1958 — May 20, MD Air NG T-33 hits Capital Air Viscount (11) near Brunswick, MD– 12

–12 Baugher. 1953 USAF Serial Numbers. 10-27-2011 rev.
–12 CAB. AAR. Midair Collision-Capital Air… MD Air N.G.…Brunswick, MD, 20 May 1958.
–12 Kimura. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Ed., 1946-1993, V1. 4-11-1994, p. 3-128
–11 Planecrashinfo.com. 1958, Accident Details, Capital/ANG, Brunswick, MD, May 20.

Narrative Information

Baugher: “Lockheed T-33A-5-LO….5966 (Maryland ANG) collided in midair with Capital Airlines Viscount N7410 4 mi E of Brunswick, MD May 20, 1958. 7 passengers and crew of 4 aboard the Viscount all killed, passenger in T-33 was killed, but pilot ejected safely.” (Baugher. 1953 USAF Serial Numbers. 10-27-2011 rev.)

Civil Aeronautics Board Synopsis: “On May 20, 1958, about 1129 e. d. t., a Capital Airlines Viscount, N 7410 and a Maryland Air National. Guard T-33, 35966, collided in the air about four miles east-northeast of Brunswick, Maryland. Seven passengers and the crew of four aboard the Viscount were killed. A passenger in the T-33 was killed but the pilot, although severely burned, parachuted safely. Both aircraft were totally destroyed by inflight collision, ground impact, and the ensuing fire.

“The collision occurred at an altitude of about 8,000 feet…while the Viscount was descending en route from Pittsburgh to Baltimore-Friendship Airport. It was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan but in visual flight rules weather conditions. The T-33 pilot was on a VFR proficiency flight from Martin Airport, Baltimore, Maryland. Just before the collision the aircraft were observed in the area west of Brunswick flying parallel easterly courses with the T-33 some distance behind and to the left of the Viscount. The T-33 quickly overtook the Viscount and made a gentle right turn, during which it struck the forward left side of the fuselage of the Viscount.

“Both aircraft were being operated in visual flight rules weather conditions and it was therefore the responsibility of each crew to provide separation from other aircraft by visual reference. The right-of-way rules contained in the Civil Air Regulations clearly set out the pilot’s responsibility in the overtaking situation.

“It is the Board’s aim to provide for a positive control system of air-craft separation which will not depend upon the “see and be seen” principle to prevent the occurrence of collision accidents. The Board has been actively engaged for some time in the development of such a program. Its full implementation is several years away and will be dependent on additional technical improvements in equipment and on the expansion of the air traffic control facilities to accommodate the ever increasing amount of traffic.

“Since the accident the USAF and Capital Airlines, along with other carriers, in an effort to reduce collision hazards, have required, in general, that all aircraft on airways above 10,000 feet be operated in accordance with IFR.

Investigation “Capital Airlines (CAP) flight 300 is a regular flight from Chicago, Illinois, to Baltimore, Maryland, with one en route stop at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The flight of May 20 departed Chicago at 0755 c. d. t. and proceeded to Pittsburgh…. at 1050 it took off for Baltimore….

“ANG 35966 took off from runway 14 at 1107. The flight proceeded south-ward, climbing to 3,000 feet. Captain McCoy said the weather briefing he had received before takeoff indicated there would be an overcast at 5,500 feet in the Baltimore area. He said that to his best recollection this was the condition he found. He continued south to about Gibson Island, Maryland, on Chesapeake Bay, keeping below the overcast, and then turned to a westerly heading, passing north of Washington and south of Friendship Airport to Leesburg, Virginia….

“According to Captain McCoy, after straightening out on this course, he began a slow climb, still maintaining 85 percent r. p. in. He did not know his airspeed or rate of climb but did recall seeing the altimeter indicating 8,000 feet. At this point he said, he thought the aircraft exploded. He did not know how he got clear of the aircraft, which was tumbling and afire, but recalled opening his parachute and descending to the ground. He then walked some distance to a farmhouse and requested to be taken to a hospital. There Captain McCoy learned for the first time his aircraft had been involved in a collision….

“Numerous witnesses in the area were contacted, all of whom were in substantial agreement in their descriptions of the accident. They agreed that just before collision both aircraft were on approximately parallel easterly headings and did not appear to be climbing or descending. Most described the Viscount as flying straight and level and stated that it was ahead of the T-33 at all times until collision. The T-33 appeared to be traveling considerably faster and rapidly overtaking the Viscount from a position behind and to the left. The T-33 was then seen to make a shallow turn to its right during which it struck the forward part of the Viscount. The witnesses said there appeared to be a small explosion when the aircraft hit. After collision the aircraft separated and the T-33 continued on its original course for a short distance, then exploded. The Viscount appeared to pull up to a near stall, then spin steeply. This spin gradually lessened to a slow flat spin which continued until the Viscount hit the ground….

“…subsequent to this accident the Air Force accepted certain voluntary flight restrictions. The resulting directives are voluminous but basically the effect is to preclude nontactical flying in jet aircraft below 20,000 feet under visual flight rules. They also direct other similar action be taken to reduce as much as possible any conflict with other traffic. These directives again caution pilots about the provisions of regulations requiring a constant vigilance to prevent the recurrence of similar collisions….

“During the investigation it was learned that the T-33 pilot had been involved in two previous collisions and one major landing accident. Also, the copilot of the Viscount had been involved in a collision and one other incident.

“From a study of the inflight damage to the two aircraft, it was deter-mined that initial contact between them was when the nose section of the T-33 right tip tank struck the left side of the Viscount fuselage just ahead of station 132 below the floorline. As a result of this impact the nose section of the tank was crushed inward and rearward, Rivet scratches on the tank also running inward and rearward confirm the fact that the damage resulted from loads acting inward and rearward at an angle of approximately 47 degrees. The Viscount fuselage conversely was destroyed by loads acting from left to right with some indication of an upward component at station 132.

“Following this initial impact, which separated the nose section from the T-33 tip tank, the main section of tank contacted the Viscount fuselage below the forward entrance door. The next area of impact was between the T-33 wing and the Viscount fuselage, upward and forward of the initial impact area. This destroyed the right wing of the T-33 and shattered the nose structure of the Viscount. The forces which destroyed the wing acted rearward, inboard, and downward as evidenced by the bending of the front spar upper cap and scratches running aft and inboard at angles of 142 degrees to 145 degrees on the top surfaces of wing fragments. Damage to the Viscount nose structure was caused by loads acting predominantly from left to right….

“…it was determined that the airspeed of the T-33 was approximately 55 knots greater than that of the Viscount at the instant of impact. The rate of closure between then was approximately 195 knots.

“The Board believes, from all the evidence, that the Viscount was flying a straight course but descending at a normal rate and at an indicated airspeed of approximately 235 knots; further, that the T-33 was flying a straight course which was parallel and to the left and behind the Viscount. Although in a shallow climb of a few degrees its airspeed was higher and it was overtaking the Viscount….

“A comparison of these angles with the cockpit visibility charts for the Viscount shows that the copilot could not have seen the T-33 until at the instant of impact. The pilot could not have seen the T-33 until about 26 seconds prior to collision because of the intervening fuselage aft of his left window.

“As for the T-33 pilot, there was no obstruction to his seeing the Viscount for well over a minute before collision….

“…all witnesses were in general agreement that both aircraft were clearly visible for a considerable period of time prior to the collision.

“Civil Air Regulations require that all pilots in VFR weather conditions maintain separation from other traffic visually, irrespective of the type of flight plan or clearance. In addition, these regulations have established right-of-way rules governing the flight of converging aircraft. Here the evidence shows that both aircraft were being operated in VFR weather conditions; also, that the T-33 was behind and overtaking the Viscount. Civil Air Regulations clearly state that an aircraft being overtaken has the right-of-way. The overtaking aircraft, whether climbing, descending, or in horizontal flight shall keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering its course to the right, and no subsequent change in the relative position of the two aircraft than absolve the overtaking aircraft from this obligation until it is entirely past and clear.

“The evidence is clear that the T-33 pilot had ample opportunity to see the Viscount and avoid it.

“In this accident it is obvious the Viscount pilot did not see the T-33. It is fundamental that a pilot’s primary responsibility is to direct his attention to the most critical area, which is ahead of the aircraft. This is in no way intended to mean pilots should not look around and take any action necessary to avert collisions. It does mean, however, that a greater degree of vigilance is required in the direction the aircraft is flying….

“As stated before, the Board believes that the collision was observed on the radarscope by the controller. It is tragic that no return was received from the T-33 in time for the controller to take action to alert the crew of the Viscount. As more advanced and sensitive equipment is developed many limitations of radar traffic control will be alleviated and it should be possible to prevent this type of aircraft accident….

“The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the T-33 pilot to exercise a proper and adequate vigilance to see and avoid other traffic.” (CAB. AAR. Midair Collision-Capital Air… MD Air N.G.…Brunswick, MD, 20 May 1958.)

For more on this disaster and some of its aftereffects see: GenDisasters: “Brunswick, MD Military Jet and Airliner Collide, May 1958.” Accessed at: http://www3.gendisasters.com/maryland/4837/brunswick,-md-military-jet-airliner-collide,-may-1958

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit: United States of America, Appellant, State of Maryland, for the Use of Mary Jane Meyer, Et al., Appellees. United States of America, Appellant, v. State of Maryland, for the Use of Vance Lewman Brady, widow, et al., Appellees. United States of America, Appellant, v. Capital Airlines, Inc., a Corporation, Appellee. Nos. 16953-16955. Argued February 27, 1963. Decided June 13, 1963. Accessed at: http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/322/322.F2d.1009.16953-16955_1.html

Sources

Baugher, Joseph F. 1953 USAF Serial Numbers. Oct 27, 2011 revision. Accessed 1-12-2012 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1953.html

Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Midair Collision – Capital Airlines, Inc., Viscount, N 7410, and Maryland Air National Guard T-33, Near Brunswick, Maryland, May 20, 1958. Washington, DC: CAB (File No. 1-0074), January 9, 1959, 20 pages. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C052058.pdf

Kimura, Chris Y. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Edition, 1946-1993, Volume 1: Jet and Turboprop Aircrafts. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Nuclear Engineering Group. 4-11-1994.

Planecrashinfo.com. “1958…Accident Details…Capital/ANG, Brunswick, MD, May 20.” Accessed at: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/1958/1958-23.htm