1982 — Nov 8, Fire (intentionally set by inmate), Harrison County Jail, Biloxi, MS — 29

— 29  Bell. “Investigation Report. Twenty-Nine Die in Biloxi…” Fire Journal, Nov 1983, p. 44.

— 29  National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 137.

— 29  National Fire Sprinkler Association. F.Y.I. 1999, 6.

 

Narrative Information

 

Bell: “An early-morning fire in the Harrison County Jail in Biloxi, Mississippi, on November 8, 1982, was responsible for the deaths of 29 inmates and injuries to 59 others including inmates, jail officers, sheriff’s deputies, police officers, and fire fighters. The fire, reported to the Biloxi Fire Department at 1:31 am, originated in an occupied isolation cell in the nonsprinklered jail facility. The isolation-cell walls and door were padded with a sprayed-on, rigid synthetic foam-plastic material.

 

“Although the fire was confined to the cell of origin, dense black smoke spread rapidly throughout the jail, trapping inmates in their cells. The jail officers’ attempts to extinguish the fire and unlock cell doors to release inmates were hampered by the rapidly developing fire and the spread of thick smoke in the jail corridors.

 

“The following major factors contributed to the fatalities and injuries in this fire:

 

• Lack of detection and extinguishment of the fire in its incipient stage before it became life-threatening.
• Once ignited, the synthetic foam-plastic cell padding material created an intense fire characterized by a rapid rate of burning, high heat release, and a large amount of dense smoke.
• Lack of smoke barriers and compartmentation allowed unrestricted spread of smoke throughout the jail.
• Inability of jail officers to rapidly release the inmates in all cells in the confinement area, using the key system. [end of p. 44]

 

“The Harrison County Second Judicial District Jail was built in 1964 as a police station and courtroom. The building had later been converted to a municipal jail, with additional detention areas added and renovations completed in 1980 and 1981…

 

“The jail was a one-story structure of fire-resistive construction, its exterior dimensions approximately 96 feet by 97 feet. Construction included reinforced-concrete beams and columns, with masonry (cinder or concrete-block) exterior and interior walls. The exterior façade also included brick veneer construction. The roof assembly consisted of 8-inch precast, reinforced-concrete channel panels on concrete beams with built-up asphalt and gravel covering.

 

“The interior finish of the detention areas in the facility was noncombustible, except for synthetic foam-plastic material lining the two isolation cells and inside the corridor doors of the two “drunk tanks.” Interior walls consisted of painted concrete-masonry units, steel bars, or steel mesh. Ceiling interior finish consisted of exposed reinforced-concrete roof slabs….

 

“The jail contained 20 cells with a maximum designated capacity of 102 inmates. Cells varied both in size and in function… The Padded Cells…, the Drunk Tanks…, and the five Security Cells…were provided with solid steel doors. The Bullpens…which could house up to 15 inmates, had corridor walls of steel bar or steel mesh screen, with sliding bar or wire mesh screen

corridor doors. The remaining cells were provided with swinging barred doors.

 

“The fire originated in an isolation cell designated as Padded Cell-1 (PC-l). The 7-by-8-foot cell had a ceiling height of 10 feet. The cell’s corridor door was solid steel, with a 4-inch-by-12-inch “pass-through” or tray opening. The “pass-through” door could be closed and locked from the corridor. A supply-air grill located at ceiling level provided conditioned air to the cell. Return air from the cell passed through the wall to the corridor through a grill located at ceiling level. The cell walls were covered with a rigid, sprayed-on foam plastic reported to be polyurethane. The foam was three inches thick on walls and three inches thick on the steel cell door. Post-fire inspection of the foam plastic indicated that the surface was exposed and did not have any covering over it. The ceiling and the floor of the cell were exposed concrete. Contents of the padded cell were restricted to a fire-retardant, vinyl-covered mattress made of boric-acid-treated cotton, which had been placed directly on the floor…. [p.45]

 

“Ten keys were required to open all the cellblock and cell access doors. Cell-door keys were color-coded to match colors painted on cell doors. There were two sets of keys; the first set was normally kept by the on-duty jail officers in the confinement area or administrative area. A second ring of keys was locked in an administrative office near the jail officers’ desk area…..

 

“…At the time of the fire, three jail officers were on duty for the night shift, one female and two male officers. In addition, seven inmates were designated as trusties. [end of p.46]

 

“Jail officer training included major emergency operation procedures. The training-program manual provided specific guidelines for handling a fire emergency within the jail, entitled “‘Fire Evacuation Procedures.” These procedures included relocation of inmates within the jail, and single-file evacuation of inmates to a double-fenced recreation yard across the street from the jail. The procedures also noted that “all keys to cell doors are color-coded to match the color code painted on the door of each cell.” A fire-safety evacuation plan was also posted at seven locations in the jail. According to that fire evacuation plan, all cells within the confinement area were to be evacuated through the main (front) door located on the north side of the building.

 

“Inmates with apparent psychiatric conditions or inmates requiring disciplinary action were placed in padded isolation cells. An inmate with a psychiatric condition was allowed a minimum of clothing and no other personal items. Smoking materials were not allowed in the isolation cells. If an inmate was permitted to have a cigarette, a lighted cigarette was to be passed into the

cell, and the inmate was to be kept under observation by the guard until the cigarette was extinguished or returned to the guard.

 

“At the time of the fire, improvements were being made in the jail to upgrade safety, health, and sanitary conditions in the jail. These improvements had been completed or were being made according to a court-approved plan, following a legal suit brought against the county for conditions in the jail. The court-mandated changes included upgrading of lighting and electrical

systems, improvement of sanitary fixtures, improvement of air handling, the addition of a kitchen cooking-range hood and duct fire suppression system with automatic fuel shutoff and manual activation switch, and a partial smoke detection system in the corridors of the jail’s confinement area.

 

“Inspection of general health and safety conditions in the Harrison County Jail were conducted periodically by several state-level agencies, upon request. These included a semiannual survey conducted by the Mississippi State Building Commission, the State Fire Marshal’s Office, and the State Board of Health…. In addition, the jail had recently been surveyed by the US Marshal’s Service, which had approved the Harrison County Jail as a facility for housing federal prisoners. As a result of those inspections, the cells on the corridor in the northeast corner of the confinement area had been designated as cells for the detention of federal prisoners….

 

“On Saturday, November 7, 1982, the day prior to the fire, the occupant of the padded cell had been arrested and charged with being drunk in public. He was released on Sunday and rearrested on the same charge later that day. He was reportedly incoherent, and reportedly had been confined because arresting officers believed that he was a danger to himself and others. He was being held for a commitment hearing scheduled for Monday, and had been placed in the padded isolation cell (PC-l) in the northeast corner of the jail confinement area. Throughout the evening, the inmate had reportedly been noisy and disruptive. At approximately 1:15 am, the jail officer closed the pass-through of the cell door because of the [end of p.47] noise and the behavior of the inmate toward other inmates in nearby cells.

 

“At approximately 1:30 am, the jail officer sitting at the jailers’ desk in the receiving area heard the occupant of PC-1 yelling “Fire in the Hole! Fire in the Hole!” The jail officer took the set of keys and entered the confinement area of the jail. He was followed by a second male jail officer and a jail trusty. As he approached the padded cell, he smelled a light odor of smoke in the corridor, but saw no visible smoke. He placed the key in the cell’s lock and unlocked the door. The jail officer reported that when he pulled the door open approximately two inches, an “explosion” blew the door open, knocking him down the corridor. A “large ball of fire” rolled out of the cell, and the corridor instantly began to fill with thick black smoke.

 

“The occupant of the cell, who had apparently been huddling at the door beneath the vinyl-covered/treated-cotton mattress, “scampered” out of the cell and down the corridor to safety.

 

“The third jail officer, who had been approaching the security screen located near the jail officer’s desk to lock the screen gate, witnessed the sudden fire development as the cell door was opened. She reported that an explosion-like noise accompanied the venting of fire into the corridor. She stated that she only had time to return approximately 12 feet to the desk, push the “0” key on the phone to connect with the Sheriff’s Department Communications Center, and. say “Fire in the jail . . . .send the fire department!” She reported that almost immediately, thick black smoke began to fill the receiving area in which the jail officers’ desk was located and which served as the jail’s main means of egress.

 

“The first two jail officers and the trusty, who were outside the cell at the time of the explosion, obtained three fire extinguishers and unsuccessfully attempted to fight the fire. The key on the key ring remained in the lock of the cell door. Repeated efforts to retrieve the key ring were unsuccessful because the cell door was engulfed by the fire coming from the cell. The thick black smoke filling the corridor finally forced them to retreat to the exterior of the building. All three jail officers and the trusty were temporarily incapacitated by inhaling smoke.

 

“The first fire department apparatus from the headquarters station, seven blocks away, arrived at the jail at 1:34 am. Since all three jail officers were still affected by the smoke, one of the jail trusties donned fire department self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and entered the building with fire fighters. They were able to retrieve the ring of keys from the padded-cell door. The trusty and fire fighters were able to unlock cell doors in the north cell block until the trusty’s SCBA air supply was exhausted and he was forced to leave the building. When the trusty, reached the exterior of the jail, one of the jail officers took the key ring from him and reentered the jail without donning breathing apparatus. The officer was later found unconscious in a corridor by fire fighters sent in to search for him. The fire fighters rescued him and also retrieved the key ring, which was lying on the floor beside him.

 

“The jail warden arrived at the jail at approximately 1:40 am. He attempted to enter the administrative area in order to obtain the second set of keys, which were locked in one of the offices, but was unable to enter the reception area due to the heavy, smoke. Returning outside, he requested that a tow truck be called to start pulling out bars and windows. The tow truck reportedly appeared almost instantly, as it was in the jail area. Attempts were made to pull the bars and windows from the building, with little effect.

 

“The warden then went to the west side of the jail, where he asked fire fighters to break out a glass exterior door. He entered the building and opened the unlocked interior exit door located at the west end of the corridor, in front of Bullpens 3 and 4. He then ordered that the tow truck be moved to the west side of the building. It was backed up to the building, and the warden and others pulled the cable into the corridor. The warden attached the cable around the locking bar of the sliding Bullpen doors, and the doors to Bullpens 3 and 4 were pulled open.

 

“The warden was informed that the jail officer who had been unlocking the cell doors with the keys was “down.” He returned to the north side of the building, and fire fighters gave the officer’s key ring to the warden as they carried the unconscious jail officer out of the building. [end of p.48] The warden reentered the building from the doorway on the west side of the building and was able to unlock the cell doors to Bullpens 1 and 2, the last cell areas to be unlocked.

 

“It is estimated that approximately one hour had passed before all of the inmates were removed from the locked cells. As the cell doors were opened, fire fighters entered the cell areas to search for and locate the occupants. While they pulled inmates from the cells, other fire fighters, sheriff’s deputies, and police officers, most of them without breathing apparatus, entered the jail to carry the victims from the jail; many of them were overcome by smoke.

 

“Actions of Occupants

 

“Occupants of the Security Cells (S-1 through S-4) and Padded Cell 2 (PC-2) used towels, sheets, or blankets to block tray pass-through openings or viewing ports in their cell doors, to prevent smoke from entering their cells. In bullpens and cells with barred doors, smoke was able to enter the cells through bars or steel mesh walls and doors. Occupants of these cells took a variety of actions to mitigate the effects of smoke, including crawling into shower stalls, running water, and wetting towels or pillows. Many occupants apparently crawled to walls or under bunks furthest from the corridor.

 

“Casualties and Fire Damage

 

“The fire initially caused the deaths of 27 of the 94 inmates in the jail. After the fire, two of the critically injured inmates died, bringing the number of fatalities to 29, 27 males and two females. In addition, 61 persons were injured. Of these, 10 inmates and one jail officer were admitted to the hospital in critical condition.

 

“In the padded cell of fire origin (PC-l), the foam-plastic padding material on the walls was heavily charred; the foam-plastic material on the door was partially consumed… Flames vented into the corridor from the fully involved padded cell; however, flame spread was essentially limited to the cell. Smoke spread was reported throughout the jail facility.

 

Analysis. Fire Growth and Development

 

“The Harrison County Jail fire is another in the series of multi-fatality fires that have occurred in correctional and [end of p.49] detention facilities over the last eight years. Most of these fires have followed strikingly similar scenarios.[1]

 

“Like most of the other correctional facility fires, this fire was apparently incendiary in nature. As determined by the Mississippi State Fire Marshal’s Office, it was most likely intentionally initiated by smoking materials and involved materials found in the cell other than the wall padding materials or the mattress. The fire then involved the rigid foam padding material on the walls and door of the cell…. [p.52]

 

“The absence of visibility during rescue made the color-coded key system unusable. Each key on the ring had to be inserted in the lock of each door until the proper key was located to open the door. Jail officers indicated that a great deal of time was spent trying each key on the ring to find the appropriate one…. [p. 53]

 

“Summary

 

“Detention and correctional facilities present unique fire-safety problems. Limitations of movement within the facility and restricted egress from a facility may require that adequate protection be provided to defend occupants in place against fire conditions that may develop. Ignition control, fuel control, occupant protection, appropriate detection and suppression activities and planning [end of p. 54] The Harrison County Jail did not have an “area of refuge” to which inmates could be safely moved, nor was it protected by automatic sprinklers to detect and extinguish incipient-stage fires. Therefore, safety required a complete and timely egress from the facility. The intensity of the fire, along with the immediate production of dense smoke and manual unlocking and release difficulties, prevented timely evacuation that would have prevented fatalities and injuries.

 

“As in previous major, multi-fatality correctional facility fires such as those in Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada and Maury County, Tennessee in June 1977, the rapidly developing fire at the Harrison County Jail, involving synthetic foam materials in a padded cell, fully involved the cell and produced large amounts of dense, black smoke, exposing occupants throughout the facility. In the two earlier fires, the inability to evacuate inmates in a timely manner due to the loss of keys or key and lock malfunctions during the incidents were factors contributing to the loss of life.

 

“In this fire, the inaccessibility of the regular key ring left in the padded cell door, the multiple keys required to open cell doors, and the inability to identify color-coded keys in the dense black smoke contributed to delays in initiating and maintaining a timely evacuation of inmates from cells, in spite of the repeated attempts of jail officers and fire department personnel.

 

“The fire hazard potential of padded cell materials is well documented and is recognized in state-of-the-art codes and standards. Among other important fire-safety requirements, NFPA 101, The Life Safety Code, 1981 edition, designates padded cells as severe high-hazard areas requiring both automatic sprinkler protection and fire-resistance separation. Such technology applications are important to reduce the potential for other padded cell-related loss-of-life disasters….” [p.55]

 

(Bell, James R. (NFPA). “Investigation Report. Twenty-Nine Die in Biloxi…” Fire Journal, Nov 1983, pp. 44-49, 52-55.)

Sources

 

Bell, James R. (NFPA). “Investigation Report. Twenty-Nine Die in Biloxi…” Fire Journal, Nov 1983, pp. 44-49, 52-55. Accessed 5-31-2015 at: http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fires-by-property-type/prisons-and-jails/deadliest-prison-fires-in-the-united-states

 

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

 

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Bell footnote 1: “Between 1971 and 18=982, 277 correctional facility fires were reported to the NFPA. Of those, 56 were fatal fires resulting in a total of 178 civilian fatalities (staff, inmates, visitors, and police), 272 civilian injuries, and 17 fire-fighter injuries….”