1967 — Feb 7, Dale’s Penthouse Restaurant Fire, Montgomery, AL — 25

–26 Decatur Daily, AL. “Montgomery Fire Claims 26. Glaze Destroys Restaurant…” 2-8-1967, 1.
–25 AP. “25 Killed in Fire in Penthouse Restaurant.” Republican-Courier, Findlay, OH, 2-9-1967, p. 1.
–25 Juillerat and Gaudet. “Fire at Dale’s Penthouse Restaurant.” Fire Journal, 61/3, May 1967, 5.
–25 Morris. “A Fire Protection Lecture for Students of Architecture.” Fire Journal, 66/1 Jan 1972, p.41.
–25 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 137.
–25 National Fire Sprinkler Association. F.Y.I. 1999, p. 6.

Narrative Information

Juillerat and Gaudet: “During the late evening of February 7, 1967, fire swept through Dale’s Penthouse Restaurant atop the Walter Bragg Smith Apartment Building in Montgomery, Alabama, killing 25 persons. It was the largest loss-of-life restaurant fire in the United States since the Cocoanut Grove fire, which killed 492 persons in Boston, Massachusetts, on November 28, 1942. The two fires had three factors in common: inadequate exits, combustible interior finish, and lack of a sprinkler system.

“he Walter Bragg Smith Apartment Building was complete in 1951 and in later years the penthouse was extensively remodeled twice, at which times the penthouse restaurant was enlarged to almost double its original size. Mercantiles occupied the first story, 122 apartments, the second to tenth stories. The apartments were occupied by approximately 200 persons. The ten-story-with-penthouse basement-and sub-basement building was of fire-resistive construction of protected steel frame with brick and clay tile panel walls and a concrete roof. The penthouse was constructed of a mixture of tile, glass, and insulated panel surfaced with cement asbestos board. The original section of the penthouse had an eight-inch-thick reinforced-concrete roof supported by protected steel columns. The additions had a roof of noncombustible roof planking on unprotected steel.

“The dining-room lounge and bar covered about 2,800 square feet of the approximately 4,700-square-foot penthouse. The partition separating the bar and lounge from the dining room…was prefinished plywood on wood studs. Other partitions were gypsum board on wood stud or masonry. The ceiling in the penthouse was of combustible fiberboard tiles. Most of the furnishings and decorations were made of combustible materials. The elevator machinery house and two 5,000-gallon water tanks were located above the penthouse.

“Two self-service passenger elevators ran from the basement to the penthouse. The shafts were equipped with conventional self-closing metal doors (not fire rated). An enclosed stairway behind the elevators led from the basement to the penthouse. There was no door at the stairway on the penthouse level, but the short corridor into which the stairway opened was enclosed on each end by a metal door equipped with a closer…A second stairway led from the basement to the tenth story…Standpipe cabinets, each containing a 2½ inch fire department connection and a 1½ inch connection with 100 feet of linen hose and straight stream nozzle were located near the stairways in each story…the water tanks above the penthouse were connected to the standpipe…A fire department connection was provided at street level.

“Shortly before 10:00 pm about 50 customers were in the dining room and lounge, six employees were in the kitchen, and one of the co-owners, a hostess, and a few other employees were in various parts of the penthouse restaurant, when fire of undetermined cause started in the unattended coat room. The accounts given by the survivors varied, and it was impossible to trace the exact sequence of action in the restaurant; however, a customer discovered the fire while it was still small and reported it to the manager, who went to the coat room. When he got there, the chef had already attempted to use a portable extinguisher, without success. Smoke began to drift into the dining room and several of the customers decided to leave by way of the elevators. The chef rode down with one group and returned in an elevator. Meanwhile, the manager noticed that the hostess was using the telephone to call the fire department and that someone else was using the house telephone. He pushed the elevator button, but when a car did not arrive within a few seconds he started down the stairway, reportedly to tell the building operator in the first story to warn the occupants of the apartments. Before the manager reached the first story, the chef had returned to the penthouse in an elevator and had started down with a second group of alarmed restaurant customers. Apparently no one warned customers or asked them to leave.

“At about that time, the fire had reached the combustible ceiling and had started to sweep into the dining room, cutting off access from the coat-room side. The hostess attempted to lead a group of customers through the kitchen to the stairway, but found the stairway corridor also impassable. She and her group of guests retreated to the west end of the kitchen, where they perished. As smoke, heat, and flames boiled out of the corridor into the dining room, other persons retreated to the southwest corner of the kitchen and to the office area, where they were trapped and killed. Others broke windows and climbed out to the ledge on the north wall of the dining room. When the windows were broken, a light wind blowing through the window openings intensified the fire. Those who escaped through the windows crawled to the east end of the penthouse and climbed over the fence to the patio, from which they were later rescued.

“The fire department received the first call at 10:03 pm. The first-in assistant chief arrived with thee apparatus from his statin a half mile away, went to the tenth story by elevator, and reported smoke there by means of his portable radio at 10:06, exactly three minutes after alarm headquarters had received the first telephone call. The fire department’s first-alarm response consisted of four engines, two aerial ladders, and two assistant chefs. Thirty-nine men responded to the first alarm – a normal response for an alarm in that zone.

“As the first-in assistant chief drove up to the building, has car was showered with broken glass from the penthouse windows. He, his aide, and two car men (extra firemen who ride with the assistant chiefs) entered the elevator and went to the tenth story. After the assistant chief had reported the smoke conditions in the tenth storm, he led his me up the stairway to the penthouse, but they found the door between the stairway corridor and the corridor to the coat room partially blocked open and flames coming through the doorway. They retreated to the tenth story, where they strung out the standpipe hose and pulled it up to the penthouse. While they were knocking down the fire in the stairway corridor, the assistant chief radioed for 2½-inch hose and breathing apparatus. He also ordered a pumping engine to connect to the standpipe system and boost the pressure.

“Meanwhile, the chef, who was still in the elevator, having come up with the assistant chief to the tenth story, pushed the down button; but, because the elevator button had previously been pushed at the penthouse level, the scar went up. Four firemen and two officers who had entered the other elevator with their equipment also went to the penthouse level. Both elevators stalled there; they could not be moved and their doors would not open. The firemen pried the door of the car open slightly and were met with heat and flames. They immediately stuffed their coats and salvage covers into the opening to keep out the fire. They then opened the escape hatch at the top of the elevator car and climbed out. When they heard the chef in the other car, they opened the hatch of that car and pulled him out. The only wat to escape was to slide down the counterweight cables from the penthouse level to the basement, which they did.

“Firemen had to carry hose up ten flights of stairs and use the stairways to evacuate the occupants of apartments. As the firemen with the standpipe hose reached the dining room, a fireman with a fresh-air mask tried to crawl past the side of the elevator enclosure to get a look at the dining-room area. The heat was so intense that his ears were burned, and the other men dragged him back by his coat. Firemen continued to use the standpipe hose and the fire department hose, which by then had been connected to the standpipe at the tenth story, to knock down the fire in the east end of the restaurant. When they had the fire knocked down in the bar and lounge area, they heard the survivors on the patio. The firemen formed a chain of the terrified survivors and led them from the patio to the stairway under cover of a fog stream. Although none of the survivors was injured seriously, several of them suffered cuts, bruises, and shock.

“By that time, an aerial ladder gun had been positioned and was pouring water into the penthouse through the broken windows. Using the two hand lines and the aerial gun, the firemen brought the fire under control in a short time. They suspected that several persons had been trapped in the fire, but they had no idea of the grim discovery they were soon to make.

“At 10:58 pm they found the first body near the center of the kitchen. A second body was pinned beneath the collapsed steel room beams in the dining room. There were eight bodies huddled in the beverage storage room behind the office; four in the small storage room in the kitchen section; and the remaining eleven scattered around in the same general area – near the spot where the second stairway terminated at the story below….” (Juillerat, Ernest E. and Robert E. Gaudet. “Fire at Dale’s Penthouse Restaurant.” NFPA Fire Journal, Vol. 61, No. 3, May 1967, pp. 5-9.)

Morris: “When we study reports of building fire disasters we almost always find such obvious design errors as inadequate exits, dead-end corridors, or open stairways. We have to think that neither the architect who drew the plans for the building nor the official who approved the plans fully understood the life safety implications of his duties. There are other factors, of Course, contributing to death and destruction from fire – e.g., outmoded standards, lack of any standards at all, weakness or corruption in officials and inspectors, and abortions of good life safety doctrine by bad building management. Bur for the moment we are concerned with practicing architects and building officials, and with our conviction that some of them do not have a sufficient grasp of life safety fundamentals….

“A restaurant fire in Alabama on February 29 [7th], 1967 killed 25 people…The modern penthouse addition to a 10-story apartment house had only one stairway exit adjacent to the elevators, although each of the other floors of the building had two exits. Fire near the exit fed on combustible interior finish materials; the patrons were too late in realizing the danger; and elevators malfunctioned, trapping firemen….” (Morris, John. “A Fire Protection Lecture for Students of Architecture.” NFPA Fire Journal, Vol. 66, No.1 Jan 1972, pp. 40-43.)

Newspapers

Feb 8: “Montgomery, Ala (AP) – a fire which began as tiny flickers in a cloakroom raced through a fashionable rooftop dining room in downtown Montgomery Tuesday night [Feb 7], leaving at least 26 persons dead, including a former state official who was indicted Tuesday. Another victim was identified as Sidney Zagri, a prominent Teamster Union official from Washington, D.C.

“Identification was difficult because of the condition of the bodies, which were taken to four funeral homes. A police identification team assisted by FBI experts was set up to help establish the identification.

“Another body was identified today as that of Mrs. Jack Doane, wife of the sports editor of the Montgomery Advertiser. Mrs. Doane was a hostess at the fashionable restaurant.

“Water pouring from the blackened ruins of Dale’s Penthouse restaurant atop the 11-story Walter Bragg Smith apartment hotel froze on the sidewalks and streets in the wintry 29-degree night, making it treacherous for firemen and police to move about. A city maintenance truck spread sand over the icy coating.

“A spokesman at one funeral home said positive identification had been made of the bodies of former Public Service Commissioner Ed Pepper and his wife Ann. The Peppers were dining with friends at the plush café when the fire started about 11 p.m.

“Pepper was indicted on two counts of extortion Tuesday by a federal grand jury at Birmingham. The indictments charged he ‘obstructed and delayed the transportation of goods and commodities in interstate commerce’ while a PSC member. A third indictment was brought against Pepper last November by the grand jury. Pepper, a onetime cabinet member during former Gov. James E. Folsom’s second administration, was elected to the Public Service Commission in 1962. He gave up his place on the utility-regulating body to run for Congress last spring, but was defeated in the Democratic Primary by former State Sen. Bill Nichols, who subsequently was elected last November. In private life, he was an automobile dealer at Ashland, Ala. ….

“John English, assistant manager of the restaurant and one of its owners, said the fire began in a cloakroom off the cocktail lounge adjoining the main dining room. He said it started as a ‘very small fire’ but the flames spread rapidly.

“Many of the 75 or more diners trapped by the flames made their way to safety by breakout out windows and crawling onto the roof surrounding the penthouse. One of them was Bill White of Dothan, Ala., a truckline president who was with Mr. and Mrs. Pepper. White, his hand bleeding after he had smashed a window and led others to safety, said he saw no trace of the former state official or his wife after the fire erupted with a ‘whoosh’ into a raging inferno. The car the Peppers had driven to the restaurant was still parked in a lot across the street, four blocks from the heart of the business district.

“A cook who tried in vain to put out the flames with a fire extinguisher, Jessie Williams, said the fire had spread too swiftly by the time he could run across the room. Williams said he took two loads of diners down an elevator, then went back for more, but the elevator stuck when the power failed. He slid down the elevator cable.

“Several firemen were trapped in an elevator when the power failed. They, too, escaped by sliding down the cable….

“The fire was confined to the rooftop dining room, and one of the 75 to 100 guests living in the apartment hotel was injured. However, the fire department ordered the building evacuated. Downtown hotels took in the stranded guests.

“Firemen were handicapped by the height of the building, too tall for their ladders to reach. Some went by ladd4r as far as it would go, then climbed in an apartment window and walked the rest of the way. Others raced up the long flight of stairs.

“Besides the dead, at least eight persons were injured, most of them by smoke inhalation.

“Spectators reaching the fire shortly after it broke out heard screams for help from diners trapped far above the street….” (Decatur Daily, AL. “Montgomery Fire Claims 26. Glaze Destroys Restaurant in Hotel Penthouse.” 2-8-1967, 1.)

Feb 9: “Montgomery, Ala. (AP)….Fire Chief W. T. Mallory, weary from lack of sleep, said the original figure of 26 included remains which the Montgomery County coroner later identified as non-human. Mallory said the cause of the blaze, which spread swiftly through Dale’s Penthouse Tuesday nith6t, was still undetermined….” (AP. “25 Killed in Fire in Penthouse Restaurant.” Republican-Courier, Findlay, OH, 2-9-1967, p. 1.)

Sources

AP (Associated Press). “25 Killed in Fire in Penthouse Restaurant.” Republican-Courier, Findlay, OH, 2-9-1967, p. 1. Accessed 4-22-2022 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/findlay-republican-courier-feb-09-1967-p-1/

Decatur Daily, AL. “Montgomery Fire Claims 26. Glaze Destroys Restaurant in Hotel Penthouse.” 2-8-1967, 1. Accessed 4-22-2022 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/decatur-daily-feb-08-1967-p-1/

Juillerat, Ernest E. and Robert E. Gaudet. “Fire at Dale’s Penthouse Restaurant.” NFPA Fire Journal, Vol. 61, No. 3, May 1967, pp. 5-9.

Morris, John. “A Fire Protection Lecture for Students of Architecture.” NFPA Fire Journal, Vol. 66, No.1 Jan 1972, pp. 40-43.

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf [Inoperable when checked 4-22-2022]