— 27 Mine Safety and Health Administration. Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the U. S.
— 27 Salt Lake Trib. “Remembering Wilberg, the lives lost, the humanity found.” 12-14-2014.
— 27 U.S. House of Representatives. A Staff Report on the Wilberg Mine Disaster of 1984,
Narrative Information
House Subcommittee on Health and Safety: “On December 19, 1984, a fire broke out at the mouth of a longwall mining section in the Wilberg Mine in Emery County, Orangeville, Utah. Twenty-eight miners were on the section when the fire started. One was able to escape, but 27, many of them management personnel in the mine to witness a record-breaking production run, died.
“Prior to the reopening of the mine following a strike, agents of the Mine Safety and Health Administration’s (MSHA) District 9 office gave permission to the owner and operator of the mine to begin work on the longwall section even though an airway return was not passable. The permission was granted by the District 9 office, even though the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and amendments to the Act in 1977 require a hearing.
“Investigations into the tragedy were conducted by both MSHA and the United Mine Workers (UMW). MSHA placed the blame for the fire on an air compressor on which certain cut-offs had been by-passed. UMW suggested that the fire may have started on the coal conveyor belt or in some other area.
“The primary question, among numerous ones raised by the tragedy, is not where or how the fire started, but why the personnel on the longwall weren’t able to escape.
“Other questions include: Were basic safety precautions ignored in the attempt to set a production record? Why did the Mine Safety and Health Administration, through its District 9 office, ignore the requirements of the statutes governing mine safety? Is this indicative of an inherent weakness in the agency itself? What must be done to prevent similar tragedies?
“In an attempt to focus on these and other questions, the Subcommittee on Health and Safety conducted a series of hearings, beginning on June 16, 1987. At its opening hearing, the Subcommittee received testimony from the mine owner, Utah Power and Light Company, and the mine operator at the time of the fire, Emery Mining Corporation.
“On June 23, 1987, then Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health, Alan McMillan, and other MSHA officials testified, and on June 24, 1987, representatives of the United Mine Workers appeared before the Subcommittee.
“In addition, prior to preparing this report, the Subcommittee staff reviewed the Department of Labor’s final investigative report, the United Mine Workers’ report on the tragedy, a report by the General Accounting Office on MSHA’ role, and a ruling by Joseph A. Matera, DOL Administrative Law Judge, with regard to petitions from Utah Power and Light Company for modifications and exceptions from the multiple-entry mining requirements for the Cottonwood and Deer Creek Mines, sister mines of the Wilberg Mine. [end of p.1]
“Finally, staff conducted numerous meetings and interviews, both orally and in writing, and examined other records and reports in conjunction with the hearings and subsequent report.
Summary of Finding
“By any measure, mining ranks as one of the most dangerous occupations in this country. In the most recent compilation of occupational deaths, completed last July, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health reported an annual fatality rate of 30.1 per 100,000 workers in the mining industry. That is more than three times the overall national average of 9 deaths per 100,000 workers.
“Given the inherent danger associated with mining, the Congress, in passing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and the amendments to that Act in 1977, made every effort to ensure that the safety of miners was its principal priority. In fact, as Acting Assistant Secretary McMillan stated in his testimony, ‘The Mine Act is one of, if not the strongest worker protection laws in existence, and it provides a basic framework to assure a safe and healthy working environment.’
“The Subcommittee, throughout its hearings and continuing investigation, found little evidence that the law itself was flawed. Instead, it is clear that the tragedy that occurred in the Wilberg Mine resulted from failures by both the mine owner and operator, who apparently cut corners to increase production, and the Mine Safety and Health Administration, the agency charged with protecting the workers, which failed to enforce the law.
“To blame the deaths of the 27 miners in the Wilberg Mine on the fire itself is to ignore those failures by both the operator and the agency.
“Fires in underground coal mines are a persistent problem. The fire in the Wilberg Mine was only one of 456 underground mine fires reported between 1981 and 1985. Reportable fires are those that last for more than 30 minutes or cause injury. While more mining fatalities result from roof falls than fires, the fewer deaths due to fires in the result of well-trained and equipped fire fighters and a reliance on multiple-entry mining requiring separate splits of air, especially for return passages. From 1970 to 1979, 456 miners died as a result of roof falls. From 1980 to 1987, the number of such fatalities was 227. During that same first period, fatalities from roof falls accounted for 38 per cent of all mining fatalities. In the 1980-87 period, the 227 deaths represented 37 per cent of all mining fatalities, a fairly stable picture.
“Deaths in mines due to fires is another story. During the 1970-79 period, 91 miners died as a result of fires — 8 per cent of all mining fatalities in that decade. In the 1980-87 period, virtually the same number of miners died as a result of fires, 92, but this was double the percentage of total deaths — from 8 per cent in 1970-79 to 16 per cent in 1980-87.
“In Wilberg, the tragedy was more the result of a mining system that limited escape routes and provided limited ventilation. It resulted from inadequate emergency training for miners, especially [end of p. 2] in the use of self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs), and in fire-fighting techniques.
“The loss of life in the Wilberg fire occurred because a district office staff either ignored or didn’t know the requirements of the 1969 Act and its 1977 amendments, and the headquarters office failed to properly oversee and review district office activities.
“The hearing record contains many instances of negligence by the mine owner and operator as well as MSHA. Among these are:
(1) The assembly of so many management officials on had in the mine to watch a possible production record set;
(2) An unsafe and unattended air compressor left running for more than 69 hours, which was found to have its safety devices by-passed;
(3) Several unused and improperly used self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) indicating either the lack of training or poor training or mine personnel;
(4) The failure of the MSHA investigative team to find an evacuation map;
(5) Rescue efforts hampered by inadequate emergency training and fulty equipment;
(6) Request for a modification with respect to an escapeway closed by a roof fall (6th Right); and
(7) Requests for modification with respect to multiple-entry mining as required.
“MSHA, however, is also responsible. The fact that the agency issued citations proposing a record amount in fines is not enough to absolve the agency of its role in the disaster. MSHA, as noted, failed to provide its district managers and their staffs adequate instruction in the enforcement of the law. The agency failed to exercise proper controls over its district offices to ensure that its agents were complying with the laws as well as standards and regulations.
“It is clear that the agency still does not recognize that a two-entry mining system operating off a single split of air was a factor in the tragedy. In two recent applications, both, in fact, by Utah Power & Light for sister mines of Wilberg, the agency approved them following standard hearings. Only a ruling by an Administrative Law Judge, denying the petitions because this alternative was not as safe as required by law, has blocked the company’s application. The Judge noted that the company’s claims of roof-fall hazards merely reflected the company’s desire to increase the coal out-take from the mine as an alternative to leaving pillars of a size and strength to prevent roof alls or floor heaves.
“Thus, the Wilberg tragedy was not just the result of a fire. The loss of 27 lives could very well have been expected in the event of a serious underground mine fire, given the shortcuts and failures of the mine operator and owner and the Mine Safety and Health Administration….” [p.3]
History of the Wilberg Mine
“….At the time [of the fire] the mine was one of the larger underground mines in the country, producing over two million tons of coal in 1984… Emery Mining employed 326 miners working on three shifts at the Wilberg Mine site, with 290 of these working underground. The mine had five sections in operation — two longwall panels and three continuous mining production units. Coal was transported from the working sections to the surface by conveyor belts. Men and materials were transported in and out of the mine by diesel-powered mobile equipment…. [p. 4]
“The net effect of the inferior and unsafe condition of the 5th Right section on the night of the fire was that escapeways were limited to just two entries, the side-by-side intake, and return belt entries off 1st North. These entries were ventilated with the same split of air, however, and the deadly smoke and gases that poured into the intake entry quickly contaminated the return belt drive as well, virtually assuring the fate of the miners.
Wilberg Safety Record
“The Wilberg Mine had a history of unsafe conditions. In fact, in 1982 the incident rate for lost-time accidents was 29.6 lost-time accidents per 200,000 man-hours, four times the national average. This abnormally high incidence rate caused Wilberg to be put on a special monitoring program by MSHA’s Mine Evaluation and Action program or MEA. The goal of MEA was to provide a program of evaluation, analysis, recommendation, and follow-up action that would help in reducing accidents and injuries
“After observing a 44 percent decrease in Wilberg’s lost time accident rate to 13.1 in 1984, the mine was placed on an MEA ‘maintenance’ program. Wilberg’s incidence rate was still twice the national average. In fact, MSHA’s own evaluation of the effectiveness of the MEA program at Wilberg noted a continued weakness in the determination of what accidents are reportable and what are not. So, despite the efforts to make it a safer place to work, on the night of December 19, 1984, the Wilberg Mine and especially the 5th Right section remained a dangerous site.
MSHA District 9 Safety Record
“The Wilberg Mine is located in MSHA District 9 which has jurisdiction over the western United States. There have been numerous charges of lax enforcement and unauthorized waivers of the mine law by MSHA District 9 officials
“The United Mine Workers Union maintains that unsafe government-approved plans have contributed to 46 coal mine deaths since 1981….The Department of Labor’s own statistics illustrate the problems existing in MSHA District 9. In 1986, MSHA District 9 led all districts in the number of fatalities — 16, yet ranked third lowest in the number of underground coal mines; second lowest in the average number of underground miners; and fourth lowest in the number of underground inspectors. From 1978 to 1986, 128 miners have died in mining accidents in MSHA District 9. Roof falls (28) and fires (27) have been the leading causes of these fatalities. [end of p. 5]
Chronicle of the Wilberg Mine Fire
“On December 19, 1984, at about 9:00 p.m., a fire started at the mouth of the 5th Right section of the Wilberg Mine. It started from one of several possible sources in the 1st North Mains of the mine, near the entry point for both the 5th Right intake and the 5th Right Belt Return. The fire soon produced a thick, deadly smoke that was taken up the intake entry and quickly contaminated the belt return as well.
“When the fire broke out, 28 of the 80 people in the mine were in the 5th Right longwall section. Extra miners had been assigned to 5th Right and many key management personnel were present on that shift because the company was attempting to set a longwall production record. On the 28 in that location, only 1 miner was able to escape, the remaining 27 died of smoke inhalation.
Detection of Fire
“The fire was first detected by two employees working at the 5th Right belt drive. After smelling smoke, they located thick black smoke rolling up the intake. An attempt to call and alert the surface was made, but the phone was out of order. At about the same time, another employee, who was delivering parts to the 5th Right, noticed the smoke, found a working phone, and reported it to the surface. Following normal procedure, the surface personnel then called 5th Right to relay the message. Confirmation that it was indeed smoke and not steam (a common occurrence in mines) was requested, however, and evacuation was delayed until further information was received. When this same employee returned to the phone and said, ‘You had better get those people out of 5th Right because that fire is bad’, surface personnel tried to contact 5th Right again, but there was no response.
Statement of Survivor
“The statement of the lone survivor…noted that he was working at the longwall face when the first mention of smoke was made. According to [survivor], the initial conclusion was that the smoke was coming from diesel equipment in the intake. Shortly after that, the General Mine Foreman hollered that there was a fire in the intake and directed the miners to obtain rescuers off the tailgate and proceed down the belt drive. After going down the intake to shut off the transformer…[the survivor] moved with several other miners to the belt drive. Even at that point, however, the smoke was so think in the belt drive that ‘You couldn’t even see your hand in front of your face’… [He] followed the belt line to an isolation stopping where several mine personnel had gathered. They were trying to determine what to do next…[He] thought it best to keep moving out the return. He and another miner then left the group searching for a way out. Passing underneath the conveyor belt, the two men wandered into a ‘dog leg’ entry off the return belt drive. There they traveled for some time unable to see even each other. After being separated a last time and realizing he did not have enough oxygen left to return and search for a possible escape route through the belt drive…[he] continued on his own looking for a stopping with [end of p. 6] a door in it that was not hot on the other side. Finally…[he] stumbled upon such a door and was then able to grope his way into clean air. Shortly after that, according to witnesses, in a state of shock and covered with soot…[he] came upon four men fighting the fire and was taken out of the mine….” [p. 7.]
Recommendations
“….it is the failure of mine owners and operators to comply with the law, knowingly or unintentionally, that creates conditions and situations which, in the event of an accident, result in the unnecessary loss of life. It appears that Utah Power and Light Company, the owner of the Wilberg Mine, and Emery Mining Corporation, the operator of the mine at the time of the tragedy, either allowed or encouraged certain conditions to exist that led to the events that resulted in the deaths of 27 miners….Still, Utah Power and Light has persisted in seeking approval to mine with two entries fed by a single split of air, a condition in existence in the Wilberg Mine at the time of the tragic and fatal fire. And, unless more escapeways are provided and ventilated by separate or at the very least, different sources of air, another fire in one of those mines could very easily result in another disaster similar to that in Wilbert.
“At any rate, the Subcommittee believes that its only recommendation to mine owners and operators is to comply with the law, standards, and regulations currently in effect.
“The focus of recommendations with respect to the Wilberg Mine fire and the ensuing loss of life is toward the Mine Safety and Health Administration.
“It is noted that MSHA, under the temporary leadership of Alan McMillan, was preparing a number of substantive internal changes with respect to monitoring of district activities and decision-making. Since the transfer of Mr. McMillan to other duties with the Department of Labor and the assignment of a new Deputy Assistant Secretary as the person in charge of the agency, the question arises as to whether there is the same commitment by the new leadership to making the necessary and vital internal changes that [end of p. 26] will increase accountability for the district managers and district offices.
“Until it can be demonstrated that MSHA and the Department of Labor leadership are willing to ensure that each district office operates under the same framework and that each follows the law and is accountable to the agency leadership, it is unlikely that sufficient support will be given to headquarters personnel to enable them to overrule incorrect or improper actions by district staff. Thus, if the internal accountability necessary to improve MSHA’s actions isn’t in place, it is unlikely that the agency will be able to faithfully perform its mission — to ensure the health and safety of the men and women in the mining industry….
“It is up to MSHA to ensure that the requirements of the Act and its own regulations and standards are enforced. MSHA must act within the framework of those same documents, and it should not be a rubber-stamp for mine owners and operators….MSHA must recommit itself to protecting miners’ safety by halting two-entry mining systems, except as noted earlier.” [p. 27.]
(Subcommittee on Health and Safety, Committee on Education and Labor, House of Rep., U.S. Congress. A Staff Report on the Wilberg Mine Disaster of 1984, Orangeville, Utah. 1988.)
SLT: “….federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) investigators determined an air compressor with two defective safety devices was turned on accidentally and left running unattended for 69 hours before self-combusting, its flames filling mine tunnels with poisonous gases….” (Salt Lake Tribune, UT (Mike Gorrell). “Remembering Wilberg, the lives lost, the humanity found.” 12-14-2014, updated 2-14-2017.)
Sources
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the United States. Arlington, VA: MSHA, U.S. Department of Labor. Accessed 10-5-2008 at: http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCT8.HTM
Salt Lake Tribune, UT (Mike Gorrell). “Remembering Wilberg, the lives lost, the humanity found.” 12-14-2014, updated 2-14-2017 at: http://www.sltrib.com/home/1883420-155/remembering-wilberg-the-lives-lost-the
Subcommittee on Health and Safety, Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, U.S. Congress. A Staff Report on the Wilberg Mine Disaster of 1984, Orangeville, Utah. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, 27 pages. Google digitized and accessed 2-15-2017 at: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31210015455742;view=1up;seq=1
