–33 NCDC. “East Coast Snowstorm on February 10-12, 1983.” Storm Data. 25/2, Feb 1983, 4.[1]
–31 Frump, Robert. Until the Sea Shall Free Them. Knoph Doubleday Publishing, 2002.
–31 Journal of Commerce. “Prosecutor Hints of Indictments in Ship Sinking.” 5-30-1988.
–31 Thayer. “The Sinking of the SS Marine Electric.” Seamen’s Church Institute. 9-4-2014.
–31 Thiesen. Captain Domenic A. Calicchio: The Coast Guard’s Champion of Marine Safety.
–31 USCG. Marine Casualty Report. SS Marine Electric…Atlantic Ocean…12 Feb 1983. 1984
–31 Wrecksite.eu. “Musgroves Mills SS (1944~1947) Marine Electric SS (+1983).[2]
Narrative Information
NCDC: “An intense low pressure system which organized in the gulf states and moved northeastward up the eastern U.S. coast, dumped record amounts of snow and created blizzard conditions over much of the northeastern U.S. on February 10th to the 12th. The storm paralyzed many major eastern cities with snow amounting to 22.8″ at Washington and Baltimore, 22″ at New York, 21.3″ at Philadelphia, 18″ at Roanoke, and 13″ at Boston. The Blue Ridge area of the Appalachian Mountains had some of the highest amounts as evidenced by Glen Gary, West Virginia which received 35 inches. There were 46 storm-related deaths, 33 of which occurred when a freighter capsized in strong winds and sank in the Atlantic off Chincoteague, Virginia near Maryland-Virginia border.” (NCDC. “East Coast Snowstorm on February 10-12, 1983.” Storm Data. 25/2, Feb 1983, 4.)
Thayer (based on an oral history interview by Jennifer Fremont with survivor Eugene Kelly):
“Back in 1983, his ship, the SS Marine Electric, carrying coal from Norfolk, VA, encountered a massive storm off the coast of Virginia and sank. Gene, sailing as third mate, was one of just three survivors. Thirty-one of his shipmates died.
“The tragedy of the SS Marine Electric prompted a thorough investigation that led to widespread industry reforms regarding safety at sea….
“The trouble started soon after the Marine Electric left harbor in Norfolk on February 9 in the midst of a moderate storm. Overnight the storm worsened significantly and intensified into the next day. After responding to a distress broadcast from a sinking fishing vessel, the Marine Electric found itself rolling in 40-foot seas. Not long after midnight, the captain summoned Gene and all other officers to the bridge to inform them that waves had begun to break over the bow of the ship and across the deck. With the ship’s pumps failing, the Captain put in a call for help to the Coast Guard.
By the time the conversation ended with the Coast Guard—only a matter of minutes describing what we’re doing, where we are, who we are—the situation worsened to the point where the ocean was now coming all the way back to the house … so the front 500 or so feet of the ship was invisible—completely under water. And the condition of the ship just lent itself to a catastrophe at that point.
“Soon thereafter, the Captain gave orders to abandon ship. Gene prepared his own life vest and gathered charts from his room before collecting life rings on the deck and tripping the distress beacon. With the ship listing heavily to starboard, Gene and his shipmates were unable to lower the lifeboats before the ship capsized. Left with no other options, the crew began to jump.
“Gene found himself in the icy water looking up at the ship’s smokestack as it nearly fell on top of him. Miraculously, Gene survived, enduring several hours in the water clinging to a life ring while battling frostbite and the onset of hypothermia. By the time a Coast Guard helicopter arrived to rescue Gene and the other two survivors, he had lost eleven pounds, ingested gallons of oil, and witnessed the deaths of several of his shipmates as they succumbed to hypothermia….” (Thayer. “The Sinking of the SS Marine Electric.” Seamen’s Church Institute. 9-4-2014.
USCG Investigation Summary: “1. The SS Marine Electric departed Norfolk, Virginia, with a cargo of steam coal about 2345 on 10 February 1983, bound for Brayton Point, near Somerset, Massachusetts…[3] A winter storm was underway when the vessel loaded, and continued to build as she departed the Chesapeake Bay. Winds were from the northeast from 35-55 knots, and the seas built from about 4 feet in the Chesapeake Bay to 20-40 feet in the ocean. The vessel steamed at 80 RPM (11-12 knots) until about 0900 on 11 February 1983, when the turns were reduced to 40 RPM (4-5 knots).
“2. About 1600 on 11 February 1983, the Marine Electric sighted the fishing vessel Theodora,[4] which was taking on water, disoriented and requesting assistance from the Coast Guard. Joining in the radio conversations, the Marine Electric gave her position — she had made good only about 95 miles from the mouth of the Bay. The Marine Electric stood by the Theodora on a westerly course toward Chincoteague, Virginia, until about 1825, when she resumed a course to Massachusetts.
“3. At about 0000 12 February 1983, it was noted the vessel was trimmed by the head. At about 0115, the bow was noticeably behaving sluggishly. At 0251, the Master called the Coast Guard, Ocean City, Maryland, and reported he seemed to be taking on water and going down by the head. At about 0300, the crew was awakened and mustered at the starboard lifeboat, and the vessel altered course to 000 degrees True. Trim by the bow continued to [end of p. 1] to increase, but no list was reported until 0350, when a 5 degree starboard list was reported. The list increased to 10 degrees by 0410, and the Master reported he was abandoning ship at 0414. At about 0415, with most of the 34 crewmembers on the starboard boat deck, the ship took a sudden roll to starboard, throwing the crewmembers into the 37 degree F. water before the boat was lowered.
“4. Three men survived, and were rescued by a Coast Guard helicopter, which arrived on scene at 0520.[5] Twenty-four bodies were recovered, most of whom died due to hypothermia. Seven bodies remain unrecovered, including that of the relief Master, Captain…[6] The vessel capsized shortly after taking the sudden roll, and a portion of the stern section was visible until about 1130, 12 February 1983. The vessel sank in position 37-52.8N, 74-46.0W, in about 120 feet of water….” [p. 2]
USCG Findings of Fact. General Description. Hull.
“1. The bow and stern sections of the SS Marine Electric were built as part of the SS Musgroves Mills, a T2-SE-A1 tanker, at Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Chester, Pennsylvania, in May 1944. It was operated by the U.S. Maritime Administration until May 1947, when the vessel was sold to Gulf Oil Corporation, and the name was changed to the SS Gulf Mills. In May 1961, it was purchased by the Marine Transport Lines Corporation, and renamed the Marine Electric.
“2. A new mid-body for carriage of grain or ore was constructed at the Bremer-Vulcan Yard, Bremen, Germany, in 1961, and towed to the Bethlehem Steel Company Shipbuilding Yard in East Boston, Massachusetts. To the 387 foot mid-body was attached the bow and stern, with the addition of the old midship deck house on top of the old aft superstructure, and a small portion added to the forecastle deck forward to bring the foredeck flush with the main deck of the mid-body. Work was completed in November 1962, and the vessel’s new length overall and depth became 605 feet x 47.25 feet.[7] Ownership changed to the Marine Coal Transport Corporation in November 1962.
“3. The Marine Electric’s converted mid-body consisted of five cargo holds, separated by watertight bulkheads, spaced 80 feet apart, for holds 2-5, and 67 feet in hold 1. Each hold was covered by MacGregor ‘Single Pull’ hatch panels, which folded and stacked aft of the hold when opened….[8] [p. 8]
“Cargo Hatches.
“8. The MacGregor hatches constructed in 1961 at the Bremer-Vulcan Yard, Bremen, Germany, were Single-Pull Type. The design and construction of the hatch covers were approved by the ABS[9] and the Coast Guard for a static loading of 220 lbs. per square foot, and met the minimum thickness standards for the rules effective at that time. To prove weather tightness, as required by the Coast Guard regulations and the ABS Rules, the hatch covers were to be subjected to a hose test (30 psi) at the time of construction and at subsequent ABS special hull surveys…. [p.9]
“Underway.
“52. It was raining and stormy as the vessel got underway. The wind and seas were north-northeast, with about 4-foot waves in the Bay. On departure from Hampton Roads, Virginia, the Marine Electric, while on a northeasterly course at a speed of about 80 RPM’s (about 8 knots over the ground), encountered head winds of gale force and boisterous seas which caused the vessel to roll, pitch and ship water over its main deck and forward hatch covers….
“53. Early Friday morning, the weather was estimated as 34-40 knots with seas 10-15 feet (Force 8) from the northeast. By dawn, the wind increased to 50 knots with seas between 20 and 40 feet (Force 10) from the northeast.
“54. At 0700 on 11 February 1983, the vessel was pitching in a heavy northeasterly sea. Nothing unusual was reported to the 8-12 Third Mate upon relieving the watch. Around 0900, the Captain came up and reduced the vessel’s speed to 40 RPM. [end of p. 19]
“55. Weather was logged every four hours, at the end of the watch, an described the weather of the previous four hours. For the 0800-1200 watch on Friday, the 8-12 Third Mate recorded the wind to be from the northeast at Beaufort Force 10 (48-55 knots) and ‘very rough’ seas with heights of 25 to 30 feet, with an occasional ‘rogue’ wave of 35-40 feet. There was no change in the weather conditions during this watch. Occasionally he was at eye level with the seas. The vessel was taking green seas over the starboard bow and foredeck. The seas were breaking fairly heavy up on the forecastle deck area. The bow was rising and readily shedding the water. The seas were fine on the starboard bow and broke right at the anchor windlass, I the vicinity of the doghouse….
“57. During the afternoon on 11 February 1983, the wind and seas continued to build. The vessel was still taking green seas over the bow, and the bow was rising and falling without any sign of sluggishness throughout the afternoon. The metal guards covering the bull gears on the windlass were torn off. From time to time, seas were coming over the hatches, and occasional green seas were coming over the bow. Seas were hitting on the dry cargo hatch during the storm. The dog house[10] protected the starboard side, but the port side was being hit by the seas. Occasionally green seas came over the cargo hatches. The vessel was not slamming or pounding, but occasionally she shuddered. At no time was the propeller heard to be racing.
“58. The Operations Department of MTL received a message from the ship at noon on Friday, 11 February 1983, stating they had left Norfolk at 10 knots and slowed to 8 knots due to the weather. At 1500 Friday, the MTL operator received a call stating the ship was hove to,[11] and proceeding at one knot. This was the last message received from the ship by the owners.” [p. 20]
“….The Accident.
“77. At about 0230, the Master summoned the Chief Mate to the bridge. The Chief Mate testified:
Shortly before 3 o’clock in the morning, the Captain came to my room. He said to me come up on the bridge…I believe that we’re in [end of p. 24] trouble. He said, I think she’s going – settling by the head. And he said to me, ‘This may be my imagination, with the way the seas are running, I can’t really tell, but I think she’s settling by the head…
I went up, took one look, and I run down and got the Chief Engineer…[name blacked out]. The two of us went right back to the bridge, took one quick look, and it was apparent that she was. The seas were staying up there. They were not…the bow was not lifting up properly.
“78. The Marine Electric’s first radio call of distress came at 0251 on 12 February 1983. They informed the Ocean City, Maryland Coast Guard Station, ‘I’m approximately 30 miles from Delaware Bay entrance, and I’m going down by the head. I seem to be taking on water forward.’ After initial responses by the Coast Guard, the Captain said, ‘we need someone to come out and give us some assistance, if possible.’ The Coast Guard contacted Station Indian River[12] to pass on the distress information, and then asked the Marine Electric if she had pumps on board that could control the flooding. The Marine Electric replied, ‘Our problem is we don’t know exactly what our situation is.’
“79. The wind had now shifted to the northwest. The seas were ‘roaring down the deck.’ No suggestion or attempt was made to bring the ship about. At this time the Captain ordered the Chief Mate to call all hands and to stand by the boats. The General Alarm was not sounded.
“80. The Chief Mate dispatched the 12-4 Ordinary Seaman[13] to call the men. He woke the bosun[14] and the day-man himself, told them to dress in heavy clothes, and come up and ready the boats. They removed the covers from the boats and released the forward gripes, leaving the after gripes on. They then removed the stanchions from around the life rafts, but did not release the strip to the hydrostatic release gear. They also gathered life rings and stacked them on the boat deck. The general belief was that nothing serious was going to happen — the lifeboat covers were folded and stowed in anticipation of soon recovering the boats…. [p. 25]
“85. A 0300 on 12 February 1983, the 8-12 Third Mate was awakened in his stateroom by the Ordinary Seaman. He reached the bridge about 0306. He noticed the bow was definitely down. He could see the foredeck covered with about 6 feet of seawater, and waves breaking as far back as No. 3 hatch. The dog house was still visible. The seas were fine on the starboard bow. The whole main deck was awash. After the waves broke on the hatches, they rolled right back against the house. He said he couldn’t see if any of the hatches had been ripped apart, since the water covered them….
“87….The Chief Engineer said he thought the No. 1 hatch was stove in.
“88….At 0312, the Marine Electric radioed the Coast Guard that they were continually taking on water forward with the bow going down. [end of p. 26]
“94….At 0352, the ship reported that her forward deck that leads into the forecastle was under water, and that she was staking a starboard list. When informed the Point Highland would be on scene around 0615, the Marine Electric replied they didn’t think they could hold on that long. The degree of list was reported as 5 degrees at 0356, and it was rolling to 14 degrees. About this time the 8-12 Third Mate observed the inclinometer showed a 6 degree starboard list. He said the ship would roll to starboard about 20 degrees, then come back to 6 degrees…. [end of p. 27]
“95. At about 0400, the Captain ordered the Chief Mate to swing out the boats. The ship had about 5 degrees starboard list at this time, and only the starboard boat could be swung out. The Chief Mate stayed by the boat. At 0404, the Marine Electric reported an 8 degree starboard list. At 0408, the Master radioed, ‘I think I’m going to lose my ship here….we are starting to take a real bad list to starboard. The Chief Engineer told the First Engineer to shut down the engines. Before he left the bridge, the AB noted the RPM indicator showed the engines to be completely stopped.
“96. At about 0410, the radio operator came on the bridge and said he had messages from two merchant vessels. One was due on scene at about 0800. The Third Mate said this news was met with a sigh of despair from those on the bridge, since they knew the ship would not stay afloat that long. The ship then listed about 10 degrees starboard. The Captain told the helmsman, to leave his station, since the ship was not answering the rudder too well by that time.
“97. At 0410, the Coast Guard said a helicopter should be n scene in half an hour. At 0413, the Master said they were about to abandon ship. The list had now increased to 15 degrees….The last voice transmission came at 0414, ‘We are abandoning the ship right now. We are abandoning the ship right now.’
“98. The General Alarm was never sounded. The Third Mate gave a quick blast on the whistle for ‘Abandon Ship’ just before leaving the bridge….
“99. When readying the starboard lifeboat, the Chief Mate said the wind was off the port bow, and appeared to have ‘lightened up a lot right around that time.’ The seas were coming farther and farther aft down the deck. He could not recall whether the ship fell off into a trough of the waves just before the last roll. The seas were coming from the starboard side when the ship took its last roll, the 8-12 Third Mate said. ‘I don’t know if we had turned into the sea, or turned broadside to the sea at that time. I know whew a washing up on the starboard side because the waves were coming at me.’ [end of p. 28]
“CAPSIZED.
“100. Having been relieved from the helm, the 12-4 AB went below on the inside and came out on the starboard side, one deck above the boat deck. When he reached the ladder above the boat deck, he said the men had just finished cranking the starboard boat in some, since the vessel was listing such a degree….Just as he reached the cruciform bitt that the falls[15] were secured to, the ship jerked, and he went into the water.
“101. The boat had been only about 5 feet from the water when the ship took the roll, now it was floating, but still attached to the falls. The 12-4 AB was between the ship and the boat when he felt himself being pushed under water by some steel. He finally was able to break free and reach the surface again. He saw the ship still slanted at about 60 degrees, and swam on his back away from it. Within 5 to 15 minutes of the capsizing, he reached back, felt a line, turned, and saw it was attached to a liferaft still contained in its canister. Propping his feet against the canister and pulling on the line, he caused the raft to inflate. He tried for 15 to 20 minutes before he was able to enter the raft. Three other men swam to the raft as he was trying to get in. He tried to help one man into the raft, but had no success. The AB said they just clung to the raft and did not try much to get inside — they may have been in shock. The Second Mate also came to the raft. The Mate told the AB to get the ladder. He looked through the raft, then saw there was cargo-netting-type ladder on the side of the raft opposite from where the other four men were. He directed the men to the other side of the raft, and stated he had to repeat himself many times to be understood by those in the water. Even with the assistance of the ladder, and after half an hour of trying, the AB could not get anyone into the raft. The netting was flush against the raft, and the Mate couldn’t get his hand around it. One by one, the men drifted away, leaving the AB alone with the raft.
“102. When the AB heard the Coast Guard helicopter, he flashed his flashlight in the air. He said he wasn’t too concerned about rescue, since the raft was riding very well, with only 3 to 6 inches of water in the bottom. It was still dark when the helicopter lowered the rescue basket to him, but he said it was very shortly after his rescue that he saw daylight. He said he shivered all the time, but he felt that the security of being in the raft helped calm his down. [end of p. 29] ….
“104….The Third Mate [just after evacuating the bridge] fell down the ladder…
At that time I didn’t think it was going to roll over. I thought she was going to go down straight by the head….
I got outside — right directly outside the radio shack, and I went down one ladder to about 7 or 8 steps maybe 10 steps, and I came to the spot where we had piled all the life rings. I stopped there and I started throwing life rings over the side of the ship. I believe it was probably half a dozen life rings sitting there, and I think maybe 3 or 4 of them made it into the water. The rest hit the overhead and bounced directly back down onto the deck.
It seemed like only seconds after that that I started down the ladder to the boat deck. It is only a short little ladder, down to what they call the stack deck, where the stack is located, and I was watching the lifeboat being launched. The falls were being paid out. The Mate was there — the Mate was on the forward fall. He was paying it out. And I don’t know who was on the after fall, but all of a sudden, the ship rolled, and I saw the water level start to rise, and before the releasing gear was even released on the life boat, the seas picked it up and brought it right in front of me up against the stack. And I just watched the ocean level come up and grabbed me. [end of p. 30]
As I went into the water, I looked up and I saw Captain…[blacked out] on his deck, climbing over the railing, trying to get into the water. This is the last time I saw the Captain. I wasn’t in the water with him. ….
“106. After what he estimated was half an hour, he found five men holding onto 2 life rings. They ‘sounded off’ by number — The Chief Engineer, Third Mate…[blacked out], two seamen and the Radio Officer were present. Once on the life ring, he heard an explosion, the the Chief Engineer remarked it was the boilers exploding.
“107. By the time the helicopter arrived, only the Third Mate was left holding onto the life-ring. The other five seamen had succumbed to the elements of the weather and sea and had drifted away..
“108. The Third Mate wore light hunting boots, wool socks, leg warmers, blue jeans, chamois shirt, wool watch cap, a down jacket and gloves in addition to the life jacket.
“109. The Chief Mate had been standing by the starboard boat. He heard the whistle blow — Abandon Ship. He testified:
Everything was proceeding in a seamanlike fashion. The boat was being paid up. The ship would roll from time to time….And without any warning…the ship just rolled…right completely down on her side. [end of p. 31]
And the next thing I knew…I was clawing and swimming up…I come up, broached the surface, took a deep breath, and not far from me, I could see the smoke stack. It seemed to be just a little bit above the horizontal. I started swimming out.
“….111. The Chief Mate found an oar after being in the water what he estimated was half an hour. As he rose on the crests of the waves, he recalled seeing the strobe lights of the life rings blinking, and heard cries and groans. He also noted a flashlight beam shining in the air. He then recalled seeing the dark shape of a lifeboat. The lifeboat was swamped, with only a few inches freeboard. He estimated it took half an hour to reach the boar after he saw it. He succeeded in entering the boat and found it warmer to lie in the water, under a thwart, than to stay exposed to the air…. [p. 31]
“114. The Chief Mate recalled the next event was that a Norwegian ship [the Berganger] came alongside the lifeboat, and sailors scaled the ship’s side, in Jacobs’ ladders and nets, and tried to bring him aboard. The seas were too high, however, and the ship backed away. He then heard a whirr overhead, looked up, and saw the Coast Guard helicopter. The rescue basket was lowered, the Mate toppled into it, and was hoisted clear. He was transferred to a hospital in Salisbury, Maryland. He estimated he was rescued near 0700. He said it was broad daylight when the Norwegian ship attempted to rescue him.
“….116. Medical Examiner reports for the 29 bodies recovered from the scene of the accident attributed 20 deaths to drowning resulting from hypothermia. Four of the reports stated the cause of death was simply drowning. The reports also stated that many of the bodies were covered with heavy bunker oil….”[p. 33]
“146. Efforts were made by Coast Guard divers on 16 February 1983 to investigate the wreck for any signs of survivors trapped in the hull. No responses were heard, however…. [p. 38]
“GENERAL COMENTS ON THE HATCHES AND VESSEL CONDITION: ….
“312. The Chief Mate stated he would not make a North Atlantic run with the vessel in its condition, but felt safe making coastwise trips because the Coast Guard was nearby for a rescue if necessary. Although the condition of the hatch covers and main deck was common knowledge among the ship’s crew, no report or complaint was made by them to the Coast Guard, or to affiliated Maritime Union representatives, or to any other organization or agency.[16] [end of p. 73]
“313. The main deck outside of the hold openings was in very good condition according to the Chief Mate. The plating between the hatches was thin, however. Over the last two years before the accident, holes would appear in the deck in this area. At various times, doublers[17] were welded over the wasted areas. On the last voyage, at Brayton Point, he showed a hole in the deck between the hatches to a Promet representative. The Promet man said he had no work items to repair it, so the Chief Mate had an epoxy patch put over it.[18]
“314. The Chief Mate stated the dry cargo hatch cover ‘appeared to be thin’, though he didn’t know what the required thickness was. The Chief Mate recalled that as far back as February 1980, numerous homes appeared when the hatch cover was scaled. He recalled a doubler welded over a hole in the coaming[19] on the aft side, and a doubler ‘five foot square’ on the forward port corner around the booby hatch.
“315. According to the Chief Mate, the ballast lines were holed in No. 4 starboard double bottom. The no. 4 Starboard tank had to be pumped after all forward of it were emptied so that the suction would not be lost….
“317. The 8-12 Third Mate’s opinion as to the condition of the hatches during his three weeks aboard was based on touring the decks while in port on day-work, observing the crew working on the hatches, and observations made from the bridge while on watch. He related he had used his knife to knock sheets of scale up to 3’ by 3’ off some hatch covers. He related that all the hatches, on different panels, had wasted areas and holes ranging in size from pinholes to fist size. He found blistered areas where ‘whole sheets of scale and paint would come off.’ He saw gaskets not fastened to the covers and hanging down loosely. Portions of the track on top of the hatch coamings were missing or bent, due to damage by the offloading bucket at Brayton Point. He saw numerous doublers, some stretching for several feet and butted end to end. In his opinion, the constant efforts to grind and paint the hatch panels were ‘camouflage.’ He said that it was standard procedure to break out chain falls and come-a-longs to reseat hatches after they had jumped off their tracks when being secured. He remembered seeing epoxy patches between the hatches on the main deck, specifically between hatches 2 and 3. He also recalled a crack that had been circled between hatches 3 [end of p. 74] and 4 on the main deck. He knew of epoxy patches on the main deck between hatches 1 and 2, and forward of No. 5 hatch. These were located adjacent the hatch coamings.
“318. On one occasion, the 8-12 Third Mate overheard Captain…[name blacked out] make the statement that the hatches were in no worse condition at that time than when he had served onboard the vessel during the summer of 1982.
“319. The crack the Third Mate observed between hatches 3 and 4 was about 3½ inches long and ¾ inch wide, penetrating the full depth of the metal. The crack ran fore and aft. He located the crack between frames 78 and 79, about ten feet to starboard of the centerline. He first noticed the crack on 4 February 1983, and said he discussed it with the Second Mate and other Third Mate. He did not notify the Chief Mate, about the crack, but said the Chief Mate was cognizant of it.
“320. The Third Mate did not report any of his concerns over the hatch covers or cracks in the deck to the ABS, Coast Guard or Union, but notified his superiors. He said he followed the chain of command, and reported his concerns about the hatches to the Chief Mate. He saw a Port Engineer on board the last time the vessel was at Brayton Point, but did not talk to him. He was aware, however, that he could call the Coast Guard any time he was concerned the ship was unsafe to sail.
“321. The material condition of the hatch panels was poor in the opinion of the 12-4 AB. He related one occasion the day-workers chipped the top of the No. 5 hatch panels. When he got off the wheel watch, it was his job to sweep up. He said he saw ‘a whole bunch of little holes in the hatch — the average, I guess, would be about 1 inch by 6 inches.’ Holes were also present in the sides of the hatch panels. He estimated 6 or 7 holes on each panel….
“322. …On Sunday, 6 February 1983, while the ship was anchored off Newport, Rhode Island, the Chief Mate demonstrated [to the AB] the operation of all five hatches. He described the single wire pull that was shackled to the foremost panel and has hauled in by a steam winch. He [the AB] said the hatches did not operate smoothly, especially when attempting to close them. On one hatch, it was necessary to use a chain fall because the panels were warped, and on another hatch, lines had to be tended on each side to guide it into place. [end of p. 75] …
“324. On one occasion in 1981 or 1982, on a grain trip to Haifa, the Master recalled grain damage caused by water entering through a hole in the deck. About 100 tons of grain was damaged, in hold Nos. 3 or 4…. [p. 76]
“335. The Permanent Master repeatedly stated that the authority over repairs was delegated to the Chief Engineer and Port Engineer. He said ‘They have complete — are in complete charge of all repairs and how they are done. I am not, even though it is my responsibility. I do not have that authority on repairs.’ …. [p. 77]
“340. The Marine Superintendent did no know when the hatch covers were last tested for strength or whether they were ever audio gauged or hose tested. (The Chief Mate stated there had not been a hose test performed on the hatches since he came aboard in September 1977 by the crew or anyone else.) …. [p. 78]
“ 410. A Notice of Proposed Rule Making was published just prior to the Marine Electric casualty on 3 February 1983, regarding requirements for equipping certain vessels with exposure suits. On February 1984, the final rules were published, and required vessels such as the Marine Electric to carry exposure suits for each person on board unless the ship operated between 35S and 35N latitudes, or had covered lifeboats which met certain requirements. [p. 91]
CONCLUSIONS
“THE CAUSE OF THE CASUALTY
“….2. The cause of the casualty was due to progressive flooding of the vessel’s forward spaces. The sequence of events most likely commenced with flooding through sections of the deteriorated and wasted top plating of the dry cargo hatch and wasted main deck plating subjected to the dynamic effects of the striking sea, resulting in filling the dry cargo spaces, stores spaces, and the deep tanks. The chain locker may have filled to some degree as a result of water entering through th spill pipe- a non water-tight deck fitting. The additional weight from flooding forward significantly reduced the freeboard at the bow, allowing greater amounts of sea water to board the vessel. Eventually, the force and weight of the boarding sea striking the top plating of No. 1 and No. 2 cargo hatch covers exceeded the strength of the deteriorated and wasted sections of the unsupported plating, resulting in the collapse of these plates, wholly or in part. Sea water then entered No. 1 and No. 2 cargo holds. The vessel settled into the water to a point where its righting arm was so reduced that the Marine Electric became unstable, and capsized. A starboard list commenced about twenty minutes before the vessel capsized. The list was most likely produced by a cargo shift, or wind heel on the port side as the stability became increasingly tender.
“3. Significant flooding of the forward spaces most likely occurred between 2000-2400 on 11 February 1983. The vessel lost most of its 13 foot freeboard at the bow during this watch. Since flooding through the hatches would be very gradual, it is likely the change in trim was imperceptible at first. The 12-4 AB noted the bow was not rising as before, and the ship was plowing through the waves when he took the lookout watch at midnight.
“4. A contributing cause to the casualty was the failure on the part of Captain…[name blacked out], Relief Master of the Marine Electric, to take into consideration the effects of heavy boarding seas on the hatch covers, and to maneuver his vessel accordingly. [end of p. 111] ….
“6. Belowdecks at the bow, at least one of the manhole covers to the deep tanks was not in place when the ship left Norfolk, since diver Becroft described putting his body into a hole fitting the description and location for one of these manhole locations. Had the cover been bolted, it is unlikely it would have dislodged after the sinking.
“….8. At the time of the casualty, the Marine Electric failed to meet the applicable Coast Guard Load Line Regulations, as well as the ABS Rules. Based upon records of the manufacturer’s surveys, reports and testimony by the ship’s officers, and the owner’s repair records, the hatch covers had not been weather-tight since the 1981 Jacksonville overhaul, and did not meet the ABS Rule strength requirements. The hatch covers were wasted, holed, deteriorated, epoxy patched, deflected, weakened, and missing securing devices and cross-joint wedges. In addition, the main deck plating was wasted between the hatches, and was repaired improperly at times with epoxy patches. The hatch covers were not considered to have been fit or satisfactory for their intended use from 1981 to the time of the casualty, therefore, the vessel was in violation of its Certificate of Inspection.
“9. The vessel did not meet the Coast Guard Marine Engineering Regulations or ABS Rules applicable to an effective cargo bilge pumping system. Solid plates had been installed over the bilge wells in the holds, which precluded pumping water out of the cargo holds. Consequently, the vessel was in violation of the provisions of the Certificate of Inspection. [p. 112]
“CONCLUSIONS REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY
“COAST GUARD
“17. The Coast Guard inspector failed to insure that the requirements of the Load Line Regulations were met during the February 1981 overhaul. Given the knowledge of major repairs to the hatch covers, it was incumbent upon him to insure the repairs were sufficient and proper, that ABS was complete in its inspections, and the vessel complied with the Load Line Regulations. Since the vessel did not meet the regulations, the inspector should have taken steps to revoke the Load Line Certificate. The ABS has no authority to revoke a Load Line Certificate once issued by them.[20]
“18. The deteriorated condition of the hatch covers should have been apparent to the Coast Guard inspectors at the Inspection for Certification in June 1981, and the Mid-Period Inspection in June 1982. Corrective action should have been initiated. They failed to properly examine and test the hatch covers, or cause such examinations and tests to be conducted, to assure compliance with the applicable regulations, apparently relying solely on the fact the vessel possessed a Load Line Certificate. The inspections made were incomplete and misleading. Inspectors cited certain examinations as being made and found to be satisfactory, when, in fact, they were never made, and indicated that the vessel was in full compliance with the applicable regulations.
“19. In the course of the examinations in June, 1981, and June, 1982, the Coast Guard inspectors failed to take notice that the cargo bilge wells were covered with solid metal plates and require their removal. There is evidence that confusion existed in the minds of the Coast Guard inspectors as to when metal hatch covers were to be examined…. [p. 115]
“21. The Coast Guard examinations made of the Marine Electric during the drydock and overhaul completed in February 1981, the Inspection for Certification in June 1981, the mid-period inspection in June 1982, and the drydock extension inspection in December 1982, were performed by Coast Guard personnel who lacked the experience to conduct safety examinations of a vessel the size, service, and configuration of the Marine Electric. The incompleteness of these inspections as to the dictates of regulations and policy was attributed to the lack of training and experience on the part of the Coast Guard inspectors….[21]
“23. The Coast Guard had no firm regulations, policy or guidelines which addressed a valid reason for honoring a request for a drydock extension. Nor had it any regulations, policy or guidelines which outlined specific areas to be examined or tests to be made, prior to granting an extension of drydock.[22]
“AMERICAN BUREAU OF SHIPPING
“24. The ABS surveyor issued to Load Line Certificate in Jacksonville, 1981, without inspecting the hatch covers — a major component of the Load Line Survey. The ABS surveyor had the opportunity and duty to be aware of the repairs, testing and material condition of the hatch covers. After the major repairs were made to the hatch covers during the overhaul period, and also as a part of the Special Hull Survey, the surveyor should have required the weather-tightness test prescribed in Section 18 of the Rules. No hose testing of the hatch covers was done, however…. [p. 116]
“27. Basically, ABS surveys and visits are oriented toward protecting the best interest of marine insurance underwriters, and not for the enforcement of Federal safety statutes and regulations. Since the cost of these surveys and visits is borne by the owners, or other interested parties, the attending surveyor is subject to the influence of such persons.[23]
“THE OWNERS
“28. The ship was poorly managed and horribly maintained with respect to repairs to the hatch covers, main deck, and holes in the cargo hold area caused during off-loading. When the patchwork repairs performed during the 1981 drydocking proved to aggravate the covers’ conditions, the hatch manufacturer was called in, but not permitted to restore the weather-tightness or strength originally designed into the covers. On completion of his work in March 1981, and on three other occasions before the vessel’s accident, the manufacturer’s representative notified the owners, in writing, of his concern that the hatches were not weather-tight or structurally sound. Reports to officials of the Marine Coal Transportation Corporation, or the parent company, MTL, of the exacerbating deterioration of the panels came not [end of p.117] only from the manufacturer, but from the vessel’s repair requisitions and reports from attending Port Engineers and Agents….
“29. As the Marine Superintendant, and later the Fleet Director, Mr. Joseph Thelgie was the senior corporate official having intimate knowledge of the Marine Electric’s material condition and was the individual most capable of initiating action to correct the unseaworthy conditions of the hatch covers and main deck. He had the duty to notify the regulatory agencies or insure such notification was made when repairs were performed on the hull and hatch covers, but failed to do so.
“30. Records show that, in the last two years of her life, the Marine Electric had upward of 400 doublers or patches placed on the hatch covers, and over a dozen doublers on the main deck between the hatches….Tests to prove the weather-tightness or the strength of the covers were never performed. Instead, to insure weather-tightness, the owners resorted to tar paper and roofing tar to seal the hatches during grain voyages, but took insufficient steps to restore the required strength of the covers.
“31. At no time was the Coast Guard notified by the owners, agents or Master of the vessel of the hatch cover or hull repairs made after February 1981, as required by 46 CFR 42.09-50 and 91.45.1. Similarly, the ABS was not officially notified of the doubler or patched repairs. At no time did the owners, their agents, or the master notify the regulatory bodies of the approximately 95 wasted areas on the hatch covers that were noted in the Chief Mate’s sketches, and existed at the time of the casualty.
“32. The Marine Electric’s owners were remiss in not submitting the modification to use blank plates over the cargo hold bilge wells to the Coast Guard for plan approval. The Permanent Master knowingly and wrongfully permitted the use of these blank plates in the coal trade without Coast Guard or ABS approval, and in contradiction to good marine practice, as described by the National Cargo Bureau in its publication, ‘Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes.’ The publication was endorsed by the Coast Guard, and was available on board the vessel…. [p. 118]
“34. Throughout the inspection and repair history of the Marine Electric’s hatch covers, MacGregor was the only participant to recognize the importance of maintaining the strength of the covers. All other parties seemed concerned only with weather-tightness. As a result of this state of mind, the owners were content to use doublers or epoxy and tape, and the crew did not recognize the danger to the vessel’s seaworthiness posed by seas striking the hatch covers.
“THE CREW
“35. The Permanent Master, Captain…[name blacked out] in spite of his disclaimer concerning the handling of repairs aboard the vessel, was knowledgeable of the deteriorated conditions of the hatch covers and main deck plating between the hatches and was cognizant of the MacGregor Company’s report of 30 November 1982. He ordered the use of epoxy patches over holed and wasted portions of the hatch covers and main deck, without insuring that proper, permanent repairs were made. In addition, he failed to notify the Coast Guard when the hole was discovered in the side shell at No. 1 port upper wing tank on 2 February 1983. Instead, after he was cognizant of it, he ordered a temporary repair of a cement box. He allowed the vessel to go to sea with blanks over the cargo hold bilge wells, and with uncovered holes in the top of the No. 5 hatch covers. At no time did he make these conditions known to the Coast Guard, American Bureau of Shipping, or Captain…[name blacked out], his relief.
“36. There is evidence of misconduct and/or negligence on the part of the permanent master, Capt. Farnham, for knowingly putting to sea in an unseaworthy vessel in violation of 46 USC 390d (46 USC 10908). This matter will be forwarded to the Commander, Fifth Coast Guard District for further investigation under the suspension and revocation proceedings.
“37. A number of officers and crewmembers were aware of the condition of the hatch covers, and at times expressed their concerns among themselves. However, due to the lack of seagoing employment, and the desirable nature of the voyages being made by the Marine Electric, they were content to sail the vessel on coastwise voyages without further complaint. They were largely under the belief that should a serious casualty occur, they would be evacuated in a timely manner.[24]
“LIFESAVING ASPECTS
“38. The EPIRB failed to function, and did not transmit its signal. The unit may have tangled in the wreck as it capsized to [end of p. 119] starboard, and become trapped under the hull. A manufacturer’s defect is also possible, since, in 1980, a high failure rate was detected in the water-activated switch installed in this type EPIRB….
“40. With the exception of the Master and six engineers, the crew complement of the Marine Electric has been accounted for….
“42. There is evidence that the boarding ladders for the liferafts, consisting of synthetic fabric web-belt ladders, were inadequate to permit successful boarding from the cold, stormy seas. The victims were unable to get a hand hold on the boarding ladder since it became compressed against the side of the inflation chambers.
“….GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
“44. The examination of vessels made for the purpose of enforcement of Federal Statutes and Regulations should be conducted by an impartial governmental agency having expertise in that field, with no other interests and/or obligations other than assuring compliance with applicable requirements. By virtue of its relationship to the vessel owners, the ABS cannot be considered impartial (in spite of the many years experience of the surveyors). Their failure to note and require correction of the deteriorating hatch covers on the Marine Electric constituted negligence on their part. The assertion on the part of the surveyors in their written reports and their testimony before the Board that the hatch covers were in satisfactory condition and met the Load Line Regulations, raises questions about the professional integrity of their surveys. [25]
“The Coast Guard is an impartial agency, but the inexperience of the inspectors who went aboard the Marine Electric, and their failure to recognize the safety hazard imposed by the deteriorated, weakened and non-tight hatch covers, raises doubts about the capabilities of the Coast Guard inspectors to enforce the laws and regulations in a satisfactory manner…. [26][p. 121]
“50. Had the Master found a favorable heading, and ordered periodic examination of the foredeck and hatch covers, as well as sounding bilge wells of the forward spaces and cargo holds, the ingress of water would then have been discovered at an early stage.
“51. In the case of the Marine Electric, the observation in NVIC[27] 7-68 that where doublers are permitted they tend to ‘proliferate as randomly-placed patches’ proved woefully true.[28] The guidance permitting doublers is overly broad and does not specifically provide for periodic re-evaluation of the efficiency of the doubler or the conditions of the defect the doubler was intended to remedy.
“RECOMMENDATIONS
“1. That the examination of U.S. merchant vessels to assure their compliance with the applicable Federal safety statutes and regulations be conducted and determined by knowledgeable members of a U.S. Government agency. The responsibilities for these functions should not be delegated or entrusted to the private sector.[29]
“2. That the Commandant[30] commission a panel to conduct an in-depth review of the entire Coast Guard Commercial Vessel Safety Program and make recommendations to him. The panel should consist of no less than fifty percent retired Officers in Charge, Marine Inspection recognized for their vessel inspection expertise, and recognized for their Merchant Marine background….[31] [p. 122]
“3. That the Coast Guard publish a policy to define the reasons and vessel inspection criteria that must be followed before granting a vessel an extension of its drydocking date. Requests for such an extension should not be entertained unless the reasons are beyond the owner’s or operator’s control.[32]
“4. That the Commandant publish a policy concerning the examination, repair, and testing of metal hatch covers with emphasis not only on the watertight or weather-tight integrity of the covers, but the strength of them as well. The policy should address gauging and hose testing the covers periodically.[33]
“….8. That the actions of the Permanent Master, Capt. James K. Farnham, be referred to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution under 46 USC 10908, in that he took the Marine Electric to sea with unseaworthy and improperly repaired hatches and main deck areas, and with no effective cargo bilge pumping system on numerous occasions, and, on two occasions in February, 1983, with a hole in the port sideshell.[34]
“9. That the actions of Mr. Joseph Thelgie with respect to managing the repairs and maintenance of the Marine Electric while serving as MTL’s Fleet Director be referred to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution under 46 USC 658 (46 USC 10908). [The USCG Commandant concurred (p. 7.)]
“10. That the Coast Guard propose regulations requiring improved boarding arrangements into inflatable liferafts by persons afflicted by injuries or cold. Modifications of existing liferafts should be required to improve the hand-hold arrangements of the boarding ladders.[35]
“11. That the Coast Guard propose regulations to insure that vessels so constructed and operated with spaces which become inaccessible due to heavy weather or conditions of loading are fitted with flooding alarms capable of notifying the control station of such condition.”[36] [end of p. 123]
[Not including recommendations 12-14. Signed by Captain P. C. Lauridsen, Chair, and Captain D. A. Calicchio, Member.]
(USCG. Marine Casualty Report. SS Marine Electric…Capsizing and Sinking in the Atlantic Ocean on 12 February 1983 with Multiple Loss of Life. July 25, 1984.)
Journal of Commerce, May 30, 1988: “A key federal official said he expects a negotiated settlement or criminal indictments within the next few months in the February 1983 sinking of the merchant vessel Marine Electric that resulted in the deaths of 31 crewmen.
“If negotiations fall through, a federal grand jury will be asked to hand up indictments in the case, said Henry Hudson, U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. For the past six months, we have been engaged in negotiations to bring about a solution satisfactory to all parties, Mr. Hudson said in a telephone interview….
“In January 1985, following a two-year investigation, the Coast Guard recommended that the Justice Department consider criminal prosecution against James K. Farnham, the ship’s captain, who was on vacation at the time of the sinking, and Joseph Thelgie, fleet director for Marine Transport Lines Inc., the Secaucus, N.J.-based company that owned the vessel….
“Mr. Hudson’s comments ended two years of official silence about the Justice Department’s handling of the case. He said negotiations began with attorneys for the ship’s officials about six months ago.
“Jeffrey A. Breit, a Norfolk lawyer who represented about 15 survivors or estates, said the action is welcome, if overdue. Their actions call out for criminal action, he said, likening the Marine Electric officers’ actions to a drunk consciously deciding to drive and endanger the lives of others….
“The ship’s owners contended that the ship’s 8-ton anchor had been improperly secured before it broke free during the storm. But the Coast Guard dismissed that theory and singled out the deteriorated deck and hatch covers….
“Mr. Farnham voluntarily surrendered his license to the Coast Guard in 1985, according to officials at the 5th District headquarters in Portsmouth, Va.
“Robert M. Cusick, the ship’s chief mate and one of three survivors, testified at the hearing that he was terrified by the ship’s conditions and remained aboard only because its routes kept it close to shore and Coast Guard rescue vessels….
“All claims against Marine Transport Lines have been settled for an estimated $15 million, Mr. Breit said. In May 1985, months after the Coast Guard released its report, the shipping company agreed to pay $5.14 million to settle lawsuits brought by one survivor of the sinking and families of 14 men who died. The company did not admit liability, but Mr. Breit, a Norfolk lawyer who represented the seaman and families, said the Coast Guard findings had a dramatic effect on the amount the company was willing to pay to avoid a scheduled trial. The company later negotiated very satisfactory settlements with Eugene Haynes, a third mate who survived, and with the widow of a seaman who died, said Henry E. Howell Jr., a Norfolk lawyer who represented the two.” (Journal of Commerce. “Prosecutor Hints of Indictments in Ship Sinking.” 5-30-1988.)
Thiesen on Domenic A. Calicchio, USCG Investigation Board Member: Captain Domenic A. Calicchio was one of the United States Coast Guard’s many unsung heroes whose career embodied the service’s core values of honor, respect and devotion to duty. The Coast Guard’s Inspect ions & Investigation School named the Award for Captain Calicchio due to the significant impact he had on the U. S. marine industry and the Coast Guard as a senior Marine Casualty Investigator….
“Calicchio’s greatest achievement, and one that would mark the end of his career, was the investigation into the infamous loss of the M/V Marine Electric. The Marine Electric was a T-2 bulk cargo carrier built during World War II and intended to fill Allied war-time needs for bulk cargo and fuel shipments. Numerous T-2s found employment in shipping lines after the hostilities, even though designers only intended them to serve for the duration of the War. The T-2s proved so brittle that several of them produced stress fractures or split in two before they set sail on their maiden voyage. Not surprisingly, more and more T-2 tankers sank or fell apart as these vessels grew older and rustier. For example, the T-2s Fort Mercer and Pendleton sank on the same February evening in 1952 off the Cape Cod coast leading to one of the Coast Guard’s best known rescues. Like many of its T-2 sister ships, Marine Electric saw service well beyond its years and, on a stormy evening in February 1983, the ship sank in the Atlantic off Maryland’s Eastern Shore. Of the thirty-four crew members who went into the frigid seas only three came out alive. The Coast Guard’s marine board formed to investigate this disaster included Calicchio and two other Coast Guard marine safety officers. It was due in large part to Calicchio’s effort to uncover the causes of the wreck that the board handed down a criminal indictment of the Marine Electric’s owners. The case was a landmark event in U. S. marine safety because it set safety standards for older vessels, such as the T-2s, and led indirectly to the scrapping of about seventy vessels unable to meet those standards. It also led to regulations requiring the adoption of survival suits on board vessels navigating in cold water climates. Lastly, the tremendous loss of life in the Marine Electric disaster focused attention on the need for Coast Guard rescue swimmers and spurred support for establishing that fledgling program.
“Throughout his career, Captain Domenic Calicchio championed the cause of safety on the open ocean. Ironically, he downplayed his own critical role in overhauling marine safety regulations in the Marine Electric case and other cases during his Coast Guard years. Not long after the Marine Electric marine board of inquiry released its critical 1985 report, Calicchio chose to retire. He established a very successful practice as a cruise-ship safety expert in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Captain Calicchio passed away in March of 2003, but his honor, integrity, devotion to duty and his high regard for those who go to sea in ships have set the standard for all Coast Guard personnel tasked with overseeing marine safety.” (Thiesen)
Sources
Frump, Robert. Until the Sea Shall Free Them. Knoph Doubleday Publishing, 2002. Google digital preview accessed 2-27-2017 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=0iSVPOlLh8sC&dq=until+the+sea+shall+free+them&source=gbs_navlinks_s
Journal of Commerce. “Prosecutor Hints of Indictments in Ship Sinking.” 5-30-1988. Accessed 2-27-2017 at: http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/prosecutor-hints-indictments-ship-sinking_19880530.html
National Climatic Data Center. Storm Data. Vol. 25, No. 2, February 1983, 26 pages. Asheville, NC: NCDC NOAA, U.S. Department of Commerce. Accessed 2-28-2017 at: https://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/orders/IPS/IPS-7F0CB6DC-6A58-4205-B164-16AEC4A3B0AC.pdf
Thayer, Johnathan. “The Sinking of the SS Marine Electric.” Seamen’s Church Institute. 9-4-2014. Accessed 2-25-2017 at: http://seamenschurch.org/article/the-sinking-of-the-ss-marine-electric
Thiesen. William H. (Atlantic Area Historian, USCG). Captain Domenic A. Calicchio: The Coast Guard’s Champion of Marine Safety Regulations. 12-31-2009 modification. Accessed 2-28-2016 at: https://www.uscg.mil/history/people/CalicchioDomenicA.pdf
United States Coast Guard. Marine Casualty Report. SS Marine Electric, O.N. 245675, Capsizing and Sinking in the Atlantic Ocean on 12 February 1983 with Multiple Loss of Life (Report No. 16732/0001 HQS 83). Washington, DC: Commandant, USCG, July 25, 1984, 154 pages. Accessed 2-25-2017 at: https://www.uscg.mil/history/docs/casrep/1983marineelectric.pdf
United States Coast Guard. Shipboard Launch and Recovery Procedures Manual (COMDTINST M3120.6). Washington, DC: USCG, 1-23-2013. Accessed 2-26-2017 at: https://www.uscg.mil/directives/cim/3000-3999/CIM_3120_6.pdf
Wrecksite.eu. “Musgroves Mills SS (1944~1947) Marine Electric SS (+1983). Accessed 2-25-2017 at: http://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?149318
[1] Incorrect number of lives lost — 31 of crew of 34 died.
[2] See, in particular, the informative “History” section by Allen Tony, dated 12-21-2007, who uses the name Musgrove Mills.
[3] Frump notes in his book that this “was about thirty-two hours each way, and the earlier trip down just a few days before had been glass-smooth…”
[4] Frump notes that at sixty-five feet “the Theodora was a tenth the size of the Marine Electric. She could easily sit on the bigger ship’s deck.” While “The Marine Electric pounded through the waves; the Theodora sailed up and down them.” She had left Cape May, NJ the previous day and was now lost in the storm.
[5] The Chief Mate, Third Mate, and an Able Seaman. (p. 111)
[6] The names and positions of the recovered fatalities can be found at pp. 125-129. Names of the un-recovered fatalities are noted in the original report but blacked out in online version (pp. 129-130).
[7] Frump: “The Marine Electric was a small ship by the standards of the new supertankers, but immense by human scale. Stretch two football fields end to end, and you had her.”
[8] Frump describes the five cargo bay hatches “like huge horizontal garage doors.”
[9] American Bureau of Shipping.
[10] “A part of the below-decks cabin which is raised above the deck level to provide additional headroom below.” (Sea Talk Nautical Dictionary at http://www.seatalk.info.)
[11] “In a stationary position with head to wind: at a standstill — ore freighters hove to in the fog.” Merriam-Webster.com.
[12] Near Rehoboth Beach, DE.
[13] Naval rating of apprenticeship position on a merchant ship. An Able-bodied seaman (AB), on the other hand is someone who generally has at least two years’ experience and is considered well acquainted with their duties.
[14] Ship’s officer in charge of equipment and crew.
[15] “Falls: The wire rope that transmits winch controlled hoisting and lowering to the boat.” “Glossary and Acronyms,” p. ii in USCG, Shipboard Launch and Recovery Procedures Manual. January 2013.
[16] According to Frump, however, one member of the crew, Clayton (Clayt) Babineau, had contacted the Coast Guard: “…it had been no small thing several weeks back when he [Babineau] had called the Coast Guard about the Marine Electric. Mary [his wife] was in Clayt’s study when he phoned. The ship was in a Rhode Island repair yard in the winter of 1982 when he dialed up the local Coast Guard inspectors. ‘Listen,’ he said, ‘here’s what’s wrong with the ship. Go on board and just take a look. You’ll see the cracks in the deck. You can’t miss them. Check the hatches.’ ‘Will do,’ said the Coast Guard guy. But the Marine Electric sailed a short time later, and the complaint made in Rhode Island was not forwarded to other ports where she put in. Babineau never got any response, never saw any results of his call, and watched in fact as inspectors of the American Bureau of Shipping and the Coast Guard stepped over obvious safety violations. The crew had circled cracks in the deck with chalk, then spray-painted circles around them. The inspectors were careful both not to trip over the deficiencies and to ignore them in their inspection reports.”
[17] “Doubler plates are used as one of the solutions for plate damage from corrosion in the structures of…ships. Doubler plates are also called ‘doublers.’ This method is used as the preferred method for repairing the structure of ships as it is less costly and relatively each compared to inserting a permanent welded plate.” (Corrisionpedia.com. “Doubler Plate.” Accessed 2-27-2017 at: https://www.corrosionpedia.com/definition/2085/doubler-plate. Frump writes that the doublers were quarter-inch steel sheets.
[18] In his book Frump calls this “marine-strength epoxy patching” “Red Hand.”
[19] “Coaming is any vertical surface on a ship designed to deflect or prevent entry of water. It usually refers to a raised section of deck plating around an opening such as a hatch. Coamings also provide a frame onto which to fit a hatch cover.” (Wikipedia. “Coaming.” 2-7-2016 modification accessed 2-27-2017.)
[20] The USCG Commandant only partially concurred in Conclusion 17, writing: Given the knowledge of major repairs to the hatch covers, the inspector could have scheduled a return visit to the vessel to insure that the hatch covers had been returned and properly repaired and installed. However, the issuance of load line certificates and the associated surveys to ensure compliance with the load line regulations is a function which has been delegated to the ABS pursuant to Title 46 App. USC 86d. The reason for delegating certain inspection functions to ABS is to eliminate duplication of effort whenever possible…” (p. 2.)
[21] In his partial concurrence, the Commandant noted at one point: “The Coast Guard has in progress a project to revise its marine safety training program which was initiated before the Marine Electric casualty….” (p. 3.)
[22] The Commandant concurred, noting in his point 8. “Policy guidance has been issued for such extensions.” (p. 3.)
[23] Commandant’s point 10. “Conclusion 27: This conclusion is not supported by the findings of fact and is not concurred with. ABS or any other classification society surveys, when performed for the Coast Guard, are performed on behalf of the Administration’s interest. If the ABS surveyor is on board for the endorsement of a load line certificate or issuance of a certificate, he is acting on behalf of the Coast Guard and not on behalf of the owner. As such, the surveyor may look at all parts of the vessel to the extent needed for the annual or periodic survey. The Marine Electric surveys in question were poorly conducted, but that fact does not condemn the entire system of third party delegation which has been authorized and encouraged by the Congress.” (p. 4.)
[24] In concurring with and then commenting on this conclusion, the Commandant wrote: “However, it fails to note that the licensed officers assisting the Coast Guard in their inspections aboard the Marine Electric were bound by law (46 USC 3315) to report any known deficiencies to the Coast Guard. Their failure to do so cannot be justified by their interest in retaining employment. On October 30, 1984, Title 46, USC Chapter 21 was amended to include protection for seamen against discrimination for reporting violations of laws or regulations to the Coast Guard. This casualty clearly reinforces the continuing necessity for the persons sailing on and living aboard merchant vessels to provide information on safety discrepancies to the Coast Guard…” (p. 4.)
[25] The Commandant, in his note No. 13, did not concur, writing: “There were no facts developed that show that the ABS did not act impartially; rather the investigation shows that on two occasions their surveyors failed to fully carry out their responsibilities….This casualty more accurately highlights the need for more formal oversight of surveyor performance. Additionally, the casualty indicates a need for improved guidance for ABS surveyors. In recognition of this fact, ABS has already published revised guidelines for surveys of older vessels (20 years of age or more), updated criteria for intermediate and annual surveys which emphasizes hatch cover condition, and updated criteria for gaugings on older vessels. ABS has also instituted a program of unannounced visits to field offices by representatives from the New York main office. The program’s intent is to verify the efficiency and accuracy of field personnel, and to highlight any need for additional training or more experienced personnel.”
[26] The Commandant writes: “The part of the conclusion relating to the capabilities of the Coast Guard inspectors to enforce the laws and regulations in a satisfactory manner is too broad. The failure of the Coast Guard inspectors to detect the deteriorated condition of the hatch covers on the Marine Electric is not an accurate reflection of the Coast Guard’s ability to carry out the laws and regulations….This casualty does identify the need for additional training of Coast guard inspectors and additional policy guidance for inspection and oversight functions. Action has been taken to revise the marine safety training program, provide guidance on drydock extensions, implement the inspection program for vessels 20 years of age or older, and develop oversight guidance.”
[27] Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular, USCG. Provides detailed guidance about the enforcement or compliance with certain Federal marine safety regulations and Coast Guard marine safety programs.
[28] Not only metal doublers, but cement for patching holes as well. Frump writes that “When they patched holes in the ship with cement, he [Bob Cusick, one of the crewmen] began calling the Marine Electric the Marine Sidewalk because there was more concrete in her than in all the sidewalks in Scituate.
[29] The Commandant did not concur, noting, in part: “The recommendation is contrary to 46 USC 3316 and 46 App. USC 86d regarding delegation of Coast Guard load line inspection functions to classification societies.” (p. 6.)
[30] USCG Admiral J. S. Gracey.
[31] The Commandant did not concur, noting, in part: “Efforts commenced before and after this tragic casualty are already addressing the mentioned issues…” (p. 6.)
[32] The Commandant concurred, writing, in part: “In July 1983, the Coast Guard published guidance on granting drydock extensions….” (p. 6.)
[33] The Commandant concurred, writing: “Interim guidance pertaining to hatch cover inspections has been issued and will be incorporated in the Marine Safety Manual.” (p. 7.)
[34] The Commandant concurred noting that “Evidence…will be forwarded to the Department of Justice for their review and possible prosecution.” (p. 7.)
[35] The Commandant concurred, writing: “As part of the present regulatory project concerning SOLAS 74/83, the Coast Guard will propose that new inflatable liferafts be equipped with a boarding ramp. Further, the Coast Guard intends to propose that existing inflatable liferafts be retrofitted with boarding ramps, or stiffeners with standoffs for boarding ladders, or both.” (p. 7.)
[36] The Commandant concurred, writing: “In a related area, the Coast Guard is developing a regulatory project which would require flooding alarms for normally unmanned spaces that are vulnerable to substantial undetected flooding. While this action was initiated in the context of mobile offshore drilling units, its scope will be expanded to include other vessel types and arrangements.” (p. 7.)
