— 24 NFPA. Deadliest fires in facilities for older adults Since 1950. 2003
— 24 NFPA. Investigation Report: Hotel Fire, Bradley Beach, New Jersey…, July 26, 1980.
— 24 PA Gen. Assembly. The Feasibility of Retrofitting High Rises, College Dorms…, 2001.
— 24 U.S. Congress, House. Boarding Home Fires: New Jersey Hearing, March 9, 1981, p. 14.
Narrative Information
NFPA Investigation Report: “On July 26, 1980, a late evening fire in a licensed hotel in the resort town of Bradley Beach, New Jersey, was responsible for the deaths of 24 of the 38 residents of the facility. Many of the residents had been referred to the home by state mental health care institutions or by the county welfare department. Most residents of the facility were elderly and mentally impaired.
“The fire, most probably of electrical origin, started in a concealed space above the ceiling of a basement recreation room. The fire spread to upper floors by means of a stairway from the basement. Smoke and heat swept up a three-story open stairway, quickly filling the exit access corridors on each floor. Fire fighters found victims in rooms and corridors.
“Factors that contributed to the fatalities were: a delayed alarm due to fire ignition in a concealed space, the lack of an early warning fire detection system, unprotected vertical openings, lack of a second means of egress from upper floors, presence of louvers on guest room doors, and a basement door that was left open….” (NFPA. Investigation Report: Hotel Fire, Bradley Beach, New Jersey…July 26, 1980. P. ii.)
“The weekend manager had finished watching television at about 10:30 p.m. She locked the front door and went to bed. At a little before 11:00 p.m., the fire alarm system activated. After first checking the kitchen in the north end of the building, the manager saw a light haze of smoke around an exit light in the dining room as she returned to the front of the building. The lights in the south end of the building were out. She proceeded through the lobby to the basement stairway door. Opening the door she saw heavy smoke in the basement. As she stood at the doorway, heavy smoke poured through the door and into the lobby area. She left the door open and retreated from the smoke, which quickly began to fill the first floor. In the darkness she was unable to find the phone to call the fire department. As she looked for the phone, she yelled for the residents to get out of the building.
“Neighbors sitting on the front porch of a home across the street noticed smoke issuing from the building and heard the alarm bells activate. They placed a call to the fire department through the borough police, who dispatched fire calls, reporting the fire at 11:02 p.m. Two police officers were in the station when the fire was reported. As the police dispatcher put out the fire call, they proceeded the six blocks to the Brinley Inn. As the police officers arrived, they saw heavy smoke issuing from the second and third floors of the front third of the building. One officer headed for the front porch. A female resident ran past him to the street as he started up the stairway of the porch. As he reached the front door, he found the manager standing near the doorway in the lobby. She indicated the residents were all still in the building. Looking through the lobby and out the east windows, the officer could see flames rolling up onto the porch on the east side of the building. Noting that the lobby was filled with heavy black smoke, he pulled the manager from the doorway across the porch and started down the porch stairs.
“At that moment there was either a backdraft explosion or flashover occurred in the basement. There was sufficient impact to knock the police officer and the manager down the front stairs onto the lawn. The windows of the basement were blown out. Fire quickly engulfed the basement and went up the stairway into the lobby and by the open stairway to the floors above (see Photos 3, 4). Several residents from the upper floors were able to negotiate the stairway at least one floor before escaping from the building. An employee who resided in Room 5 on the second floor learned of the fire early enough to use the stairs from the second floor to the lobby in time to escape through the front door as police officers arrived.
“Another resident on the third floor had gotten out of bed a little before 11:00 p.m. to go to the bathroom. His smoke detector in the center of the ceiling in his room went off and he smelled smoke. He opened his louvered panel door and as he stepped out into the hall, the alarm bell in the hallway went off. With another resident who was already in the hallway, they were able to descend from the third floor to the second floor, using the front stair. They started to descend to the first floor, reaching the landing halfway between floors when they were forced from increasingly heavy smoke conditions to retreat up the stairway to the second floor corridor. They then moved down the corridor to the rear exit door and out onto the kitchen roof.
“The first Bradley Beach fire apparatus arrived shortly after the backdraft explosion (or flashover) had occurred. Fire was rolling out of the basement on both the south and east sides of the building through open areas below the porch. The lobby was also found heavily involved in fire. Fire fighters initially placed two 1-1/2-inch hose lines and one 2-1/2-inch line into operation, attacking both the basement fire and the heavy fire in the lobby. Aware of the open stairway, fire fighters made the attack in the lobby through the window closest to the stairway. They quickly knocked down the fire in the stairway and attempted to push the fire away from the open stairway.
“Residents were heard screaming and moaning in the building. Witnesses saw several residents run to the windows in their rooms and then back into the room, repeating this action several times. Bystanders pleaded with the residents to jump, but none did. Smoke soon obliterated the window areas and the noise from within the building ceased within five minutes.
“The police officers and arriving fire fighters assisted residents who were standing on the roof at the north end of the building to the ground by using the ladder on the side of the building. Teams of fire fighters with self-contained breathing apparatus entered the corridors on the second and third floors, attempting to rescue victims found in the corridors and in rooms. Fire fighters kicked open doors as they proceeded, up the hall. Ladders were raised on both the east and west sides of the building and at least three occupants were rescued. Some victims were revived by fire fighters performing cardio-pulmonary resuscitation.
“Mutual aid companies from Avon, Ocean Grove, and Neptune City responded to assist the Bradley Beach department. Approximately 150 fire fighters were present at the scene. A triage area with two doctors present was set up in the parking lot area immediately adjoining the north wall of the building. Twelve first aid squads transported victims to the area hospital…
“There were 24 fatalities as a result of the fire (See floor plan). Two victims were located in the lobby on the first floor. Eight fatalities were found on the second floor. Five of these people succumbed to the fire in their rooms and three in the corridor. Three others were rescued and revived. Two survived the fire but one died several weeks later. There were 13 fatalities on the third floor. Four of those were located in the corridor at the top of the stairs and another on the stairway landing between the second and third floors. Three other victims were found in the third floor corridor and five victims were found in rooms on the third floor.
“The fire victims ranged in age from 39 to 80 years, with most of the victims in their 70’s….” (NFPA. Investigation Report: Hotel Fire, Bradley Beach, New Jersey…July 26, 1980. Pp. 9-12.)
“The primary factor that contributed to the fatalities was the unenclosed stairway that terminated in an unprotected lobby. This, and the lack of protection at the top of the basement stairs, allowed the fire to quickly spread to the second and third floors of the structure….” (NFPA. Investigation Report: Hotel Fire, Bradley Beach, New Jersey…July 26, 1980. P. 19.)
(National Fire Protection Association. Investigation Report: Hotel Fire, Bradley Beach, New Jersey, 24 Fatalities, July 26, 1980. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1980.)
U.S. Congress: “At approximately 10:30 pm on July 26, 1980, fire broke out in the Brinley Inn. The fire was reported at 11:02 pm by a passing policeman. Twenty-four (24) people died in the fire…
“The facility was a three-story wood and stucco structure about 55 years-old with a basement half below grade level. The facility had formerly been a resort hotel. The facility had a large open interior stairwell which was one factor in the death toll…
“The building had several exterior fire escapes. Moreover, smoke alarms were installed in patient rooms and heat detectors were located in the basement. None of these interior alarms were connected with the fire department; their function was to warn the residents. There was no sprinkler system…
“The facility had contracted with a New York firm which specialized in conducting fire dl ills to teach residents in boarding homes what to do in case of a fire. Unfortunately, the residents appear to have been taught to walk slowly to the open central staircase to evacuate the building rather than using more cumbersome fire escapes. The residents who walked towards the central staircase perished as the fire raced up to the other floors through it…
“The cause of the fire is listed as “electrical failure” by authorities. The fire started in the basement. It is thought by fire experts that improper wiring and the combination of new wiring improperly patched into an old wiring system may have led to an overload and a short which ignited the blaze…
“The fire department arrived on the scene in about 3 minutes from the time the fire was reported. This is an excellent response time. About 140 firefighters and a dozen ambulances were brought to the scene within minutes…
“There were 38 residents in the facility at the time of the fire plus two live-in staff members. Most of the elderly were those who had been institutionalized because they were either mentally impaired or mentally retarded…
“The quality of care in the facility was fairly good according to New Jersey officials. Reportedly, the facility had few complaints…
“The facility was licensed by the State Department of Community Affairs as a boarding home. It had applied to the health department for licensure as a licensed shelter care boarding home but withdrew the application when it became clear they could not meet fire safety standards for this higher class of boarding homes.” (U.S. Congress, House. Boarding Home Fires: New Jersey Hearing, March 9, 1981, pp. 14-15.)
Association for Retarded Citizens: “The Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC) in Monmouth County is appalled by the tragic fires that occurred at the Brinley Inn in Bradley Beach, the Beachview Rest Home in Keansburg, and in other boarding house facilities in New jersey (as well as in other states). We mourn the loss of those who died in the fires, and particularly those of the mentally retarded persons who perished in the various holocausts. Some of the” people who died were clients of our Association, and we had come to know them as human beings, not at all unlike you and me.
“At the outset, in the strongest possible terms, we want to once again express our concern and our fear for the safety of all of the other mentally retarded individuals, who have been placed in living conditions that are unsuitable for them.
“Since our Association was well acquainted with the five mentally retarded men who resided in the Brinley Inn and who lost their lives there, we make these remarks in relation to that particular structure and fire. However, it should be realized that this statement is appropriate comment about many of the domiciles that are in use here, in Monmouth County, New Jersey as housing for retarded people.
“The men who died in the Brinley Inn Fire had been deinstitutionalized from state schools and placed there by the State Division of Mental Retardation (DMR). While we feel the Division of Mental Retardation is sincere in its deinstitutional effort, the plain and simple fact is that a placement such as the Brinley Inn is not suitable. No mentally retarded person should ever live in a dwelling of this type, and we have previously called for the immediate removal from all other similar unlicensed premises of mentally retarded persons who currently live in such facilities.
“It also seems reasonable to us to feel that residences similar to the Brinley are not suitable for older people, or for people who have been mentally ill; as well as the mentally retarded.
“Our investigation has turned up the fact that the Brinley Inn was neat and clean, and probably managed by well intentioned people, but that did not make it suitable for housing mentally retarded persons. We were also alarmed to notice a statement in the press after the fire which was attributed to a New Jersey State employee, who characterized the Brinley Inn as, “One of the better placements.” If that is indeed true, and it probably is, we feel there is even more reason for the immediate removal of mentally retarded people from such residences.
“For the select committee’s information, the State of New Jersey, through the Division of Mental Retardation, defended its use of the Brinley Inn during hearings before the State Assembly’s Institutions Health and Welfare Committee. Subsequent to that time, a report has been issued, however, which does state clearly that the Brinley suffered serious shortcomings. The report in question was written by the National Fire Protection Association, and as we understand it, financed in part with federal funds. The report has been quoted as saying, “Unprotected, vertical openings in the building (which we take to mean open stairwells), the fire’s origin in a concealed space, the building’s lack of an early fire detection system, and the lack of a second means of egress from the Inn’s upper floors also contributed to the 24 fatalities and the blaze.” Additionally, the report states, “The electrical wiring in the Brinley Inn that was most likely involved in the ignition scenario did not comply with the requirements of the National Electrical Code.”
“With that report in mind, we feel there is even more reason for the position we take, with regard to the immediate removal of mentally retarded people from such residences.
“With regard to deinstitutionalization of mentally retarded people: We feel these people should only be placed in licensed community residences for the developmentally disabled, or other licensed facilities which meet stringent standards.
“The Association for Retarded Citizens in Monmouth strongly favors the removal of those mentally retarded individuals from state schools who can benefit by being placed in the community in suitable housing. However, we are aware of the fact that there is an enormous shortage of proper housing for these people. It seems, therefore, that the deinstitutionalization process might have to be slowed until proper facilities are found or developed. As regrettable as that may be, it is a better alternative than improper placement.
“As a point of information, we do realize that Chapter 496, of the Public Laws of 1979 of New Jersey, is now in effect. This piece of legislation does indeed call for stringent standards which we feel are needed, but we also note that this same law provides for waivers, postponements, and modifications. We do not feel this is proper. The lives of people are involved, therefore, we oppose waivers, postponements, and delays as a general rule.
“As we previously mentioned, Chapter 496 does appear to call for standards that are reasonable and desirable, but perhaps your committee would like to look into this to ascertain as to whether federal legislation might also be desirable where deinstitutionalized persons are concerned, since federal funds are involved in the intermediate care facility/ mental retardation, deinstitutionalization process.
“Following the Brinley Inn Fire, a hearing was held (as we previously mentioned) by the State Assembly’s Institutions Committee. We testified at that hearing, and I would like to enter into this record a portion of a statement which was made at that time. It said, “One of the Monmouth County daily newspapers (The Daily Register) has editorially commented on the fact that “An argument swells after each new tragedy and then unfortunately grows quiet.” The Daily Register’s comment is all too true. Regrettably, this has happened before. We, therefore, call upon this committee and all of the New Jersey legislature to assume complete responsibility for a full-scale investigation into the concept of deinstitutionalization and the placement of mentally retarded individuals in residences in the various communities in this state.”….
“Quoting again from the testimony which we gave to the aforementioned New Jersey Assembly Institutions Committee: “If the New Jersey legislature does indeed conduct a full scale investigation and make a sincere effort to address and solve this problem, we urge that legislators also take into consideration the fact that trained, educated personnel must staff the housing facilities developed for mentally retarded people. They are as much a need as the housing units themselves and this point has often been overlooked.”….
“Finally, we understand that other groups feel that more stringent regulations, such as the aforementioned Chapter 496, could cause many boarding homes and other facilities used for residences for mentally retarded people to close. If this comes to pass, there will be many, many people with literally no place to go. Therefore, we feel the Congress and/or the New Jersey legislature should consider a program of incentives to operators to upgrade their facilities– perhaps a very low cost loan program. If this is not done, many owners of the buildings might be unwilling to meet standards, and our problem could become even more severe….” (Association for Retarded Citizens, Monmouth County, NJ. March 10, 1981 written statement.)
Sources
Association for Retarded Citizens, Monmouth County, NJ. March 10, 1981 written statement for the House Select Committee on Aging, in: U.S. Congress, House. Boarding Home Fires: New Jersey. (Hearing, March 9, 1981), p. 14.
National Fire Protection Association. Deadliest Fires in Facilities for Older Adults Since 1950. Accessed 1-22-2009 at: http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=795&itemID=20732&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fact%20sheets/Nursing%20homes/Deadliest%20fires%20in%20facilities%20for%20older%20adults
National Fire Protection Association. Investigation Report: Hotel Fire, Bradley Beach, New Jersey, 24 Fatalities, July 26, 1980. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1980.
Pennsylvania General Assembly, Legislative Budget and Finance Committee. The Feasibility of Retrofitting High Rises, College Dorms, and Certain Other Buildings With Fire Sprinklers, Volume II (A Report in Response to Senate Resolution 132). Harrisburg, PA: PA General Assembly, January 18, 2001. Accessed at: http://74.125.93.132/search?q=cache:KBzYm2dK2qIJ:lbfc.legis.state.pa.us/reports/2001/224.PDF+Fire,+Boarding+Home,+Connellsville,+PA+April+1+1979&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
United States Congress, House of Representatives. Boarding Home Fires: New Jersey (Hearing before the Select Committee on Aging, 97th Congress, 1st Session, Jan 21, 1981, Trenton, NJ).
Washington, DC: GPO, 1981.
