition turning to the new heading (360 degrees) we were able to see the fire on the water.” He estimated that the time between the initial and last sighting of the traffic (EAL 663) was about a minute and a half.
“The first officer of PAA 212 testified, “As we were descending from an altitude of 4,000 feet to our last clearance limit altitude of 3,000 feet, I became concerned with traffic of which we had been notified and seen . . This aircraft appeared to me to be making a climb, and, of course, it was moving from our left to the right, across our path of flight.” He said that the other aircraft, identified by its beacon, started toward PAA 212 very close to their altitude; that the turn was then rapid and that he said to the captain, “This guy is getting too close, let’s go down.” The captain looked out at the traffic and started to roll the aircraft into a right bank. After the right bank was initiated, he related, “. . . I am getting a very definite impression that this altitude separation is really starting to deteriorate very rapidly. Now this thing is coming right down, and in my mind, I am also beginning to think that even though this is coming at us, I have the impression that it is going to possibly pass to the right of us. So immediately I want to stop this turn but I want to get down, I want to get away from this thing that is coming down on us. So apparently at this time when I said ‘No down,’ I reached for the control wheel. Well apparently (the captain) must have arrived at this same conclusion about the same time, because as I got my hand on the wheel – I think this is where the ‘Yeoh (an exclamation on the communication tape at 1826:19) came in . . . when I grabbed for the aileron, I caught the trigger switch on my boom mike, . . . but as I got my hand on the wheel I felt him rolling . . . out of the bank and starting to go forward on it. This is the time I noticed the forward push on the yoke because now I had my hand on it.”
“The first officer also stated that PAA 212 was in a level position when the other aircraft went by; that the other aircraft at that time was in a 90-degree bank slightly nosedown; that he saw the mid sections of both wings inboard of the aileron, and the hump of the fuselage; that the separation between the two aircraft was 200 to 300 feet; that he had the definite impression that he heard engine noise; that the other aircraft was four to five miles from PAA 212 when it made the right turn; and that the time after the turn to passing his aircraft was 40 to 50 seconds….
“The wreckage of EAL 663 was located by Sonar Soundings on the ocean floor at a water depth of 70-80 feet. The location of the crash site was 13 nautical miler southeast of the JFK Airport…. Wreckage distribution was confined generally to an area 125 yards wide and 400 yards long. Over 60 percent of the aircraft was recovered, including portions of all major components. The investigation revealed no evidence which would indicate failure or malfunction of the aircraft’s powerplants, systems, or structural components prior to impact…. There was no evidence of inflight fire or explosion…. All evidence indicated that this was a non-survivable type accident….
“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the evasive action taken by EAL 663 to avoid an apparent collision with PAA 212. The evasive maneuver of EAL 663, prompted by illusion, placed the aircraft in an unusual attitude front which recovery was not effected.” (Civil Aviation Board. Eastern Air…Atlantic Ocean…Jones Beach, Long Island, NY, Feb 8, 1965.)
Sources
AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. “Accident Synopsis 02081965.” Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=02081965®=N849D&airline=Eastern+Air+Lines
Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., DC-73, N849D, in the Atlantic Ocean 6.5 Nautical Miles South-Southwest of Jones Beach, Long Island, New York, February 8, 1965. Washington, DC: CAB (File No. 1-0001), Nov 17, 1966, 27 pages. At: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C020865.pdf
Kimura, Chris Y. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Edition, 1946-1993, Volume 1: Jet and Turboprop Aircrafts. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Nuclear Engineering Group. 4-11-1994.