1965 — Nov 13, SS Yarmouth Castle fire/capsize/sinks, Miami to Nassau, ~Great Stirrup Cay-90

— 90 NFPA. “Fire At Sea: The Yarmouth Castle Disaster.” Fire Journal, 60/4, July 1966, p. 15.
— 90 USCG. Marine Board of Investigation. Panamanian SS YARMOUTH CASTLE…, 1966, 1.
–85 passengers missing
— 2 crew missing (Cuban doctor and Jamaican stewardess; p. 7.)
— 3 passengers known dead
— 89 (Passengers). Cornell, J. The Great International Disaster Book (3rd Ed.). 1982, p. 415.
— 89 Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours. 1977, p. 624.

Narrative Information

National Fire Protection Association: “Partial sprinkler protection and combustible concealed spaces allowed fir originating in an unsprinklered storeroom to spread beyond control. Failure to alert passengers promptly and other negligence of the part of the ship’s officers were among the principal reasons that 90 passengers and crewmen lost their lives.” (p. 15.)

“….Although the vessel was actually American-owned, it was operated under the Panamanian flag….”

“Room 610, where the fire started, was located on the main deck on the inboard side of the port passageway and immediately forward of the boiler-room uptake. The steel galley vent trunk on the forward side separated to room from the stairwell. On the starboard side of the room was a ladies’ toilet. The boiler room was below. Above was a men’s toilet on the boat deck. At the forward and after ends of Room 610 natural ventilation ducts, which also served and opened directly into the two toilet rooms above, extended vertically from the room to the top of the superstructure. A mechanical exhaust duct also served these rooms.

“Room 610 had been built as a toilet room and was of steel construction. When the sprinkler system was installed in 1947…no sprinklers protected this room. At some later date the room had been converted to a ship’s hostess stateroom, but still no sprinklers were installed. In October 1965 the room was dismantled and the insulation, paneling, and equipment were removed. On the night of the fire the unlocked room contained about five mattresses, a few damaged chairs, pieces of scrap paneling, a vacuum cleaner, and other miscellaneous items in storage. Stretched across the room there was a temporary electric cable from which hung a large, unprotected light bulb and socket with bare wire connections. Evidence indicates that the light was on at the time of the fire.” (p. 16.)

“The United States has enacted legislation resulting in a situation where there are few, if any, seamen on United States passenger vessels not conversant with the English language. Foreign-flag passenger ships often sail with crews of many nations – a tragic example being the Yarmouth Castle, whose Greek master headed a crew from Cuba, Jamaica, Bahamas. Honduras, and other countries. The language difficulties in such a crew create problems of communication between officers and crewmen….

“Had the Yarmouth Castle been a vessel under the United States flag, she would have been required to carry two radio officers and to maintain continuous radio listening watch by means of an operator while outside a harbor or port. International regulations require only one operator maintaining only eight hours’ radio-listening watch when the voyage, such as the one between Miami and Nassau, is less than 16 hours. In this case, the radio operator had completed his watch just a few minutes before discovery of the fire….

“Following the Yarmouth Castle disaster, the United States was instrumental in initiating the convening of a new Safety of Life at Sea Conference under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization of the United Nations. An Extraordinary Session of the Marine Safety Committee of the Organization met in London May 3-10, 1966, for the sole purpose of considering amendments to improve the fireworthiness of new and existing passenger ships. Results of that and subsequent meetings are expected to improve materially the regulations governing the fireworthiness of existing passenger ships.” (p. 22.) (NFPA. “Fire At Sea: The Yarmouth Castle Disaster.” Fire Journal, Vol. 60, No. 4, July 1966, pp. 15-22.)

United States Coast Guard: “Findings of Fact

“1. The Commandant, pursuant to the request of the government of the Republic of Panama, convened this board on 19 November 1965 for the purpose of inquiring into all the facts and circumstances surrounding the fire and sinking of eh Panamanian Flag SS Yarmouth Castle, with loss of life, while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, on 13 November 1965.

“2. At or about 0045 (EST), 13 November 1965, the Panamanian SS Yarmouth Castle, O.N. 4318-53, was enroute Miami, Florida to Nassau, Bahamas. A fire was discovered in the forward staircase area, which rapidly spread and enveloped the amidship passenger section and the bridge area. The vessel subsequently capsized and sank at 0603 the same morning in the Northwest Providence Channel, Atlantic Ocean in approximate position 25⁰ 55’ North, 78⁰ 06’ West, about 13 miles from Great Stirrup Cay [Bahamas]. As a result 85 passengers and 2 crew are missing and 3 passengers are known dead….” (p. 1.)

4. “The weather at the time of the casualty was good, the sea smooth, the sky clear, visibility excellent and there was a light southeasterly breeze…

“5. The SS Yarmouth Castle was 379 feet overall, 5002 gross town, 2474 net tons, molded depth to main deck 29 feet 6 inches, with steam turbine propulsion of 7500 HP. Home port was Panama, Republic of Panama. Owner was Chadade Steamship Company, Inc., Pier 3, Miami, Florida and the operator was Yarmouth Cruise Lines, Inc., Pier 3, Miami, Fla. Licensed by the Republic of Panama.

“6. The SS Yarmouth Castle (ex-SS Evangeline) was a passenger vessel of riveted steel construction, built at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1927. She had eight (8) watertight trans-verse bulkheads extending to the main deck, stepped where required to suit accommodations and freight spaces….” (p. 7.)

“7. The vessel operated first in coastwise service and in international coastwise service under the U.S. flag and was delivered to the Government for war service in 1942. The vessel, as the SS Evangeline, was converted from wartime to peacetime service in 1946-47 by the War Shipping Administration. At that time the U.S. Coast Guard considered the conversion a ‘material alteration’ of the vessel and pursuant to the provisions of 46 USC 369 the War Shipping Administration was advised that the vessel would have to meet all the requirements relative to fire retardant construction. In addition, detailed plans and arrangement of the vessel were required to be submitted to the Coast Guard for approval prior to conversion….

“8. In 1947, after reconversion, she returned to service under the U.S. flat. The vessel was laid up from 1948 through 1953, except for 2½ months in 1950, and was sold in April 1954 to a wholly owned Liberian subsidiary of the Eastern Steamship Company and placed under Liberian flag and registry….The vessel operated under Liberian flag and registry through several owners until 1958 when she was transferred to the McCormick Shipping Corporation, a Panamanian corporation, with concurrent transfer of flag and registry from Liberia to Panama. In 1962 the vessel was sold to the Evangeline Steamship Company, S.A., a Panamanian alien controlled corporation. The Panamanian flag and registry were retained, but the name was changed from Evangeline to Yarmouth Castle.

“9. The vessel had a dry-pipe automatic sprinkler system which was installed to cover by seven zones all staterooms, passageways, stairways and public spaces….” (pp. 8-9)

“The vessel carried 13 lifeboats including one (1) radio equipped motor lifeboat for a total capacity of 598 persons….Also provided were eight (8) approved type buoyant apparatus capable of serving 160 persons.

“10. The vessel was classed as a passenger vessel by the American Bureau of Shipping. She had a Passenger Ship Safety Certificate issued by the American Bureau of Shipping as agent for the Republic of Panama….The Passenger Ship Safety Certificate certified the vessel for carriage of 426 passengers and 172 in the crew.

“11. In June 1965, the American Bureau of Shipping inspected the vessel at Miami, Florida…and on 23 June 1965 issued a 1960 SOLAS Passenger Vessel Safety Certificate to the vessel for a period of three months….[later extending to January 1966]….” (pp. 10-11.)

“15. The Yarmouth Castle departed at approximately 1700, 12 November 1965 on her bi-weekly trip from Miami, Florida to Nassau, Bahas. The sailing and subsequent passage was uneventful until abut 0030, 13 November 1965….On board were 376 passengers and 176 crew….The master of the Yarmouth Castle had retired to his cabin….

“16. Although not known on the bridge, first indications of fire were noted by officers and crew of the vessel after midnight and before 0100. Turing that time a member of the engine-room crew advised the Chief Engineer by word of mouth that there was smoke coming into the engine spaces through the natural draft ventilation system. Immediately the Chief Engineer started a search in the pantry-galley-bakeshop area with negative findings and without report to the bridge. He proceeded to the main entrance lobby (Purser’s square on the main deck) where he met the night cleaner, Whyley, who reported that he had found smoke in the men’s toilet on the promenade deck. The night cleaner and the Chief Engineer ran up to the promenade deck and forward via the port passageway to the men’s toilet opposite stateroom 702. The Chief Engineer opened the door, looked inside, closed the door and proceeded forward. The night cleaner proceeded aft to awaken the crew in the crew’s quarters aft. When he passed through the main entrance lobby on the main deck he told the gift shop operator [name blacked out] about the fire and its location. Mr. [name blacked out] testified that the time was 0045….Meanwhile the radio operator who left the radio room at 0048 had smelled smoke at his station on the sun deck and started looking for the fire. A passenger, Mr. [name blacked out] from cabin 634 on the main deck, the Master, the Chief Mate, the First Assistant Engineer, the Cruise Director, the Switchboard Operator and other crewmen and passengers also were looking for the fire and all of the above ultimately arrived on the promenade deck and main deck at the forward staircase. There was considerable confusion in this vicinity with these people arriving and leaving at different times; however, fire and smoke were found or observed by these individuals in room 610 on the main deck and in the men’s toilet directly above on the promenade deck. Several fire extinguishers were used to no avail and an attempt was made to activate the zone fire alarm boxes in the vicinity. A fire hose was run out and the First Assistant Engineer was sent by the Chief Engineer to notify the engine-room to start the fire pump. By this time the fire appeared to be extremely hot and well advanced in Room 610 and when the door to this room was (sic) opened, pushed in or fell in, the fire, heat and smoke broke out into the passageway. Fire and smoke quickly advanced into the forward staircase and aft in the passageway out of control. The Master, leaving the Chief Engineer in charge, returned to the bridge. The Chief Engineer, after fighting the fire for a brief period, gave the hose to an unidentified crewman and went to the engine-room to close off the mechanical ventilating system and to see that all machinery was operating and then proceeded about the decks closing scuppers. The Chief Mate did not tarry at the scene of the fire but went forward on the outside of the house on the promenade deck and with other crew members began assisting passengers out of their stateroom windows and breaking out fire hoses to fight the spreading fire. The radio operator made his way back to the bridge. All others went aft, pounding on stateroom doors to awaken passengers and crew and ultimately to the promenade and boat decks to the area of the aft lifeboats. The crew was not alerted to the fire emergency by the general alarm system and the fire emergency organization of off-watch personnel did not come into play during the resulting debacle.

“17. Action On The Bridge. It was testified to by the mate on watch that the first indication of fire came to the bridge at about 0110 when the Engineer of the watch [name blacked out], a Greek national, licensed by the Government of Panama, reported smoke coming through the engine-room natural draft ventilation system. Immediately the watch officer dispatched one 91) watchman to the sun deck and one (1) watchman to the promenade deck to locate the fire and report. He then reported by word of mouth through the voice tube to the master, who ordered, ‘Sound the alarm, I am coming up’. There was testimony by the Master and several officers of the vessel that the general alarm was sounded and heard, but this was not corroborated by any passengers interviewed. Within a short time the Master arrived on the bridge; directed the mate to stay in charge and departed to locate the fire. The Master returned to the bridge. He ordered, ‘Stop the engines’ (0120), ‘close the watertight doors in the engine-room’ (0121), and ‘turn to port’. No attempt was made to use the public address system. At about this time the radio officer reported for orders and was directed by the Master to transmit a distress message. Immediately thereafter he reported inability to comply because of flames and smoke at the radio room, and was directed to transmit a distress message by flashing light. Communications were not established by the radio officer with either the SS Bahama Star or the MV Finnpulp. During this time bridge personnel were forced by smoke and flame to the open forward deck of the wheelhouse. The Master ordered that abandon ship signal sounded at approximately 0125. The Second Mate broke the wheelhouse window and sounded the whistle by electrical control but was unable t enter the bridge to sound the general alarm. The complete abandon ship signal of seven shorts and one long was not obtained. Within a few minutes the Master, the Second and Third officers and the watchman abandoned the forward deck of the bridge and all, with the exception of the Master, proceeded to assist in the evacuation of passengers. The Master proceeded to motor lifeboat number 3 which contained the emergency radio. He, with the assistance of the Second Electrician [name blacked out], a Greek national, was unable to clear the boat because of fire and smoke. At this time the Second Electrician and four (4) passengers…from stateroom W-1, and…from stateroom 835, released a buoyant apparatus and jumped from the sun (top) deck into the water. Mrs. [name blacked out] testified that her watch stopped at 0130. The Master proceeded to lifeboat number 1, which contained several passengers and after considerable difficulty, due to the proximity of the fire, the boat was lowered to the water by the Master and Chief Boatswain…who had come to the boat deck from the forecastle. The boatswain descended in the boat and the Master descended on the life lines. At this time the Staff Captain…licensed by the Government of Greece, appeared and came down to the boat on the lifelines. The time by best estimate was 0145….” (pp. 12-15.)

“About 0150 the number one lifeboat in which the Master, Staff, Boatswain, several crew members and several passengers were embarked went off the vessel about fifty yards and began sending up flares. The passengers and crew in the bow area hailed the boat to pick them up. The Master testified that he had been unable to send off an SOS signal and wanted to go to a ship that was approaching from some distance away on the starboard bow to advise them to send an SOS and of the need for lifeboats for rescue purposes. Seeing that the boat was not going to come back to the bow to pick up passengers, several passengers and crew went over the side and swam to the boat. The boat then rowed to meet the approaching vessel, MV Finnpulp, and arrived alongside between 0215 and 0225, about 1/3 mile from the Yarmouth Castle.

“Back on the bow of the Yarmouth Castle the remaining crew and passengers waited to be rescued. Three crew members had gone below through the forward hold to the D deck where they opened the forward port cargo side port and went overboard in a small paint boat that was stowed in the hold. Later when the lifeboat from the two rescue vessels arrived, the passengers and crew forward were picked up and taken to these vessels. When evacuation of the vessel was completed by approximately 0400 the port cargo door forward on D deck, at frame 37, and the side pilot ports, port and starboard, at frame 103 on the same deck were open….” (pp.16-17.)

“22. At 0154 the MV Finnpulp advised Coast Guard Radio, Miami, of a vessel on fire. This information was relayed from the Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center to the Coast Guard Air Station, Miami, Florida, by telephone at 0204. The first aircraft was airborne at 0236 and was followed by three others at 0300, 0392 and 0322, respectively. The first helicopter was airborne at 0322 hours, followed y another at 0412 and a third at 0657. Illumination of the scene was commenced at 0343. At 0513 the first of the twelve injured passengers transported to Nassau was hoisted from the SS Bahama Star. Search of the area was conducted throughout the day with the last helicopter departing the area at 1651 and the last aircraft departing at 1745.

“There was no noticeable list to the vessel during the night prior to the casualty. After the fire broke out, the vessel heading was altered to place the prevailing wind on the starboard side and the vessel was stopped. At time elapsed a gradual list developed to the port side and the vessel was down by the head. By about 0300 the list appeared to be approximately 4 to 5 degrees. When the vessel was completely abandoned about 0400 the list was estimated to have increased to about 7 or 8 degrees and the sea was observed entering the forward open cargo side port on the port side. The list continued to increase to port until the vessel quickly rolled over, bottom up, and sank at 0602….” (pp. 19-20.)

“27. The greatest loss of life was determined to have occurred on the boat deck. Fifty-two of the passengers and crew missing and presumed dead were assigned staterooms on this deck; twenty-two were assigned staterooms on the promenade deck; and thirteen were assigned staterooms on the main deck. The of the passengers known dead were assigned staterooms on the boat deck and the third was assigned a stateroom on the main deck.

“28. Testimony of several witnesses who occupied outside staterooms on the night of the fire indicated that they could not open the windows and shutters in their staterooms.” (p. 21.)

Conclusions

“1. That the fire originated in room 610, on the main deck, originally a toilet space, containing a number of combustible items including mattresses, discarded bulkhead paneling and broken chairs. The fire smoldered and increased in intensity for an unknown period of time.

“2. That the source of ignition of the fire could not be determined, but could be attributed to anyone or a combination of the following:

a. Malfunction of the lighting circuit in room 610 which had been jury rigged.
b. Sparks entering room 610 through the natural ventilation ducts during blowing of boiler tubes.
c. Unintentional or careless acts of persons entering room 610 during the evening of 12 November 19765, such as failure to extinguish a cigarette; placing of mattresses so that they came in contact with the jury rigged lighting circuit, etc.

“3. That the proximate cause of the debacle was failure of early detection of the fire in a ship with combustible materials in her structure. When the fire escaped room 610, the wooden interior and inflammable paint together with the chimney effect of the forward stairway permitted a rapid, uncontrolled spread of fire and smoke to the overhead of the boat deck and forward passageways. Contributing to the rapid spread was the mechanical exhaust system connecting room 610 with the toilet spaces on the port side of the main deck.

“4. That contributing to the failure of early detection was the inadequate control of the security patrol in not knowing that he was not following the prescribed route and thereby increasing the possibility of a fire going undetected. A further contributing factor was the absence of a sprinkler head in a room containing combustible materials.

“5. That the magnitude of loss of life stemmed from failure of early use of the general alarm or the public address system and failure of windows and shutters on outside staterooms to be maintained in a condition so they could be easily opened.

“6. That the general alarm did not ring during the casualty.

“7. That an attempt to sound the general alarm was not made before the Master returned from the scene of the fire to the bridge. Failure of the alarm on any subsequent attempt is ascribed to the fact that the general alarm was a one circuit system and fire damage to any portion would place the complete circuit out of operation.

“8. That the lack of pressure at fire hydrants forward on the vessel es ascribed to the fact that more valves were opened throughout the ship than the fire pumps could service. Contributing to this deficiency was the open valve from the fire main to the swimming pool.

“9. That the installed sprinkler system was in operation, but was ineffective in reducing a fire of this magnitude.

“10. That the sprinkler system is of value only in early detection and extinguishment of small fires in their early stages within the area of sprinkler heads. It is of little value in hidden spaces such as overhead ceiling spaces, behind paneling, etc., or where an advanced fire has developed before the sprinkler system comes into action.

“11. That with the possible exception of the sliding fire screen door in the port passageway aft of room 610 there is no evidence that any fire doors in the vessel were closed.

“12. That the Master and ship’s officers who were searching for the fire and ultimately arrived at the scene failed to take firm and positive action to organize the crew to isolate and combat the fire or to awaken and evacuate passengers in the area.

“13. That the decision of the Master to leave his ship to allegedly go to the rescue vessel to assure the sending of the distress signal demonstrates negligence, abandonment of command responsibility, and an overall failure to approach and cope with the difficulties attending the accomplishment of a task of this order of magnitude.

“14. That the emergency squad was unable to obtain gear from the emergency squad locker outside the radio room on the sun deck due to the delayed alert and the rapid spread of fire in the area.

“15. That the organization of the vessel for fighting a fire as evidenced by the station bill was adequate; however, the organization was not implemented upon first discovery of the fire or subsequently thereto and prior to its getting out of control. When the fire was out of control those members of the crew remaining on board and performing as individuals performed adequately.

“16. That the organization of the vessel for abandon ship, as evidenced by the station bill, was adequate and in view of the extent of the fire at the time the abandon ship signal was given, all accessible boats were utilized and there was no loss of life as a result of abandon ship procedures.

“17. That a progressive list developed to port as a result of the accumulation of water on the several decks from the sprinkler system, open fire hydrants, and probably sanitary lines damaged during progression of the fire. As this list progressed the open side ports became awash and, as the testimony indicated that no watertight doors other than three doors in the boiler and machinery spaces were closed, the sea flooded the vessel amplifying the list and the vessel rolled over and sank.

“18. That the inspection performed by the American Bureau of Shipping for the Passenger Vessel Safety Certificate was proper and adequate. The vessel was equipped in accordance with the SOLAS, 1960, requirements with the single exception of inflatable life rafts, and the board received no evidence of significant failure or deficiency.

“19. That the inspection performed by the Coast Guard for the Examination of Foreign Passenger Vessel Certificate was proper and adequate to verify that the vessel was in compliance with her Passenger Vessel Safety Certificate and that her lifesaving and firefighting equipment was satisfactory.

“20. That the rescue effort of the SS Bahama Star and the MV Finnpulp was performed in an exemplary manner and in keeping with the highest traditions of the sea.

“21. That over half of the persons who are missing and presumed dead were assigned staterooms on the boat deck and their loss is attributed to the rapid rise of smoke, heat and fire in the forward staircase reaching the closed overhead of the staircase on the boat deck and rapidly spreading horizontally preventing passengers exiting through the passageways.

“22. That the board had difficulty, and was unable to correlate fully the observed and estimated times of reported events into a chronological sequence.” (pp. 22-24.)

Recommendations

“….2. That, although the record indicates there are no U.S. flag passenger vessels operating on the high seas with combustible material in their structure, it is recommended that the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, institute a study looking to federal legislation to require that any other American flag passenger vessels fitted with passenger berthing spaces and built prior to 27 May 1936, be made to conform to the requirements for use of incombustible material in their structure as applicable to passenger vessels built subsequent to that date.

“3. That the Commandant, through the U.S. representatives to the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), seek to amend the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, to require all signatory governments to upgrade passenger vessels which contain large amounts of combustible material in their construction to obtain an acceptable fire safety standard….” (p. 25.)

(United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Panamanian SS YARMOUTH CASTLE, O.N. 4319-53; fire aboard on 13 November 1965 and subsequent sinking with loss of life. Washington, DC: Treasury Dept., Commandant, USCG, February 23, 1966.)

Sources

Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.

Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Pocket Books, Wallaby, 1977, 792 pages.

National Fire Protection Association. “Fire At Sea: The Yarmouth Castle Disaster.” Fire Journal, Vol. 60, No. 4, July 1966, pp. 15-22.

United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Panamanian SS YARMOUTH CASTLE, O.N. 4319-53; fire aboard on 13 November 1965 and subsequent sinking with loss of life. Washington, DC: Treasury Dept., Commandant, USCG, February 23, 1966. Accessed at: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/docs/boards/yarmouthcastle.pdf
Accessed 7-21-2020 at: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/docs/boards/yarmouthcastle.pdf