1978 — Oct 20, USCG Cutter Cuyahoga hit/sunk by freighter Santa Cruz II ~Smith Point, MD-11

–11 Ferrara, Grace M. (editor). The Disaster File: The 1970s. 1979, p. 44.
–11 NTSB. Safety Recommendation (s) M-79-17 through -30. Washington, DC: 3-2-1979.
–11 New York Times. “Officer Guilty in Sinking of Cutter.” 11-4-1979, p. 40.
–11 Nova Tech (Northern Virginia Technical Diving Community). “Cuyahoga.”
–11 USCG. Cuyahoga, 1927 WIX / WMEC / WSC-157. 2008.
–11 USCG. Marine Casualty Report. USCGC Cuyahoga, M/V Santa Cruz II… Oct 1978. 1979.
–11 Washington Post (Frankel) “Cuyahoga Skipper Given Token Cut in Seniority…” 11-6-1979.
–11 Washington Post (S. Mansfield). “Cutter Captain Had Other Accidents.” 11-3-1978.

Narrative Information

NTSB Safety Recommendation(s) M-79-17 through -30:
“At 2107 e.d.t. on October 20, 1978, the Argentine freighter M/V SANTA CRUZ I1 and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter CUYAHOGA collided in the Chesapeake Bay at the mouth of the Potomac River, Maryland. As a result of the collision, the CUYAHOGA sank. Eleven Coast Guardsmen were killed; 18 Coast Guardsmen were rescued by the SANTA CRUZ I1 which experienced minor damage.

“Although the Commanding Officer (CO) of the CUYAHOGA knew that the two vessels would pass close to each other for at least 20 minutes prior to the collision, the CO did not call the SANTA CRUZ I1 on the bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone to relate the navigational intentions of his vessel or to determine the intentions of the SANTA CRUZ 11. A call on the bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone would have alerted the CO to the course of the SANTA CRUZ I1 and may have averted the collision.

“The regulations concerning the use of bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone are not clear as to when vessels should exchange bridge-to-bridge navigational information in passing, meeting or crossing situations. There is a need for the Coast Guard to determine the minimum distance at which navigational information should be transmitted and promulgate regulations.

“The VHF radiotelephone installed on the CUYAHOGA was not capable of constantly monitoring channel 13 as required by the Vessel Bridge-to- Bridge Radiotelephone Act. If the CUYAHOGA had been broadcasting on some other channel, the CUYAHOGA’s radio could not receive navigational information from other vessels on channel 13. [p.1]

“The enlisted crew of the CUYAHOGA, who were assigned to bridge watches were suitably qualified for assignment to a vessel of this size. However, the experience and training level was less than adequate to provide safe operations of a training vessel operating in the congested water of the Chesapeake Bay. The CO and 12 crewmen, including 3 reservists assigned to active duty for training, of the CUYAHOGA were overtaxed with the requirement to provide training to 16 officer candidates in addition to conducting normal vessel operations. There were no personnel assigned to the CUYAHOGA for the sole purpose of conducting officer candidate training. The personnel assigned to the CUYAHOGA were not adequate to allow a three-watch system. Furthermore, the Coast Guard does not have any uniform servicewide standards to guide CO’s in determining personnel qualifications for assignment to such duties as officer-of-the-deck, helmsman, and lookout.

“The radar on the CUYAHOGA was located in a space other than the wheelhouse where there was a possibility of the loss of night vision. Because of its position and the possibility of losing night vision, the CO of the CUYAHOGA made minimal use of this important navigational instrument. The CO failed to determine the relative motion, course, speed, or closest point of approach of the SANTA CRUZ I1 prior to collision. There is a need to establish a policy concerning the use of radar equipment on Coast Guard cutters for plotting navigational data.

“The Coast Guard does not provide the CO’s of Coast Guard cutters with sufficient guidance on what effect medications may have on the ability of watchstanders to perform their duties. The CO cannot be expected to know the effects medication can have on himself or his crew. Standards should be set for the taking of medication by watchstanding officers. In addition, the Coast Guard should require that watchstanding officers who have visual impairments wear corrective lenses when on duty.

“The International Rules for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 permits the stand-on vessel in a crossing situation to take action to avoid collision as soon as it becomes apparent that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action. The Pilot Rules for Inland Waters require the stand-on vessel to hold course speed in a crossing situation until immediate danger of collision exists The Inland Rules and the Pilot Rules for Inland Waters should be amended to conform with the International Rules. This would avoid confusion between the Inland and International Rules and permit the stand-on vessel to take corrective action before immediate danger of collision exists.

“The stowage of all lifejackets on the 0-1 deck level of the CUYAHOGA prevented their use in time of emergency. Lifejackets should be distributed throughout the berthing and working areas on Coast Guard cutters convenient for each person on board. Additional lifejackets should be stowed where the crew normally musters for abandon-ship drill. [p.2]

“The only automatic emergency lighting provided on the CUYAHOGA was in the cutter’s engineroom. When the collision occurred, the CUYAHOGA’s mess and berthing areas were in complete darkness, making escape from these areas difficult. Coast Guard standards for new cutters require automatic emergency lighting in all manned spaces. Existing Coast Guard cutters should be examined and emergency lighting provided on all cutters.

“Although it is not known when the drawers in the inclined ladders broke loose, enough drawers had opened to make climbing both ladders hazardous, when the CUYAHOGA was raised. The drawers probably broke loose at time of collision and impeded escape from the berthing areas. All Coast Guard vessels should be examined and drawers removed from any inclined ladders.

“Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the U.S. Coast Guard:

Install VHF radiotelephones on Coast Guard cutters which will constantly monitor channel 13. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-17)

Determine in quantitative terms at what minimum distance navigational information should be transmitted by bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone in passing, crossing, or meeting situations, and promulgate regulations accordingly. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-18)

Review the personnel assignment policy of the Coast Guard to insure that the experience and training level of critical personnel is high, and that their time on board is adequate for familiarization with the vessel. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-19)

Review the manning level of Coast Guard vessels, particularly training vessels, to insure that an adequate number of experienced persons are assigned to stand watches, and that trainees are not required to stand critical watches. (Class 11, Priority Action) (M-79-20)

Establish requirements to insure that all training vessels have enough instructors aboard so that the safe navigation of the vessel is not adversely affected by the training program. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-21) [p.3]

Establish a servicewide policy to provide guidance to Commanding Officers of vessels concerning the necessary qualifications for personnel who are assigned the duties of OOD, lookout, helmsman, quartermaster, and other important positions. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-22)

Evaluate the installation of radar equipment on Coast Guard vessels and insure that indicators are so located that the equipment can be easily and properly used by personnel on watch in the wheelhouse. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-23)

Establish a policy concerning the use of radar equipment and the plotting of radar data. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-24)

Establish standards for the taking of medication by watchstanders on Coast Guard vessels to insure that the medication does not impede the individual’s ability to perform his duties. II, Priority Action) (M-79-25)

Require that watchstanders who have visual impairment wear their corrective lenses while on duty aboard Coast Guard vessels. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-26)

Take the action necessary to amend the Inland Rules and the Pilot Rules for Inland Waters to provide mariners the flexibility to initiate early action in crossing situations to prevent dangerously close situations as has been done in the International Rules for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-27)

Locate lifejackets on Coast Guard cutters so that they are readily accessible to all crewmen. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-28)

Provide automatic emergency lighting for egress from all manned spaces on all Coast Guard cutters. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-29)

Examine all Coast Guard cutters and remove drawers from any inclined ladders. (Class II, Priority Action) (M-79-30)”

[Signed by NTSB Chairman James B. King. [p. 4]

United States Coast Guard. Cuyahoga: “The USCGC Cuyahoga, which was homeported at the Reserve Training Center at Yorktown, Virginia celebrated 50 years of commissioned service on 3 March 1977. She was the oldest operational commissioned ship in all of the United States sea services at that time. Cuyahoga (WIX-157) was built at the American Brown Boveri Corporation in 1926. She was launched 27 January 1927 and placed in commission 3 March 1927 at Camden, New Jersey. She was 125 feet long, had a beam of 23 feet 6 inches and a draft of 9 feet. Her total displacement was 276 tons. Her hull was steel and she had two diesel engines and twin screw propulsion which gave her a maximum speed of 13 knots and maximum cruising range of 4,900 miles….

“At about 2100 hours on 20 October 1978, in an area about 3½ miles northwest of Smith Point, which marks the mouth of the Potomac River as it empties in the Chesapeake Bay, catastrophe occurred.

“The Argentine coal freighter Santa Cruz II, a 521-foot bulk carrier, hit the Cuyahoga on her starboard side between amidships and the stern. A consensus of accounts indicated that the cutter was dragged backwards for a minute and then fell away from the tanker, rolled on her side, and sank within a couple of minutes. The Santa Cruz rescued 18 survivors from the water and stayed on the scene until help arrived. The remaining 11 men embarked on the Cuyahoga were lost. Four days after the accident, a Marine Board of Inquiry convened in Baltimore, Maryland, at the Marine Safety Office to investigate the accident.

“After some delay due to heavy seas and high winds, two massive floating cranes were used to raise the Cuyahoga, which was in 57 feet of water. After an initial inspection, the ship was placed on barges and towed 65 miles to Portsmouth for a full inspection.

“The Marine Casualty Report, number USCG 16732 / 92368 and dated 31 July 1979, concluded:
The Commandant has determined that the proximate cause of the casualty was that the commanding officer of the USCGC CUYAHOGA failed to properly identify the navigation lights displayed by the M/V SANTA CRUZ II. As a result he did not comprehend that the vessels were in a meeting situation, and altered the Cuyahoga’s course to port taking his vessel into the path of the SANTA CRUZ II. The Cuyahoga was later sunk off the coast of Virginia as an artificial reef.” (USCG. Cuyahoga, 1927 WIX / WMEC / WSC-157. 2008.)

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Casualty Report: USCGC Cuyahoga, M/B Santa Cruz II…:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

“The Marine Board of Investigation [MBI] was ordered to convene by the Commandant by letter of 24 October 1978. The Board convened in Baltimore, Maryland on 24 October 1978, and then in Yorktown and Norfolk, Va. The taking of testimony was completed on 14 November, the Board having heard from 47 witnesses, including all survivors of the Cuyahoga and all persons associated with the navigation of Santa Cruz II. The Board viewed salvage of Cuyahoga on 30 October, and boarded the vessel as it lay on a barge at Portsmouth, Va. On 31 October 1978.

“Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas S.A., as owner of M/V Santa Cruz II, and Captain [blacked out] her master, were designated as parties in interest to the investigation and afforded their rights as set forth in 46 CFR part 4. CWO4 [blacked out, though identified on page 12 as Chief Warrant Officer Donald K. Robinson], commanding officer of USCGC Cuyahoga, was designated a party in interest to the investigation and afforded his rights as set forth in 46 CFR part 4 and paragraph 0304d, Coast Guard Supplement to the Manual for Courts-Martial.

“After giving limited background testimony, CWO4…[Robinson] exercised his right to remain silent and did not testify as to the circumstances of the collision, nor did he submit to cross-examination by parties with regard to his background testimony. The Board requested a grant of testimonial immunity from the Commandant. Testimonial immunity, as opposed to transactional immunity, was desired so that the possibility of future criminal action, if found appropriate, would not be impaired. This request was denied, and CWO4…[Robinson] maintained his silence. A prior statement, made by CWO4…[Robinson] on 22 October, was received into evidence. The Board has been hampered in its investigation as a result of the unavailability of his testimony. While the Board was able to determine how this casualty occurred, many questions as to why it occurred can only be answered by CWO4…[Robinson].

“The investigation was conducted jointly with representatives of the National Transportation Safety Board, pursuant to joint regulations, 46 CFR 4.40. Although the investigation phase was conducted jointly, the deliberations resulting in this report were conducted separately and independently of those of the National Transportation Safety Board.

Findings of Fact

“Summary

“1. On the evening of 20 October 1978, the U.S. Coast Guard, Cutter Cuyahoga (WIX-157), under command of CWO4…[Robinson], USCG, was underway on a training cruise in Chesapeake Bay, with 16 officer candidates, 9 crewmembers, and four augmenting crewmembers on board. The intended track was generally northerly, until off the mouth of the Potomac River, when the course was changed to the left so as to take the vessel into the river for a planned overnight anchorage.

“The Argentine Motor Vessel Santa Cruz II had departed the port of Baltimore, Md. On the afternoon of 20 October and proceeded southbound in Chesapeake Bay for sea, loaded with a cargo of coal.

“Cuyahoga and Santa Cruz II closed on nearly reciprocal courses in Chesapeake Bay, off the mouth of the Potomac River. Neither vessel used bridge-to-bridge radio to communicate with the other or sounded whistle signals as they closed. When about one mile from Santa Cruz II, Cuyahoga changed course 35⁰ to the left, putting her on a collision course with Santa Cruz II. Santa Cruz II sounded a single short blast signal. Cuyahoga heard and answered the signal, but it was not heard on Santa Cruz II. Santa Cruz II sounded a second single short blast, and then the danger signal twice. The engine was stopped and the rudder placed hard to port when the second danger signal was sounded. Cuyahoga backed engines and sounded a single short blast signal.

“At 2107 (all times eastern daylight savings time), 20 October 1978, the vessels collided. Cuyahoga was struck on the starboard side aft of the wheelhouse by the bow of Santa Cruz II. Cuyahoga heeled to part and sand in two minutes.

“Eighteen men escaped from the sinking Cuyahoga, and made their way to the utility boat which had surfaced, where they waited until Santa Cruz II returned and they were able to board that vessel.

“Eleven men perished. Nine bodies were recovered by Navy and Coast Guard divers and two were recovered on the surface before salvage of Cuyahoga, which occurred on 30 October 1978.
….
“3. Record of Dead:

Michael Andrews Atkinson
Seaman Apprentice, USCGR….[Blacked out are SSAN, DOB, address, and next of kin.]

Ernestino Acogido Balina
Subsistence Specialist First Class, USCG….

William McDonald Carter
Yeoman First Class, USCG….

James Wesley Clark
Officer Candidate, USCGR….

John Paul Heistand
Officer Candidate, USCGR….

James Lowell Hellyer
Fireman Apprentice, USCG….

David Bryan Makin
Senior Chief Machinery Technician….

David Scott McDowell
Seaman Apprentice, USCGR….

Wiyono Sumalyo
Captain, Indonesian Navy….

Edward Jerry Thomason
MK1/Officer Candidate, USCG

Bruce Earl Wood
RM 1/Officer Candidate, USCG…. [pp. 5-7]
….

“No VHF-FM radio call was initiated by Santa Cruz II on channel 13, the designated vessel bridge-to-bridge radio frequency, or on channel 16, the designated calling frequency. Pilot…[name blacked out] brought with him a portable VHF-FM radio, capable of broadcasting at a one watt, low power and five watt, high power level on channels 13, 16, 11, and 18A. The radio was in apparent good working order, and had been used on this voyage on channels 13 and 11. At all times material to this casualty, the portable radio was hanging by its strap from the motor of the starboard clear view screen, about 15 feet from the position kept by Pilot…in the minutes before the collision.

“Pilot…testified that before Cuyahoga changed course and showed its green sidelight he felt no need to communicate any navigation information by bridge-to-bridge radio because of the apparent routine nature of the anticipated port-to-port meeting. He said it was his practice to use the radio when there was some question about vessel intentions.

“Pilot…testified that after Cuyahoga changed course and showed its green sidelight that he did not attempt to retrieve his radio and make a call because he did not want to be distracted from watching, or lose the position and reference point he was using to establish bearing drift. He further testified that he could not have anyone bring the radio to him because people on the bridge did not know the location of his radio. He testified that he would not command or allow vessel personnel to make a bridge-to-bridge call because of language difficulty and possible confusion….” [p. 11-12]

“Voyage of Cuyahoga

“9. ….At about 2045, Cuyahoga was approximately 1.7 miles east of Smith Point Light (L.L. No. 2725)…when the lights of what were to be identified as Santa Cruz II were seen. The lights were first spotted by then OC-OOD…, who reported the sighting to CWO4 Robinson. Both men used binoculars to confirm that the lights were of a vessel; they could see a masthead light and a red sidelight. CWO4 Robinson went to the chartroom and by radar ascertained that the range was 15,700 yards. Based on the small size of the radar contact and his perception of a single white light, he formed the opinion that the lights were of a small vessel proceeding into the Potomac River.

“The planned track called for two course changes that would take Cuyahoga into the lower Potomac River. With Smith [end p.15] Point Light, L.L. No. 2725, bearing 270⁰T at a range of 3900 yards, course would be changed left to 338⁰T. With Smith Point Light bearing 199⁰T, at a range of 5400 yards, course would be changed left to 303⁰T. That course would take the vessel into the river. At about 2049 course was changed left to 338⁰T, the change being delayed to allow clear passage of a tug and tow. The engines remained at ahead full, turning for 11.8 knots…. [p.16]

“Collision occurred at 2107.0.

“12. The effect of the collision on Cuyahoga was to heel the vessel to port 40 to 50 degrees. The effect below decks of the severe impact was to cast adrift personal effects and equipment, and throw crewmembers about, leaving all spaces in disarray. The port side of the main deck was submerged. Cuyahoga ‘hung up’ on the bow of Santa Cruz II and was pushed through the water at nearly 13 knots for 30-45 seconds. Down-flooding was rapid through the two partially submerged portside watertight doors because of the speed. There was gross down-flooding of the forward accommodation spaces, engine room, galley, and after accommodation spaces.

“Electrical power was lost on Cuyahoga in impact, and all lights went out. After some 30 seconds, the four battle lanterns in the engine room equipped with solenoids automatically came on. There were no other relay lanterns or automatic emergency lighting units on the ship, and all other spaces remained dark.

“The port heel progressed until Cuyahoga was on her beam ends, and she came free. Cuyahoga then slid down the starboard side of Santa Cruz II. [end p. 18]

“Two minutes after collision, Cuyahoga sank.

“Rescue

“13. As Cuyahoga heeled to her beam ends, those men who were able to, crawled and climbed to the starboard side of the vessel, where they perched on the side of the deckhouse and the hull. The lifejacket bin was found to be already underwater; no lifejackets were obtained from it. The starboard inflatable liferaft was found to have been crushed in its container, and was not used; the port inflatable liferaft was already underwater. The men jumped or stepped into the water as Cuyahoga sank. No life rings or float lights were used. A number of men testified that they were aware of the suction effect that would result from the sinking of the ship; one man experienced it and was pulled underwater, but he was able to swim to the surface. The swimmers initially sought pieces of flotsam for support. In ice chest came to the surface and was used for flotation.

“The Cuyahoga’s utility boat, a 14 ft Boston Whaler came free and surfaced. The boat became the focal point of the survivors efforts….

“Eighteen men found themselves swimming in total darkness. CWO3…, one of the more experienced men with extensive sea service, emerged as a leader and kept the other men calm and together. When the Boston Whaler surfaced he gave instructions to the group to move to the boat, but not to attempt to board lest the boat be swamped…. [p19]

“Cuyahoga Command
….
“35. CWO4 Robinson was ordered to assume command of Cuyahoga by message orders from the Commandant dated 30 March 1977, and he did so on 17 June 1977. His orders provided:

Attention is called to COMDRINSR 1540.3 series, Formal School Training Standards for Major Cutters. Every effort should be made to obtain as much of the recommended training as possible prior to reporting for duty….

“Among the courses recommended for commanding officers were:

a. Emergency Shiphandling for Senior Officers, and
b. Rule of the Road and Shiphandling (Refresher).

“Among the courses recommended for those who stand deck OOD watches were:

a. Rules of the Nautical Road, and
b. Emergency Shiphandling.

“CWO4 Robinson never received any of the recommended training…. [p32]

“CWO4 Robinson testified that he had not undergone classroom courses or training in these matters. Rather, all his training was described as ‘practical.’…. [p33]

“There are no records attesting to SWO4 Robinson’s proficiency in seamanship, rules of the road, emergency Shiphandling, or local knowledge.

“36. CWO4 Robinson is myopic, with his most recent eye examinations showing 20/30 right eye, 20/100 left eye vision. His vision is correctable to 20/20 in each eye. He has sunglasses which were worn during daylight activity; these are corrective prescription eyeglasses. There is no record of his ever having obtained clear prescription eyeglasses for nighttime use. CWO4 Robinson was not wearing corrective prescription eyeglasses at any time material to this casualty.

“The statement of CWO4 Robinson was to the effect that on initial sighting, he perceived a single white light and single red light. However, Santa Cruz II was showing a white masthead light and white forward range light in addition to her red and green side lights. These lights were on and working properly.

“There are no objective standards of visual acuity within the Coast Guard which reflect the particular demands of vessel command or deck watch officer duty. There is no procedure for identifying those individuals who must be wearing corrective prescription eyeglasses to meet eyesight requirements while performing such duties…. [p. 34]

Conclusions

“1….Cuyahoga violated its duty to pass port to port…. [p38]

“3. ….The evidence adduce with regard to practices of mariners demonstrates a stubborn determination to resist full use of technological advances such as bridge-to-bridge radio. The result of such resistance is seen in casualties such as this…. [p40]

“7. Contributing to the loss of life in this casualty was the fact that the main deck watertight doors on the port side by way of frame station 30 and 40 w4re open for ventilation. When Cuyahoga was pushed over by Santa Cruz II, these doors were partially submerged. As the two vessels continued through the water by virtue of the momentum of Santa Cruz II, a tremendous volume of water entered Cuyahoga through the doors. As a result of this rapid down-flooding, personnel below decks were hampered in their efforts to escape against the rush of water. In addition, this condition resulted in Cuyahoga’s rapid sinking, reducing the time in which those below decks could escape.

“8. Contributing to the loss of life in this casualty was the failure to sound the general alarm or use the public address system, which could have warned the personnel located below decks in Cuyahoga of the impending collision.

“9. Contributing to the loss of life in this casualty was the absence of adequate automatic emergency lighting in the passageways, berthing, and accommodation spaces in Cuyahoga, which absence inhibited escape from below decks in those minutes before Cuyahoga sank. It is probable that this lack of lighting contributed to the deaths of:

SS1 Ernestino Acogido Balina,
OC James Wesley Clark,
OC John Paul Heistand,
MK1/OC Edward Jerry Thomason, and
Capt. Wiyono Sumalyo [p.43]
….

“13….The lack of an objective system of record for vessel commanding officers to demonstrate their competence and professional knowledge is considered a weakness in the assignment process…. [p.44]

Commandant’s Action on The Marine Board of Investigation….

Comments on Conclusions

1. The relevant facts indicate that the proximate cause of the casualty was that CWO4…
[Robinson] failed to properly identify the navigation lights displayed by the M/V Santa Cruz II. As a result he did not comprehend that the Cuyahoga and the M/V Santa Cruz II were in a meeting situation subject to 33 USC 203 (Article 18, Rule I, Inland Rules of the Road) and 33 USC 157 (33 CFR 80.4). Subsequent to his initial erroneous conclusion as to the heading of the M/V Santa Cruz II, CWO4…[Robinson] altered his course to port which eventually placed the Cuyahoga directly in the path of the oncoming M/V Santa Cruz II. The reason why SWO4…[Robinson] failed to properly identify the navigation lights of the M/V Santa Cruz II or comprehend that both vessels were in a meeting situation can not be positively determined…. [p.2]

Action Concerning The Recommendations

1. Recommendation 1: Violation of Article 110, Uniform Code of Military Justice, is a serious
offense. In the case of negligent hazarding of a vessel, punishment may include dishonorable discharge and confinement at hard labor for two years; a general court-martial is the only forum empowered to consider such punishments. Despite the gravity of this case, the Board is mindful of the contributing causes which have been identified and which may act in mitigation when consideration is given to the appropriate action to be taken with regard to the conduct of CWO4… [Robinson]

“A charge sheet has been prepared in accordance with Paragraph 0302 d(11) ©, Coast Guard Supplement to the Manual for Courts-Martial, and is forwarded herewith. The Board recommends referral to an appropriate court-martial convening authority for such further investigation and action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice as he many consider appropriate.

“Action: Court-martial process under the Uniform Code of Military Justice has been initiated.

“2. Recommendation 2: “It is recommended that the Commandant consider the need to amend existing regulations by defining specific and objective parameters for those situations where exchange of navigational information between vessels by bridge-to-bridge radio is necessary.

“Action: This recommendation is not concurred with. To develop a regulation accounting for all of the variable factors that must be considered in setting specific and objective parameters for the exchange of navigational information would result in a ponderous regulation that would be impractical in its application. However, it may be possible to amend the Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge Regulation (33 DFR 26) to more fully emphasize the need for compliance and to provide further guidance in its application.
….
“4. Recommendation 4: It is recommended that the Commandant consider the need to require appropriate Coast Guard personnel to demonstrate the professional knowledge required for vessel command and deck watch officer duty, and to record individual qualifications in that regard. An objective system such as the present merchant marine licensing program, including the concept of radar observer endorsement, would appear adaptable to this end. [end of p.3]

“Action: Selectees for command are currently required to demonstrate their professional knowledge and competence and be recommended for command during their afloat tours. Their performance is objectively reported in the existing fitness report system. A pilot project will be initiated utilizing an examination system similar to the mr4echant marine licensing program to evaluate the feasibility of enhancing this process.

“5. Recommendation 5: It is recommended that the Commandant consider the need for a policy which would insure that Coast Guard vessels with trainees embarked for underway training be manned sufficiently to insure that those persons tasked with the safe navigation of the vessel need not be simultaneously tasked with instructor duties.

“Action: Procedures are in the process of being modified to insure that Coast Guard vessels with trainees embarked for underway training be manned sufficiently to insure that those persons tasked with the safe navigation of the vessel need not be simultaneously faced with instructor duties….[end p. 4]
….
“9. Recommendation 9: It is recommended that the Commandant consider the need to establish standards for physical competence and fit-for-duty status appropriate to vessel command and deck watch officer duty.

“Action: Prior to relieving as commanding officer or officer in charge and prior to being assigned to deck watch officer duty, these personnel will be required to be certified as fit for duty within six months of the date of the orders. Further, these personnel will be required to obtain annual physical examinations while they are assigned duty afloat….” [Sighed by J.B. Hayes, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant. End of p. 5.]

Newspapers

Nov 3, Washington Post (Stephanie Mansfield). “Cutter Captain Had Other Accidents”:

“The captain of the Coast Guard cutter Cuyahoga – named as a ‘suspect’ in the official inquiry into the ship’s collision with an Argentine freighter in which 11 crewman died – was also the subject of two separate Coast Guard investigations earlier this year.

“Chief Warrant Officer Donald K. Robinson, 46, was reprimanded for “poor judgment” and “poor seamanship” after the Cuyahoga ran into a drawbridge near Baltimore Harbor on May 31, according to Coast Guard documents. The impact knocked the ship’s radar antenna off the mast, causing more than $5,000 in damages.

“A month earlier, the Cuyahoga struck a sea wall while mooring near the same harbor, dislodging a large piece of granite, according to the accident report.

“Robinson was held accountable for the bridge incident and received a letter of reprimand that his immediate superior yesterday called ‘a chewing out.’

“A 27-year veteran of the Coast Guard, Robinson was promoted between the first and second incidents to chief warrant officer 4th class.

“Documents also revealed that as a result of the bridge incident, a Coast Guard investigative board recommended that the 51-year-old Cuyahoga’s pilot house controls be updated. The modern equipment was not installed, a senior Coast Guard officer said yesterday.

“On May 31, the accident report states, the Cuyahoga left the Coast Guard Yard in Curtis bay near Baltimore enroute to Yorktown, Va., where the training vessel-described as a ‘floating classroom’ – was stationed. While attempting to pass under the Pennington Avenue drawbridge – which Robinson had been told four hours earlier would have only half of its span open – the Cuyahoga swung to the left and struck the bridge’s closed west span, the report said. Immediately before the collision, Robinson ordered the engines reversed. He heard no response from the engine room, the report states, and signaled full astern again to ensure the crewmen ‘understood the urgency of the order.’….

“The May 31 incident occurred as the Cuyahoga was navigating two bridges, the I-635 bridge and the Pennington Avenue bridge. The Cuyahoga with its mast height of 52 feet, passed under the first bridge at the center span. Then, according to the report, Robinson tried a ‘zig-zag’ maneuver, turning right, then left. ‘The intricacy, if not impossibility, of this maneuver, as planned, constitutes poor judgment on the part of CWO Robinson, said…the report. ‘A prudent seaman would navigate his vessel so as to pass through both spans on a constant course . . . several alternative means of doing this were available to CWO Robinson, citing excessive speed and too sharp a course change….

“Robinson, the father of six from Yorktown, Va., has been described as a deeply religious man who is a deacon in his Baptist church. ‘I’ve been praying daily . . . continuously,’ Robinson was quoted as saying in an interview yesterday. “God is my strength in this time to face each day.’”

Nov 3. New York Times. “Officer Guilty in Sinking of Cutter.” 11-4-1979, p. 40:

“Yorktown, Va., Nov. 3 (AP) — A jury of Coast Guard officers today found Chief Warrant Officer Donald K. Robinson guilty on a reduced charge of dereliction of duty in the collision that sank his cutter and killed 11 men. The jury returned its verdict after deliberating about 12 hours yesterday and today. It is to return Monday to hear arguments on what punishment should be imposed.

“Mr. Robinson’s defense was based on medical inability to function. He was originally charged with negligently hazarding his vessel, but that charge was reduced by the jury.

“Punishment for dereliction of duty could range from a finding of no punishment to a maximum of three months in custody, dismissal from the service and forfeiture of all benefits.

“Mr. Robinson, 47 years old, was silent as the court‐martial verdict was announced in the courtroom at the Yorktown Coast Guard Station.

“He had been accused of making a criminally negligent decision when he ordered a turn that resulted in the collision of the cutter Cuyahoga and an Argentine freighter the night of Oct. 20, 1978, in the Chesapeake Bay….

“At least five votes were needed to convict Mr. Robinson. Two captains, a commander and four chief warrant officers, all former ship commanders, made up the panel.

“Testimony throughout the trial showed the Cuyahoga’s skipper was weary from sleeplessness due to a pulmonary disorder that went undiagnosed by military doctors from March 1978 until December 1978— two months after the accident. Defense witnesses testified that Mr. Robinson did not know how sick he was and that he had made repeated trips to the medical staff at Yorktown. He had also gone to the Walter Reed Army Hospital for tests on several occasions, including twice in the two weeks before the collision.”

Nov 6. Washington Post. “Cuyahoga Skipper Given Token Cut in Seniority…” 11-6-1979.

“The Coast Guard officer whose actions were blamed for a collision that killed 11 servicemen was sentenced today to receive a letter of reprimand and a token reduction in seniority for his role in the accident. The verdict, issued by a military court, will have little practical effect on Chief Warrant Officer Donald K. Robinson, 48, skipper of the cutter Cuyahoga.

“Moments after he was sentenced, Robinson said he soon will retire from the service. Neither the formal letter of reprimand he will receive nor the loss of ranking among other warrant officers is sufficient to block him from receiving a full military pension, retirement benefits, and an honorable discharge.

“‘I’m very happy with it,’ said Robinson, a 27-year Coast Guard veteran who dashed into an anteroom with tears in his eyes to thank the jurors after the sentence was pronounced….

“The jury, which on Saturday had found Robinson guilty of dereliction of duty, could have sentenced him to as much as three months in jail at hard labor and dismissal from the service — a punishment equivalent to dishonorable discharge that, would have meant the loss of his pension. Instead, the jurors, who spent an addition two hours and forty minutes deliberating Robinson’s sentence today apparently heeded the plea of defense attorney Jerome V. Flanagan. He told them this morning that Robinson had already suffered enough for his role in the mishap, the worst Coast Guard disaster in more than 10 years.

“The sentence will be routinely reviewed by Coast Guard Commandant Adm. John B. Hayes and Transportation Secretary Neil Goldschmidt, who have the power to reduce it or throw out the verdict. Court officials said the review process could take up to a year, after which Flanagan said he plans to appeal the case to either a military or a federal court.

“Today’s sentencing ended the two week trial at the Coast Guard Reserve Training Center here, where the Cuyahoga was based before the tragedy….

“Robinson was originally charged with involuntary manslaughter, destruction of government property and negligence — charges that could have resulted in up to five years imprisonment. The first two charges were dropped last June when a military judge ruled that the Coast Guard would have to renew its investigation to justify the allegations.

“Chief prosecutor Cdr. James F. Meade, said after the sentencing that the Coast Guard did not plan to revive the other charges in the case. ‘As far as we’re concerned it’s over,’ he said….

“After 12 hours of deliberation ending Saturday, the jury rejected the negligence charge — which carried a maximum penalty of two years in jail and dismissal from the service — but found Robinson guilty of the lesser dereliction of duty charge….

“Asked what he would say to the families of the 11 dead crewmen, Robinson paused in the courtroom and replied: ‘I don’t think it would be an appropriate time to say anything.’”

Other

1984 US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruling:
“….
“The United States appeals from an order denying its claim for limitation of liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1958). We affirm the judgment of the district court.

“This suit arises out of a collision between the United States Coast Guard Cutter Cuyahoga and the Argentinian freighter, Santa Cruz II. How the collision occurred is undisputed. On a clear night in October 1978, the Cuyahoga, under the command of Chief Warrant Officer Donald K. Robinson, was northbound in the Chesapeake Bay on an officer candidate training cruise from its base at the Coast Guard Reserve Training Center (RTC) in Yorktown, Virginia. The Santa Cruz II, a freighter loaded with coal, was southbound in the Bay from Baltimore, Maryland.

“While standing watch on the Cuyahoga, Captain Robinson and several officer candidates noticed the lights of a vessel, which turned out to be the Santa Cruz II, off the port bow. Captain Robinson checked the radar and determined that the vessel was about eight miles away and had a left-bearing drift. From the configuration of the lights, Captain Robinson, despite many years of experience, guessed erroneously that the Santa Cruz II was a small vessel traveling in the same direction as the Cuyahoga. When the vessels were about a mile apart, Captain Robinson ordered a change of course, turning left to take the Cuyahoga into the mouth of the Potomac River to moor for the night. Having erroneously concluded that the Cuyahoga and the Santa Cruz were traveling in the same direction, Captain Robinson thought that by turning left the Cuyahoga would cross astern of the Santa Cruz. In fact, the left turn caused the Cuyahoga to cross the bow of the Santa Cruz II. When the Cuyahoga crossed its path, the Santa Cruz II sounded its warning signals. Captain Robinson did not realize that his vessel was in the path of the Santa Cruz until it was too late. The bow of the Santa Cruz struck the Cuyahoga. The Cuyahoga sank in two to three minutes. Eleven of her crew died. The Santa Cruz II sustained substantial injury to her bow.

“II

“Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, SA (ELMA), the owner of the Santa Cruz II, filed a complaint against the United States seeking recovery for damages to the Santa Cruz II and for indemnity and contribution for any claims arising out of the accident for which ELMA might be held liable to third parties. The United States denied liability but asserted that, in the event that it was found liable, its liability should be limited under 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) to the value of the Cuyahoga, which is nothing.

“In a memorandum opinion, Judge Blair found that the multiple errors of judgment and perception made by Captain Robinson were the sole cause of the collision. Consequently, the United States was 100% liable. The court also held that the government was entitled to limit its liability under Sec. 183(a) because the United States did not have privity or knowledge of the cause of the collision.

“Before judgment was entered, Judge Blair died. The case was reassigned to Judge Thomsen. Upon motion of ELMA, which the government opposed, Judge Thomsen reopened the case and held another trial at which additional evidence was received and new witnesses heard. Judge Thomsen agreed with Judge Blair’s conclusion that the Cuyahoga was solely responsible for the collision. Judge Thomsen, however, held that the United States could not limit its liability under Sec. 183(a) because “one or more persons in the chain of command over Robinson had knowledge or were charged with knowledge of the existence of Robinson’s physical problems and loss of sleep, which were responsible for his bad judgment, the cause of the collision.” It is from this judgment that the United States appeals.

“III

“Under 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) the liability of a shipowner for any loss, damage, or injury by collision may not exceed the amount or value of the interest of the owner in the vessel if the loss is occasioned without the privity or knowledge of the owner. Determining whether a shipowner may limit liability under this section is a two-step process. First, the court must consider what acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness caused the accident. Here, the United States does not appeal the district court’s finding that Captain Robinson’s errors of judgment due to his physical condition caused the collision. Consequently, we must address only the second question, whether the shipowner had knowledge of the events which caused the loss.

“To preclude limitation under Sec. 183(a), the shipowner’s knowledge need not be actual. The shipowner is chargeable with knowledge of acts or events or conditions of unseaworthiness that could have been discovered through reasonable diligence. See Spencer Kellogg Co. v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502, 511-12, 52 S. Ct. 450, 452-53, 76 L. Ed. 903 (1932). Thus, the inquiry here is whether the United States had sufficient knowledge of Robinson’s medical condition, which the district court found caused his errors in judgment, so that limitation of liability should be denied.

“The same standards are applicable to the United States when it seeks a limitation of liability because it lacked privity or knowledge of the cause of the loss as when a private corporation seeks the same benefit. United States v. Standard Oil of California, 495 F.2d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1974). In both instances, liability may not be limited under Sec. 183(a), where the negligence is that of an executive officer, manager, or superintendent, whose scope of authority includes supervision over the phase of the business out of which the injury occurred. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410-11, 63 S. Ct. 291, 293-94, 87 L. Ed. 363 (1943) (dicta). Here, the record shows that three officers were above Captain Robinson in the chain of command at Yorktown. The authority of the commanding officer of the Reserve Training Center in Yorktown included the operational control of the Cuyahoga. Below him in the chain of command was the executive officer. Finally, Captain Robinson’s reporting officer was the chief of the training division at Yorktown. As head of the training division, he had operational and administrative control of the Cuyahoga. Each of these officers had sufficient authority over the operation of the Cuyahoga to impute to the United States his knowledge of the events that caused the accident. See Spencer Kellogg Co., 285 U.S. at 511, 52 S. Ct. at 452.

“IV

“The United States argues that it cannot be charged with privity or knowledge of Robinson’s errors of navigation and seamanship when the vessel is underway. See La Bourgogne, 210, U.S. 95, 28 S. Ct. 664, 52 L. Ed. 973 (1908). Nonetheless, the United States may not absolve itself if through the use of reasonable diligence it could have taken action while the vessel was in port and under its authority and control that would have prevented Robinson’s negligent acts at sea. Spencer Kellogg Co., 285 U.S. at 511-12, 52 S. Ct. at 452-53; States Steamship Co. v. United States, 259 F.2d 458, 474 (9th Cir. 1957). We turn then to consider whether Robinson’s superiors exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain the effect Robinson’s medical condition might have on his performance as commanding officer of the Cuyahoga.

“Robinson first visited the medical clinic at the RTC in Yorktown in April 1978 complaining of wheezing, coughing, and shortness of breath. Initially, he was treated by corpsmen at the medical clinic who apparently diagnosed his condition as a sinus infection and prescribed antihistamines and a cough expectorant. Robinson returned to the medical clinic several times over the next few months because his symptoms persisted. Sometimes he was seen by a doctor, at others by a physician’s associate or corpsman. From July to September he visited the clinic frequently, going two to three times a week for treatment. During this period he was treated by a doctor who had diagnosed Robinson’s illness as bronchial asthma. Robinson repeatedly complained to the doctor that his coughing and difficulty in breathing were affecting his sleep. Some nights he said he slept only two to three hours. The doctor’s testimony conflicted with Robinson’s. The doctor admitted Robinson told him about difficulty in resting. He denied that he had any discussion about lack of sleep, and he asserted that he did not think Robinson was unfit for duty.

“Robinson’s condition did not improve materially, so in September the doctor sent him to the allergy clinic at Walter Reed Hospital. Robinson visited the allergy clinic at Walter Reed three times between September 14 and October 20, 1978. During this period he saw the doctor at the Yorktown clinic only on an informal basis, keeping him apprised of his progress and treatment at Walter Reed. His last visit to Walter Reed was the day before the collision, at which time he still complained of coughing, wheezing, chest congestion, and sleeplessness. Because Robinson’s condition had not improved, his physician at the allergy clinic arranged for him to go to the pulmonary clinic for further testing. Robinson’s illness was not correctly diagnosed as aspergillosis until after the accident, in December 1978.

“The medical clinic at Yorktown documented most visits on a daily medical report that was circulated to the commanding and executive officers. It listed patients seen at the clinic, their diagnosis, and a fitness-for-duty determination made by medical personnel. The district court found that although Robinson’s superiors knew his name was appearing frequently on this list, they took no reasonably adequate steps to determine whether his medical condition affected his ability to perform his duties as the commanding officer of the training vessel Cuyahoga.

“The government argues that Robinson’s superiors exercised due diligence and concluded that his condition would not impair the performance of his duties. The executive officer asked the doctor at Yorktown about Robinson and he also asked Robinson on at least one occasion how he was feeling. To require more, the United States argues, places an impossible burden on Robinson’s superiors.

“The executive officer testified that he noticed Robinson’s name on the daily medical report several days in a row in July 1978. He testified, however, that his conversation with the doctor, which the United States asserts constitutes sufficient diligence, was for a limited purpose. He questioned the doctor because he could not decipher the notation of Robinson’s diagnosis on the daily medical report. He did not ask medical personnel whether Robinson’s condition in any way affected his ability to perform as the commanding officer of the Cuyahoga. Moreover, although the executive officer notified the commanding officer that Robinson’s name was appearing frequently on the daily medical report, neither officer initiated any action or made any inquiry concerning the necessity of sick leave for Robinson or relief from his command. The chief of the training division made no attempt to determine the extent of Robinson’s illness, although, as Judge Thomsen found, he, too, had knowledge that Robinson had been ill for some time.

“The United States argues that to require Robinson’s superiors to conclude that he should not perform his duties as commanding officer when the doctors at Yorktown and Walter Reed had not recommended that he be removed from duty is to hold the United States to a standard of omniscience. The government relies on the doctor’s testimony that had he thought Robinson was too ill for duty he would have insisted that Robinson stay home in a not-fit-for-duty status.

“Conflicting evidence undermines the government’s reliance on the doctor’s testimony. Medical personnel at the RTC generally did not place senior officers like Robinson on limited or not-fit-for-duty status because senior officers could determine their own duty status. Consequently, a senior officer often would not be put on not-fit-for-duty status under circumstances where an enlisted man would be. Indeed, the doctor testified at Robinson’s court martial that he would have put Robinson on not-fit-for-duty status on several occasions had Robinson been an enlisted man on the Cuyahoga.

“Robinson, however, did not know that he could declare himself not-fit-for-duty for medical reasons, nor did he feel that he was incapable of performing his duties. He was confident that if he were unfit, the medical officers would tell him. Robinson believed that because his superiors received the daily medical report and thus were aware of his condition, they would relieve him of his duty if they thought it was necessary. Unfortunately, Robinson’s superiors considered senior officers listed on the daily medical report fit-for-duty unless medical personnel or the individual recommended otherwise. Consequently, they did not suggest independently that Robinson may not be fit-for-duty.

“That the policy was unclear for declaring senior officers not-fit-for-duty does not absolve the United States. Knowledge within the context of Sec. 183(a) includes both actual knowledge and the knowledge of conditions likely to produce or contribute to loss which the owner or superintendent could have discovered through reasonable diligence. “The measure in such cases is not what the owner knows, but what he is charged with finding out.” States Steamship Co., 259 F.2d at 466 (quoting Great A & P Tea Co. v. Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir. 1947). The executive officer’s limited questioning of the doctor did not meet this standard. The Coast Guard officers whose authority included the operational command of the Cuyahoga had a duty to conduct a more probing inquiry to determine whether Robinson’s condition might affect his ability to perform as the commanding officer on training missions on the Cuyahoga. Failing in this duty, the United States may not limit its liability under Sec. 183(a). See Spencer Kellogg Co. 285 U.S. at 512, 52 S. Ct. at 453.

“V

“Other considerations support the district court’s finding that the United States had privity and knowledge. Robinson had been involved in two minor accidents in April and May of 1978. After investigating these accidents, the Coast Guard reprimanded Robinson for exercising poor judgment. The government argues that these accidents bore no relationship to Robinson’s competence. Nonetheless, we agree with the district court’s observation that, although these accidents do not compel the conclusion that Robinson was incompetent, they are factors that in conjunction with Robinson’s medical problems should have prompted Robinson’s superiors to investigate whether he was fit to perform full duty.

“ELMA also asserts that independent grounds support a denial of limitation of liability. First, ELMA argues that the Cuyahoga was not sufficiently manned with a competent crew. ELMA presented as evidence three Coast Guard district inspection reports, from 1973, 1975, and 1978, which concluded that the Cuyahoga was undermanned and recommended an increased personnel allowance. Additionally, ELMA introduced a letter written by Robinson to the Commandant of the Coast Guard requesting an electrician billet for the Cuyahoga. In his letter Robinson explained that the personnel allowance was “far below the level of the necessary manpower needed to maintain this class and size of vessel, provide the routine administration, watchstanders and furnish qualified instructors for the training of the officer candidates ….” The district court found, however, that Robinson’s errors of judgment, not undermanning or an incompetent crew, caused the damage to the Santa Cruz. We cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous.

“ELMA also asserts that the Coast Guard had knowledge of material deficiencies on the Cuyahoga, including inadequate radar and emergency lighting, and poor watertight integrity, that were sufficient to deny limitation. The district court found that material deficiencies did not cause or contribute to the damage to the Santa Cruz but that they would be important with respect to 46 U.S.C. § 183(e), the loss of life provisions of the statute, if ELMA were held liable for damages in the Massachusetts cases. This finding also is not clearly erroneous, and we will not disturb it on review.

“We turn finally to ELMA’s claim for indemnity and contribution. Like the district court, we find this claim is premature because no judgment for damages has been rendered against ELMA in the wrongful death and personal injury suits filed in Massachusetts.

“We conclude that Judge Thomsen’s findings are not clearly erroneous and that he correctly applied the legal principles that govern this suit. Accordingly, we hold that the United States may not limit its liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) because it had privity and knowledge of the conditions that caused the collision between the Cuyahoga and the Santa Cruz. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.”

Sources

Ferrara, Grace M. (editor). The Disaster File: The 1970s. New York: Facts On File, 1979.

Justia US Law. “Argentinas S.A. As Owner of the Motor Vessel Santa Cruz II, Appellee, v. United States of America, Appellant, 730 F.2s 153 (4th Cir. 1984). US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit…Argued Sept. 1, 1983. Decided March 21, 1984.” Accessed 6-29-2021 at: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/730/153/345090/

National Transportation Safety Board. Safety Recommendation (s) M-79-17 through -30. Washington, DC: 3-2-1979. Accessed 6-23-2021 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/M79_17_30.pdf#search=cuyahoga

New York Times. “Officer Guilty in Sinking of Cutter.” 11-4-1979, p. 40. Accessed 6-29-2021 at: https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/04/archives/officer-guilty-in-sinking-of-cutter.html

Nova Tech (Northern Virginia Technical Diving Community). “Cuyahoga.” Accessed 8-29-2009 at: http://home.earthlink.net/~toddclagett/NovaTech/va_coast.htm

United States Coast Guard. Cuyahoga, 1927 WIX / WMEC / WSC-157. 9-9-2008 last modified. Accessed at: http://www.uscg.mil/tcyorktown/info/cuyhistspecs.asp

United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report. USCGC Cuyahoga, M/V Santa Cruz II (Argentine); Collision in Chesapeake Bay on 20 October 1978 with Loss of Life. Washington, DC: USCG (Report No. USCG 16732/92368) Commandant’s Action July 31, 1979, 66 pages. Accessed 6-23-2021 at: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/docs/boards/cuyogasantacruz.pdf

Washington Post (Glenn Frankel). “Cuyahoga Skipper Given Token Cut in Seniority; Cuyahoga Skipper Given a Reduction in Seniority.” 11-6-1979. Accessed 6-29-2021 at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1979/11/06/cuyahoga-skipper-given-token-cut-in-seniority-cuyahoga-skipper-given-a-reduction-in-seniority/7f1a91c4-e35d-4851-84f4-b139ebe17dd2/

Washington Post (Stephanie Mansfield). “Cutter Captain Had Other Accidents.” 11-3-1978. Accessed 6-29-2021 at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1978/11/03/cutter-captain-had-other-accidents/30afb6f6-16d4-4bca-8cc3-5a382a098b98/

Wikipedia, “USCGC Cuyahoga,” 6-12-2021 edit. Accessed 6-23-2021 at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USCGC_Cuyahoga