lornajarrettblanchard

— 18 Baugher. US Navy…Marine Corps BuNos Third Series (130265 to 135773). 10-7-2011.
— 18 Del Rio News-Herald, TX. “U.S. Navy DC-6 Crash Kills 18.” 10-6-1978, p. 2.
— 16 Aiken Standard, SC. “South Carolinian Killed in Crash of Navy Airplane.” 10-9-1978, 16
— 16 Daily Globe, Ironwood, MI. “Plane that Crashed Based in Michigan.” 10-7-1978, p. 1.
— 16 Daily Herald, Chicago, IL. “Yanks’ coffins head home.” 10-8-1978, p. 6.
— 16 Stevens Point Journal, WI. “Duluth man among 16 air crash victims.” 10-6-1978, p. 19.

Narrative Information

Baugher: “131618 (c/n 43721) loaned to USAF as C-118A 51-17659. Returned to USN. Crashed Santiago de Chile Oct 6, 1978. 18 killed.” (Baugher. US Navy…Marine Corps BuNos Third Series (130265 to 135773). 10-7-2011.)

Newspapers

Oct 6: “Santiago, Chile (AP) – A U.S. Navy DC-6 crashed into a hill south of Santiago today, killing all 18 persons aboard, Chilean national police reported. The Chilean air force confirmed the deaths, but it was not known whether all aboard were Americans.

“The plane was taking part in “Operation Unitas,” a joint naval training exercise involving the United states, Chile and Peru.

“Police said the plane burst into flames shortly after it hit the ground. The owner of a farm near the crash site said some of her workers reported hearing a loud noise just after the plane passed over at low altitude, but that they did not see the crash because of heavy fog.

“The air force said the plane took off from the airport at Concepcion, 300 miles south of Santiago, on a flight to Los Cerrillos Airport in Santiago. The Chilean Air Rescue Service sent two helicopters to the crash site and reported there were no survivors.” (Del Rio News-Herald, TX. “U.S. Navy DC-6 Crash Kills 18.” 10-6-1978, p. 2.)

Oct 7: “Santiago, Chile (AP) – A Michigan-based U.S. Navy transport plane, taking part in a training exercise here, slammed into a fog-shrouded hill 10 miles south of Santiago, killing all 16 American servicemen aboard….The [U.S.] Embassy…[said] that eight of the dead were known to be the plane’s crew, and the other eight were U.S. Navy personnel who were passengers.

“A spokesman at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Mount Clemens, Mich., where the plane was based, said it was not known whether any of the dead were from Michigan. However, the spokesman said, some of the crewmen aboard the C-118 when it left the base Monday afternoon
were believed to be reservists from Michigan….

“The Chilean air force said the plane lost contact with ground crews just before crashing and the
crash was probably caused by fog. A Chilean navy spokesman said those aboard the plane were being flown back to the United States.” (Daily Globe, Ironwood, MI. “Plane that Crashed Based in Michigan.” 10-7-1978, p. 1.)

Victims

1. Bacalis, Theodore R. Seaman Grand Rapids, MI
2. Beck, Charles W. Aviation Electronics Tech., 1st Class Hayesville, OH
3. Cook, Roy E. Aviation Machinist Mate 1st Class, Selfridge Air Force Base, MI
4. Dann, Warren K. Commander Alviso, CA
5. David, Mario M. Postal Clerk 3rd Class Panpanga, Philippines
6. Dufour, Patrick B. Boiler Tech. Fireman Recruit Pineville, LA
7. Ennis, Marvin R. Lt. Commander New Philadelphia, OH
8. Goyda, Richard G. Radioman 2nd Class Goose Creek, SC
9. Griffy, John R. Aviation Structural Mechanic 1st Class Tipton, IN
10. Hobbs, Gerald P. Opticalman 2nd Class Stockton, CA
11. Jones, Harlen B. Boiler Tech Chief Virginia Beach, VA
12. Lopez, Nickie A. Seaman Denver, CO
13. Marrazzo, Vincent A. Hospitalman Rivervale, NJ
14. McClatchey, Aviation Machinist Mate Chief Theodore R. Columbus, OH
15. Quade, Lt. Kenneth E. Duluth, MN
16. Reger, Aviation Machinist Mate 2nd Class John G. Dexter, OR

(Stevens Point Journal, WI. “Duluth man among 16 air crash victims.” 10-6-1978, p. 19.)

Sources

Aiken Standard, SC. “South Carolinian Killed in Crash of Navy Airplane.” 10-9-1978, 16. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=104071394

Baugher, Joseph F. US Navy and US Marine Corps BuNos Third Series (130265 to 135773). Oct 7, 2011 update. Accessed at: http://www.joebaugher.com/navy_serials/thirdseries15.html

Daily Globe, Ironwood, MI. “Plane that Crashed Based in Michigan.” 10-7-1978, p. 1. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=81400241

Daily Herald, Chicago, IL. “Yanks’ coffins head home.” 10-8-1978, p. 6. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=15790576

Del Rio News-Herald, TX. “U.S. Navy DC-6 Crash Kills 18.” 10-6-1978, p. 2. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=112312017

Stevens Point Journal, WI. “Duluth man among 16 air crash victims.” 10-6-1978, p. 19. Accessed 9-25-2021 at: https://www.newspapers.com/clip/18783554/16-air-crash-victims-listing-1061978/

–7 Daily Globe, Ironwood, MI. “Dam Inspected Day Before Accident that Killed 7.” 10-7-1978, 1.
–7 AP. “Dam Collapse Kills Workers.” Daily Times-News, Burlington, NC, 10-7-1978, p. 1.

Narrative Information

Oct 7, Associated Press: “Seneca, S.C. (AP) – Seven construction workers were crushed to death or drowned Friday in the collapse of a temporary dam shielding construction work on the floor of Lake Keowee, authorities said. A crew from Southern Construction and Engineering Co. of Birmingham, Ala., was working on a water pipeline when the 35-40-foot cofferdam collapsed. Five workers were trapped beneath concrete pilings, according to Pickens County Civil Defense Director Don Evett. Two other workers atop the dam when it fell at 11 a.m. were missing and presumed drowned, authorities said.

“Charles A Long, Jr., chairman of the board of the company, said the structure had been inspected Thursday afternoon. ‘We had no reason to believe we had anything but a well-conceived, well-designed structure,’ he said.

“He said the rescue operations to recover the bodies would proceed slowly. ‘We don’t want to lose anyone else,’ in the rescue operations, he said. ‘The thing happened in seconds. The is the most tragic accident we’ve had happen since we’ve been in business,’ since around 1890. Company president Joseph L. Cobb said there had been perhaps one or two other deaths on the company’s construction projects, ‘but nothing of this consequence.’

“There was an eighth man standing atop the construction. ‘He heard a snap and then it threw him, fortunately, away. He went about 160 feet in the air and landed in the water,’ Long said. Long declined to identify the man and said he was unavailable to talk to newsmen.

“He said some heavy underwater cutting equipment was being brought from Birmingham to assist divers in dismantling the crumpled and twisted steel structure under the water.

“He said there was nothing unusual about the project and that it was not the largest such project his company has built….

“There was no immediate explanation for the collapse of the dam, on the eastern shore of the lake.

“The dam was located about 15 miles north of Seneca, a town of some 8,000 in the Appalachian foothills in northwestern South Carolina.

“The accident occurred at the site where the construction firm was building a $3.3-million water intake structure. The work was part of a $58-million project to build a 27-mile pipeline for the Greenville, S.C., Water System. The pipeline, which will bring water from Lake Keowee to Greenville, was scheduled to be completed by 1985.” (Associated Press. “Dam Collapse Kills Workers.” Daily Times-News, Burlington, NC, 10-7-1978, p. 1.)

Sources

Associated Press. “Dam Collapse Kills Workers.” Daily Times-News, Burlington, NC, 10-7-1978, p. 1. Accessed 9-24-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/burlington-daily-times-news-oct-07-1978-p-1/

Daily Globe, Ironwood, MI. “Dam Inspected Day Before Accident that Killed 7.” 10-7-1978, 1. Accessed at: https://newspaperarchive.com

–144  Blanchard.[1]

–153  History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, September 25, 1978. Mid-air Collision…

–150  AP. “3^rd Plane May Have Confused PSA Pilot Before Fatal Crash,” Register, 9-28-1978, 1.[2]

–150  AP. “Controller Quizzed in Midair Disaster.” The Register, Orange County, 9-29-1978, 1.[3]

–150  AP. “Warning of crash ignored by tower.” Times-Standard, Eureka, CA, 9-30-1978, p. 3.[4]

–150  Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFM&P, 3/1, March 1982, Table 1.

–147  AP. “Toll 147 As Planes Collide.” The Register, Orange County, CA, 9-26-1978, p. 1.[5]

–135  PSA 182 (note that PSA originally indicated 136 onboard, but changed number)

—    2  Cessna

—>10  People on ground

–147  Jones and Lubow. Disasters and Heroic Rescues of California. 2006, p. 131.[6]

–136  Pacific Southwest Airlines

–136  passengers

—    7  crewmembers

—    2  Cessna (instructor and student)

—    9  People on the ground

–146  OJP DOJ.  Community Crisis Response Team Training Manual: 2^nd Ed.  (Appendix D).

–145  AP. “‘Six seconds of terror straight to the ground.’” The  Sun, Lowell, MA, 10-1-1978, A5.[7]

–144  AP. “Transcript of conversation to be made public…” Big Spring Herald, TX. 10-2-1978, 8A.[8]

–144  Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 25 Sep 1978

–144  Derner, Phil Jr. “After 37 Years, Remembering the Horrors and Sacrifices of PSA Flight 182.”

–144  NTSB. AAR. Pacific Southwest…and…Cessna 172…San Diego…Sep 25, 1978, 1979, abstract.

–137 from the two aircraft (all); 135 on Pacific Southwest Airlines 182; 2 on Cessna.

–128 passengers on PSA 182. (p. 5)

—    9  crew of PSA 182 and the Cessna. (p. 5.)

—    7  on the ground

–144  NationMaster.com, Encyclopedia, List of Notable Accidents–Aircraft;

–144  Notable California Aviation Disasters.  “The 1970s.” Oct 23, 2008 update.

–144  San Diego Union-Tribune. “After 38 years, the memories of PSA 182….” 9-25-2016.

–144  Sanders 2002, p. 177.

–136  UPI. “PSA 727 crashes in San Diego neighborhood,” Ukiah Daily Journal, 9-25-1978, 1.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB Synopsis: “About 0901:47 P.s.t. [Pacific standard time], September 25, 1978, Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., Flight 182, a Boeing 727-214, and a Gibbs Flite Center, Inc., Cessna 172 collided in midair about 3 nautical miles northeast of Lindbergh Field, San Diego, California.

 

“The Cessna was under the control of San Diego approach control and was climbing on a northeast heading. Flight 182 was making a visual approach to runway 27 at Lindbergh Field and had been advised of the location of the Cessna by the approach controller. The flightcrew told the approach controller that they had the traffic in sight and were instructed to maintain visual separation from the Cessna and to contact the Lindbergh Tower. Flight 182 contacted the tower on its downwind leg and was again advised of the Cessna’s position. The flightcrew did not have the Cessna in sight, they thought they had passed it and continued the approach. The aircraft collided near 2,600 ft m.s.l and fell to the ground in a residential area. Both occupants of the Cessna were killed; 135 persons on board the Boeing 727 were killed; 7 persons on the ground were killed; and 9 persons on the ground were injured. Twenty-two dwellings were damaged or destroyed. The weather was clear, and the visibility was 10 miles.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flightcrew of Flight 182 to comply with the provisions of a maintain-visual-separation clearance, including the requirement to inform the controller when they no longer had the other aircraft n sight.

 

“Contributing to the accident were the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures to separate two aircraft on potentially conflicting tracks when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical radar separation to either aircraft.” [p. 1.]

Factual Information

 

“1.1  History of the Flights.

 

“About 0816 P.s.t. on September 25, 1978, a Gibbs Flite Center Cessna 172, N7711G, departed Montgomery Field, California, on an instrument training flight. Since the flight was to be conducted in visual meteorological conditions, no flight plan was filed and none was required. A flight instructor occupied the right seat, and another certificated pilot, who was receiving instrument training, occupied the left seat.

 

“The Cessna proceeded to Lindbergh Field, where two practice ILS[9] approaches to runway 9 were flown….About 0857, N7711G ended a second approach and began a climbout to the northeast; at 0859:01, the Lindbergh tower local controller cleared the Cessna pilot to maintain VFR conditions and to contact San Diego approach control.

 

“At 0859:50, the Cessna pilot contacted San Diego approach control and stated that he was at 1,500 ft, and ‘northeastbound.’ The approach controller told him that he was in radar contact and instructed him to maintain VFR conditions at or below 3,500 ft and to fly a heading of 070°. The Cessna pilot acknowledged and repeated the controller’s instruction.

 

“Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., Flight 182 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight between Sacramento and San Diego, California, with an intermediate stop in Los Angeles, California. The flight departed Los Angeles at 0834 on an IFR flight plan with 128 passengers and a crew of 7 on board. The first officer was flying the aircraft. Company personnel familiar with the pilots’ voices identified the captain as the person conducting almost all ir-to-ground communications. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) established the fact that a deadheading company pilot occupied the forward observer seat in the cockpit.

 

“At 0853:19, Flight 182 reported to San Diego approach control at 11,000 ft and was cleared to descend to 7,000 ft. At 0857, Flight 182 reported that it was leaving 9,500 ft for 7,000 ft and that the airport was in sight. The approach controller cleared the flight for a visual approach to runway 27; Flight 182 acknowledged and repeated the approach clearance.” [end of p. 2.]

 

“At 0859:28, the approach controller advised Flight 182 that there was ‘traffic (at) twelve o’clock, one mile, northbound.’ Five seconds later the flight answered, ‘We’re looking.’

 

“At 0859:39, the approach controller advised Flight 182, ‘Additional traffic’s twelve o’clock, three miles, just north of the field, northeastbound, a Cessna one seventy-two climbing VFR out of one thousand four hundred.’ According to the CVRE, at 0859:50, the copilot responded, ‘Okay, we’ve got that over twelve.’….

 

“At 0900:23, the approach controller cleared Flight 182 to ‘maintain visual separation,’ and to contact Lindbergh tower. At 0900:28 Flight 182 answered, ‘Okay,’ and 3 sec later the approach controller advised the Cessna pilot that there was ‘traffic at six o’clock, two miles, eastbound; a PSA jet inbound to Lindbergh, out of three thousand two hundred, has you in sight.’ The Cessna pilot acknowledged, ‘One one golf, roger.’

 

“At 0900:34, Flight 182 reported to Lindbergh tower that they were on the downwind leg for landing. The tower acknowledged the transmission and informed Flight 182 that there was ‘traffic, twelve o’clock, one mile, a Cessna.’

 

“At 0900:41, the first officer called for 5° flaps, and the captain asked, ‘Is that the one (we’re) looking at?’ The first officer answered, ‘Yeah, but I don’t see him now.’ According to the CVR, at 0900:44, Flight 182 told the local controller, ‘Okay, we had it there a minute ago,’ and 6 sec later, ‘I thin he’s pass(ed) off to our right.’ (According to the ATC transcript the 0900:50 transmission was ‘think he’s passing off to our right’ and the local controller testified that he heard, ‘he’s passing off to our right.’)

 

“The CVR showed that Flight 182;s flightcrew continued to discuss the location of the traffic. At 0900:52, the captain said, ‘He was right over there a minute ago.’ The first officer answered, ‘Yeah.’

 

“At 0901:11, after the captain told the local controller how far they were going to extend their downwind leg, the first officer asked, ‘Are we clear of that Cessna?’ The flight engineer said, ‘Suppose to be’; the captain said, ‘I guess’; and the forward jumpseat occupant said, ‘I hope.’ [end of p. 3.]

 

“At 0901:21, the captain said ‘Oh yeah, before we turned downwind, I saw him about one o’clock, probably behind us now.’

 

“At 0901:31, the first officer called, ‘Gear down.’

 

“At 0901:38, the first officer said, ‘There’s one underneath,’ and then 1 sec later, he said, ‘I was looking at that inbound there.’

 

“At 0901:28, the conflict alert warning began in the San Diego Approach Control Facility, indicating to the controllers that the predicted flightpaths of Flight 182 and the Cessna would enter the computer’s prescribed warning parameters. At 0901:47, the approach controller advised the Cessna pilot of ‘traffic in your vicinity, a PSA jet has you in sight, he’s descending for Lindbergh.’ The transmission was not acknowledged. The approach controller did not inform Lindbergh tower of the conflict alert involving Flight 182 and the Cessna, because he believed Flight 182’s flightcrew had the Cessna in sight. The aircraft collided at 0901:47.

 

“According to the witnesses, both aircraft were proceeding in an easterly direction before the collision. Flight 182 was descending and overtaking the Cessna, which was climbing in a wing level attitude. Just before impact, Flight 182 banked to the right slightly, and the Cessna pitched noseup and collided with the right wing of Flight 182. The Cessna broke up immediately and exploded. Segments of fragmented wreckage fell from the right wind and empennage of Flight 182.

 

“Flight 182 began a shallow right descending turn, leaving a trail of vaporlike substance from the right wing. A bright orange fire erupted in the vicinity of the right wing and increased in intensity as the aircraft descended. The aircraft remained in a right turn, and both the bank and pitch angles increased during the descent to about 50° at impact….

 

“The aircraft crashed during daylight hours, into a residential area about 3 miles northeast of Lindbergh Field…. [end of p. 4.]

 

“….An automated conflict detection system called “conflict alert” had been incorporated into the San Diego ARTS III to alert controllers of closures between two or more aircraft. The conflict alert system had the No. 4 priority in the computer’s executive programmer. The system monitors separation between tracked Mode C aircraft and provides an alarm when a conflict situation is detected. The conflict alert system projects a horizontal and vertical volume of airspace around a target to a future position point. Whenever the airspace envelope associated with an aircraft is predicted to overlay the airspace envelope of another aircraft, a conflict situation is likely and the controller is furnished a visual alarm–the characters “CA” blink on the top line of the data tags–and a 5-set aural alarm sounds….

 

“The conflict alert which sounded at the San Diego Approach control was a Type III airport area alert….

 

“The approach controller stated that when he heard and saw the conflict alert he discussed the situation with the coordinator. At that time Flight 182 was no longer on his frequency, the targets were beginning to merge, the aircrafts’ data blocks were overlapping, and he was not able to discern their altitude readouts. Although the data blocks could have been offset by a keyboard entry into the ARTS computer, the controller did not try to reposition them. He said that he had pointed out the traffic to Flight 182; the flightcrew had stated that they had the traffic in sight and that they would maintain visual separation from the Cessna. As far as he was concerned, there was no ‘conflict, and therefore, no further action was required. He said that the coordinator concurred with his decision, and the coordinator corroborated his testimony. At 0901:47, the approximate time of the collision, the controller did advise the Cessna again that Flight 182 was in his vicinity and had him “in sight.”

 

“The San Diego Approach Control’s conflict alert system was commissioned August 7, 1978. Since that time the facility has experienced an average of 13 conflict alerts per day. Some of these were nuisance alerts; however, it is not known what percentage of these alerts were nuisance alerts.

 

“The approach controller and coordinator stated that they were not startled by the alert, because they were accustomed to experiencing them during their duty shifts and because of the many conflict alerts where there either was “no actual conflict” or no aircraft close enough to require further action. The approach coordinator said that anytime there are two aircraft in proximity under circumstances similar to those of Flight 182 and the Cessna, one can expect the conflict alert to activate. He also said that whenever he was directly involved with a conflict alert on traffic he was controlling, he was not required to take further action or to inform the pilots of the aircraft of the conflict.” (NTSB 1979, pp. 18-20)

 

“….While the evidence showed that the air traffic control services provided Flight 182 and the Cessna were appropriate for the ATC environment, it also disclosed that controller personnel did not comply with the provisions of one facility directive and that two traffic advisories did not comply precisely with the prescribed procedures of FAA Handbook 7110.65A.

 

“Contrary to Miramar Order NRY 206G, the approach controller at San Diego approach control did not direct Flight 182 to maintain 4,000 ft until clear-of the Montgomery Field airport traffic area. The controller said that Flight 182 was outside the area when he cleared it for the visual approach and that he monitored its course on his radar.  Since the flight did not enter the Montgomery Field airport traffic area, he said there was no need either to place the restriction on the flight or coordinate its passage with Montgomery Field. His determination was based on the fact that Flight 182’s course placed it south of the MZB VORTAC’s 090″ radial which, to him, constituted the end of the Montgomery Field airport traffic area and the beginning of the Lindbergh Field air traffic area. However, Flight 182’s ground track showed that it passed about .8 mile inside Montgomery Field’s airport traffic area.

 

“The purpose of the altitude restriction in the order was to avoid a potential conflict with Montgomery Field operations. In this instance neither aircraft was a Montgomery Field operation. One could infer that, had the restriction been applied to Flight 182, the two aircraft would have remained separated and that, even though the Cessna was not a traffic operation protected by the order, the failure to apply it was a causal factor.  This inference might be valid if the controllers had taken no other action to insure that they were separated; however, they did take other action. The evidence is conclusive that the controllers pointed out the traffic to Flight 182 and then applied approved traffic separation procedures to separate the aircraft….

 

“In retrospect, there is little doubt that the controllers were misled (1) by their belief that Flight 182’s flightcrew were visually separating their aircraft from the Cessna and (2) by their previous

experiences with similar conflict alerts wherein no action on their part was necessary. Based on the procedures, their requirements were satisfied.  They, therefore, did not try to reposition and unscramble the data blocks and reacquire the altitude readouts to further monitor the situation because they believed that visual separation was being applied.

 

“However, the failure of the air traffic control procedures to require that the controllers notify the pilots that their aircraft were involved in a conflict alert resulted in a less-than-optimum use of the system, particularly in a situation where visual separation procedures were being used in a terminal area. Had this requirement existed, it was possible that warnings and perhaps suggested evasive maneuvers could have been delivered to the pilots of one or even both aircraft. While the Safety Board cannot conclude that the delivery of a warning or suggested Instruction to the pilots would have altered the course of events, the failure of the procedures to require this to be done may have deprived the pilots of one more chance to avoid the collision.” (NTSB 1979, 30-31)

 

“Based on available evidence, the Safety Board cannot conclude whether the flightcrew of Flight 182 knew what they were required to do when they accepted the “maintain-visual-separation” clearance from the controller. In addition to maintaining proper separation from the designated aircraft, their acceptance of the clearance required them to tell the controller when they no longer had it in sight. The failure to notify controller personnel specifically that they had lost sight of the traffic could indicate that they were not aware of what was embodied in the instruction and that they may have considered it as merely another traffic advisory.

 

“The company’s chief pilot testified that the procedures embodied in the visual separation clearance are set forth in the regulations, which his pilots carry with them on all flights. He further testified that they are well aware of the requirements embodied within the instruction. However, the visual separation procedures are contained in the AIM and not in the Federal regulations carried by the pilots.

 

“He stated that AIM information is excerpted for presentation to their flightcrews in ground school, but he could not identify precisely what areas of Information were used. The evidence indicates that there may be a communications gap between pilots and controllers as to the proper

use of the ATC system. The ATC controllers are responsible for, and are required to apply, the procedures contained in Handbook 7110.65A in their control of traffic. Despite the fact that the successful use of these procedures requires a mutual understanding on the parts of pilots and controllers of the other’s responsibilities, pilots are not required to read Handbook 7110.65A. One Federal publication containing a description of the interrelationship of pilot and controller roles and responsibilities is the AIM, and this is not–by regulation–required reading for pilots. Considering the responsibilities placed on both the pilot and the controller for the safe operation in the National Air Space system, industry and the Federal Aviation Administration must take steps to insure that the pilots are made cognizant of what this relationship requires of them. Either the AIM should be compulsory reading for all pilots–at least those sections relating to ATC rules, procedures, and pilot and controller roles and responsibility–or pilots should be tested annually or semiannually on their knowledge of these procedures.

 

“In conclusion, the evidence indicates that even though flightcrews are still In a “see and avoid” environment, they exercise a lower degree of vigilance in areas where they receive radar assistance than in non-radar areas. Instead of attempting to seek, acquire, and then maintain visual contact with traffic, they seem to rely on the radar and radar controller to point out the aircraft, particularly an aircraft that may be in conflict with theirs. Pilots also seem to have a less-than-complete knowledge of the specific type of traffic separation services being provided. The types of traffic separation procedures available in a TRSA vary from that provided in a Stage II and Stage I area. At San Diego, depending either on the aircraft’s position or altitude, or both, the pilots could receive either Stage II or Stage III services and could pass rapidly from one area to another. Pilots must recognize the level of radar services they are receiving. In areas where traffic separation services are not being furnished they must be aware of this, and that they will be required to make a more diligent effort, not only to find conflicting traffic, but to keep previously acquired traffic in sight until they are absolutely certain it is no longer a factor to their flight. These efforts may even require that they maneuver their aircraft In a manner that will enhance their ability to sight and to maintain sight of conflicting traffic.

 

“Controllers seem to similarly relax vigilance. The evidence permits an inference that the vigilance of the approach controller and his standards for assessing the resolution of possible conflicts may have lowered because he believed that the flightcrew which had reported traffic “in sight” had a better view of the traffic and a better grasp on the situation than he did. This accident illustrated that this is not a hard and fast rule on which the controller can rely. Even though the pilot had assumed the burden of maintaining separation, the controller should have not assumed that the pilot’s ability to do so will remain unimpaired. He should be prepared to update the pilot’s information, and, time permitting, stand ready to alert the pilot to changes in the situation. The principle of redundancy has been recognized as one of the foundations of flight safety, and redundancy between the pilot and controller can only be achieved then both parties exercise their individual responsibilities fully regardless of who had assumed or been assigned the procedural or regulatory burden.”  (NTSB 1979, 33-35)

 

[Blanchard: Following the “Probable Cause” paragraphs on page 36 (which are the same as noted in the abstract, there is a handwritten note: “Reconsidered & amended, 8.11/82,” and the “Probable Cause” statement has been crossed out. Following the “Safety Recommendations” on page 36 is an “Errata” which reads:]

 

“Aircraft Accident Report — Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., B-727, and a Gibbs Flite Center, Inc., Cessna 172, N7711G, San Diego, California, September 25, 1978.

 

“During its evaluation of the ALPA[10] Petition for Reconsideration of Probable Cause of the subject accident, The National Transportation Safety Board also reviewed the entire accident report and its supporting evidence. As a result of this reexamination, the Board concluded that the cause contained in the accident report did not reflect all the causal areas involved in the accident and has amended the probable cause. Therefore, amend the probable cause in (1) paragraphs 3 and 4 on the Technical Report Documentation Page (NTSB Form 1765.2), and (2) on page 1, paragraphs 3 and 4, and (3) page 36 of the accident report to read as follows:

 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew of Flight 182 t comply with the provisions of a maintain-visual-separation clearance, including the requirement to inform the controller when visual contact was lost; and the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures in a terminal area environment when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical separation to either aircraft. Contributing to the accident were (1) the failure of the controller to advise Flight 182 of the direction of movement of the Cessna; (2) the failure of the pilot of the Cessna to maintain his assigned heading; and (3) the improper resolution by the controller of the conflict alert. [end of p. 37.]

 

 

“….McAdams, Member, dissenting

 

“I disagree sharply with the majority, for the reason that the inadequacies of the air traffic control system were not cited as being a probable cause of the accident.

 

“Although the majority does cite the inadequacies of the air traffic control system as being contributory, this is neither acceptable nor sufficient. The difference between a probable cause and a contributing factor is not semantics–there is a clear-cut distinction. A probable cause is an

act, or an omission of an act, that is in the direct line of causation and without which the accident would not have occurred, whereas a contributory factor is an event which possibly could have (but not necessarily) intervened and caused the accident. A contributing factor is not a primary cause; it is more remote and does not carry the same weight or implications as that of a probable cause.

 

“In my opinion, these inadequacies should have been given equal weight in the probable cause with the failure of the PSA crew to maintain visual separation rather than being merely mentioned as a contributory factor. The San Diego approach control had the capability of providing either vertical or lateral separation between IFR aircraft and participating VFR aircraft, and this procedure should have been used for the control of both aircraft. If it had, the accident would not have occurred. Apparently the majority agrees but is either reluctant or diffident to include this issue in the probable cause, since it is stated (p. 33) that if either vertical or lateral separation had been used, “….Flight 182 and the Cessna would not have collided.”  Such language clearly implies that this omission was a direct cause of the accident and therefore should have been included as a probable cause.

 

“The controller, instead of using available procedures, gave PSA 182 a visual separation clearance which placed the pilot in an exclusively see-and-avoid situation where the last redundancy of the system was removed. The redundancy should not have been eliminated in a dense terminal traffic area such as San Diego. In my opinion, the concept of see and avoid is outmoded and should not be used in high volume terminal areas. Positive radar separation should be used with the backup, or redundancy, being the pilot’s visual ability to see and avoid. In this case, both aircraft should have remained under positive radar separation since it was available and could have provided safe separation. The failure to do so, therefore, must be considered as causal.

 

“Furthermore, despite strong urging on my part, the majority has not named several other factors which I consider as being contributory. It is true that the majority has included three issues which I had suggested as contributing factors, but they have been included in the report only as conclusions. For example, the majority concludes that the approach controller failed to restrict Flight 182 to a 4,000-foot altitude; obviously, that logically means the controller had a duty to issue an altitude restriction, and if such altitude restriction had been issued, it is possible the accident would not have occurred. Ergo, it is a contributing factor as well as a conclusion. A similar argument can be made with respect to the other two conclusions of the majority, i.e., heading, the Cessna failed to maintain the assigned and two separate facilities were controlling traffic in the same airspace….

 

“Contrary to the majority, I would cite the improper resolution by the controller of the conflict alert as contributory. The Air Traffic Control handbook, 7110.65A, requires a controller to resolve all conflict alerts. The controller failed to do this. The conflict alert was received approximately 19 seconds before the collision. Although this might be considered a rather short time, it was still sufficient to have permitted the controller to relay this information to either the Cessna or to the Lindbergh Tower or to have attempted to relay it.  Irrespective of the time element, the controllers had no knowledge that there were only 19 seconds to collision, but the duty still existed.  According to the majority, the reason the controllers did not take the required action was they considered that the conflict had been resolved based upon PSA 182’s response to

the traffic advisory, “Traffic in sight.” This response had been made 66 seconds prior to the conflict alert and, in my opinion, the controller should not have assumed in such an area as San Diego that the situation was static and that the conflict was resolved.

 

“I am at a loss to understand the reasons the majority did not include this failure as a contributing factor since it is stated in the report (p. 31), “ ..the failure of the procedures [conflict alert] to require this to be done may have deprived the pilots of one more chance to avoid the collision.” The existing procedures did require action to resolve the conflict. The issuance of a previous visual separation clearance by no means resolves a later conflict.

 

“The majority has now concluded that the Cessna failed to maintain the assigned heading contained in the ATC instruction, but it is not cited as a contributing factor for some unknown reason. In my opinion, the failure of the Cessna to maintain the assigned and mandatory heading was a critical factor in this accident.  If the required heading had been maintained, the aircraft would have been separated 1,000 feet vertically; therefore, it is a factor to be considered as contributory. The Cessna was told to “maintain a heading of 070 and vector final approach,” which was a mandatory instruction to maintain a heading until the controller was able to vector the aircraft to a downwind leg and the final approach course. This procedure was obviously for separation reasons, since the Cessna was crossing and ascending toward the flightpath of the descending PSA 182.  However, the Cessna turned to a downwind leg of 090 prematurely and beneath PSA 182. If this had not been done, the accident may not have occurred.

 

“In my opinion there still exists the possibility that there was a third unknown and unreported aircraft in the area which could have been mistaken by the crew of PSA 182 for the Cessna. Analysis of the CVR could be interpreted to mean that PSA never acquired the Cessna but was observing some other aircraft that was unknown or unseen by ATC. Even the majority concedes this point since they state (p. 26), the question arises as to whether the flightcrew was referring to it [The Cessna] when they called ‘traffic in sight.”‘ At 0859:39, a traffic advisory indicated the Cessna at 3 miles, and at 0859:50 PSA replied, “We’ve got that other twelve.” Whether he was referring to a previous traffic advisory or to the Cessna is not clear. At 0900:15 — 37 seconds after the first traffic advisory — another advisory was given but without aircraft identification or direction of movement, but still reporting the target at 3 miles. This mileage was corrected at the hearing, but insofar as PSA was concerned these two traffic advisories could have been related to two different aircraft since the second advisory did not either identify the target or the direction of movement, and the distance remained the same 3 miles.  Obviously, the mileage would have changed by approximately 2 miles between the two aircraft, and at the time of the second advisory the separation was approximately 1 mile. This could have led PSA to assume there were two different aircraft.  Further, if PSA 182 had the Cessna in sight at 0900:21 on a north-northeast course, he would have expected the target to pass off to the left of his aircraft and not to the right as he stated at 0900:50.

 

“Additionally, the captain reported he had seen the target at 1 o’clock before turning downwind, whereas it has been well established by the ground track of both aircraft that at this time the Cessna would have been at the 11 o’clock position. This is a difference of approximately 60 degrees, a substantial change, and could indicate the captain was looking at a target other than the Cessna, either unreported or unknown to ATC.

 

“At 0901:38 and 0901:39, the first officer pointed out a target, “There’s one underneath,” and “I was looking at that inbound there.” The only known and reported inbound traffic was a PSA flight that at this time had completed its landing roll and was in the 6 o’clock position to PSA 182. The first officer could not have been looking at this aircraft but must have been looking at unreported and unknown inbound traffic. Significantly, 16 ground witnesses reported additional traffic in the area that could be interpreted as being potential traffic to PSA 182. However, the important fact is there appears to have been at least one inbound aircraft that was unknown or unreported by ATC.

 

“Despite the conclusion of the majority that the evidence indicates there was not a third aircraft in the area, my reading of the evidence is contrary. The evidence is inconclusive on this point, and the existence of a third unknown or unreported aircraft was a distinct possibility.  If there was a third aircraft and the crew of PSA 182 was watching it, this could explain the reason why the crew of PSA 182 either did not see the Cessna or subsequently lost contact with it.

 

“Based upon the foregoing, I would state the probable cause as follows:

 

“…was the failure of the flightcrew of Flight 182 to maintain visual separation and to advise the controller when visual contact was lost; and the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures in a terminal area environment when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical radar separation to either aircraft. Contributing to the accident were:

 

1. The failure of the air traffic control system to establish procedures for the most effective use of the conflict alert system at the San Diego approach control facility.

 

2. The failure of the controller to restrict PSA 182 to a 4,000-foot altitude until clear of the Montgomery Field airport traffic area.

 

3. The improper resolution by the controller of the conflict alert.

 

4. The procedure whereby two separate air traffic control facilities were controlling traffic in the same airspace.

 

5. The failure of the controller to advise PSA 182 of the direction of movement of the Cessna.

 

6. The failure of the Cessna to maintain the assigned heading.

 

7. The possible misidentification of the Cessna by PSA 182 due to the presence of a third unknown aircraft in the area.” (NTSB 1979, 39-44)

 

(NTSB. Aircraft Accident Report. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., B-727, N533PS and Gibbs Flite Center, Inc., Cessna 172, N7711G, San Diego, California, September 25, 1978 (NTSB-AAR-79-5). Washington, DC: NTSB, 4-20-1979.)

 

Derner: “….September 25th of 1978 was a very hot but pretty day that would end with what was, at the time, the deadliest air crash in the United States. Aside from its significance in airline history, this crash which resulted from a mid-air collision with a Cessna, is also very well known because of two images caught by photographer Hans Wendt of the aircraft plummeting to Earth with its right wing on fire….

 

“PSA Flight 182 was a flight from LAX to San Diego that originated in Sacramento. These short flights connecting Californian cities made it a popular commuter flight for those that worked for PSA. As a result, over 30 of their own employees were riding as passengers that day….

 

“While PSA Flight 182 was descending below 4,000ft, air traffic controllers informed the pilots of a small Cessna flying in the area. The pilots of both aircraft were required to “see and avoid” each other in this environment. Confusing the Cessna with a different aircraft nearby, the PSA pilots did not have this particular Cessna in sight, and they ended up descending right on top of the small propeller aircraft at 2,600 ft above the intersection of 38th Street and El Cajon Blvd.

 

“The top of the Cessna hit the bottom of the right wing on the 727, which is where the jet’s fuel tanks are housed. The Cessna exploded and dropped from the sky, landing close by at 32nd Street and Polk Avenue, killing both of the 2 people on board (and thankfully, no one on the ground).

 

“Flight 182’s damage was severe along the right wing, with Wendt’s photos clearly showing damage to the right wing’s leading edge. Damage and fire also crippled the hydraulic systems, preventing control of the aircraft. Useless attempts to correct the right-banking aircraft can be seen in high-resolution versions of the same photos, showing full-deflection of the left aileron….

 

“After the mid-air collision, the aircraft hit the ground 13 seconds later at a nose-down angle of 50 degrees at 300 mph. Of the 135 people that were on the aircraft, only 4 bodies were found intact. Crashing into a neighborhood, the 727 destroyed or damaged a total of 22 structures, with 7 people on the ground also perishing (including a couple in an Audi that happened to be driving down that street). Though it was the deadliest U.S. plane crash at the time (144 between the 2 aircraft and on the ground), it only held that title for a mere 8 months until American Airlines Flight 191 crashed in Chicago the following May….” (Derner, Phil Jr. “After 37 Years, Remembering the Horrors and Sacrifices of PSA Flight 182.” NYC Aviation, 9-22-2015.)

 

History.com: “A Pacific Southwest Airlines jet collides in mid-air with a small Cessna over San Diego, killing 153 people on this day in 1978. The wreckage of the planes fell into a populous neighborhood and did extensive damage on the ground.

 

“David Lee Boswell and his instructor, Martin Kazy, were in the process of a flying lesson in a single-engine Cessna 1732 on the morning of September 25, practicing approaches at San Diego’s Lindbergh Field airport. After two successful passes, Boswell aimed the Cessna toward the Montgomery Field airport northeast of San Diego.

 

“At the same time, Pacific Southwest Flight 182 was approaching San Diego. The jet, a Boeing 727, was carrying 144 passengers and crew members from Sacramento, after a stopover in Los Angeles. Though air-traffic controllers at Lindbergh had told Boswell to keep the Cessna below 3,500 feet altitude as it flew northeast, the Cessna did not comply and changed course without informing the controllers.

 

“The pilots of Flight 182 could see the Cessna clearly at 9 a.m., but soon lost sight of it and failed to inform the controllers. Meanwhile, the conflict-alert warning system began to flash at the air-traffic control center. However, because the alert system went off so frequently with false alarms, it was ignored. The controllers believed that the pilots of the 727 had the Cessna in view. Within a minute, the planes collided.

 

“The fuel in the 727 burst into a massive fireball upon impact. A witness on the ground reported that she saw her ‘apples and oranges bake on the trees.’ The planes nose-dived straight into San Diego’s North Park neighborhood, destroying 22 homes and killing seven people on the ground. All 144 people on the 727 were killed, as well as both of the Cessna’s pilots.”  (History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, September 25, 1978. Mid-air Collision Kills 153.”)

 

Notable California Aviation Disasters:

“Number 1 in California’s “10 Worst Crashes”

“Date / Time: Monday, September 25, 1978 / 9:02 a.m.

“Operator / Flight No.: Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) / Flight 182

“Location: San Diego, Calif.

 

“Details and Probable Cause:   Midair collision.   The Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) Boeing B727-214 (N533PS), carrying 128 passengers and a crew of seven on an early morning flight from Sacramento and Los Angeles, was descending for a landing at San Diego’s Lindbergh Field.

 

“Also in the skies over San Diego that morning was a Cessna 172 Skyhawk II (N7711G) from Gibbs Flite Center, Inc., occupied by a certified pilot and a flight instructor, which had taken off from nearby Montgomery Field on a training flight.

 

“The Cessna had made several practice approaches at Lindbergh and was on an eastbound course to circle around and approach the same runway from the opposite direction when it was overtaken from behind by the much faster PSA jet while both planes were flying at approximately the same heading over the city’s residential North Park district.

 

“The Cessna impacted the forward, underside of the jetliner’s right wing, broke up, and spiraled to the ground in pieces.

 

“At the same moment, Hans Wendt, a local photographer covering an outdoor press event in North Park, swung his camera skyward and managed to capture two dramatic, post-collision photographs of the flaming PSA 727 jetliner as it plunged to earth several blocks away, obliterating residences and automobiles in the quiet neighborhood.

 

“Killed were both occupants of the single-engine Cessna, all 135 passengers and crew on board the PSA 727, and seven persons on the ground at the jetliner’s impact site.   Nine other people on the ground were injured and 22 homes were destroyed or damaged.

 

“Despite being warned of traffic in the area, the flight crew of the PSA jet apparently lost sight of the Cessna and did not convey that fact to Lindbergh air traffic control (ATC), while ATC did not realize from radio transmissions that the PSA crew had lost track of the Cessna.

 

“The worst air disaster in San Diego County history as well as the worst air disaster in California to date.  Fatalities: 144 — all 135 aboard the PSA jet; the 2 occupants of the Cessna; and 7 persons on the ground in North Park.”  (Notable California Aviation Disasters.  “The 1970s.” Oct 23, 2008 update.)

 

Newspapers

 

Sep 25: “San Diego (UPI) — A Pacific Southwest Airlines Boeing 727 with 133 persons aboard collided in flight with a small Cessna today an plunged into a residential neighborhood in possibly the worst air accident in U.S. history. All aboard the jet, a student pilot and his instructor aboard the Cessna and at least one person on the ground wee reported killed. Several others on the ground were rushed to hospitals.

 

“The death toll was apparently the worst for an airplane collision in U.S. history. In December 1960 two commercial planes collided over New York City, killing 128 aboard the planes and six others on the ground. The worst air disaster in history occurred March 27, 1977, at Tenerife in the Canary Islands, when two jumbo jets collided, killing 582 persons.

 

“The PSA plane, Flight 182 from Sacramento and Los Angeles, was on its landing approach when it collided with a Cessna 150 at an altitude of 3,000 feet, the Federal Aviation Administration said. ‘I saw the jet plane…It was smoking on the right side,’ said Phil Hopkins, a witness. ‘The right inboard engine was burning and it exploded into a fireball…and spiraled to the ground.’

 

“The 727 smashed into a row of houses along Dwight Street in the North Park district, about five miles from the city airport, Lindbergh Field. As it careened along the street wreckage was spewed across a wide area, injuring several persons. At least six homes were set afire. ‘There were bodies lying everywhere,’ said Barry Fitzsimmons, a photographer for the San Diego Evening Tribune who was one of the first to arrive at the scene. ‘A block of homes was on fire. It was horrible. The only thing you could see of the plane was a PSA engine. All the other wreckage appeared to level the whole block.’ Residents of the neighborhood were said to be mostly elderly persons….” (UPI. “PSA 727 crashes in San Diego neighborhood,” Ukiah Daily Journal, 9-25-1978, p. 1.)

 

Sources

 

AP (Associated Press). “3^rd Plane May Have Confused PSA Pilot Before Fatal Crash,” The Register, Orange County, CA, 9-28-1978, p. 1. Accessed 7-19-2018 at:

https://newspaperarchive.com/santa-ana-orange-county-register-sep-27-1978-p-1/

 

AP (Associated Press). “Additional Dead.” The Register, Orange County, CA, 9-27-1978, p. 2. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/santa-ana-orange-county-register-sep-27-1978-p-2/

 

AP (Associated Press). “Controller Quizzed in Midair Disaster.” The Register, Orange County, CA, 9-29-1978, p. 1. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/santa-ana-orange-county-register-sep-29-1978-p-1/

 

AP (Associated Press). “List of Crash Dead Released.” The Register, Orange County, CA, 9-26-1978, p. 1. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/santa-ana-orange-county-register-sep-26-1978-p-5/

 

AP (Associated Press/Peter J. Boyer). “‘Six seconds of terror straight to the ground.’” The Sunday Sun, Lowell, MA, 10-1-1978, A5. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lowell-sun-oct-01-1978-p-5/

 

AP (Associated Press). “Toll 147 As Planes Collide.” The Register, Orange County, CA, 9-26-1978, p. 1. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/santa-ana-orange-county-register-sep-26-1978-p-1/

 

AP (Associated Press). “Transcript of conversation to be made public today.” Big Spring Herald, TX. 10-2-1978, 8A. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/big-spring-herald-oct-02-1978-p-8/

 

AP (Associated Press). “Warning of crash ignored by tower.” Times-Standard, Eureka, CA, 9-30-1978, p. 3. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/eureka-times-standard-sep-30-1978-p-3/

 

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 25 Sep 1978.  Accessed at:  http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19780925-0

 

Derner, Phil Jr. “After 37 Years, Remembering the Horrors and Sacrifices of PSA Flight 182.” NYC Aviation, 9-22-2015. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: http://www.nycaviation.com/2015/09/psa-flight-182/39479

 

Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.

 

History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, September 25, 1978. “Mid-air Collision Kills 153.”  Accessed 12-8-2008 at: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=tdihArticleCategory&displayDate=09/25&categoryId=disaster

 

Jones, Ray and Joe Lubow. Disasters and Heroic Rescues of California: True Stories of Tragedy and Survival. Guilford CT: Insiders Guide, an imprint of Globe Pequot Press, 2006.

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., B-727, N533PS and Gibbs Flite Center, Inc., Cessna 172, N7711G, San Diego, California, September 25, 1978 (NTSB-AAR-79-5). Washington, DC: NTSB, 4-20-1979. Accessed 7-18-2018 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR7905.pdf

 

NationMaster.com. Encyclopedia. “List of Notable Accidents and Incidents on Commercial Aircraft.” Accessed 12-15-2008 at: http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/List-of-notable-accidents-and-incidents-on-commercial-aircraft

 

Notable California Aviation Disasters. “The 1970s.” Oct 23, 2008 update. Accessed 10/18/2009 at: http://www.jaydeebee1.com/crash70s.html

 

Office of Justice Programs, United States Department of Justice. Community Crisis Response Team Training Manual: Second Edition (Appendix D: Catastrophes Used as Reference Points in Training Curricula). Washington, DC: OJP, U.S. Department of Justice. Accessed at:  http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/crt/pdftxt/appendd.txt

 

San Diego Union-Tribune. “After 38 years, the memories of PSA 182 crash are just as sharp and painful.” 9-25-2016. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/local-history/sd-me-crash-memorial-20160925-story.html

 

Sanders, D.E.A. (Chair), et al. The Management of Losses Arising from Extreme Events. GIRO, 2002, 261 pgs. At: http://www.actuaries.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/18729/Sanders.pdf

 

UPI (United Press International). “PSA 727 crashes in San Diego neighborhood,” Ukiah Daily Journal, CA, 9-25-1978, p. 1. Accessed 7-19-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/ukiah-daily-journal-sep-25-1978-p-1/

 

 

[1] The Associated Press article of Oct 2, noted below, notes the reason for the drop of estimated fatalities from 150 to 144, the number found in the National Transportation Safety Board report on the collision (see footnote 8).

[2] “Phillip Hogue, who is overseeing the National Transportation Safety Board investigation of the Monday crash that took at least 150 lives, said both the jetliner and an unidentified twin-engine Cessna had been cleared for landing on the same runway at Lindbergh Field her.”

[3] “…a jetliner and a small plane collided, killing at least 150 persons.”

[4] “All 135 persons aboard the PSA plane were killed, as were the two occupants of the Cessna. At least 13 more persons died on the ground.”

[5] “Officials said at least 147 persons were killed in the worst air disaster in U.S. history….The FAA said none of the 135 persons aboard PSA flight 182…survived the collision. PSA had originally reported that 136 persons were aboard the jet. Both persons in the rented Cessna 172 were killed. At least 10 persons on the ground were killed by falling bodies and debris or the resulting fires….” On page 5 the paper names 128 PSA victims. Eleven additional names printed in next day’s paper, on page 2.

[6] Our total based on: “All 136 passengers and seven crew onboard the flight [182] died. Both the instructor and the student in the Cessna died. Nine people on the ground died.”

[7] Eight on the ground, 135 on PSA 182 and two on the Cessna.

[8] “San Diego (AP)….At least 144 persons died, including seven on the ground, said Deputy County Coroner Max Murphy. He said during the weekend that the death figure was revised downward from 150 to 144. He said six persons believed killed on the ground were not in their homes at the time of the crash.”

[9] Instrument Landing System.

[10] Air Lines Pilot Association.

— 8 Baugher, Joseph F. 1964 USAF Serial Numbers. 1-16-2012 revision.
— 8 Benton Courier, AR. “C-130 crash cause is investigated.” 9-11-1978, p. 5.
— 8 Benton Courier, AR. “Low flying said to be cause of fatal crash.” 12-22-1978, p. 9.
— 8 Northwest Arkansas Times, Fayetteville. “Crash Claims Eight Airmen.: 9-10-1978, p. 1.
— 8 The News, Frederick, MD (AP). “Eight die in crash.” 9-9-1978, p. A2.

Narrative Information

Baugher: “Lockheed C-130E-LM Hercules….0532 (c/n 382-4021) crashed into mountain in Arkansas while practicing instrument approaches to Little Rock AFB Sep 8, 1978. All 8 onboard killed (ASN).” (Baugher, Joseph F. 1964 USAF Serial Numbers. 1-16-2012 revision.)

Newspaper

Associated Press, Sep 9: “Conway Ark (AP) — An Air Force C-130 transport plane with eight persons aboard crashed and burst into flames Friday during a training flight and witnesses said there appeared to be no survivors. ‘I can confirm that there have been deaths’ said Maj Chance Sharpe. However, neither the Air Force nor local authorities would say how many persons were killed in the crash as they resumed a search for survivors this morning.

“At least five of the crewmen were believed dead, according to witnesses at the scene of the crash Friday night, about eight miles north of Little Rock Air Force Base. Reporters at the scene witnessed five bodies being removed before the Air Force sealed the crash site, which was littered by burning debris from the huge transport.

“The crash occurred about one mile from the home of Jack and Ann Croft as they returned from a high school football game. Croft said he saw two C-130s flying in formation when he heard a small explosion followed by a much louder explosion and then ‘a giant ball of fire.’ Croft and his wife drove across the hilly terrain to the crash site on a motorcycle. Croft said he got as close as he could to the burning wreckage, calling for survivors. He said he didn’t see any.

“Air Force officials said the plane was on a training mission near the base when it crashed. It was practicing instrument landings when it went down, but was neither landing nor taking off, officials said.

“The plane and crew belonged to the base’s 314th Tactical Air Wing, the world’s largest C-130 wing and the only C-130 training wing in the Department of Defense. The cause of the crash was not immediately known.” (The News, Frederick, MD. “Eight die in crash.” 9-9-1978, A2.)

Sep 10: “The Air Force said Saturday night [Sep 9] that all eight crewmen aboard this C-130 [reference to photo] transport were killed when it crashed Friday night in Central Arkansas. Earlier spokesmen had said only that there were some casualties. The plane from Little Rock Air Force Base was practicing instrument landings when it crashed. (AP Laserphoto).” (Northwest Arkansas Times, Fayetteville. “Crash Claims Eight Airmen.” 9-10-1978, p. 1.)

Dec 22: “Little Rock (AP) – The final U.S. Air Force report on the Sept. 8 crash of a C-130 transport plane that killed eight persons indicates the plane was flying too low when it crashed into a ridge in Faulkner County. The report, obtained by The Associated Press, is massive – three inches thick and weighing seven pounds. It is a compilation of testimony, photographs, drawings and various documents….

“The plane that crashed was piloted by Capt. Ronald J. Fagan and was one of four C-130s from Little Rock Air Force Base on maneuvers in the area.

“Lt. Mark Baty, pilot of one of the other planes, testified that he believed the plane piloted by Fagan was at least 1,000 feet below his aircraft and that his plane was flying at about 2,000 feet above sea level. Fagan’s plane struck a 25-foot-tall tree in an area 654 feet above sea level. Most of the terrain in the area is abut 300 feet above sea level.

“The C-130 is equipped with a proximity warning feature that sets off a horn and light in the cockpit when another plane on the same frequency gets too close. At the time of the crash, Baty said the system was set for 1,000 feet and that it was not activated by Fagan’s plane….

“Capt. Courtney W. Locke, an instructor pilot in the plane piloted by Baty, said….one of the other crew members pointed out that there was a plane underneath their plane. ‘When I looked back down at him I saw his leading-edge lights shining on the trees,’ Locke testified. ‘I knew he was extremely close to the ground at that time and I was just reaching for my wafer switch on the instructor’s panel to change to interplane radio to say something to him when he hit the ground.’….” (Benton Courier, AR. “Low flying said to be cause of fatal crash.” 12-22-1978, p. 9.)

Victims

1. Ewert, Danny, 27, Captain. Pemberton, MN
2. Faber, Dennis, 31, Captain and navigator. Fort Worth, TX
3. Fagan, Ronald, Captain. Annandale, VA
4. Hayashi, Edwin. Captain and Commander. Aiea, HI
5. Ramsey, William, 27. Sgt., load master Cincinnati, OH
6. Shadbegian, Mark. 2nd Lt. Springfield, MA
7. Smith, Thomas, 29. Captain; instructor-navigator. Fort Worth, TX
8. Vogel, Randall. Staff Sgt.; flight engineer Red Bank, NJ

(Benton Courier, AR. “C-130 crash cause is investigated.” 9-11-1978, p. 5.)
Sources

Baugher, Joseph F. 1964 USAF Serial Numbers. 1-16-2012 revision. Accessed 2-26-2012 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1964.html

Benton Courier, AR. “C-130 crash cause is investigated.” 9-11-1978, p. 5. Accessed 9-25-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/benton-courier-sep-11-1978-p-5/

Benton Courier, AR. “Low flying said to be cause of fatal crash.” 12-22-1978, p. 9. Accessed 9-25-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/benton-courier-dec-22-1978-p-9/

Northwest Arkansas Times, Fayetteville. “Crash Claims Eight Airmen.” 9-10-1978, p. 1. Accessed 9-25-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/fayetteville-northwest-arkansas-times-sep-10-1978-p-1/

The News, Frederick, MD. “Eight die in crash.” 9-9-1978, p. A2. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=33600354

–8 Trib Live, Pittsburgh. “Victims, families recall ’78 helicopter crash in Derry.” 4-29-2012.
–7 Flying Magazine. “Reporting Points.” Dec 1978, p. 102.

Narrative Information

Flying Magazine: “On September 4, a Hughes 269C [N74669] that was overflying a church carnival in Derry, Pennsylvania crashed in the churchyard, killing seven people on the ground and injuring 18. None of the three occupants of the helicopter was injured. The pilot, who had 60 hours of helicopter time on her private license, had been hired to drop several hundred Ping Pong balls on the crowd. On its last pass, from an altitude of about 200 feet, say witnesses, the Hughes settled into the crowd. According to preliminary NTSB findings, there is no obvious evidence of mechanical failure.” (Flying Magazine. “Reporting Points.” Dec 1978, p. 102.)

Trib Live: “….The helicopter was supposed to be the highlight of the annual festival. It was a new addition, designed to bring in a crowd and help raise money for the parish school…. the Rev. John Wilt hired Nelson’s Helicopters of West Mifflin for the contest [gathering ping pong balls]…

“Allison [husband of victim Mary Lou Allison] said everything seemed fine until the second pass over the festival. The helicopter’s engine stopped. Pilot Pamela Nelson tried to ease the craft away from the people. ‘She guided it to the corner, but the fence caught her and it brought her down, and that’s what killed the people — the blades came down,’ Allison said….

“….it [helicopter] came down onto the bake sale booth….

“A coroner’s inquest determined that Pamela Nelson was not criminally negligent for the accident. But the NTSB said pilot error was at the heart of it. Nelson was simply flying too low, officials said. However, a worn part on the throttle may have made the helicopter difficult to control, investigations revealed….

“Eight people died when a helicopter flying over the St. Joseph Catholic Church Fair in Derry crashed into a crowd on Labor Day 1978:

• Mary Lou Allison, 46, of Derry, a homemaker and mother of three. She was there to watch her husband and daughter drop the ping-pong balls from the helicopter at their parish’s festival.

• Tammy Barchesky, 13, of Derry, a ninth-grade student at Derry Area Junior High School and a saxophone player in the school’s marching band. She survived 15 days before succumbing to her injuries.

• Edward “Tim” Deglau, 32, of Derry, a husband and father of two young children who worked as a ninth-grade math teacher at Derry Area Junior High. He was a Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War.

• Gertrude Gray, 54, and her daughter, Darlene, 13, of Unity. Their husband and father, Joseph Gray, had died seven months earlier. The Grays were members of St. Vincent Basilica. Darlene was a freshman at Greater Latrobe High School.

• Irene Maloy, 53, of Derry, a parish member. She was volunteering in a bake sale booth when the helicopter crashed on top of it. A wife and mother, she worked as a store clerk and bookkeeper and was active in church and community organizations.

• Parece Smith, 14, of Derry, a ninth-grade student at Derry Area Junior High who played bells in the school marching band. She was a member of Derry Presbyterian Church.

• Lois Joy Weidenhoff, 51, of Kittanning Township, a wife and mother of one son. She attended the festival after seeing a poster for it at the Indiana County Fair.

Sources

Flying Magazine. “Reporting Points [Dover, PA Helicopter Crash, Church Festival].” Dec 1978, 102. At: http://books.google.com/books?id=zIGG8jPKKRAC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

Trib Live (Jennifer Reeger), Pittsburgh. “Victims, families recall ’78 helicopter crash in Derry.” 4-29-2012. Accessed 10-3-2021 at: https://archive.triblive.com/news/victims-families-recall-78-helicopter-crash-in-derry/

–10 Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). Nevada.
–10 Flight Safety Foundation. Aviation Safety Network. “ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 13573.”
–10 NTSB. AAR. Las Vegas Airlines Piper…Las Vegas, Nevada August 30, 1978. 1979, p. i.

Narrative Information

NTSB Abstract: “About 0747 p. d. t., on August 30 1978, Las Vegas Airlines Flight 44, a Piper PA-31-350 (N44LV), crashed in VFR conditions [visual flight rules] shortly after takeoff from runway 25 at the North Las Vegas Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada. Flight 44 was a charter flight from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Santa Ana, California, with nine passengers and a pilot on board. After liftoff following a longer-than-normal ground roll, the aircraft pitched nose up, climbed steeply to about 400 ft above the ground, stalled, reversed course, and crashed 1,150 ft beyond and 650 ft to the right of the runway. There was no fire. All persons on board the aircraft were killed.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that th probable cause of the accident was the baked out elevator down-stop bolt that limited down elevator travel and made in impossible for the pilot to prevent a pitchup and stall after takeoff. The Board was not able to determine conclusively how the down-stop bolt jam nut-locking device came loose and allowed the stop bolt to back out.”

Sources

Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). Nevada. Accessed 3-9-2009 at: http://www.baaa-acro.com/Pays/Etats-Unis/Nevada.htm

Flight Safety Foundation. Aviation Safety Network. “ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 13573.” Accessed 9-23-2021 at: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/13573

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Las Vegas Airlines Piper PA-31-350, N44LV, Las Vegas, Nevada August 30, 1978. Washington: United States Government, 6-7-1979 report adoption date. Accessed 9-23-2021 at: https://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR79-08.pdf

–12  AP. “Plane Crash Kills 12 Near Petersburg,” The Daily Sentinel, Sitka, AK, 8-28-1978, p.1.

–12  AP. “Probers say airplane in Point Baker crash had too many riders.” Daily Sentinel, Sitka, 8-29-1978, p. 1.

–12  Aviation Safety Network. ASN Wikibase Occurrence #9684. Flight Safety Foundation.

–12  Kiffer. “Fatal Plane Crashes Average One a Year.” SitNews, Ketchikan AK, 8-25-2007.[1]

–12  Liefer, G. P. Broken Wings: Tragedy & Disaster in Alaska Civil Aviation, 2003, p. 151.

–12  NTSB. NTSB Identification: ANC78FA067. “Nonscheduled operation of Webber Airline.”

–11  UPI. “Plane Crash Kills Eleven Off Alaska.” Tyrone Daily Herald, PA, 8-26-1978, p. 1.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB Brief:

Date:                           78/8/25

Location:                     NR. [near?] Labouchere Bay, AK

Intended destination: Ketchikan AK

Flight purpose:            Commercial Air Taxi

Type of Accident:       Undetermined.

Probable Cause:          Undetermined.

 

Aug 26: “Ketchikan, Alaska (UPI) — Eleven people were believed killed Friday in the crash of a twin-engine amphibian airplane that plunged into Sumner Strait off the northern tip of Prince of Wales Island. A spokesman at Coast Guard search and rescue headquarters at Juneau said five bodies were recovered from the wreckage of the Grumman Goose charter flight operated by the Webber Air Service line. The spokesman said a sixth body was sighted by a helicopter crew but was apparently lost as they went down to recover it. Officials said there were 11 people aboard the craft and none of them was believed to have survived.

 

“The search suspended Friday night [Aug 25] because of darkness, resumed at first light today with two Coast Guard cutters and a helicopter on the scene.

 

“The spokesman said the wreckage of the plane was sighted by a fishing vessel in waters about 100 miles northwest of Ketchikan at 4:24 p.m. PDT.

 

“The flight originated in Ketchikan and was scheduled to make three stops before returning to Ketchikan. It was not yet known how many of the stops were made before the crash.

 

“The five bodies were recovered by a Coast Guard helicopter based at Sitka.

 

“A representative of the Webber Air Service office at Ketchikan declined to comment on the crash. ‘There is no one here who can give any information at this time,’ the Webber representative said.” (UPI. “Plane Crash Kills Eleven Off Alaska.” Tyrone Daily Herald, PA, 8-26-1978, pp. 1-2.)

 

Aug 28: “Petersburg, Alaska (AP) — State and federal authorities have begun a probe of a light plane crash that is believed to have claimed 12 lives in Southeast Alaska. Federal Aviation Administration and National Transportation Safety Board investigators started work Sunday in cooperation with Alaska state troopers.

 

“Coast Guard spokesman Dan Dewell said four bodies had been recovered but that all 12 persons aboard were believed killed. A search of the area has been suspended, he said.

 

“Troopers were trying to identify the four bodies found floating near an oil slick and debris from the plane about two miles east of Point Baker on Prince of Wales Island.

 

“A preliminary investigation indicated the plane, a Grumman Goose, took off from Labouchere Bay on Friday, then headed around the north end of Prince Wales Island and crashed before it reached its first stop on a return trip to Ketchikan, Dewell said.

 

“The plane, owned by Webber Airlines of Ketchikan, crashed into the ocean and apparently exploded, Dewell said.

 

“Officials originally believed 11 persons were on board the return flight from Labouchere Bay to Ketchikan, about 75 miles to the southeast, but later said a Sitka man apparently had boarded the plane at an intermediate stop.

 

“On board the plane were pilot Jack Swaim, 40, of Ketchikan, one of the owners of Webber Airlines;[2] Peggy Murphy, about 53, of Labouchere Bay, where her husband works as a logger; Mildred Manty, 67, of Ketchikan, an itinerant nurse with the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services; and Jean Gaedecke, 30, of Ketchikan; Daniel Kwapich, 21, a student at the University of Alaska in Fairbanks; Bert White, 58, Sitka; Jerry Kowalski, 26, Ketchikan, formerly of New York state; Gene Gray, 27, Colorado Springs, Colo.; Dwain Yothers, 38, Ketchikan; Jerry Macious, Ketchikan, formerly of Illinois; and Norman Peru, Ketchikan.” (AP. “Plane Crash Kills 12 Near Petersburg,” The Daily Sentinel, Sitka, AK, 8-28-1978, p. 1.)

 

Aug 29: “Ketchikan, Alaska (AP) — Federal investigators say an amphibious plane was overloaded when it crashed into the water and killed 12 persons last Friday. Jerry Dennis, a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator, says the Grumman Goose…was carrying one more passenger than authorized when it plunged into the sea near Prince of Wales Island. The aircraft, Dennis told the Ketchikan Daily News Monday, was restricted to a pilot and 10 passengers instead of the 11 passengers actually on board….

 

“So far, investigators have recovered only about 20 small bags of debris from the aircraft, including only one hand-sized piece of metal from the aircraft itself.

 

“Herman Ludwigsen, Webber’s chief pilot, acknowledged that the plane may have been overloaded according to FAA regulations, but contended that it was well within operating limits. Ludwigsen said the Goose had been certified to operate with 13 persons aboard until several years ago when the FAA lowered the limit. In any event, Ludwigsen said, the load had no relationship to the crash.”[3] (Associated Press. “Probers Say Airplane in Point Baker Crash Had Too Many Riders.” The Daily Sentinel, Sitka, AK, 8-29-1978, p. 1.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “Plane Crash Kills 12 Near Petersburg,” The Daily Sentinel, Sitka, AK, 8-28-1978, p.1. Accessed 12-29-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/sitka-daily-sentinel-aug-28-1978-p-1/

 

Associated Press. “Probers Say Airplane in Point Baker Crash Had Too Many Riders.” The Daily Sentinel, Sitka, AK, 8-29-1978, p. 1. Accessed 12-29-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/sitka-daily-sentinel-aug-29-1978-p-1/

 

Aviation Safety Network. ASN Wikibase Occurrence #9684. Flight Safety Foundation.  Accessed 12-29-2017 at: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=9684

 

Kiffer. Dave. “Fatal Plane Crashes Average One a Year.” SitNews, Ketchikan AK, 8-25-2007. Accessed 12-29-2017 at: http://www.sitnews.us/Kiffer/CrashHistory/082507_fatal_crashes.html

 

Liefer, G. P. Broken Wings: Tragedy & Disaster in Alaska Civil Aviation. Blaine, WA: Hancock House, 2003.

 

National Transportation Safety Board. NTSB Identification: ANC78FA067. “Nonscheduled operation of Webber Airline.” Washington, DC: NTSB, no date. Accessed 12-29-2017 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/brief.aspx?ev_id=39681&key=0

 

United Press International. “Plane Crash Kills Eleven Off Alaska.” Tyrone Daily Herald, PA, 8-26-1978, pp. 1-2. Accessed 12-29-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/tyrone-daily-herald-aug-26-1978-p-1/

[1] Notes that “the FAA was never able to determine an exact cause.” Also notes that three days later, on Aug 28, a Cessna out of Ketchikan crashed on way to Wrangell killing two people; then on Aug 30 “a Beech with six people on board on their way from Prince George B.C. to Ketchikan crashed killing all aboard.” Then in October a Ketchikan plane crashed killing the pilot. Finally, in November, “a Beaver flying for Tyee Airlines crashed on its way to Hydaburg, killing all five aboard.”

[2] Liefer notes that Swaim “was not instrument certified.” Also notes: “There was also no evidence of Swaim receiving the required annual recurrent training in the Grumman amphibian, as specified in his company’s operations manual.” (p. 153.)

[3] Liefer writes that “The aircraft was flying under a special operating limitation that specified a maximum gross weight of 8,920 pounds, based on single-engine capability. Gross weight at takeoff from Labouchere Bay was determined by the accident investigator to be at a minimum of 400 pounds above maximum, and possibly more….This was not the first time Webber Airlines had exceeded the requirement.”

—  34  Blanchard tally of victims by locality breakout noted below.[1]

—  34  USGS. Major and Catastrophic Storms and Floods in Texas. “John Patton Narratives.”[2]

—  33  Coastal Zone Info. Ctr. The Disastrous Texas Flash Floods of August 1-4, 1978. X-1.[3]

—  33  Ludlum, David M. The American Weather Book. Houghton Mifflin, 1982, p. 82.

—  33  Roth, David (NWS). Texas Hurricane History. Jan 17, 2010 update, p. 55.

—  33  Schroeder, Massey, and Waddell (USGS). Floods in Central Texas, August 1978. P. 1.[4]

—  33  USGS. Summary of Significant Floods in the US, PR, and the VI, 1970-1989. 2008.

—>31  AP, Bandera. “Texas Recovering from River’s Betrayal.” The Ledger. 8-16-1978, 10A.[5]

—  31  AP, Bandera (Thompson). “Texas rivers kill 31.” Paris News, TX, 8-13-1978, p. 1.

—  29  Blanchard tally of victims identified by locality and at least one other identifier.

—  27  Nielsen-Gammon and Johnson. Texas and Oklahoma’s Greatest Hits:  April 2004.

—  26  Blanchard tally of victims identified by name.

—  25  UPI. “New Floods Sock Texas; Toll At 25.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 8-4-1978, A10.

—>24  Drabek, Thomas E. The Human Side of Disaster. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010, 52.

—  23  AP (King). “Possible flood deaths pegged at 23.” Odessa American (TX), 8-5-1978, p. 1.

—  22  Ochoa. “Medina River,” Handbook of Texas Online. Texas State Historical Society.

—  21  AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

Localities breakout:

—  6  Albany, Prong Creek vicinity, Shackelford County.[6]

–Stacy Cooper, 14.[7]

–Adam Richard Ochoa, 4 months.[8]

–Wiley L. White, Jr., 51.[9]

–Varner Williamson, 62.[10]

–Brenda Wright, 23.[11]

–14  Bandera County, Aug 2. (NCC. Storm Data, V20, N8, Aug 1978, p. 21.)[12]

–2  Bandera (drowning deaths). NCC. Storm Data, V20, N8, Aug 1978, 21; CZIC, 1-5.

–1  Aug 2, Vicki Ruth Buchanan Romigh,[13] 52.[14]

 

–2  Bandera (drowning deaths). NCC. Storm Data, V20, N8, Aug 1978, 21; CZIC, 1-5.

–1  Aug 2, Vicki Ruth Buchanan Romigh,[15] 52.[16]

–8  Camp Bandina, about 2:45 CST (drowning).[17] NCC. Storm Data. 21; CZIC, 1-5.

–1  Bertha Louise Baum, 80.[18]

–1  Mrs. King Buchanan, 70.[19]

–1  David Sanchez, 11.[20]

–4  Peaceful Valley Dude Ranch (drowned). NCC. Storm Data. 8-1978, 21.[21] CZIC, 1-5

–1  L. F. “Fred” Champion, 41 of Houston.[22]

–1  Lillian Champion, 68, mother of Fred Champion.[23]

–1  Sandra Champion, wife of Fred Champion, age not given.[24]

–1  Evelyn Walker, mother of Sandra Champion.[25]

Unclear if Bandera, per se, or from Camp Bandina.

–1  Alan Ray Jones, 21.[26]

–1  Jason Skretton, 5.[27]

–1  Aug 3.[28] Arnold Ervin Watson, 44.[29]

—  8  Center Point, along Verde Creek, Kerr County, Aug 2.[30]

–1  Bonnie Lynn Bridges, 11.[31]

–1  Richard Bridges, 12.[32]

–1  Ritchie Carlson, 7.[33]

–1  Mrs. Claudia Livingston, 70.[34]

–1  Kerry McCabe, 18 months.[35]

–1  Johnny C. Pickett, 60.[36]

–1  Mrs. Johnny C. Pickett, 60.[37]

–1  Unknown to us.

—  3  Comfort, Kendall County, Aug 2.[38]

–1  Timothy Klenstein, 28.[39]

–1  Antonio (Jose) Morales, 83.[40]

–1  Mrs. Helen L. Woods, 53.[41]

—  2  Gillespie Co., U.S. Highway #290 at Spring Creek, Aug 3. Cattle truck washed off road.[42]

—  1  Morse, Hansford County, Aug 2. “…high water killed a ranch hand in Morse…”[43]

 

Narrative Information

 

CZIC: “The remnants of Tropical Storm Amelia moved inland over the south Texas             coast on Monday,  July 31.’ While heavy rains were expected as it moved across Texas, no  one foresaw the extraordinary efficiency with which the atmosphere would  dump water in two separate regions over 200 miles apart–the Hill Country  northwest of San Antonio and the Big Country area centered over Shackelford  County, near Abilene…. Over 30 inches of rain fell in the Hill Country between August 1-3 and in Shackelford County on August 3-4…These rainfall centers of over 30 inches appear to represent 80-90 percent of the probable maximum             precipitation, i.e., the maximum precipitation amount possible from an optimum combination of meteorological factors for these locations….

 

“Indeed this was an extremely rare event, but just how rare is not possible to say with confidence. The flash flooding produced by this rainfall was understandably of extraordinary magnitude.  All-time record flooding was recorded at several points.

 

“As is so often the case, the killer flash floods occurred during the early morning hours in the Hill Country. Twenty-seven people died there on August 2…Fortunately, the flash floods in the counties near Abilene peaked during the early evening of August 3 when people were up and about. Still, six people died there….” (Coastal Zone Information Center. The Disastrous Texas Flash Floods of August 1-4, 1978. March 1979, pp. 1-1-1-2).

 

Nielsen-Gammon: “August 1-4, 1978, Texas: Remnants of Hurricane Amelia drifted north across Texas, and conditions were just right for serial thunderstorm development in Albany.  Thirty inches of rain later, 27 persons were dead and $50 million in damage was recorded.”  (John Nielsen-Gammon, (TAMU), and Howard Johnson (Univ. of OK).  Texas and Oklahoma’s Greatest Hits:  The most significant weather events to strike Texas and Oklahoma (OSC Report 04-1). April 2004.)

 

Ochoa: “On August 2, 1978, what was widely termed a 500-year flood came down the Medina, an unofficial record rainfall of forty-eight inches having fallen on the North Prong in twenty-four-hours. Twenty-two lives were lost, millions of dollars of property loss or severe damage reported, and thousands of cypress and pecan trees downed. After a cleanup program by the United States Army Corps of Engineers and private contractors, strict floodplain regulations were ordered to be enforced by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. More sophisticated rainfall reporting and warning systems than those previously in place were put into effect.” (Ochoa, Ruben E. “Medina River.” Handbook of Texas Online. Texas State Historical Society.)

 

Patoski: “The rains that fell over the Hill Country on August 2, 1978…broke a severe six-week dry spell by dumping more than twenty inches of precipitation in the headwaters of the Guadalupe, Medina, and Sabinal rivers in a few hours, causing record flow rates and numerous deaths.”  (Joe Nick Patoski. “The Flash Flood,” Texas Monthly, April 1987.)

 

Roth: “July 30-August 5th, 1978 (Amelia): Tropical storm Amelia developed suddenly fifty miles off the Lower Texas coast near Brownsville…quite similar to Alice in 1954. On the next page is the exceedingly short track of this cyclone. Winds increased by mid-afternoon on the 30th. During the evening, blinding sand blew across South Padre Island, keeping all who hadn’t evacuated indoors.

 

“Even though it was a mere tropical storm, six vessels sank. The shrimper Margaret Webster broke up near the jetties of Lower Padre Island. A wave lifted the shrimper Miss Lorie Ann 30 to 40 feet into the air, tore the cabin off the ship, and dropped her hull down near the coast of Padre Island. Those inside were rescued from their predicament the next day by a Port Isabel fisherman, who busted the hull open with a sledge hammer (St. John).

 

“Corpus Christi set a new daily rainfall record on the 31st when 3.77″ of rain fell during the storm’s landfall into the Lone Star State. The tropical cyclone revived west of San Antonio as it moved into the High Plains. The interaction between the remains of Amelia and a tropical disturbance which moved across Mexico from the Pacific Ocean led to a rejuvenation of thunderstorm activity across the Hill Country and Big Country between the 1st and the 4th.

 

“Torrents of rain fell along the Balcones Escarpment. Drifting north across the Edwards Plateau, copious rains fell again near the city of Abilene. At the headwaters of the Medina River, near the town of Bluff, 46″ of rain fell from the 1st through the 4th. Albany saw 32″ of rain deluge the town. An area of 20″ of rain caused local rivers and streams to flash flood. By the 2nd, 26 people had died during the ensuing flood along the Guadelupe, Medina, and Sabinal Rivers. Before the low finally died in North Central Texas on the 5th, five inches of rain relieved areas south of the Red River, a region that had endured a drought up until that time.

 

“Seventeen counties saw severe and widespread damage, eight of which were declared flood-disaster areas. In the three counties of Bandera, Kerr, and Medina, $50 million in water damage had been incurred. In all, losses totaled $110 million. Thirty-three people perished in the great flood.” (Roth, David (NWS).  Texas Hurricane History.  Jan 17, 2010 update, p. 55.)

 

Schroeder, Massey, and Waddell (USGS): “Catastrophic floods, which resulted in millions of dollars in property damages and the loss of 33 lives, occurred in Central Texas during August 1-4, 1978, as a result of intense rainfall produced by the remnants of tropical storm Amelia. Rainfall in excess of 30 inches was unofficially reported at several locations, while the highest 24-hour amount recorded by the National Weather Service was 29.05 inches at Albany in Shackelford County.

 

“Major flooding occurred on the Medina River and tributaries above Medina Lake and on the Guadalupe River and tributaries above Canyon Lake. Minor to severe flooding occurred on the tributaries of the Nueces River, on the Clear Fork Brazos River and tributaries, and on the Llano and Pedernales Rivers, which are tributaries of the Colorado River.

 

“Peak discharges at several streamflow stations exceeded the historic peaks, and the flood magnitude and frequency data for the Guadalupe River above Canyon Lake, the Medina River near Pipe Creek, and Clear Fork Brazos River indicate that the August 1978 flood had a recurrence interval in excess of 100 years. The highest unit discharge observed during this flood

was 3,010 cubic feet per second from a 14.1-square-mile drainage area of Spring Creek, which is tributary to the Pedernales River….

 

“Seventeen counties in Central Texas sustained widespread damages from the floods associated with tropical storm Amelia (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1978). Eight of these counties (Bandera, Kendall, and Kerr Counties in south-central Texas, and Haskell, Shackelford, Stephens, Throckmorton, and Young Counties in north-central Texas) were declared flood-disaster areas by the Federal government. Ironically, Bandera, Kendall, and Kerr Counties had been declared drought-disaster areas prior to the floods.

 

“In Bandera, Kendall, and Kerr Counties, 25 people were drowned, about 150 people were injured, and property damages were estimated to be at least 50 million dollars. About 175 homes were destroyed and about 650 were damaged. About 350 businesses were destroyed or damaged. Public utilities were disrupted in much of the area and many roadways and bridges were heavily damaged. The bridge on State Highway 173 over the Medina River at Bandera, which was designed to withstand the 50-year flood, was inundated by 18 feet of water….

 

“A considerable amount of damage was also sustained in Gillespie and Kimble Counties in south-central Texas. Two people were drowned when Spring Creek inundated the bridge on State Highway 290 west of Fredericksburg…and many roadways, bridges, and farm and ranch lands were extensively damaged.

 

“In Haskell, Shackelford, Stephens, Throckmorton, and Young Counties in the Brazos River basin in north-central Texas, the flood damage was comparable to the damage in south-central Texas. Six people were drowned, four were injured, and property damages were estimated to be at least 62 million dollars. About 750 homes and 75 businesses were destroyed or damaged… and the damages to livestock, crops, and farm and ranch lands were extremely severe. In Haskell County alone, these damages were estimated to be about 30 million dollars.

 

“In the total area affected by the storm, 33 people were drowned, 154 were injured, and property damages were estimated to be more than 110 million dollars. The devastation resulting from tropical storm Amelia and the subsequent floods exceeded that of any storm in Central Texas in recent history.” (Schroeder, Massey, Waddell. Floods in Central Texas, August 1978. P. 1 & 14.)

 

USGS (Slade and Patton): “1978 – August 2, 1978 – Tropical Storm Amelia formed in the western Gulf of Mexico, southeast of Brownsville the evening hours of July 30, 1978, never was officially raised to hurricane intensity, and made landfall near Port Isabel that evening. As the system moved into the Texas Hill Country the evening of July 31, it dropped below depression intensity, a very dangerous phase in Texas flooding history. Showers and periods of heavy rain began falling west and northwest of San Antonio August 1st. Disastrous heavy rain fell the evening of Aug 1st/early morning hours of Aug 2nd.

 

“Roland Manatt, in the Rocky Creek drainage along the divide between the Medina and Guadalupe Rivers, 8 mi northwest of Medina, measured 48 in. of rain in 52 hrs. He began measuring in a vegetable can which rapidly became tiresome in the sometimes over 4 in/hr intensities. He switched to a large fruit juice can and stayed awake over 2 days and nights measuring the rain. He said he dozed off a few times and let the can overflow – so the 48 in. is to be considered a lower limit. Charles Voss, in the same area, measured 42.0 in. during the same period; Joe Ortiz 35.0 in.; Heneary Heinen 31.0 in. The National Weather Service cooperative observer, John Derry, the postmaster at Medina, measured 32.0 in. during 24 hrs ending at 7 AM Aug 2nd.

 

“This was another example of “Core Rains,” as was Hurricane Alice, and the 1921 Thrall storm. The heaviest rain was during the early morning hours at the storm center. The storm would drop a 32.5-in. center in 24 hrs near Albany in north Texas ending at 7 AM Aug 4th. During daylight hours, these tropical systems disperse into scattered thunderstorms as solar radiation heats the top of the air mass and stabilizes it. During nighttime hours, the top of the tropical air mass cools and destabilizes it. The instability entrains into a “core” at the center of the system.

 

“The Guadalupe River at Bandera crested at 46.62 ft Aug 2, 1978; 19 ft over the Hwy 173 bridge in Bandera. Disastrous flooding also passed down the Guadalupe River below Hunt to Canyon Lake. The Guadalupe River at Comfort crested at 40.90 ft, 240,000 cfs. Twenty-seven persons drowned in the Texas Hill Country [emphasis added]. Of these, only three drowned in automobiles. The others drowned in their homes or trying to rescue cattle. Nearly all were elderly (over 60) or young (under 12).

 

“One example told by Mr. Thompson, the caretaker of Camp Bandina, a Church of Christ recreational camp on the Medina River below Medina – Warnings were issued and the people left their homes beside the Medina River. A large flood wave passed through and receded. A family of four in a Volkswagen bus returned to their home to load belongings in the bus. They were loaded, in the bus and ready to leave when they noticed they didn’t have their dog. As they got out to find the dog, a second wave came down and swept all four downstream. The dog almost certainly was on the bluff watching them as they were swept downstream. In all, eight persons drowned at Camp Bandina. Many homes washed downstream at that site. Mr. Thompson participated in the search afterwards and said the only way they found some bodies was to look where buzzards were circling overhead.

 

“An additional seven people drowned in Albany [Albany is not in Texas Hill Country; emphasis added] as Hubbard Creek washed through town in the early morning hours. Many people were picked from trees and saved….” (USGS (Raymond M. Slade Jr. and John Patton). Major and Catastrophic Storms and Floods in Texas/ “John Patton Narratives.” 1-13-2013 mod.)

 

USGS: “Tropical Storm Amelia brought extremely intense rains to central Texas on August 1-4. Rainfall of more than 48 in. in 72 hours occurred northwest of the town of Medina. More than 30 of the 48 in. occurred on August 2 (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1978), setting a point rainfall record for the United States. In response to the large rainfall, significant flooding occurred in the Medina River Basin. The upstream reaches of the Guadalupe and Medina Rivers had the highest floods recorded since records began for each station in 1848 and 1880, respectively. Thirty-three deaths occurred, and the damage totals for the area were estimated at $110 million (Paulson and others, 1991[44]).” (USGS. Summary of Significant Floods in the United States, PR, and the VI, 1970-1989. 2008.)

 

Newspapers

 

Aug 4 article: “A sudden downpour spawned by the vestiges of Tropical Storm Amelia killed at least six persons in arid West Texas late Thursday night, pushing to at least 21 the number of victims left as rainstorms progressed on their watery path across the state.

 

“Raging flood waters in Albany, a town of 2,000 about 35 miles from Abilene, claimed six lives and others remained unaccounted for, the Department of Public Safety said.

 

“Weary rescue workers further to the southeast in the Central Texas Hill Country, where at least 15 persons have died, began a second day of trudging through the muddy devastation searching for persons still missing in the flood’s wake. Hundreds have been left homeless in the Hill Country, and, while official damage estimates may be weeks away, the figure is expected to run easily into the tens of millions of dollars.

 

“The National Guard arrived in Albany with boats before dawn, fearful some house roofs that sheltered stranded residents would collapse before rescue could be accomplished. At least seven inches of rain fell in the ravaged town, and neighboring Throckmorton County reported a rainfall of 17 inches. A DPS spokesman said accumulated rain water, a rising creek and the drainage system all contributed to the flood.

 

“President Carter Thursday declared Texas a major disaster area, freeing federal recovery funds for the three hardest-hit Hill Country counties — Kerr, Bandera and Kendall. Ironically, the counties were already listed as disaster areas by the Agriculture Department due to drought conditions….

 

“In West Texas, where the storms moved Thursday, U.S. Navy and Marine reserves were coordinating evacuation efforts for two low-lying areas in Abilene. Although some residents returned to their homes during the night, rising creek waters caused the areas to be evacuated again before dawn. Flash flood warnings were issued Thursday night for at least 25 West Texas counties, and some were extended until noon today. Officials reported flooding and ordered some evacuations in Callahan and Knox counties….

 

“A U.S. Geological Survey official in Virginia said the Guadalupe was flowing at 149 billion gallons a day, more than twice the previous record flow established in 1959. As a comparison, he said the Potomac River’s normal flow is 7 billion gallons a day….” (AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, p. 1.)

 

Aug 5 article: “Albany, Texas (AP) — Killer rains turned the parched West Texas countryside into a giant pond Friday, leaving at least seven persons dead or missing, wrecking houses and leaving more than 100 persons homeless. The Department of Public Safety said late Friday three bodies had been recovered in Albany and four persons were missing and presumed dead.

 

“The statewide death toll from the torrential rains — spawned by the dregs of Tropical Storm Amelia — could reach 23. The DPS said 16 bodies had been recovered in the Hill Country of central Texas where more than 20 inches of rain fell earlier.

 

“In Albany, a farming community of about 2,000 located 35 miles northeast of Abilene, the rains sent normally dry creeks and gullies surging out of their banks and gushing across the rugged countryside. The Clear Fork of the Brazos River north of Albany was swollen to a two-mile width wide in the record flooding, the National Weather Service said. One Albany resident said a 20-foot wall of water roared down Hubbard Creek, which flows through the town. The torrent scattered homes, uprooted trees and wrecked automobiles. A Shackleford County deputy sheriff said six Albany residents disappeared beneath the swirling waters late Thursday night. Another man was swept from a bridge. The missing included a man and his wife whose home was carried three-quarters of a mile downstream, a DPS spokesman said. The couple has not been found….”

(AP (King). “Possible flood deaths pegged at 23.” Odessa American (TX), 8-5-1978, p. 1.)

 

Aug 13 article: “Bandera, Texas (AP) — It’s the river — the ice-clear Medina, canopied by ancient cypress trees and gurgling gently through the ruggedly beautiful Hill Country — that pumps millions of tourist dollars into scenic Bandera County each year. But the river — suddenly transformed before dawn Aug. 2 into a snarling, muddy, 50-foot wall of water — turned on Bandera during the lucrative tourist season, snapping those huge cypress canopies like matchsticks and slicing a deadly, multi-million dollar path. The frothing Medina, spurred by torrential rains from Tropical Storm Amelia which came ashore between Corpus Christi and Brownsville, rampaged at 4 a.m. through the riverfront Camp Bandina homes, built by those who had retired to the solitude of the river. Eight persons, most of them elderly retirees, died there. More than 100 children escaped injury at the church camp only a few yards away. It ripped through the Peaceful Valley Dude Ranch, which was filled to a festive summer capacity. Almost

everything but the buildings’ concrete foundations was washed away. Pieces of the ranch airplane were left twisted in a tree downstream….

 

“The next day [Aug 3], tropical rains from the same storm system bore down on the small West Texas ranching town of Albany, about 30 miles northeast of Abilene. The excessive rainfall and

bulging Hubbard Creek caused sudden floods that washed away 10 homes, damaged hundreds of others and killed at least five persons.

 

“To the northeast, one county over, the Brazos rose from its banks and inundated the west side of Graham, a town of 8,000.

 

“By the time the rivers returned to their banks a week later, at least 29 persons had died and another 10 or so were missing. More than a week later, authorities in Albany still were searching for the bodies of four other victims believed swept away and drowned. Sheriff Ben Jack Riley said they may never be found. ‘Sides of the creek caved in in several places. They could be buried under 20 feet,’ he said….

 

“In neighboring Kendall and Kerr counties, the usually placid Guadalupe River, also swelled by the 30-inch rains, came out of the limestone hills and killed 10 other persons in Center Point and Comfort….

 

“The flood in Albany hit hardest in the city’s poorest residential section, a neighborhood known as the “the Flat.” Those living in the run-down frame homes located only a few feet from Hubbard Creek who survived got out early or spent the night in trees, praying and watching boiling flood currents destroy their homes.”  (AP, Bandera, TX (Greg Thompson). “Texas rivers kill 31.” Paris News, TX, 8-13-1978, p. 1.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press, Austin. “Death toll from flood reaches 21.” Odessa American, TX. 8-6-1978, p. 2A. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=185657337

 

Associated Press (Greg Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, p. 1. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=113071615&sterm

 

Associated Press, Albany (James R. King). “Possible flood deaths pegged at 23.” Odessa American (TX), 8-5-1978, p. 1. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=185970229&sterm

 

Associated Press, Bandera. “Texas Recovering from River’s Betrayal.” The Ledger, Lakeland, FL. 8-16-1978, p. 10A. Accessed 9-15-2014 at: http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=jcUSAAAAIBAJ&sjid=CfsDAAAAIBAJ&pg=7423,4542248&dq

 

Associated Press, Bandera, TX (Greg Thompson). “Texas rivers kill 31.” Paris News, TX, 8-13-1978, p. 1. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=113071702&sterm=amelia

 

Associated Press, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, p. 2-A. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=185657318&sterm=amelia

 

Coastal Zone Information Center. The Disastrous Texas Flash Floods of August 1-4, 1978 — A Report to the Administrator Disaster Survey Report 79-1). Charleston, SC: CZSC, Coastal Services Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, March 1979. Accessed 9-15-2014 at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-gb1399-4-t4-u52-1979/html/CZIC-gb1399-4-t4-u52-1979.htm

 

Drabek, Thomas E. The Human Side of Disaster. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010.

 

Find A Grave. “Arnold Ervin Watson.” Record created 8-3-2010. Accessed 9-15-2014 at: http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=55811081

 

GenealogyBuff.com. “Miscellaneous Bandera County, Texas Obituaries.” Accessed 9-15-2014 at: http://www.genealogybuff.com/tx/tx-bandera-obits2.htm

 

Ludlum, David M. The American Weather Book. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982.

 

National Climatic Center. Storm Data, Vol. 20, No. 8, Aug 1978. Asheville, NC: NCC, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Accessed 9-15-2014 at: http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/orders/IPS/IPS-36311B69-BA9F-402E-B19D-E36B3918003B.pdf

 

Nielsen-Gammon, John (Texas State Climatologist) and Howard Johnson (Oklahoma Climatological Survey). Texas and Oklahoma’s Greatest Hits: The most significant weather events to strike Texas and Oklahoma. Office of the State Climatologist, Texas, 2004. 8-5-2004 update. Accessed 3-27-2014 at: http://climatexas.tamu.edu/files/osc_pubs/hits.pdf

 

Ochoa, Ruben E. “Medina River.” Handbook of Texas Online. Texas State Historical Society. Accessed 11-14-2009 at: http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/MM/rnm2.html

 

Odessa American, TX. “…At least (cont. from 1A).” 8-3-1978, p. 2A. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=185657275

 

RootsWeb’s World Connect Home. “The Trail to Texas.” Accessed 9-15-2014 at: http://wc.rootsweb.ancestry.com/cgi-bin/igm.cgi?op=GET&db=bluebonnets&id=I04418

 

Roth, David (National Weather Service). Texas Hurricane History. Camp Springs, MD:  NWS.  1-17-2010 update. Accessed at  http://www.hpc.ncep.noaa.gov/research/txhur.pdf

 

Schroeder, E. E., B. C. Massey, and Kidd M. Waddell (USGS). Floods in Central Texas, August 1978 (Open-File Report 79-682). Austin, TX: United States Geological Survey. April 1979. Accessed 9-14-2014 at: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1979/0682/report.pdf

 

TX Gen Web. “Bremond Cemetery, Robertson County TX.” Rootsweb.ancestry.com. Accessed 9-14-2014 at: http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~txrober2/cemetery/bremond_cem.htm

 

United Press International, Albany, TX. “New Floods Sock Texas; Toll At 25.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 8-4-1978, A10. Accessed 9-15-2014 at: http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=BhshAAAAIBAJ&sjid=kFgEAAAAIBAJ&pg=4056,1113755&dq

 

United States Geological Survey (Raymond M. Slade Jr. and John Patton). Major and Catastrophic Storms and Floods in Texas (USGS Open-File Report 03-193). “John Patton Narratives.” 1-13-2013 modification. Accessed 9-15-2014 at: http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2003/ofr03-193/cd_files/USGS_Storms/patton.htm

 

United States Geological Survey. Summary of Significant Floods in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, 1970 Through 1989 (Water-Supply Paper 2502). USGS Kansas Water Science Center, Sep 17, 2008. At: http://ks.water.usgs.gov/pubs/reports/wsp.2502.contents.html#HDR1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] I use the range of 33-34 in the title-line in that I am wary of the number 34 given the number of sources citing 33, even though the USGS in one of their publications uses numbers that total 34.

[2] “Twenty-seven persons drowned in the Texas Hill County….An additional seven people drowned in Albany.”

[3] “…33 people died – 27 in the Hill Country and 6 in the Big Country.” Elsewhere on the same USGS website, though, it is noted that there were 33 fatalities.

[4] On page 14 it is stated that all 33 fatalities were due to drowning.

[5] Notes that “another 10 or so were missing. The four missing victims in Albany…may never be found…”

[6] NCC. Storm Data, 20/8, Aug 1978, p. 20; AP. “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-78, 1; CZIC. The Disastrous Texas Flash Floods of August 1-4, 1978. March 1979, Table 1-1. We have seen a UPI report of nine deaths in Albany with another 12 missing. (UPI. “New Floods Sock Texas; Toll At 25.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 8-4-1978, A10.)

[7] AP, Austin. “Death toll from flood reaches 21.” Odessa American, TX. 8-6-1978, p. 2A.

[8] AP, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, 2-A.

[9] “…drowned when he and a companion were swept off a bridge [in Albany] by water.” (AP (King). “Possible flood deaths pegged at 23.” Odessa American (TX), 8-5-1978, p. 1.)

[10] AP, Austin. “Death toll from flood reaches 21.” Odessa American, TX. 8-6-1978, p. 2A.

[11] AP, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, 2-A.

[12] The NCC writes that there were 25 deaths from flooding in the wake of Tropical Storm Amelia in Bandera, Kendall and Kerr Counties combined and that 14 were in Bandera County.

[13] Full name is from RootsWeb’s World Connect Home. “The Trail to Texas.” Which notes her place of death in Bandera, Bandera County.

[14] AP, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, 2-A.

[15] Full name is from RootsWeb’s World Connect Home. “The Trail to Texas.” Which notes her place of death in Bandera, Bandera County.

[16] AP, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, 2-A.

[17] “At Camp Bandina 8 drowning deaths occurred as residents were caught by the extremely rapid rise of water…” An AP Report notes that most of the eight drowning victims were elderly retirees. (The Ledger, 8-16-1978, 10A.)

[18] AP, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, 2-A; Odessa American, TX. “…At least (cont. from 1A).” 8-3-1978, p. 2A — notes she had been camping in the area, thus our placement in Camp Bandina.

[19] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1; Odessa American, TX. “…At least (cont. from 1A).” 8-3-1978, p. 2A. This article notes her body was found near Bandera.

[20] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1. Positive identification of location of death as Camp Bandina is from obituary of David’s mother, Mary Lou Sanchez, which notes she lost her son David [aged 11] “in Camp Bandina during the flood of 1978.” GenealogyBuff.com. “Miscellaneous Bandera County, Texas Obituaries.” Accessed 9-15-2014.

[21] Writes that “4 persons drowned in a cabin near the river side.” We have seen an Associated Press account which writes that “Six sleeping Peaceful Valley guests were killed and one disappeared in the churning water. Twenty staff members and guests survived by clinging to trees or rooftops for a terrifying six hours.” (AP, Bandera. “Texas Recovering from River’s Betrayal.” The Ledger, Lakeland, FL. 8-16-1978, p. 10A.)

[22] AP, Bandera (Thompson). “Texas rivers kill 31.” Paris News, TX, 8-13-1978, p. 1.

[23] AP, Bandera (Thompson). “Texas rivers kill 31.” Paris News, TX, 8-13-1978, p. 1.

[24] AP, Bandera (Thompson). “Texas rivers kill 31.” Paris News, TX, 8-13-1978, p. 1.

[25] AP, Bandera (Thompson). “Texas rivers kill 31.” Paris News, TX, 8-13-1978, p. 1.

[26] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1. Age from: TX Gen Web. “Bremond Cemetery, Robertson County TX.” Rootsweb.ancestry.com. Noting that Alan Jones was from Bremond, an AP report includes his death under its “Bandera” breakout of localities where deaths took place. It is noted that his is from the official list provided by the Texas Department of Public Safety. (AP, Austin. “Death toll from flood reaches 21.” Odessa American, TX. 8-6-1978, p. 2A.)

[27] AP, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, 2-A.

[28] Date of death is from: Find A Grave “Arnold Ervin Watson.” Record created 8-3-2010.

[29] AP. “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1. Another account has his death in Bandera noting he was of Bremond. (AP, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, 2A.) Also listed amongst Bandera victims in: AP. “Death toll from flood reaches 21.” Odessa American, TX. 8-6-1978, 2A.

[30] CZIC. The Disastrous Texas Flash Floods of August 1-4, 1978. March 1979, Table 1-1, “Information on Casualties,” p. 1-5. Notes “All were in or close to homes or mobile home. All were very young or 60 or over (18 months, 11, 13, 60, 64, 65, 81).” Our breakout of 7 identified fatalities shows one victim aged 7, one 70, and two aged 60, in addition to the ages identified in the CZIC. We do not show fatalities aged 64, 65 (2), or 81. See also NCC. Storm Data, V20/N8, Aug 1978, p. 21.

[31] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[32] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[33] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[34] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[35] Associated Press, Austin. “Victims identified.” Odessa American, TX, 8-5-1978, p. 2-A.

[36] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[37] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[38] CZIC. The Disastrous Texas Flash Floods of August 1-4, 1978. March 1979, Table 1-1, p. 1-5. Table 1-1 “Information on Casualties,” notes that “1 occurred on Highway 27 in a car; 1 died trying to save cattle in pasture; 1 in home (76 years old).” See also NCC, Storm Data, V20/N8, Aug 1978, p. 21, which writes “One person was killed on state highway 27 as the river surged over its banks. One person was drowned in his home at Comfort. The third drowning occurred as a person was swept from a pasture on Block Creek near the Guadalupe River just downstream from Comfort.”

[39] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[40] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[41] AP (Thompson). “Flood rages through West Texas town.” Paris News, TX, 8-4-1978, 1.

[42] CZIC. The Disastrous Texas Flash Floods of August 1-4, 1978. March 1979, Table 1-1, p. 1-5; NCC. Storm Data, V20/N8, Aug 1978, p. 21.

[43] UPI. “New Floods Sock Texas; Toll At 25.” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. 8-4-1978, A10.

[44] Paulson, R.W., Chase, E.B., Roberts, R.S., and Moody, D.W., compilers, 1991, National water summary, 1988-89-Hydrologic events and floods and droughts: U.S. Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper 2375, 591 p.

–16  Fitzgerald. Sound and Fury: A History of Kansas Tornadoes, 1854-2008. 2008/09, p. 265.

–16  Grazulis. Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991. 1993, pp. 310 and 1204.

–16  National Weather Service WFO, Topeka, KS. “1978 Whippoorwill Tornado Disaster.”

–16  Wikipedia. “1978 Whippoorwill tornado.” 3-7-2012 modification.

–15  Drabek, Thomas E. The Human Side of Disaster. Boca Raton, FL:  CRC Press, 2010.

—  2  Hutchinson News, KS.  “Twister flips boat.” 6-18-1978, 1.

 

Narrative Information

 

Grazulis: “KS  Jun 17, 1978  1815  16k  3inj  150y  8m  F2  Osage – Moved ESE from 4m NNE of Lyndon, on the west edge of Pomona Lake, to south of Michigan Lake.  What should have been a marginally significant tornado became a major killer when it encountered the showboat ‘Whippoorwill,’ causing it to capsize.  Sixteen of the 58 passengers and crew on board were drowned…” (Grazulis. Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991. 1993, p. 1204.”  (Grazulis.  Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991. 1993, p. 1204.)

 

NWS WFO Topeka: “On June 17th 1978, a tornado struck very near the Whippoorwill Showboat on Lake Pomona in Osage county causing it to capsize. This very unusual and unique disaster resulted in 16 deaths and 3 injuries among the 58 passengers and crew aboard. Although the deaths were due to drowning when the vessel overturned, they were attributed to the tornado; making it one of the worst tornado death tolls in Kansas history. Nationwide media coverage was focused on Kansas and this tornado for many days after the tragic event. People who boarded the Whippoorwill for an evening of fun and entertainment, likely never imagined what a historical catastrophe they were in for.

 

“The tornado formed very rapidly around 7 pm, cut an erratic but generally eastward path about 8 miles long before dissipating near the small community of Michigan Valley. Witnesses sighted 3 funnels rotating around the main vortex, which itself was no more than about 150 yards wide. Some people reported more than one tornado in the area.

 

“Although damage was also reported to campers, trees and power lines in and near the lake, this tornado should have been relatively insignificant and generally the “norm” in Kansas. The exception occurred when the winds from the tornado capsized the Whippoorwill Showboat causing the 16 deaths. This incident shows that ALL tornadoes, no matter how small or short-lived, demand our respect, and have the potential to cause damage, injuries and fatalities, even when they do not make a direct strike.” (National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office, Topeka, KS. “1978 Whippoorwill Tornado Disaster.” 8-31-2010.)

 

Newspaper

 

June 18: “Ottawa (UPI) — A tornado overturned an excursion boat with at least 58 persons aboard Saturday night, killing at least two persons. At least 17 others were reported missing.  The boat, the Whippoorwill Showboat, was capsized on 4,000 acre Lake Pomona by what apparently was a tornado, the Franklin County sheriffs dispatcher said. It was carrying 46 passengers, a crew of six and a six member band.

 

“A witness on the boat told a sheriff’s deputy “We were cruising along when a funnel appeared over the water.  The boat was turned away from it.  It looked like smoke coming out of the water. It went about 200 feet into the air.  Then the boat went over.”

 

“Three persons were injured and taken to Stormant-Vail Hospital at Topeka, where they were listed in serious condition. A hospital spokesman said the injured were a man in his 80s and two women, one in her 70s and one in her 30s….

 

“Lt. Fred Austin of the Kansas Highway Patrol said shortly after 10 p.m. that one death had been confirmed and 17 persons were still missing.  Reporters at the scene said a second body was pulled from the water a short time later.

 

“All available ambulances in the area were dispatched to the scene, about 15 miles west of Ottawa in east central Kansas.  Nearby area hospitals called in emergency personnel and were standing by for injured passengers.  Sheriff’s deputies and highway patrolmen were at the scene, along with workers equipped with cutting torches — apparently to be used to extricate any persons trapped inside the vessel.  Scuba divers were sent from Lee’s Summit, Mo., — about 85 miles east of Ottawa — and a Shawnee County underwater rescue squad was dispatched to the scene.”  (Hutchinson News, KS.  “Twister flips boat.” 6-18-1978, 1.)

 

Sources

 

Drabek, Thomas E. The Human Side of Disaster. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010.

 

Fitzgerald, Daniel C.  Sound and Fury: A History of Kansas Tornadoes, 1854-2008. Dan Fitzgerald Company, 2008-2009.

 

Grazulis, Thomas P. Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991: A Chronology and Analysis of Events. St. Johnsbury, VE: Environmental Films, 1993.

 

Hutchinson News, KS. “Twister flips boat.” 6-18-1978, 1. Accessed at:  http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=149602952

 

National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office, Topeka, KS. “1978 Whippoorwill Tornado Disaster.” 8-31-2010. Accessed at:  http://www.crh.noaa.gov/top/events/whippoorwill.php

 

Wikipedia. “1978 Whippoorwill tornado.” 3-7-2012 modification. Accessed at:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Whippoorwill_tornado

 

— 51 Burkhammer. “Willow Island: A Personal Reflection.” Charleston Gazette, Apr 27, 2008.
— 51 Carper and Feld. Construction Failure. 1997, p. 8.
— 51 Levy and Salvadori. Why Buildings Fall Down. 1987, p. 174.
— 51 Nat. Bur. of Standards. Investigation of Construction Failure…Willow Island…, 1979, 1.
— 51 Stulberg, Robert B. A Citizens Investigation of The Willow Island Scaffold Disaster. 1978.
— 51 Tuckwiller. “Start Praying That Our Dad’s Alive. Willow Island: Revisited, 27 Apr 2008.
— 51 Ward. “It was Gone: String of Problems Led to 51 Deaths at Willow Island.” 27Apr2008.
— 51 West Virginia Division of Culture and History, “April 27, 1978: Willow Island Disaster”
— 51 WV Governor’s Commission on Willow Island. Report to the Governor…. 1980, p. 1.

Narrative Information

Carper and Feld: “Cooling Tower Scaffold Collapse, Willow Island, West Virginia, April 1978. Premature loading of cast-in-place concrete resulted in loss of life for 51 construction workers, the most costly construction accident since the first collapse of the Quebec bridge over the St. Lawrence River in 1907. (The Quebec failure killed 74 people.)” (Carper and Feld. Construction Failure. 1997, p. 8.)

NBS: “Two natural-draft hyperbolic concrete cooling towers were being constructed at the Pleasants Power Station which is located on the Ohio River at Willow Island, West Virginia…. Shortly after 10 a.m. on April 27, 1978, the top portion of the second unit which had reached a height of 166 ft (51 m) collapsed during construction…. A four-level scaffolding system which was anchored to the collapsed portion of the shell fell with it killing all 51 workers who were on the scaffold.” (National Bureau of Standards. 1979, 1)

WV Gov: “On the morning on April 27, 1978, scaffolding collapsed at a Monongahela Power Company station at Willow Island, northeast of Parkersburg. The scaffolding was being used to pour concrete for a cooling tower that was under construction. Forty-five workers fell more than 150 feet to their deaths and six more were crushed to death on the ground, ranking Willow Island among West Virginia’s worst construction disasters.

“The disaster became a national story. But the rush to report it alienated members of the grieving community, and an investigation begun almost immediately by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) didn’t please them either. ‘The families have been held at arm’s length and have been ignored. Being the biggest losers, we feel it should have been the other way around’.”

“An investigation of the New Jersey construction company which built the cooling tower revealed that the poured cement had not set properly, enabling the scaffolding to tear loose. At the time of the accident there were only 20 federal OSHA inspectors in West Virginia. The AFL-CIO and other agencies in the state responded by pushing to increase the number of inspectors in the state to avert future disasters.” (WV Div Culture/History, 27Apr978: Willow Island Disaster)

Ward: “At about 10 a.m. on April 27, 1978, workers began raising the day’s second bucket of concrete up 166 feet to Lift 29. Each day, they poured another 5-foot lift to build the second of two 430-foot cooling towers for the new Pleasants Power Station at Willow Island.

“But on that Thursday morning, 30 years ago today, something went terribly wrong. The cable hoisting that bucket of concrete went slack. The crane that was pulling it up fell toward the inside of the tower. Scaffolding followed. The previous day’s concrete, Lift 28, started to collapse. Concrete began to unwrap off the top of the tower. First it peeled counter-clockwise, and then in both directions. A mess of concrete, wooden forms and metal scaffolding crumbled to the ground.

“Fifty-one construction workers were on the scaffold at the time. They all plunged to their deaths. “I looked up at the top of the tower, and it was gone – the scaffolding was gone,” William Van Vlack Jr., who was working on the ground at the time, later told investigators.

“Thirty years later, the Willow Island disaster is still considered the worst construction accident in U.S. history. Like most disasters, it’s still hard to point to one specific triggering event. Instead, a mix of safety lapses combined to bring the tower crashing down. Concrete in the previous day’s lift hadn’t hardened enough to hold the scaffolding. Key bolts meant to attach the scaffolding to the tower were missing. An elaborate concrete hoisting system was modified without proper engineering review. Contractors were rushing to speed construction, perhaps overlooking important safety measures along the way. “There were redundant features here that, if they had corrected them, this wouldn’t have happened,” said Stan Elliott, who was then and is now the area director for the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. “If they had put the bolts in, it probably wouldn’t have happened,” Elliott said earlier this month. “If they had let the concrete cure, it probably wouldn’t have happened. “But when you put all of these things together all on the same day at the same time, this is what happened.” ‘A matter of luck’

“Up and down the Ohio Valley in the 1970s, power plants were rising up. Coal was taking over as a major source of electricity across the country. New coal-fired units were being built from Mason County to Moundsville. Located just south of St. Marys, the Willow Island plant was being built by Allegheny Power System, now called Allegheny Energy, for its Monongahela Power unit. There were already two smaller units at the site, built in 1949 and 1959. The new, $677 million plant would include two units and a total of 1,300-megawatts of capacity.

“By April 1978, workers had finished one and were building a second “natural draft” cooling tower. These are like huge chimneys, which create an updraft of air that cools the water as it falls down the inside of the tower. For most people, these hourglass-shaped concrete cooling towers probably bring back bad memories of the March 1979 Three-Mile Island nuclear plant accident. But cooling towers are crucial parts of coal-fired power stations as well. In power plants, electricity is generated when steam drives a turbine. This steam must be condensed before it can be returned to the boiler to continue the cycle of steam and electricity generation. This condensation happens in a heat exchanger. Cooling water is needed in the heat exchanger and it is this cooling water that is cycled through the cooling tower. In this way, the water from the boilers and steam turbines are kept separate from the cooling water. Impurities are kept out of the turbines.

“One of Willow Island’s contractors, New Jersey-based Research-Cottrell, had already built 35 cooling towers at plants around the country. Research-Cottrell used a patented system, with an elaborate, four-level system of scaffolding that circled the tower as it was built. The scaffolding was secured to the inside and outside of the tower. Hydraulic jacks lifted the scaffold as work on the tower progressed. A system of cranes spread around the top of the scaffolding hoisted buckets of concrete up. Workers were to pour one 5-foot lift per day.

“After the disaster, a Research-Cottrell lawyer told a congressional committee that the system previously had a flawless record. “There has been no death and there has been no serious injury related to this complex system of construction,” company lawyer Willis O. Shay said. But Van Vlack, a plant electrician, later told a state panel that he worried about the system from the start. “I consider that an extremely dangerous procedure – the fact that they have managed to build many, many cooling towers with that particular procedure before – I would consider more a matter of luck than anything else,” Van Vlack said.

“Wet concrete and wrong angles. After the collapse, OSHA called in the National Engineering Laboratory, part of the Commerce Department, to help figure out what happened. Engineers studied the scaffolding setup, examined concrete curing times, and calculated the loads created by lifting the buckets up the tower. In a 188-page report, they concluded that “the most probable cause” of the collapse was “the imposition of construction loads … before the concrete of Lift 28 had gained adequate strength to support these loads.” Translation? The concrete wasn’t given time to dry.

“But OSHA’s Elliott recalls that the causes were more complicated than that. For one thing, the entire scaffolding and crane system was based on elaborate geometry. Each crane had to be located at a certain spot at the top of the tower, and each bucket loaded and hoisted from another certain spot on the ground. If everything was placed just right, the angles lined up to give the system enough strength. If the angles were off, the strength just wasn’t there.

“Elliott said OSHA discovered that, to cut corners on construction time, management and workers were loading concrete from different spots. The angles were wrong, weakening the entire system. “The concept was wonderful, but the implementation left something to be desired,” Elliott said.

“On June 8, 1978, OSHA cited Willow Island contractors for 10 willful and 10 serious violations. Among other things, the violations cited the failure to field test concrete and properly anchor the scaffold system. OSHA proposed $108,300 in fines. The cases settled for $85,500, or about $1,700 per worker killed in the disaster. Joe Powell, then-president of the West Virginia AFL-CIO, called the amount “a small pittance of a fine.” “Judged as a percentage against profits, such fines would not constitute a tenth of a percent and most assuredly would not serve as a deterrent to future accidents,” Powell told a congressional hearing convened in St. Marys.

“OSHA referred the case to the U.S. Department of Justice for a criminal investigation. A grand jury was convened, but no charges were ever filed. Meanwhile, Willow Island’s general contractor, United Engineers and Constructors Inc., hired a consultant to perform its own study. The consultant, Lev Zetlin Associates, said that OSHA and the Bureau of Standards were wrong to blame improperly cured concrete. “Key evidence,” the consultant said, “suggested that the problems originated due to lack of understanding of the scaffold system by the workers, and also due to its systematic misuse. Lack of technical and management supervision was also an underlying cause to this collapse.”

“Within days of the collapse, a young lawyer working for one of Ralph Nader’s crusading groups was poring over OSHA records about Willow Island. Robert B. Stulberg of Public Citizen’s Health Research Group found what he called “substantial evidence” that OSHA knew nearly a year before the disaster that the scaffold used at Willow Island “posed serious hazards to workers.” In March 1977, an OSHA inspector who visited the site found no evidence that the same scaffolding – then being used to finish the first cooling tower – would hold the intended load. The inspector also warned that the company’s use of only one temporary stair-tower could be hazardous if workers needed an emergency exit from the scaffolding.

“A second inspection that same month found the scaffolding “was badly in need of repairs.” Some of these repairs, it cautioned, “were made without knowledge of the engineering department.” The inspector warned of possible “disastrous consequences.”

“Eula Bingham, assistant labor secretary for OSHA, responded that the Nader report was “untrue and actually misleading and has caused unnecessary anguish for members of this community by diverting attention from the true cause of the collapse.” Lawmakers greeted the Nader report with equal disdain. They grilled Stulberg in a hearing about his qualifications to perform such a study. Then-Rep. Robert Mollohan, a Democrat whose district included Willow Island, told reporters that Stulberg’s hearing testimony was “patently ridiculous.” “Any flannel-mouth can get up here and make a charge,” Mollohan said.

“’Last bastion of hope’ Not long after the collapse, then-state Labor Commissioner Steve Cook flew up the highway with a State Police trooper, headed for Willow Island. He needed to meet then-Gov. Jay Rockefeller to tour the site. “I remember the trip, because we were going 115 miles per hour,” Cook recalled. But it would be six months before the state took any steps to investigate the disaster. Rockefeller was under pressure to do so. His Republican rival, Arch Moore, was giving speeches about Willow Island. So was A. James Manchin.

“In early October 1978, Rockefeller announced the creation of the Governor’s Commission on Willow Island. The group included labor and business representatives, and state lawmakers. R.W. Bowser, who lost a son at Willow Island and was head of a victims’ support group, called Rockefeller’s commission “perhaps the last bastion of hope for truth and justice – even-handed justice – to prevail at the disaster site.”

“Rockefeller instructed the commission to “conduct a comprehensive and detailed investigation into the collapse, evaluate the facts and circumstances surrounding the collapse and determine, if possible, the cause or causes.” But much of the commission’s 49-page report, released in December 1980, is spent criticizing OSHA. Commission members were furious that OSHA officials would not answer their questions, citing the federal criminal probe. They were especially upset that OSHA would not inspect all other cooling tower projects, and assure the public no repeats of Willow Island would ever happen. “What they appear to be saying is, ‘Don’t bother us until someone is killed or injured,'” Cook said of OSHA during an April 1979 press conference in Wheeling.

“The commission report did discuss one option for West Virginia officials unhappy with OSHA’s performance: Create their own state workplace safety program. State inspectors would enforce federal safety standards, just as they currently do strip mining rules or water quality protections.
Commissioners declined to specifically recommend that course, though. Instead, they cautioned, “There are a great many considerations which should be given careful thought and research before any action is taken.”

“In the 27 years since, there has been little, if any, talk of West Virginia forming its own workplace safety agency.

“After the Sago Mine disaster in January 2006, Gov. Joe Manchin said he wanted to make all West Virginia workers, not just coal miners, the safest in the nation. “While we have certainly focused on improving mine safety, this year has also taught me that we can’t, and shouldn’t, take the safety of any of our West Virginia workplaces for granted,” Manchin said during his 2007 State of the State address. Manchin has not announced any specific steps to improve workplace safety for industries other than coal. And West Virginia remains one of 26 states without a public employee OSHA program.

“Warnings ignored…. “Many workers have been injured or killed in wall collapses,” OSHA said later. “[But] these accidents had not received the publicity or public attention that the structure collapse received, probably because workers are killed one at a time rather than in large numbers at one time.” OSHA did not begin to toughen its rules for concrete and masonry construction until after Willow Island.

“Today [2008], loads cannot be placed on partially constructed structures unless someone trained in structural design has certified them as able to handle those loads. New rules also mandated on-site inspections of forms and shoring to ensure they matched blueprints. Concrete must be tested before forms and shoring are removed. “It’s more specific and it’s also more rigorous,” said Noah Connell, acting director of OSHA’s directorate of construction….” (Ward 2008)

Tuckwiller: “For a few days, the people of tiny Willow Island – and especially the “Men of Steele,” as one reporter dubbed them – were the center of America’s attention. But then the reporters left, and the power plant workers went back to work, and today most people have never heard of Willow Island.” (Tuckwiller. “Start Praying That Our Dad’s Alive,” April 27, 2008.)

Burkhammer: “I hesitate to bring up this terrible day to survivors, but I need to bear witness to the accident that otherwise might get lost in history. A combination of serious safety violations was found to have caused the disaster. Those workers gave their lives over unsafe working conditions. For their sakes and the workers now – the people who still work on dangerous jobs – the rest of us must remember.” (Burkhammer. “Willow Island…” Charleston Gazette, 4-27-2008.)

US GAO: “After NDS had completed its investigation to determine the technical cause of the collapse during construction of a Willow Island, West Virginia, cooling tower, OSHA had NBS expand on its technical investigation by reviewing OSHA’s existing safety and health regulations for general concrete construction and develop guidelines for OSHA’s use for safety evaluation of reinforced concrete cooling tower construction. The introduction to the NBS report stated that the construction of cooling towers and mother reinforced concrete structures in which the partially completed structure plays a key role in supporting construction workers and other construction loads, presents special challenges to providing a safe working environment.” (US GAO, 1982, 13)

Sources

Burkhammer. “Willow Island: A Personal Reflection.” Charleston Gazette, 4-27-2008.

Carper, Kenneth L. and Jacob Feld. Construction Failure. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997. Partially digitized by Google at: http://books.google.com/books?id=-jnlb-oJxcEC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=true

Levy, Matthys, and Mario Salvadori. Why Buildings Fall Down: How Structures Fail. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987.

National Bureau of Standards (H.S. Lew, S. G. Fattal, J. R. Shaver, T. A. Reinhold and B. J. Hunt). Investigation of Construction Failure of Reinforced Concrete Cooling Tower At Willow Island, West Virginia (Part 1, NBSIR 78-1578). Washington, DC: Center for Building Technology, National Engineering Laboratory, NBS, November 1979, 42 pages (w/o appendices). At: http://wvgazette.com/static/willowdocs/OSHAReportPart1.pdf

Stulberg, Robert B. A Citizens Investigation of The Willow Island Scaffold Disaster. Washington, DC: Public Citizen’s Health Research Group, May 10, 1978. Accessed at: http://wvgazette.com/static/willowdocs/citizensreport.pdf

Tuckwiller, Tara. “Start Praying That Our Dad’s Alive. Willow Island: Revisited.” Charleston Gazette (WV), 27 Apr 2008. At: http://wvgazette.com/News/WillowIsland/200804250423

United States Government Accountability Office. Transportation: Further Examination of the East Chicago, Indiana, Highway Ramp Collapse Could Help Prevent Similar Accidents (CED-82-120). Washington: GAO 9-2-1982, p. 13. Accessed at: http://gao.gov/assets/140/138719.pdf

Ward, Ken Jr. “It was Gone: String of Problems Led to 51 Deaths at Willow Island.” WVGazette.com, 4-27-2008. Accessed at: http://wvgazette.com:80/News/WillowIsland/200804250422

West Virginia Division of Culture and History. Time Trail, West Virginia. “April 27, 1978: Willow Island Disaster.” At: http://www.wvculture.org/history/timetrl/ttapr.html#0407

West Virginia Governor’s Commission on Willow Island. Report to the Governor and the Legislature. Charleston, WV: The Commission, 1980. Accessed at: http://openlibrary.org/b/OL3143964M/Report-to-the-Governor-and-the-Legislature