1923 — Sep 8, seven US Navy destroyers run aground in fog, near Honda Point, CA — 23

–23 75th Memorial Service Plaque, Point Honda, Vandenberg Air Force Base.”
–23 Golowski, “Point Honda Research”
–23 Naval Order of the US–SF Commandery. Mission: History, Vol. 2, No. 9, Sep 11, 2000, p4.
–20 Destroyer Young.
–23 Nelson. “Gene Bruce, 98; Last Known Survivor of 1923 Naval Disaster.” LA Times, 12-12-2005.
–20 Destroyer Young.
— 3 Destroyer Delphy.
–23 US Dept. of Navy. “Casualties: US Navy…Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Injured…”
–22 Berman, Bruce D. Encyclopedia of American Shipwrecks. 1972, p. 227.
–22 Gibbs, Jim. Disaster Log of Ships…shipwrecks, California to Alaska. 1971, p. 36.
–22 Oakland Tribune, CA. “Shipwreck One of Worst Since Janeiro’s Loss…” 8-30-1929, D3.

Narrative Information

75th Memorial Service Plaque: “This plaque is dedicated to the memory of the 23 courageous sailors of U.S. Navy Squadron 11 who died in the service of their country when seven of their ships ran aground near Honda Point, California, on September 8, 1923.” (75th Memorial Service Plaque, Point Honda, Vandenberg Air Force Base.”

“Known to seafarers as the Devil’s Jaw, Point Honda has lured ships to its dangerous rocks on California’s coast for centuries, but its worst disaster occurred on 8 September 1923. That night nine U.S. Navy destroyers ran into Honda’s fog-wrapped reefs. Part of Destroyer Squadron 11, the ships were making a fast run from San Francisco to their homeport of San Diego as fog closed around them. The captain of the flagship Delphy ordered a change of course, but due to navigational errors and unusual currents caused by an earthquake in Japan the previous week, she ran aground. Eight destroyers followed her. Only Pearl Harbor in 1941 would do more damage.” (Amazon.com. Editorial Reviews, Product Description)

CaliforniaWreckDivers.org: “Young’s hull was torn by a jagged pinnacle and she swiftly capsized heeling over on her starboard side within a minute and a half, trapping many of her engine and fire room personnel below. Lt. Comdr. William L. Calhoon, Young’s commanding officer, knew that there was no time to launch boats or rafts as the ship’s list increased alarmingly following the grounding. Calhoun accordingly passed the word, through his executive officer, Lt. E. C. Herzinger, and Chief Boatswain’s Mate Arthur Peterson, to make for the port side, to stick with the ship, and to not jump. While the survivors clung tenaciously to their precarious, oily, surf-battered refuge, Boatswain’s Mate Peterson proposed to swim 100 yards to a rocky outcropping to the eastward known as Bridge Rock. Before he could do so however, Chauncey (DD-296) providentially grounded between Young and Bridge Rock, shortening the escape route considerably. The two ships were about 75 yards apart. At that juncture, Peterson unhesitatingly risked his life, diving into the swirling sea and swimming through the tumbling surf with a line to the nearby Chauncey also aground but in a far better predicament since she had remained on a comparatively even keel. Eager hands from Chauncey hauled Peterson aboard and made the line fast. Soon, a seven-man life raft from the sister ship was on its way to Young as a makeshift ferry. The raft ultimately made 11 trips bringing the 70 Young survivors to safety. By 2330, the last men of the crew were on board Chauncey; at that point, Lt. Comdr. Colhoun and Lt. Herzinger (the latter having returned to the ship after having been in the first raft across) left Young’s battered hull. In the subsequent investigation of the “Point Honda Disaster” the Board of Investigation commended Lt. Comdr. Calhoun for his ‘coolness, intelligence, and seamanlike ability’ that was directly responsible for the ‘greatly reduced loss of life.’ The Board also cited Boatswain’s Mate Peterson for his ‘extraordinary heroism’ in swimming through the turbulent seas with a line to Chauncey; Lt. Herzinger drew praise for his ‘especially meritorious conduct’ in helping to save the majority of the ship’s crew. Rear Admiral S. E. W. Kittelle, Commander, Destroyer Squadrons, subsequently cited Lt. Comdr. Calhoun’s display of leadership and personality that saved ‘three quarters of the crew of the Young’ and Lt. Herzinger for his ‘Coolness and great assistance in the face of grave danger.’ Also commended by the admiral was Fireman First Class J. T. Scott, who attempted to close off the master oil valve to prevent a boiler explosion, volunteering to go below to the fire room and go below the floor plates. The water, rapidly rising through the gashes in the shin’s hull, however, prevented Scott from completing the task. He survived. Twenty men were lost in Young, the highest death toll of any of the ships lost in the disaster at Point Honda.” (CaliforniaWreckDivers.org. Honda)

Gibbs: “….Enveloped by a steep bank of fog, the naval squadron was steaming in formation at a speed of 20 knots, and what was worse, as later developed, 30 miles off course. Off the Honda, 75 miles north of Santa Barbara, California, the flagship destroyer Delphy…scraped bottom, then heaved crazily on an outcrop 500 yards offshore. The destroyers all steaming in formation went aground one after another in one of the greatest peacetime losses in naval history. The date was September 9, 1923, and 22 sailors lost their lives. The other destroyers that piled up on the treacherous rocks were the S.P. Lee, Young, Nicholas, Woodbury, Chauncey and Fuller. An enemy could not have done a more perfect job. Hundreds of Navy personnel finally reached safety after hours of rescue work.” (Gibbs, Jim. Disaster Log of Ships: A Pictorial account of shipwrecks, California to Alaska. NY: Bonanza Books, 1971, p. 36.)

Golowski: “Between 2105 and 2115, on that day, seven destroyers out of a total of fourteen, steaming in column formation with the Eleventh Destroyer Squadron, Pacific Battle Fleet, on a 20-knot, high-speed, endurance test of their cruising turbines, were trapped in a web of sharp, volcanic spires along the rocky California coast and were stranded….

“Captain Edward H. Watson trusted LCdr. Donald T. Hunter to do the navigating for the entire squadron and to lead them home safely to San Diego. And probably because of this unquestionable trust, LCdr. Hunter was able to convince Capt. Watson that the Delphy was at or near [a] …position…to turn safely into the Santa Barbara Channel. He believed navigating by dead reckoning—the ‘old-fashioned’ way—was more reliable than by following radio compass bearings sent by ‘new-fangled gadgets’ from a naval shore station…

“Lieutenant Commander Hunter taught navigation for two years at the Naval Academy prior to assuming command of the Delphy. On September 8, 1923, he navigated the Delphy by dead reckoning because he did not trust the radio compass signals sent to the Delphy from the station at Point Arguello. Several of the radio signals indicated that the Delphy was heading directly toward the station, although, the dead reckoning position showed the Delphy in safe waters….

[Between 21:04 and 21:06] “The Young hit a submerged pinnacle reef about 2104 and her bottom was sliced open on the starboard side, as she rode over the pinnacle to a dead stop, while the Delphy and the S.P. Lee, out in front, continued on a course to the cliffs of Honda. At about 2105, the Delphy struck head on, and a minute later, the S.P. Lee veered to the left to avoid a collision and crashed nearby. Four more ships joined the wreckage: Woodbury, Nicholas, Fuller and Chauncey….” (Golowski, “Point Honda Research”)

Lockwood and Adamson in Golowski: “On September 17, 1923, a Court of Inquiry convened in the Administration Building on the Naval Air Station, North Island, California, to question defendants and witnesses concerning the circumstances surrounding the stranding of seven destroyers and the loss of 23 lives at Point Honda, California, on September 8, 1923.

The Findings of Fact, Opinions of the Court and Recommendations were documented in San Diego, California, on October 12, 1923.

In the first opinion of the Court, the direct cause of the disaster which resulted in the stranding of seven destroyers on Pedernales Point (Point Honda), and the grounding of two others in the same vicinity is, in the first instance, directly attributable to bad errors of judgment and faulty navigation on the part of three officers attached to and serving on the U. S. S. Delphy, viz: the Squadron Commander, Captain Edward H. Watson, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Donald T. Hunter, and the Navigating Officer, Lieutenant (j. g.) Lawrence Francis Blodgett.

“The findings of the Court of Inquiry (recommended General Courts-martial be awarded to eleven officers) were greeted with general satisfaction by press, public and—not least—by Congressional politicians. The approval uttered by Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby was reflected widely by the economy-minded Coolidge administration. It was apparent that to certain factions in Washington, the real tragedy at Honda—the loss of seven splendid fighting ships and 23 irreplaceable lives—was of secondary importance. To them the matter of grave concern was that $13,000,000 worth of Government property had been tossed on the junk heap. For that, heads must roll on the sand.” (Lockwood and Adamson, p. 25; cited in Golowski, “Point Honda Research”)

“But when the General Courts-martial returned only two convictions out of eleven, the mood changed considerably.

“While the findings (two convictions and nine acquittals) dissipated the gloom that hung over the Navy, they created deep displeasure in Washington. The wholesale ‘hangings’ that had been expected did not materialize to provide material for political campaigners. There was much talk about drastic Congressional changes in laws that deal with naval courts, to place greater legal power in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy.

“Even (President) Calvin Coolidge—who seldom ventured an opinion on any subject, including the weather—observed that the ‘Court Martial has been very lenient with everybody’.

“As is understandable, Secretary of the Navy Denby was much displeased with the nine acquittals. He believed that stern treatment should have been accorded all 11 of the defendants. He felt that the standards of naval discipline had been let down and that the prestige, performance, and morale of the service would suffer.” (Lockwood and Adamson, p. 216; cited in Golowski, “Point Honda Research”)

“It was the Navy Department’s next move. Commander Leslie E. Bratton was ordered to Washington and appointed the Assistant Judge Advocate to review the records of trial for the Secretary’s endorsement. Commander Bratton was also the Judge Advocate at the Court of Inquiry and the eleven General Courts-martial. On September 8, 1923, he was the skipper of the Stoddert—one of the ships of Division 32, Destroyer Squadron Eleven, which escaped the rocks at Point Honda.

“After reviewing the records of trial, Commander Bratton recommended that the not guilty verdicts (acquittals) be disapproved. In early 1924, the not guilty verdicts (acquittals) were disapproved by endorsement placed on the court martial records… This action was made public by the Navy Department with the statement noting that disapproval of the findings by the Secretary did not serve as a basis for re-trial of the cases, but was ‘simply an expression of the Secretary’s views of the Court’s action’. (Lockwood and Adamson, p. 216; cited in Golowski.)

“Once again, the bottom line took precedence. Years later, Captain H. O. Roesch, who was the commanding officer of the Nicholas at Point Honda, commented about the outcome of the reversal of his acquittal.

‘When all the acquittals were disapproved, we were all in the same boat. The principle effect of these reversals was that all the skippers were put in the position of having been responsible for the loss of their ships. This prevented us from submitting claims for the loss of our personal gear and equipment as did our junior officers’.”

(Lockwood and Adamson, p. 217; cited in Golowski.)

Naval Order of the United States – San Francisco Commandery: “Steaming south, offshore of California, time and fuel can be saved by sailing through the Santa Barbara Channel, guarded on the north by Point Arguello and Point Concepción. The passage has been well known to mariners since the Gold Rush or before and Point Arguello has been marked by a light since 1881. A radio beacon was added early in the 20th Century. Surf, seas, tides and weather are predictable.

“On 8 September 1923, the U.S. Navy Destroyer Squadron 11 under Capt. Edward H. Watson in USS Delphy (DD 261) was steaming on a heading of 150° off the coast, south of San Luis Obispo, when Watson ordered a 95° left turn to make the approach to Santa Barbara Channel. It was 2100 and dark. DesRon 11 was making 20 knots. Marine stratus obscured the sea.

“The ships were making too much speed, 95° was too much of a turn and, worst of all, the squadron wasn’t where Watson thought it was when he began the turn. It later came to light that he had disbelieved the accuracy of a Point Arguello radio signal. Following the turn, Point Arguello was dead ahead, and distant only about two nautical miles. The Point Arguello light may have been hidden by the fog.

“But, did Watson order a 95° left turn, or did he order his ships to turn to a bearing of 95° magnetic? Many accounts of the disaster say that it was a 95° left turn but a turn to 95° would have put him on course to clear the Santa Barbara Channel with room to spare on both
sides — if he had been at 26° N. Lat, 121° W. Long, to pick one spot in the ocean, safely offshore from the California coast. And testimony at Watson’s hearing established that he was not where he thought he was.

“The destroyers began crashing onto rocks and into the shore only six minutes after making the fateful turn and could have been only two nautical miles from shore, with 20 knots bent on, when Watson pointed his destroyer squadron directly at the jagged rocks between Point Arguello and Point Pedernales, just to its north. The spot, at the mouth of Honda Creek, is sometimes called ‘The Devil’s Jaws,’ for the numerous wrecks there despite Arguello Light.

“Delphy was in the van and five or six minutes after making the fateful turn she crashed hard on the rocks off Point Arguello. Like the cars of a derailed railroad train crashing into a mountainside, DesRon 11’s ships followed Delphy onto the rocks, seven ships in all, in what
would turn out to be the Navy’s greatest ever peacetime loss.

“One after the other, the ships followed Delphy at 20 knots — S.P. Lee (DD 310), Young (DD 312), Woodbury (DD 309), Nicholas (DD 311), Fuller (DD 297), and Chauncey (DD 296). Flares were fired and sirens sounded in an attempt to warn the ships following, and they were successful to the extent seven destroyers in the squadron were spared.

“One of the destroyers that did not run aground was USS Farragut (DD 300). She was sixth in line, and though two ships following her rode onto the rocks, she was saved by the seamanship of her captain, Lt. Cdr. John F. McClain, who maneuvered her through the melee and even touched bottom.

“Delphy’s hull hit the rocks amidships, breaking the ship in half, her stern settling beneath the surface. S.P. Lee threaded her way through the rocks until she ran aground and broached, parallel to a small beach. Young’s hull was ripped open by a jagged rock and she capsized to starboard within a minute and a half, trapping many sailors in her engineering spaces. Woodbury ran up on a large rock outcropping that came to be known as Woodbury Rock. At first, Woodbury’s damage seemed slight and Cdr. Louis P. Davis, her captain, attempted to back her off. But her fireroom was soon flooded, all power was lost, the ship settled on the bottom and breakers began to punish the ship.

“Fuller followed her sister to Woodbury Rock, grounding on the shore side. Lines were stretched from both ships to the rock and the crews clambered to safety. Chauncey grounded close inshore, just in front of the capsized Young. She rigged lines to the cliffs and both her men and Young’s used them to reach safety. Nicholas was not hard aground and her captain, Lt. Cdr. Herbert Roesch, thought he could save her if he could find a way out, but it was dark and he was trapped by the rocks and the wrecks of other ships. By morning, the ship had a 25° list and it was evident
from the groans of her hull that she was in danger of breaking up. Roesch ordered the ship abandoned and the entire crew was brought safely ashore.

“Twenty-three lives were lost at Point Arguello, 20 of them in the unfortunate Young, which capsized almost immediately. That the disaster did not cost more lives was due in part to individual acts of courage by some sailors and the leadership of some officers. Though Young’s boilermen and engineering crew were trapped, her captain, Lt. Cdr. William L. Calhoun rallied his men to the port side of the ship, ordering them to stick with their ship and not jump into the treacherous sea. Chief Boatswain’s Mate Arthur Peterson jumped, carrying a line through the pounding surf to Chauncey, 75 yards away. A life raft from Chauncey made 11 trips to and from Young along Peterson’s line, bringing his surviving shipmates to safety. The chief was cited for his heroism.

“In what could be called a display of leadership or just plain foolishness, Lt. Cdr. Walter D. Seed dove from his ship into the turbulent water and was cited ‘for great bravery in swimming a distance of about 75 yards through a rough and turbulent sea in order to test the feasibility of and make arrangements for the salvage of his crew.’

“Frank M. Moon, a machinists mate first class aboard Fuller, was another who braved the sea, and was cited ‘for extraordinary heroism in swimming with a line from the Fuller to a rock … in
order to salvage the crew of that vessel.’ Fuller’s entire whaleboat crew was cited ‘for displaying courage in volunteering and manning a whaleboat which they pulled throughout the night in the face of constant and imminent danger.’ Each member was presented a silver Lifesaving Medal Second Class by Assistant Secretary of the Navy L. C. Andrews. Fuller’s fireroom crew was also cited, for staying at their posts ‘until driven out by the inrush of rising water.’….” (Naval Order of the United States – San Francisco Commandery. “1923: Train Wreck at Arguello — Rocky California Coast Claims Seven Destroyers,” Mission: History, V2, N9, 9-11-2000, pp. 1-2, 4-5.)

USN: “Destroyers from Squadron 11 ran aground at Point Honda, CA: USS Delphy (DD-261), USS Young (DD-312), USS S. P. Lee (DD-310), USS Woodbury (DD-309), USS Nicholas (DD-311), USS Chauncy (DD-296) and USS Fuller (DD-297). 23 killed, at least 15 seriously injured. 8 Sep. 1923.” (US Dept. Navy. “Casualties: US Navy…Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Injured…”)

Sources

75th Memorial Service Plaque, Point Honda, Vandenberg Air Force Base. [Link no longer operable when checked 2-5-2022.]

California Wreck Divers.org. Honda. Website accessed 12-17-2008 at: http://www.cawreckdivers.org/Wrecks/Honda.htm

Gibbs, Jim. Disaster Log of Ships: A Pictorial account of shipwrecks, California to Alaska. NY: Bonanza Books, 1971.

Golowski, June Anderson. Point Honda Research. Website dated 2006 accessed at: http://www.pointhondamemorial.org/research/

Naval Order of the United States – San Francisco Commandery. “1923: Train Wreck at Arguello — Rocky California Coast Claims Seven Destroyers,” Mission: History, Vol. 2, No. 9, September 11, 2000. Accessed 2-5-2022 at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55eb4805e4b0c7e05226cf5f/t/59e52c24017db25ba91d8dd2/1508191273378/V2-I9_MissionHistory_2000_09.PDF

Nelson, Valerie J. “Gene Bruce, 98; Last Known Survivor of 1923 Naval Disaster.” Los Angeles Times, 12-12-2005. Accessed 2-5-2022 at: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-dec-12-me-bruce12-story.html