lornajarrettblanchard

— 6 NTSB. HAR. Transport Co…TX Tractor-Semitrailer…Collision…Houston…May 11, 1976.

Narrative Information

National Transportation Safety Board: “Synopsis

“About 11:08 a.m., on May 11, 1976, a Transport Company of Texas tractor-semitrailer (tank) transporting 7,509 gallons of anhydrous ammonia struck and penetrated a bridge rail on a ramp connecting I-610 with the Southwest Freeway (U.S. 59) in Houston, Texas. The tractor and trailer left the ramp, struck a support column of an overpass, and fell onto the Southwest Freeway, approximately 15 feet below. The anhydrous ammonia was released from the damaged tank semitrailer.

”Six persons died as a result of the accident, 78 persons were hospitalized, and approximately 100 other persons were treated for injuries.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the excessive speed of the vehicle combined with the lateral surge of liquid in the partially loaded tank truck, which caused it to overturn. The cause of 5 of the 6 fatalities and all of the 178 injuries was the inhalation of anhydrous ammonia. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the failure of the bridge rail to contain or redirect the vehicle.

“Innovations in transportation of pressurized liquefied products could result in a reduction of accident severity. As a result of its investigation of another tank-semitrailer accident near Eagle Pass, Texas, on April 29, 1975, the Safety Board recommended that the Secretary of Transportation “initiate a research program to identify new approaches to reduce the injuries and damages caused by the dangerous behavior of pressurized, liquefied flammable gases released from breached tanks on bulk transport vehicles.” The Department of Transportation now intends to contract for such a study, depending upon the availability of funds, sometime during FY 1977. Ammonia will be included in the study.

RECOMMENDATIONS

“As a result of its investigation of this accident the National Transportation Safety Board submitted the following recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration:

“Expedite past recommendations of the Safety Board regarding the adoption of standards for bridge barrier systems that require new installations to comply with performance standards.” (Class II, Priority Follow-up)(H-77-4)

“In consultation with State and local governments, establish highway design criteria for the selection, location, and placement of traffic barrier systems that will redirect and prevent penetration when struck by heavy vehicles. The criteria for preventing vehicle penetration should consider the human exposure to injury and the effects of hazardous cargo that could result from barrier penetration.” (Class II, Priority Follow-up) (H-77-5)

“Develop guidelines for local and State agencies to use in designating and periodically reviewing routes for the transportation of hazardous materials as a means of reducing injury and damage from accidents involving hazardous materials in their jurisdictions.” (Class II, Priority Follow-up) (I-77-1)

“As a result of its investigation of this accident the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the following recommendations made after previous investigations:

to the Federal Highway Administration:

“The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (Federal Highway Administration) in cooperation with affected industries, as represented by the Tank Truck Technical Council, conduct an investigation designed to resolve the overturn stability problems created by liquid surging of partially loaded tank-truck combinations. The ultimate objective of such a research program should be the promulgation of Federal regulations to limit the effects of surge to a specific degree. Such regulations might be based on acceptable liquid cargo outage and/or dampening requirements, consistent with safe tank-truck operations.” (H-72-45)

to the U.S. Department of Transportation:

“Initiate a research program to identify new approaches to reduce the injuries and damages caused by the dangerous behavior of pressurized, liquefied flammable gases released from breached tanks on bulk transport vehicles.” (I-76-5)”

(NTSB. HAR. Transport Co…TX Tractor-Semitrailer…Collision…Houston…May 11, 1976.)

Newspaper

May 12, AP: “Houston (AP) – Federal and state authorities began an investigation today into the freeway crash and explosion of an ammonia carrying tank truck that killed four persons and injured some 200 others. The tank truck, carrying 19 tons of anhydrous ammonia, plunged off an overpass onto the freeway Tuesday, exploding on impact. Many automobiles became involved in the wreckage.

“Most of the injured were overcome by fumes. Many were released after treatment but Houston hospitals reported 68 persons remained hospitalized late Tuesday. At least seven were said to be critical.

“Witnesses said the truck failed to make a curve at the exit ramp onto Southwest Freeway and Loop 610 and plunged 15 feet to the pavement and exploded. A dense cloud of ammonia fumes billowed into the air, causing motorists to abandon their cars. Many residents and workers in the area near the site, one of the city’s busiest traffic interchanges, were forced to evacuated homes and offices for a time.

“Authorities said up to 20 vehicles were involved in the explosion. Some cars were knocked facing the direction from which they had been coming. Twisted metal and bits of glass were flung far beyond the grassy embankments along the freeway.

“The dead were identified as William Gregory Schmidt, 28, of Corpus Christi, driver of the tank truck; Gordon D. McAdams, 40, of Conroe, Tex.; George Henty Pearson, 33, of Sugar Land, Tex., and David Randall Whiteman, 48, of Houston.

“Schmidt’s truck was owned by Transport Co. of Texas and was hauling ammonia loaded by Tenneco Chemicals Inc.

“One body was thrown 120 feet from the north side of the road. Another lay on the opposite side, one was in a truck and one was sprawled on the roadway.

“The Texas Air Control Board [TACB] said it will conduct an exploratory investigation and the National Transportation Safety Board announced that a four man team from Washington will probe the accident. Lloyd Stewart, regional Chief of the TACB, said the toxic cloud of fumes turned vegetation brown in its path….

“The explosion caused no fire but split apart at its base one of the huge concrete columns that supports the superstructure of the top level of the loop….

“The four bodies reeked so badly with ammonia when they were brought to the Harris County Morgue that the morgue had to be evacuated for a time, Dr. Joseph A. Jachimczyk, county medical examiner said.” (Associated Press. “Freeway crash probe begins.” Wichita Falls Times, TX. 5-12-1976, pp. A1 and A3.)

Sources

Associated Press. “Freeway crash probe begins.” Wichita Falls Times, TX. 5-12-1976, p. 1. Accessed 10-10-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/wichita-falls-times-may-12-1976-p-1/

National Transportation Safety Board. Highway Accident Report. Transport Company of Texas Tractor-Semitrailer (Tank) Collision With Bridge Column and Sudden Dispersal of Anhydrous Ammonia Cargo, I-610 at Southwest Freeway, Houston, Texas, May 11, 1976 (NTSB HAR-77/01; NTIS PB-268251). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted April 14, 1977. Accessed at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1977/HAR7701.htm

–37 Kimura. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Ed., 1946-1993, V.1. 4-11-1994, p. 2-18
–37 NTSB. AAR. American Air…St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, April 27, 1976. Dec 16, 1976.

Narrative Information

NTSB: “About 1510 A.s.t. on April 27, 1976, American Airlines, Inc., Flight 625 overran the departure end of runway 9 after landing at the Harry S Truman Airport, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands. The Aircraft struck the instrument landing system localizer antenna, crashed through a chain link fence, and came to rest against a building located about 1,040 feet beyond the departure end of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed. Of the 88 persons aboard the aircraft, 35 passengers and 2 flight attendants were killed. Thirty-eight other persons received injuries which ranged from minor to serious. One person on the ground was injured seriously.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the captain’s actions and his judgment in initiating a go-around maneuver with insufficient runway remaining after a long touchdown. The long touchdown is attributed to a deviation from prescribed landing techniques and an encounter with an adverse wind condition, common at the airport.

“The nonavailability of information about the aircraft’s go-around performance capabilities may have been a factor in the captain’s abortive attempt to go-around after a long landing.” (NTSB 1976, 1)

On April 27, 1976, American Airlines, Inc., Flight 625, a Boeing 727-95, N1963, operated as a scheduled passenger flight from Providence, Rhode Island, to Harry S Truman Airport, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, with an intermediate stop at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York.

“Flight 625 departed John F. Kennedy International Airport at 1200 with 88 persons, including 7 crewmembers, aboard. It was cleared to the Harry S Truman Airport in accordance with an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The assigned en route flight level (FL) was 330. The flight was uneventful during takeoff, climb, cruise, and descent into the St. Thomas area. All required descent checklists were accomplished.” (NTSB 1976, 2)

“The captain stated that, as the aircraft crossed the runway threshold at an estimated altitude of 30 t o 40 f t , he retarded the throttles gradually, and then, when the landing was assured, retarded them against the idle stops. He said the aircraft was aligned with the runway, and he felt comfortable as he began the flare. Shortly there-after turbulence was encountered.

“The captain said that he did not anticipate turbulence “that far down the runway.” He thought the turbulence was encountered about the 1,000- foot aiming point, and this turbulence caused the right wing to drop. He thought that the right flap or wingtip might strike the ground and he made a control correction to level the wings. After he leveled the, wings the first officer told him that the aircraft was high. The captain said the turbulence seemed to buoy the aircraft; however,
after the first officer’s callout he “got it on the ground.”….

“The captain said that, immediately before touchdown, he decided that the aircraft could not be stopped on the remaining runway; therefore, almost simultaneous with touchdown, he called for a go-around, moved the throttles forward to the “straight up” position (the 1.4 EPR position),
and called for 25′ of flaps.

“The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) disclosed that when the captain called for the go-around, he did not order a change of flap setting. Shortly after the captain announced the go-around, the first
officer asked the captain if he wanted 25′ of flap. The captain responded, “Flaps fifteen.” The first officer stated later that 25′ was the correct flap setting for the go-around, and that rather than debate the point, he placed the flap handle in the 25′ detent….

“The captain said that after he placed the throttles to the straight-up position he watched the EPR gauges. He did not see the EPR come up. He then moved the throttles as far forward as he could reach, and he thought that they had contacted the forward stops on the throttle race. He never saw the EPR pointers move beyond about the “5:00 to 5:30 position” on the EPR gauges (1.2 to 1.3 EPR). The captain said that there was no sensation either of power being applied or of aircraft acceleration. He saw they were not “going anywhere,” so he closed the throttles and applied the wheel brakes. He did not recall extending the speed brakes; however, he believed that he “might have actuated the reversers in the very final stages.”….

“The flight engineer stated that, when the go-around was begun, the captain moved the throttles forward and he watched the EPR pointers move to the 1.4 position; however, he could not state if they were moved farther forward because he had turned his head to scan the flight engineer’s instrument panel. When he returned his scan to the forward instrument panel, he noted that the engine instrument indications had not changed, and he thought that there had been an electrical failure. He, again, scanned his electrical panel and found the readings to be normal. He returned his attention to the forward instrument panel and reached forward to place his hand behind the throttles to assist the captain. Before he could reach them the captain pulled the throttles aft against the idle stops.

“The flight engineer’s recollection of the nose gear position and aircraft attitude during the landing roll, the attempted go-around, and the subsequent rejected go-around are similar to the first officer’s.

“The aircraft continued across the 500-foot overrun and struck the ILS localizer antenna and a portion of the airport’s chain link perimeter fence. The right wingtip struck an embankment along the fence and the outboard portion of the wing was torn from the aircraft’s structure. The aircraft crossed a road, which runs parallel to the perimeter fence, and destroyed several automobiles in its path. The aircraft came to rest in a gasoline station and against a rum warehouse. A passenger in an automobile, which was being serviced at the time the aircraft struck the service station, was injured seriously.

“The three controllers on duty in the St. Thomas tower described Flight 625’s final approach as “normal” until it reached the point on the runway where other Boeing 727’s usually touchdown. They described the usual touchdown point as a point about 1,000 ft to 1,500 ft from the runway threshold. At that point, the aircraft appeared to float. The three controllers fixed the initial touchdown point either at or just before taxiway “C”. Taxiway “C” is 3,000 ft from the threshold of runway 9….” (NTSB 1976, 3-6)

“….the aircraft crossed the threshold at an airspeed of 131 knots and an altitude of about 80 feet. The touchdown was calculated to be about 2,800 feet beyond the threshold. At touchdown, about 1,850 feet of runway and 500 feet of overrun were available on which to stop the aircraft. When the captain stated “Let’s go around,” the aircraft was about 3,450 feet beyond the threshold, or 1,200 feet of runway and 500 feet of overrun remained….

“Post-mortem examination of the 35 passengers and 2 crewmembers, revealed that they died of a combination of impact trauma, smoke inhalation, and third-degree burns. All but three of the surviving occupants of the aircraft received various bodily injuries. Their injuries included abrasions, contusions, lacerations, fractures, and burns…”

“Fire erupted immediately after the right wing struck the embankment. The fire emanated from a rupture in the right wing near the fuselage and was fed by aircraft fuel. It spread rapidly through the center section and right wing areas of the aircraft, isolating the separated tail section from the remainder of the cabin area. The cabin area, the inboard sections of both wings, and the interior of the cockpit were eventually destroyed by fire.

“The Virgin Islands Port Authority airport fire department responded to the accident before the aircraft had stopped. The fire vehicles proceeded down the runway onto the overrun. However, the driver of the lead fire vehicle determined visually that the trucks could not follow the path of the aircraft through the fence because of aircraft debris, “live” power lines, and dense smoke from the burning aircraft. The lead vehicle, with two others following, proceeded south along the perimeter fence and bypassed a closed knockdown gate that was blocked by parked automobiles. The three vehicles continued southwest and through an open gate. The vehicles then proceeded to the crash site, on the perimeter road. The first vehicle arrived on the scene about 2 minutes after the accident. The driver of the lead vehicle stated that the approach from the perimeter road placed him on the downwind side of the aircraft and that the dense smoke from the fire limited his visibility and firefighting capability. He also stated that aircraft debris, downed trees, and “live” powerlines prevented the truck from penetrating the accident area. No effort was made to move the vehicle through the impediments and approach the immediate vicinity of the aircraft wreckage. As a result, the lead vehicle was used to fight the fire from a distance of about 160 feet. In addition, only one proximity suit and no air packs were on the vehicle. Without an airpack, the fire could not have been fought in close proximity to the wreckage….” (NTSB 1976, 11-13)

“The accident was partially survivable. The structural integrity of the cabin area was compromised when it broke into three parts during the impact. Black, acrid smoke and intense fire penetrated the forward and center sections of the broken fuselage as the aircraft slid to a stop. The passengers and flight attendants who survived the accident escaped through breaks in the fuselage or through the overwing emergency exits on the left side of the fuselage within an estimated 1 to 1-1/2 minutes after the aircraft came to a stop. The three flight crewmembers escaped through the first officer’s sliding window.

“Several passenger seats broke loose from their mounts. Some were found outside of the immediate fuselage area. Because of the extensive fire damage, the security of all seats and seatbelts could not be determined….” (NTSB 1976, 13)

“Witness observations, crew statements, FDR information, and CVR information all indicate that the aircraft approached the runway in a normal profile which would result in a touchdown 1,000 feet or slightly more beyond the threshold. Instead of touching down, however, the aircraft floated 5 to 10 feet above the runway’s surface. The FDR data indicate that the aircraft floated between 7 and 8 seconds, during which time it would have traveled about 1,500 feet. This correlated with witness observations which placed the touchdown between 2,500 and 2,900 feet beyond the threshold. After touchdown, the captain, who was concerned that he would not be able to stop the aircraft on the remaining runway, decided to execute a go-around maneuver. He announced his intention to go around about 3 seconds after touchdown….” (NTSB 1976, 24)

“After the aircraft has landed, and particularly after a significant period of time with the thrust levers in idle, the engines are likely to be turning at minimum rotational speed. When the decision is made to go around, it will take about 6 to 7 seconds before the engines will accelerate to takeoff power. During at least part of this time, the aircraft will continue to decelerate while traveling down the runway at a high speed. As thrust develops, the aircraft must be accelerated back to liftoff speed. The Boeing Company’s analysis of this situation showed that a go-around initiated at 110 KIAS will require at least 1,912 feet of runway to achieve a liftoff with takeoff thrust. This distance increases to 2,387 feet if the pilot hesitates with the thrust levers at the vertical position.

“An inherent danger in the go-around maneuver is that the pilot will rotate the aircraft to the takeoff attitude before sufficient thrust has developed to counter deceleration. This procedure is likely to increase the distance required to lift off even more than that determined by the analysis.” (NTSB 1976, 25)

“The Safety Board, thus, concludes that a successful go-around could not have been executed when the captain attempted to do so. However, the analysis of the aircraft’s braking performance indicated that, using maximum braking and spoilers, the aircraft could have been stopped in less distance than required for go-around. In fact, after this landing, the captain should have been able to stop the aircraft on the runway and certainly within the confines of the runway overrun.” (NTSB 1976, 26)

“…when the captain realized that a go-around was impossible and that an accident was inevitable…[he] probably reacted impulsively and instinctively to the dangerous situation by applying full wheel brakes but he did not remember the more deliberate means of lowering the aircraft nose, deploying the spoilers, and applying maximum reverse engine thrust to attempt to stop the aircraft. Had the pilot used these deceleration means when he commenced braking at the 700 feet remaining mark, the aircraft might have been brought to a stop within the confines of the airport perimeter. At the very least, a much lower velocity impact would have occurred.” (NTSB 1976, 31)

“The Board believes that intensive training is the most effective means to combat the effects of this emergency mechanism. Had the captain been exposed during training to critical go-around situations and to the maximum performance stopping capabilities of the aircraft by means of flight simulation and lectures, he may have reacted appropriately in this situation.

“In summary, it is evident that the captain could have extracted himself twice from a dangerous situation and could have avoided this accident. His first opportunity was during the turbulence encounter just after passing the 1,000-foot touchdown area; he should have followed company procedures and should have initiated a go-around as soon as he regained control of his aircraft.

“His second opportunity to avoid the accident came when he decided to land the aircraft; he should have applied maximum performance stopping procedures to bring the aircraft to a stop within the remaining runway length. Furthermore, when an accident was inevitable, the captain had an opportunity to lessen the damage to the aircraft and to diminish the impact velocity; at this time, he should have applied maximum performance stopping procedures.

“Thus, while the Safety Board believes that the causal area of this accident involves the captain’s actions before and after the touch-down, his lack of substantive information about the aircraft’s stop or go-around performance capabilities seriously affected his ability to make a proper decision in this situation. The Board is aware that American Airlines’ training procedures have been revised to include these performance factors. An Operations Bulletin (FM2 C-13) was issued on August 16, 1976, and placed in the Flight Manual. The bulletin states that any decision to go-around at St. Thomas should be made and initiated no later than the 1,000-foot touchdown markers.” (NTSB 1976, 32)

Sources

Kimura, Chris Y. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Edition, 1946-1993, Volume 1: Jet and Turboprop Aircrafts. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Nuclear Engineering Group. 4-11-1994.

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. American Air Lines, Inc. Boeing 727-95, N1963, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, April 27, 1976 (NTSB-AAR-77-1). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted December 16, 1976, 67 pages. Accessed at: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR77-01.pdf

— 12 Delta Democrat-Times, Greenville, MS. “12 die in ‘copter crash.” Apr 23, 1976, p. 14.
— 12 Justia US Law. “Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 514 F. Supp. …” 5-21-1981.
— 12 Planecrashinfo.com. “1976. Accident Details. Petroleum Helicopter; Gulf Mex., Apr 23.”

Narrative Information

Justia US Law: “Memorandum Opinion. Just after sunrise on the morning of April 23, 1976, the helicopter piloted by the Plaintiffs’ decedent, Walter Barger, crashed into the Gulf of Mexico some 40 miles off the coast of Louisiana. Barger and all eleven of his passengers were killed. The *1203 Plaintiffs brought this suit pursuant to Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq. (DOHSA), and the general maritime law to recover for Barger’s death. The Defendants are Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. (PHI), Barger’s employer and the owner of the helicopter, and Bell Helicopters/Textron (Bell), the helicopter’s manufacturer. The cause of action against Bell is based on Texas tort law applicable in admiralty through DOHSA, see, e. g., Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 496 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980), and is pendent to the federal statutory and admiralty claims against PHI. Trial was to the Court.

“PHI is engaged in the business of transporting workers to and from drilling platforms in, among other places, the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Texas and Louisiana. It maintains offices in Sabine Pass, Texas, and Cameron, Louisiana. Barger was employed by PHI as a pilot of one of its helicopters. On the day in question, Barger was operating a Bell 205A-1 PHI-owned helicopter bearing aircraft registration number N8167J from Cameron to a drilling rig owned by Blue Dolphin Corporation in the Gulf of Mexico. Barger was ferrying eleven Blue Dolphin employees to the rig. Approximately 40 miles offshore and 5 to 6 miles from the Blue Dolphin rig, the tail boom separated from the main body of the helicopter in flight, causing it to spin uncontrollably and crash into the Gulf.

“The tail boom separated when two of the four longeron fittings that attach the tail to the cabin failed. The evidence establishes that the upper left longeron fitting failed due to corrosion and metal fatigue. The lower left longeron fitting failed immediately afterward, likewise due to corrosion and metal fatigue. Prior to the time of the crash, the two left fittings exhibited fatigue striations, which are marks on a fatigue fracture made by an advancing crack. The fatigue portions of the cracks were over an inch wide and an inch long in the upper left fitting and almost an inch and a half to an inch in the lower left. There were two cracks in each of the left longeron fittings. These cracks had been present for at least several hundred flight hours prior to the crash.

“PHI had removed the tail boom from the helicopter in question three years and 3,747 flight hours prior to the crash. On reassembly, one of the bolts used was of an incorrect type and five of other fasteners were installed backwards. Both the Bell 1204 instruction manual and PHI’s own inspection and maintenance procedures required that the longeron fittings be visually inspected every 100 flight hours. PHI had knowledge that there could be problems with these fittings in a corrosive environment by virtue of its having submitted to Bell nearly three years earlier a Malfunction Defect Report (MDR) along with a failed upper left fitting. In early 1974, Bell reported to PHI the cause of the failure, and orally advised a PHI employee that its inspection procedures should be modified so as to more closely inspect the longeron fittings, without providing specific instructions on how to do so.

“PHI is the largest commercial helicopter firm in the world and clearly has the requisite experience and expertise to properly inspect and maintain its helicopters. In particular, PHI’s mechanics are experts in the field of helicopter repair and maintenance, are FAA certified, and should be held to the standard of an expert. Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 464, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1976). As such, PHI could have been reasonably expected to devise a proper method of inspecting the longeron fittings on its helicopters, despite the lack of formal instructions from Bell. In fact, the National Transportation Safety Board inspector assigned to this crash found that, prior to the crash, PHI had in fact established a procedure to inspect these fittings. The failure of PHI’s employees to discover the cracks and the gouge in the two left longeron fittings during one of the 100 hour inspections that took place while the cracks were in existence and visible for about 300 flight hours prior to the crash constitutes negligence, which was a contributing cause of the crash and the death of the Plaintiffs’ decedent.

“The evidence indicates that the tail boom of helicopters operating in a corrosive environment should be completely removed and carefully scrutinized at no more than 1,000 flight-hour intervals. Such an inspection would have readily disclosed the fatigue cracks in the left longeron fittings. The failure of PHI to remove the tail boom from Barger’s helicopter for a period in excess of 3,700 flight-hours constitutes negligence, which was a contributing cause of the crash made the basis of this suit. PHI’s negligence in failing to perform this type of inspection is particularly blameworthy, as it previously had knowledge of the tendency of the longeron fittings to fail in the environment in which its business is conducted.

“The quantum of negligence required to impose liability under the Jones Act is very slight, and it need only be a contributing cause of the incident giving rise to the suit….The Plaintiffs easily satisfied this featherweight burden….

“The Court finds that such unseaworthy condition was a proximate cause of the crash…. the Court finds that the upper left longeron fitting, which is subject to more stress while underway than the other three fittings, was of insufficient strength and design for the use for which it is intended….

“The evidence unequivocally shows that Barger in no way contributed to causing the accident. In addition, there was nothing he could have done after the tail boom separated to prevent the crash. The Court finds that, on the occasion in question, the Plaintiffs’ decedent was not negligent….”

Planecrashinfo.com: “Fatigue fracture of tail boom fuselage attachment fitting. Pilot and 4 passengers not recovered.” No survivors. (Planecrashinfo.com.)

Newspaper

April 23: “New Orleans (UPI) — A helicopter en route to an offshore drilling rig with 12 persons aboard crashed today in the Gulf of Mexico 45 miles off the Louisiana coast. There were no reports of survivors. A Conoco Oil Co. crew boat, the Terry Lynn G, radioed it had picked up four bodies in the area of the crash. The search for possible survivors was centered in a four-square mile area. ‘We understand the wreckage has been located, but the Coast Guard has not found anything yet,’ said spokesman Tom Heflik. The spokesman said Petroleum Helicopters Inc., Lafayette, La., began a search when it received an unfamiliar “radio disturbance” about 8 a.m. from the aircraft carrying a pilot and 11 oil rig workers from Cameron [LA] to an offshore rig. ‘The chopper went down about three miles north of the rig they were supposed to land on’ Heflik said.

“The Coast Guard sent two helicopters from Houston, two from New Orleans, one airplane from Mobile, Ala., and the cutter Point Hope to the crash site. Petroleum Helicopters Inc. sent three additional helicopters to aid in the search and rescue effort.

“The crash was the second disaster involving oil rig workers in the Gulf of Mexico in eight days.
On April 15, 13 men died when an offshore rig they were helping tow to a drilling site off the Texas coast overturned in a storm. Coast Guard hearings into the Texas incident were under way in New Orleans when the helicopter crashed off Cameron.

“The helicopter, a Bell 205, was en route to the Blue Dolphin rig, leased by the Gulf Oil Corp. ‘It was one of our larger helicopters,’ said Jim Michel, a spokesman for the firm that owned the chopper….” (Delta Democrat-Times, Greenville, MS. “12 die in ‘copter crash.” 4-23-1976, p. 14.)

Sources

Delta Democrat-Times, Greenville, MS. “The South. 12 die in ‘copter crash.” Apr 23, 1976, p. 14. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=52606709

Planecrashinfo.com. “1976. Accident Details. Petroleum Helicopter; Gulf of Mexico, Apr 23.” Accessed at: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/1976/1976-31.htm

Justia US Law. “Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Tex. 1981).” 5-21-1981. Accessed 10-10-2021 at: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/514/1199/1961298/

— 13 Beard, Tom (Lt. Commander, Ret.). Ocean Express.
— 13 USCG. Marine Casualty Report. Ocean Express…Capsizing…15 April 1976… 1978.

Narrative Information

USCG Abstract: “On April 1976, the self-elevating drilling unit Ocean Express, capsized and sank while it was being towed by three tugs from one drilling site to another in the Gulf of Mexico. The crew, except for the barge mover, abandoned the rig in two survival capsules. The barge mover was evacuated by a Coast Guard helicopter just seconds before the Ocean Express capsized. All of the crew members in one of the capsules safely transferred to an attending vessel. The other capsule capsized in the vicinity of one of the tugs due to wave action and shifting weight. Seven men escaped from the overturned capsule and safely boarded the tugs, however, thirteen other persons were trapped inside and drowned.

“This report contains the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation report and the Action taken by the Commandant to determine the probable cause of the casualty and the recommendations to prevent recurrence.

“The Commandant concurs with the Board that the primary cause of the capsizing of the Ocean Express was the loss of directional control resulting from the loss of the Gulf Knight’s engine and the breaking of the Gulf Viking’s towline at a time when the weather conditions were worsening. This allowed the Ocean Express to drift broadside to the boarding seas.” (USCG. Marine Casualty Report. Ocean Express…Capsizing…15 April 1976… 1978.)

Beard: “….Ocean Express, an unusual ocean-going vessel, was in reality a movable offshore oil-drilling rig, in the form of a barge nearly 200 feet long and over 100 feet wide. It had three legs – steel columns or tubes — twelve feet in diameter. With the legs jacked down in the rig’s working position, their feet, and an attached lower-platform connecting them, rested on the seabed. Underway, towed by tugs, this lower platform was raised to eighty feet below the surface and the main platform floated, becoming an enormous barge with the legs towering nearly 240 feet above the sea’s surface. Centered on the platform and rising between these three giant tubes was the drilling derrick. Buildings on the barge’s deck provided offices and accommodation spaces for the 33 crewmembers working and living aboard.

“John Lewis related years later that, ‘What happened that night in April 1976, wrote a new chapter in offshore rescue — a chapter so complex’ it was years before a ‘Coast Guard Board of inquiry pieced together the story.’ Lewis flew with two others in his crew in a Sikorsky HH-52A, Seaguard, helicopter from Corpus Christi, Texas, into a storm in the Gulf of Mexico. While en route to the barge’s location, he was ‘pleased to hear from the bargemaster that the entire crew had gotten away in [survival] capsules.’ It was a bad night for flying. It was a very bad night on the Gulf of Mexico waters. The unexpected storm brought hurricane force winds. High winds were already battering the Naval Air station in Corpus Christi where Lewis, the senior duty officer at the Coast Guard air station, had all the aircraft brought into the hangar for protection. Gusts drumming the large hangar doors gave hints to the flight crews of promises for a night ahead. Shortly after 8 p.m. Lewis received a report that a floating drilling platform with 50 people on board was sinking in the Gulf. He had a choice between aircraft. He could fly the twin-engine amphibian, Grumman HU-16E Albatross, which could offer no assistance directly or the single-engine amphibian helicopter, Sikorsky HH-52A Seaguard, with limited abilities for this situation. Under ideal conditions, Lewis might expect to take ten survivors aboard the helicopter at one time. He elected to fly the helicopter and started for the scene in the storm. Conditions were already so severe in Corpus Christi that the Naval Air Station aircraft control tower operators abandoned the tower and closed the field.

“Soon after, a Navy helicopter following Lewis turned back when its pilots, buffeted and battered by the storm’s viciousness, saw the sea’s condition they might encounter in a rescue attempt. For them, this was a hopeless situation.

“As the storm began, three tugs were pulling the elevated rig along the Texas coast at three knots against the building southerly winds when one tug lost power. Sixty-knot winds twisted the rig around; the crippled tug was unable to hold. Next, a tow cable from a second tug parted. The storm intensified in the tempest-darkened night. Waves smashed over the now out-of-control barge, sweeping the deck as the ungainly craft wobbled and lurched, adrift in roiling seas no longer restrained by tugs. Stacks of drill pipes on the barge deck broke loose; the 363-ton derrick became detached at the base and began sliding. Foreseen by the bargemaster and crew was that unleashed weights moving to one side would soon capsize the barge in the still-building tempest. Their fears were shortly realized when the wallowing mass began to tilt. Accompanying tugs were unable to move in to assist or retrieve the barge crew. They had to get off without help.

“The crew abandoned ship in two capsule-like lifeboats once a radio distress-call went out. The bargemaster, however, unexpectedly remained on board, and with the lifeboats gone, there was no escape for him. Lewis discovered the captain’s plight when he arrived overhead, 54 miles out in the Gulf — instead of the expected 20 miles – and confirmed, he was talking to Ocean Express’ captain, who was using a hand-held radio.

“He then spotted the bargemaster clinging to the outer edge of the now tilted, helicopter landing-platform. Lewis was no longer only a witness to a maritime casualty, but instantly he realized he and his crew were the sole means available to save a man’s life. The sight, Lewis recalls, of the floundering rig as he flew near, ‘…was nightmarish.’ ‘It was like a movie set — all lights were on as it was being pummeled in huge waves.’ ‘I could see two orange capsules (containing the crew) beneath looking like they were in a washing machine.’ Seas were rolling over the barge. The Ocean Express’s helicopter landing-platform was upwind or at the forward edge of the barge deck and tilting upwards at an unusable 20 to 25 degrees. Even if the landing platform were utilizable to land, Lewis would have to fly the helicopter backwards and insert its tail between the wavering steel towers extending high above him plus miss striking the shifting drilling-tower.
Impossible.

“His only course was to hover alongside the towers, flying crosswind in winds gusting in excess of 60 knots in a helicopter that could only fly at 108 knots maximum in smooth air, much less in turbulence, and hoist the captain from the outer edge of the helicopter-landing platform. Lewis, after briefing his crew, started the first approach. Buffeting from wind surging over the platform’s edge made control of the helicopter close-in impossible. Storm-driven waves crashed into the platform, becoming windborne sheets of saltwater, then tumbling up and over the hovering helicopter. The single turbojet-engine mounted over the cockpit, ingested seawater in large gulps. The gas-turbine surged, critical engine rpm’s dropping with each saltwater dousing.

“Lewis waved off his first attempt, flying through sea spray on instruments. By the time he began his second approach, just moments later, the towers were already listing thirty degrees. Lewis knew now the rig was beginning to capsize. Only moments remained. The aircrewman, Aviation Machinist’s Mate First Class Harold J. Thomas, hung out the fuselage’s starboard side door into the slipstream about eight feet behind Lewis, attached to the aircraft only by a wide belt about his waist. A lanyard attached to the belt was snapped to a cabin-floor ring. Thomas directed Lewis verbally into position over the bargeman for the pickup with the cable-hoist with its attached rescue basket. Lewis recounted, ‘From the pilot’s seat in our helicopter you can’t see what you are hoisting because you have a pontoon out here, and so you have to depend on your crew member to talk to you…and he says come forward, come right, come left, he talks and tells you to hold. I was unable to hold it, although my crewmember, Thomas, was outstanding, real good that night, but I couldn’t hold the first time. I got on out here where there was no reference. Yet I made an instrument climb back out, came back downwind. I could see the captain standing up there. He was talking to us and trying to direct us in. So I came around the second time.’

“Work lights glowed over the entire rig, creating a strange illusion. There were no references for the pilot to orient to other than the rolling and swaying giant spaceship, caught in an eerie maelstrom, soaring in an ill-defined interface. But to him, the specter appeared stationary, unmoving against the black night. The helicopter, in contrast, seemed to the pilots to jump and roll about unmanageably against this false backdrop. This can be described as similar to the situation of waiting at a railroad-crossing in an automobile watching freight cars rush by at high speed then suddenly feeling as if the train is still and the car is moving sideways. Lewis experienced vertigo. His instruments read correctly but the stage was wandering. This is the ultimate in mind-numbing disorientation. The highly experienced Lewis did as he should, disregarding his feelings, and relying on instruments to fly safely away.

“Then the entire rug suddenly lit up in a brilliant, glaring bluish-light. Lewis exclaimed then he and his crew ‘clearly saw the tangle of pipe on deck, the shifted derrick.’ In this sudden bright light they saw the barge ‘rearing up backward like a horse and falling off to its right side.’ The mass repeated this ocean gallop, riding out each new wave.

“Captain Howard Thorsen, USCG, the Corpus Christi air station’s commanding officer, with Commander Richard McBride as co-pilot, followed Lewis’s helicopter out several minutes later in a second HH-52A, this one fitted with a ‘Night Sun’ floodlight. Thorsen lit the scene with the million-candlepower beam.

“Lewis backed his aircraft away and planned one more attempt with this new aid. The tower tips were now halfway to the water — the mass leaning forty-five degrees. He thought, ‘It’s now or never for that poor guy.’ Lewis moved the helicopter in for his expected last attempt. His only reference, the eerily glowing platform, suddenly began rearing up, pitching over nearly backwards. As he got close to it in a hover, the platform rose suddenly beneath the helicopter. Thomas, from his position hanging out the side door looking down at an instantly rising steel deck, yelled, ‘Up! Up!’ Lewis pulled away abruptly, a new wave of seawater cascading over his windscreen and helicopter. The barge captain still clung to the outer edge of the helicopter landing-pad elevated high above the tilting, and now sinking, barge beneath.

“Lewis explains next: ‘I abandoned that approach, but time seemed to be of the essence now, so rather than climbing out, I moved over to the side…and we had a little discussion, me and the crew, and tried to get a little better organized for this next approach in because it looked like the rig was maybe 45 degrees by this time, and when we were over here the waves that were hitting were — actually some of the waves and spray were getting up into the helicopter.’ To his copilot, Ensign John DiLeonardo, Lewis said, ‘See if you can monitor a seventy-five foot hover on the radar altimeter and keep us there,’ a mere 75 feet above the lunging, plunging steel decking. Later, Lewis related DiLeonardo’s feelings at that moment, sitting there in the helicopter’s left pilot-seat: His wife was pregnant with twins and it was then he revealed a sincerely felt regret, ‘I’m never going to see my twin boys.’

“To Thomas, Lewis said to start lowering the basket early and to be sure it was down on the platform as they arrived in a hover over the bargeman, because, ‘I knew I couldn’t stay in there very long; it was too turbulent. I don’t want to say that the helicopter was out of control but when I got over there it was blowing so hard and it was so turbulent that it was, just about.’ The hoist only held 100 feet of 3/16 inch stainless steel cable, 90 feet usable — the last ten painted red. Lewis was playing within 15 feet of vertical airspace to hit his target with the basket at the cable’s end.

“DiLeonardo called altitudes as he read them from the radar altimeter and Thomas directed Lewis into position with commands spoken in a monotone into his microphone, devoid of any emotion he might be experiencing, with the single phrases: ‘move forward,’ ‘move back,’ ‘move left,’ ‘move right,’ ‘come up,’ ‘down.’ Single or multiple commands were repeated continuously until Thomas got the desired response from Lewis’ placing the helicopter over the spot he targeted. But Lewis was steering a raging bull in attempting to place a wind-whipped basket, he can’t see on the end of a 75-foot cable, directly next to a frightened man on a surging platform where spatial relationships long before vanished.

“Only Thomas could see the barge’s sole occupant now with Lewis moving against the wind in a hover overhead. But just at the critical point where Thomas was sweeping the basket to the captain, DiLeonardo, obediently observing the radar altimeter, barked: ‘You’re losing altitude too fast!’ In a desperate cry he followed immediately with, ‘We’re going down!’ Thomas at the same moment losing professional calm, yelled, ‘Pull up, pull up, we’re going down fast!’

“The barge now in its final plunge rolled further; the basket scraped and bounded up a forever-increasing angle helicopter-landing platform toward the outer, now upper, edge. As a result of the barge’s sudden heeling, the barge’s helicopter-pad with the stranded captain rose rapidly. It was not the helicopter going down but the platform lunging upwards towards it. Lewis, in desperation for their safety, once again pulled away, flying on instruments, knowing this was their last chance to save a life. Waves blinded his view to the outside, smothered the helicopter, choking the engine once more as they dashed completely over the dragonfly in a tempest. It was a tough moment with the realization that they just lost a life, and their own in the next few seconds, too, relied on every skill Lewis could bring to controlling the helicopter.

“At that very same moment the basket — which bumped along on the platform — but down-slope from the captain, suddenly slid toward him with the suddenly swiftly rising helicopter. He grabbed on as it scooted by, just within reach, and frantically rolled in. The basket continued shooting upwards. Lewis, just trying to avoid the rising deck, did not know it until Thomas shouted, ‘We’ve got him — he’s in the basket!’

“Thorsen, still training the light from his hovering helicopter and watching from above, now witnessed an awesome sight. He recounted, as best he could, events later of a vivid image impossible for description by words: ‘Five seconds after John pulled away, the rig rolled over.’ Thorsen and his crew then sat as helpless spectators as Lewis’s helicopter vanished beneath the sudden cascading waves and wind-flung spray surging over the capsizing Ocean Express.

“And then, just as suddenly as it disappeared beneath the sea, the plucky “52” emerged through bounding waves and spray, seemingly coming up from beneath the sea’s surface — in flight, their survivor dangling in the basket below! The barge sank in those moments. Thirteen men in one escape capsule drowned when it capsized before rescuers could reach them. Lewis’ crewman, Thomas, after the helicopter landed, suffered a heart attack. Captain Van de Graaf, Bargeman, still remembers Commander Lewis with a card on Christmas every year.” (Beard, Tom (Lt. Commander, Ret.). Ocean Express.)

Sources

Beard, Tom (Lt. Commander, Ret.). Ocean Express. Accessed 12-19-2009 at: http://www.coastguardchannel.com/images/viewerCont/Stories/OceanExpress.pdf

United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report. Ocean Express (Drilling Unit); Capsizing and Sinking in the Gulf of Mexico on 15 April 1976 with Loss of Life (Report No. USCG 16732/61865). Washington, DC: Commandant, USCG, June 1, 1978, 106 pages. Accessed 10-7-2021 at: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/INV/docs/boards/oceanex.pdf

–26 Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). 1982, p. 317.
–15 March 9. Electrical sparks from mine locomotive ignites methane gas; miners killed
–11 March 11. Methane gas explosion during recovery and investigation operation.
–26 Mine Safety and Health Administration, Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the U.S.
–26 MSHA. Report of Investigation…Scotia Mine…Ovenfork…March 9 and 11… 8-11-1993.
–15 March 9 gas and coal dust explosion.
–11 March 11 gas and coal dust explosion.
–26 NIOSH, CDC. Coal Mining Disasters: 1939 to Present. 1-3-2013 update, page 7.
–15 March 9; explosion.
–11 March 11; explosion.
–26 US Mine Rescue Assoc. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Scotia Coal Company…”
–15 March 9.
–11 March 11.

Narrative Information

MSHA: “Two gas and coal dust explosions, the first at approximately 11:45 a.m., March 9, 1976, and the second at approximately 11:30 p.m., March 11, 1976, occurred in the 2 Southeast Main area of the Scotia Mine, Scotia Coal Company, Ovenfork, Letcher County, Kentucky. All 15 Men working in the 2 Southeast Main area at the time of the first explosion died as a result of the explosion. Ninety-one men in other parts of the mine at that time reached the surface without mishap. At the time of the second explosion, 13 men were underground near the entrance of 2 Southeast Main; 11 died as the result of the explosion and 2 repairmen working a short distance outby escaped without injury….

“MESA investigators believe that the first explosion originated near No. 31 crosscut in 2 Southeast Main when a mixture of methane and air was ignited by an electric arc or spark from a battery-powered locomotive. Forces of the explosion spread to all five 2 Southeast Main entries, extended into 2 Left Section off 2 Southeast Main and dissipated as they reached the Northeast Main junction…

“MESA investigators believe that the second explosion originated near the entrance of or in 2 Left Section off 2 Southeast Main when a methane-air mixture was ignited by one of five possible sources: an electric arc or spark from a battery-equipped deluge system; three battery-equipped telephones; scoop batteries; residual fires; or a frictional spark from a fall of mine roof on a roof-bolting machine. The forces of the explosion extended throughout 2 Left Section and all five entries of 2 Southeast Main, spread north and south in all entries in both panels of Northeast Main, and dissipated near the junction of 3 Southeast Main in the northern direction and near the junction of Southeast Main in the southern direction…”

(Mine Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. Report of Investigation, Underground coal Mine Explosions: Scotia Mine I.D. No. 15-02055 Scotia Coal Company, Ovenfork, Letcher County, Kentucky, March 9 and 11, 1976. 8-11-1993 release date. Abstract.)

Cole: “March 9, 1976 – Explosion occurred at Whitesburg, Kentucky killing 15 miners. 2 days later – A second explosion kills 11 rescue workers.” (Cole. History of MSHA, slide 21)

Contributes to passage by Congress in 1977 of Public Law 95-164, The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act:

• MESA moved to Department of Labor and changed to Mine Safety and Health Administration.
• Combined Coal and Metal/Nonmetal health and safety laws.
• Established the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.
• Expanded the rights of miners. (Cole. History of MSHA, slide 22)

Sources

Cole, Jesse P. (MSHA District 4 Manager). “History of MSHA,” Leadership Intensive Course Mine Safety and Health Administration. No date. 48 slides. Accessed 1-11-2009 at: http://www.usmra.com/repository/category/mining/modified_History_of_MSHA.ppt#256,1

Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.

Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the United States. Arlington, VA: MSHA, U.S. Department of Labor. Accessed 10-5-2008 at: http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCT8.HTM

Mine Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. Report of Investigation, Underground coal Mine Explosions: Scotia Mine I.D. No. 15-02055 Scotia Coal Company, Ovenfork, Letcher County, Kentucky, March 9 and 11, 1976. 8-11-1993 release date. Abstract. Accessed 5-31-2020 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/scotia_1976.pdf

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC. Coal Mining Disasters: 1939 to Present. NIOSH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1-3-2013 update, page 7. Accessed 5-31-2020 at: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/content/coaldisasters.html

United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Scotia Coal Company, Scotia Mine Explosions, Oven Fork, Letcher County, Kentucky, March 9 & 11, 1976.” Accessed 5-31-2020 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/scotia.htm

–5 NFPA. Deadliest Prison Fires in the United States. National Fire Protection Association.
–5 National Fire Protection Assoc. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003).
–5 Seletyn Blog. “WV: 1976 Explosion at the Mason County Jail.” 3-12-2020.

Narrative Information

Seletyn Blog: “While combing through old books in the genealogy room at the Point Pleasant library, I came across an old photo album containing news clippings that gave me pause. The subject of those clippings was the Mason County (WV) Jail bombing in 1976.

“Harriet Sisk confessed to the strangulation death of her two month old daughter, Davi Colline, on Feb 29, 1976. In her confession she noted that the baby had been crying after she tripped and fell while carrying her. Afterward, it was determined the child suffered from ongoing abuse. The investigation was brought on as a result of the child’s grandfather calling the police department to report her missing on Feb 28th. Authorities would find the body of the child in a shallow grave that was dug by Sisk and her husband, Bruce.

“Harriet Sisk was taken to the Mason County jail to await trial. Four days later, her husband would use a shotgun to force his way into the jail. He told the jailer he wanted to be in the cell with his wife. Once in the cell, the door was locked behind him. Once secured in the cell, the jail was evacuated. Bruce Sisk had carried a suitcase into the cell. Originally it was thought that Sisk used his shotgun to shoot the suitcase in which he had carried an estimated fifteen pounds of dynamite. It was later determined that he used an electric blasting cap ignited by a flashlight battery. His action created an explosion that took his and his wife’s life immediately as well as the life of the local sheriff.

“In all, three officers lost their lives and an additional eleven people were injured. Sheriff Pete Wedge, Deputy Kenneth Love and Jailer Ernest Hesson would die as a result of the intentional bombing.

“Authorities would later find a suicide note in the couple’s trailer in which a suicide pact was laid out. The shotgun would be tied back to a mid-February Mason County burglary. The dynamite had stolen from a construction company where Bruce Sisk was once employed. The Sisks had a second child, 18 month old Michael, who was taken by social workers during the arrest.” (Seletyn Blog. “WV: 1976 Explosion at the Mason County Jail.” 3-12-2020.)

Sources

NFPA. Deadliest Prison Fires in the United States. National Fire Protection Association. Accessed 5-26-2015 at: http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fires-by-property-type/prisons-and-jails/deadliest-prison-fires-in-the-united-states

National Fire Protection Association. Spreadsheet on Large Loss of Life Fires (as of Feb 2003). (Email attachment to B. W. Blanchard from Jacob Ratliff, NFPA Archivist/Taxonomy Librarian, 7-8-2013.)

Seletyn Blog. “WV: 1976 Explosion at the Mason County Jail.” 3-12-2020. Accessed 10-7-2021 at: https://seletyn.com/2020/03/12/wv-1976-explosion-at-the-mason-county-jail/

–12 Alton Telegraph, IL. “Editorials…Long overdue.” 3-12-1976, p. 4.
–12 Daily Leader, Pontiac, IL. “Father issues plea…for rail safety improvements.” 2-19-1976, 1
–12 Daily Leader, Pontiac, IL. “Order improvements at Beckemeyer crossings.” 4-9-1976, p. 1.
–12 Mt. Vernon Register News, IL. “Require Oscillating Lights on Locomotives…” 4-27-1976.
–12 Mt. Vernon Register News, IL. “Urge Closing of Railroad Crossing…12 Died.” 3-11-1976.
–12 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. FARS 1975-2010 Fatality Analysis.
–12 Southern Illinoisan, Carbondale. “State…federal agencies probe train…crash.” 2-9-1976, 3
–12 Southern Illinoisan, Carbondale. “Train kills 12 at Beckemeyer.” 2-8-1976, p. 1.

Narrative Information

Feb 8, AP: “Beckemeyer (AP). At least 12 persons were killed Saturday evening in this Southern Illinois community when a camper truck and a freight train crashed at an unguarded crossing, police said.

“State police said 15 persons were packed into the recreational vehicle. They apparently were members of two Illinois families, thought to be related.

“”Right now we have 12 confirmed fatalities,” said Sgt. William Pierce. “We have three others being treated.” Pierce said he thought most of the people in the camper were children. “I don’t know how else you could pack that many people into one of those things,” he said. “It was an unprotected crossing,” Pierce added, “no lights, no gates, no nothing, nothing.”….

Beckemeyer is located between Centralia and St. Louis.” (Southern Illinoisan, Carbondale. “Train kills 12 at Beckemeyer.” 2-8-1976, p. 1.)

Feb 9: “A corps of state and federal investigators is trying to piece together details of a railroad crossing collision that “just exploded” a truck packed with children, killing a dozen people. Eleven of the dead were youngsters, the 12th was Henry Lowe, 60, who was taking eight of his grandchildren and their seven friends on a weekly Saturday night skating trip.

“Lowe’s truck camper was smashed by a 67-car Baltimore and Ohio freight at an unguarded crossing in Beckemeyer, a community of 1,100 about 50 miles east of St. Louis.

“James Knapp, of Beckemeyer, driving across the tracks from the opposite direction, saw the impact. It looked like the pickup just exploded, he said Sunday. ‘I ran up there and I just found dead ones laying all through there. There were two up, two boys. I put them in my car.’ Before police arrived, he had found two more survivors and six bodies.

“The train reportedly was traveling at 56 miles an hour, and it took engineer O. J. Coers about four-tenths of a mile to bring the train to a stop. The train pushed the camper through a neighborhood of modest homes and past Beckemeyer’s business district, leaving it heaped beside a grain elevator.

“Three of the dead were found in the cab. No one on the train was injured.

“Knapp said he watched as Lowe approached the crossing, thinking he might not made it. As the truck reached the top of the raised concrete ramp, it ‘was going about 10 or 15 miles per hour.’ Knapp recalled.

“Robert Phillips, the town’s part-time police chief, said Lowe was on his way to gather more children for their weekly outing to a roller skating rink in Highland.

“Temperatures were in the teens, but there was no ice or snow at the crossing and the night was brightly lit by a half moon.

“Knapp said he heard the engineer blow his air horn three times as the train approached. He said there were three more blasts a moment later, and the train’s headlight was on as it slammed into Lowe’s side of the vehicle….

“A two-man National Transportation Safety Board team flew in from Washington in interview the train crew and witnesses. Also investigating were state and local police, the Illinois Commerce Commission and the railroad. An NTSB spokesman said a report on the accident is expected in about two weeks.

“A B&O spokesman said 60 miles per hour is the limit it sets on the Beckemeyer tracks. Chief Phillips said the town has no restrictions on train speeds. State police said there is no law against riding in a camper.

“Traditional white and black crossing signs mark the intersection but they are not equipped with lights, bells or gates.

“Mayor Clinton Hoffman said the community has tried in the past to improve safety at that crossing and a similar one. Only one of the four crossings in town has gates. Huffman said other people have been killed at the intersections but none recently. He said the railroad was responsible for crossing safety devices….” (Southern Illinoisan, Carbondale. “State and federal agencies probe train-camper crash.” 2-9-1976, p. 3.)

Feb 19: “Carlyle, Ill. (AP) – The father of two children killed when a fast freight slammed into a camper truck packed with youngsters has issued a plea to the President, Congress and other officials for safety improvements. A dozen people died Feb. 7 in Beckemeyer when the truck, driven by Henry Lowe, 60, of rural Carlyle, attempted to cross tracks safeguarded only by signs. Six of the children were Lowe’s grandchildren. Two of the dead, Robert 13, and Allen, 15, were N.J. Moorleghen’s sons.

“In an open letter written to the President, Congress, the governor, the state legislature and other officials, including railroad officers, Moorleghen demanded action. His plea was written the day after the crash. It read in part:

“We have spent billions of dollars to support and fight a useless war with tremendous loss of life. We have spent billions to bail out banks and big business. We have spent billions to provide arms to sustain governments which exist through force and oppression rather than popular support of the governed.

“We have spent billions to build highways to replace existing good highways which are adequate, while neglecting those that are most hazardous, contributing to additional loss of life.

“We squander millions on ridiculous and sometimes immoral research on ‘pot’ and sexual responses at Southern Illinois University. But we cannot spend dollars for safety devices to preserve life itself.

“In attempts to console the anguished, we will be told over and over that what will be will be. When has there been action taken to control the speed of trains through our communities?

“I petition everyone to act now and to demand action now to spare other parents and relatives the agony, the anguish and the unbearable sorrow that has beset the parents, brothers and sisters of the 11 children and the family of the grandfather (who so loved children) who were killed last night…because it costs too much for adequate safeguards at rail crossings.

“May God protect and preserve you from such an experience as I and others have suffered.

“You have found money for almost everything. Won’t you find just a little money to help guarantee to the people of this nation our constitutional provisions for the pursuit of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for our citizens?”

“Moorleghen is…regional superintendent of schools in Clinton…Washington counties.” (Daily Leader, Pontiac, IL. “Father issues plea to Ford for rail safety improvements.” 2-19-1976, p. 1.)

Feb 19: Springfield, Ill. (AP) — A formal state inquiry will be held March 10 into railroad crossing safety in the village of Beckemeyer where 12 persons were killed two weeks ago when a train hit a truck.

“Marvin Lieberman, chairman of the Illinois Commerce Commission, said Wednesday that village officials and representatives of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the state Department of Transportation have been asked to attend the March 10 hearing in Springfield.

“The village has two unprotected railroad crossings, he said, and the hearing will include discussion of whether to barricade the crossings or to install automatic flashing lights or other protection devices. The accident Feb. 7 occurred at a crossing which was not protected with flashing lights or signal devices.” (Daily Leader, Pontiac, IL. “State to hold inquiry into train-camper disaster.” 2-19-1976, 1.)

March 11, AP: “Springfield, Ill. (AP) — An Illinois Commerce Commission railroad utilities engineer has testified that a railroad crossing in Beckemeyer where 12 persons were killed last month is hazardous and should be closed. Ronald Dace testified at an ICC hearing Wednesday on the results of his four-day study of the Scoville Street crossing where a Baltimore and Ohio freight train slammed into a camper truck on Feb. 7. Eleven of the fatalities were children, and the 12th was Henry Lowe. 60, who was taking the youngsters on a weekly skating trip.

“`Based on the visibility in combination with the steepness of the grade cross, in my opinion. Scoville Street is a hazardous crossing,’ Dace said.

“Michael Pfaff, who was representing the commission in the hearing, asked Dace what he personally thought should be done about the crossing. ‘Considering the amount of inconvenience…and regarding the inherent hazard of any crossing…in my opinion, the crossing would best serve the interests of the people if it were closed and abolished,’ Dace said.

“The hearing was called by the ICC to determine whether any action should be taken regarding the Scoville Street crossing and another railroad crossing in Beckemeyer. Both are protected only by reflectorized signs.

“The hearing examiner, Bernard Morris, emphasized the proceeding was “not to establish guilt or
innocence in the accident.” Attorneys for the railroad, the village of Beckemeyer, a community of about 1,000 persons some 50 miles east of St. Louis, and the Illinois Department of Transportation also appeared at the hearing.” (Mt. Vernon Register News, IL. “Urge Closing of Railroad Crossing Where 12 Died.” 3-11-1976, p. 1.)

March 12: “Where has the. Illinois Commerce Commission been all these years? It moved into the latter half of the 20th century this week — at last.

“Chairman Marvin Lieberman urged creation of a task force to speed up installation of safety devices at potentially hazardous railroad crossings throughout the state.

“Apparently it took the crash that killed 12 persons at Beckemeyer to get the ICC off dead center.

“Local officials have experienced, for a long time, the effort it takes to get the ICC’s action of individual cases. The required statutory process is just too crippling.

“Lieberman’s proposed task force could order installation of safety devices without mandatory formal hearings. But new legislation establishing the group has to be passed. The proposed task force would include one member of the ICC staff, one from the Department of Transportation, and representatives of labor, the railroad industries, the legislature, law enforcement agencies, associations of municipal officials, and auto clubs. Composition of the task force appeals to us as being well conceived.

“Lieberman suggests that the task force’s first job should be to compile up-to-date information on rail intersections and establish a priority list of those requiring attention.

“We wouldn’t be surprised to find the body eventually calling authority to order grade separations at certain crossings. Once the safety devices were installed, the next responsibility would be up to motorists, themselves. Frequent complaints arise that motorists disregard such devices. Some even drive around crossing gates lowered to block motor traffic while trains pass.” (Alton Telegraph, IL. “Editorials…Long overdue.” 3-12-1976, p. 4.)

April 9: “Springfield, Ill. (AP) — The state has been ordered to pay for about $86,000 in improvements at two railroad crossings in Beckemeyer, the village where 12 persons were killed recently in a collision between a camper truck and a train.

“In a ruling announced Thursday, the ICC ordered that automatic flashing light signals be installed and the crossing approach improved at the Scoville Street crossing where the fatal collision occurred. The crossing is marked only with a railroad crossing sign. The village has been ordered to put up stop signs at the crossing within 60 days while the new signals are installed.

“The commission also ordered that crossing gates be installed at the Louis Street intersection and that the Randall Street crossing be closed within 60 days. The improvements will cost the state an estimated $85,640 with any extra costs to be borne by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad whose trains run through the town.

“The railroad was ordered to barricade the Randall Street crossing while it is removed and maintain the other three crossings.

“All work must be completed within a year, the order said. Eleven children and a 60-year-old man were riding in the camper Feb. 7 when the collision occurred.” (Daily Leader, Pontiac, IL. “Order improvements at Beckemeyer crossings.” 4-9-1976, p. 1.)

April 27: “Washington (AP) — Every locomotive in the country would be required to show oscillating lights under a proposal put forward by Rep. Paul Simon. In a letter to the Federal Railroad Administration outlining his plan, the Southern Illinois Democrat says such lights might help avert crashes at crossings like one in Beckemeyer, Ill., two months ago. A dozen people died there when a fast freight slammed into a camper crowded with children.

“Writing Monday [April 26] to FRA Director Asaph H. Hall, Simon urged the agency “to make the use of oscillating lights mandatory for trains during dusk to dawn hours …I can tell you from my own night time driving experience on the flat Illinois prairie land that a distant train light can easily be mistaken for a farmhouse utility light.” Revolving lights, he said, would eliminate possible confusion.

“A spokesman for Simon said the congressman had no estimate of the cost of such installations. But Simon said they would be worth it if they saved just’ one life or avoided one injury. Simon told Hall he believes the FRA has authority to require the lights. If Hall disagreed, he said, appropriate legislation, would be drafted.” (Mt. Vernon Register News, IL. “Require Oscillating Lights on Locomotives—Rep. Simon.” 4-27-1976, 3.)

Sources

Alton Telegraph, IL. “Editorials…Long overdue.” 3-12-1976, p. 4. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=115204393

Daily Leader, Pontiac, IL. “Father issues plea to [President] Ford for rail safety improvements.” 2-19-1976, 1. At: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=96134736

Daily Leader, Pontiac, IL. “Order improvements at Beckemeyer crossings.” 4-9-1976, p. 1. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=96135091

Daily Leader, Pontiac, IL. “State to hold inquiry into train-camper disaster.” 2-19-1976, 1. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=96134736

Mt. Vernon Register News, IL. “Require Oscillating Lights on Locomotives—Rep. Simon.” 4-27-1976, 3. At: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=162438030

Mt. Vernon Register News, IL. “Urge Closing of Railroad Crossing Where 12 Died.” 3-11-1976, 1. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=162437431

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Partial Data Dump of Crashes Involving 10 or More Fatalities, by Year, Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 1975-2009 Final and 2010 ARF. Washington, DC: NHTSA, pdf file provided to Wayne Blanchard, 1-26-2012.

Southern Illinoisan, Carbondale. “State and federal agencies probe train-camper crash.” 2-9-1976, 3. At: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=95827951

Southern Illinoisan, Carbondale. “Train kills 12 at Beckemeyer.” 2-8-1976, p. 1. Accessed at http://www.newspaperarchive.com

–10 NFPA. “1976 Multiple-Death Fires in the United States.” Fire Journal, 71/5, Sep 1977, 63.
–10 National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 137.
–10 NY Times. “10 Reported Dead and 1 Missing in Fire on the Upper West Side.” 2-4-1976, 1.
–10 New York Times. “City is Accused as Fire Kills 10.” 2-5-1976, p. 1.

Narrative Information

NFPA, 1977: “Tenement house, New York, N.Y. Seven children between the ages of one and twelve years and three women died in this early-morning fire on February 4 on Manhattan’s upper West Side. The cause of this ten-fatality fire was believed to have been careless disposal of a cigarette in a first-story living room. The fire spread from a couch through pipe recessed to the second and third stories. All of the victims were killed by carbon monoxide gas.”

Newspaper

Feb 4, NYT: “Ten persons were reported dead and one missing in an early‐morning blaze today that swept through a six‐story tenement on the upper West Side. None of the victims of the three‐alarm fire at 311 West 94th Street, near Riverside Drive, was immediately identified, although a spokesman at Fire Department headquarters said all the dead were civilians —apparently residents of the building.

“The cause of the fire, on which an alarm was first received at 12:21 A.M. by Fire Headquarters, was not known this morning. Firemen were still battling to control the blaze at 2:30 A.M.

“Four of the dead were reported to have been found on the top floor. They were said to be two women and two girls about 8 to 10 years of age.

“A fireman from Ladder Company 22, one of the first units to respond, reported that residents of the building were showing panic when he arrived. The fireman, who declined to, be identified declared:

People were all over the fires, escape. There was Just a little hit of smoke. All the fire was going out the hack. People were trapped on the sixth floor, but we couldn’t get to them.”

(NY Times. “10 Reported Dead and 1 Missing in Fire on the Upper West Side.” 2-4-1976, p. 1.)

Feb 5, NYT: “An Upper West Side fire that killed 10 persons early yesterday quickly became a focus of controversy, with some survivors contending that the Fire Department had taken up to half an hour to respond to the alarm and Fire Commissioner John T. O’Hagan insisting that it had taken only three minutes. ‘When you’re waiting for emergency vehicles, a minute can seem like an hour,’ Mr. O’Hagan said at a news conference called to defend the department’s handling of the fire, which also injured 15 persons, five of them firemen.

“The Fire Commissioner said circumstantial evidence, particularly the intensity of the fire when the first companies arrived on the scene, suggested that the blaze had been going for “20 or 30 minutes” when the alarm was raised. ‘If we had been called earlier, we might have been able to help,’ he said….

“…the blaze…swept through a six‐story gray stone building at 311 West 94th Street….Fire marshals believe the blaze started in an upholstered chair in a ground‐floor apartment at the rear of the building, possibly from a smoldering cigarette. It spread quickly up pipes recesses to the fourth floor, filling the building with smoke and intense heat.

“Of those who died, seven were children under the age of 12. Two of the victims, both small children, were found in the charred remains of the ground‐floor apartment. Eight others, including three adults, were found huddled together in an apartment on the sixth floor, all asphyxiated….

“There were scenes of hysteria as dozens of residents of the building crowded onto fire‐escapes at the front and rear of the building, screaming in Spanish, “Fuego!” (fire) and “Ayuda me!” (help me). Before the police arrived and lowered to the ground the last section of the fire‐escape at the front of the building, several persons jumped from a second‐floor balcony onto plastic bags filled with garbage that had been dragged onto the sidewalk to break their fall.

“Many survivors fled into the street wearing only nightclothes. They stood huddled together for warmth in the 26‐degree cold. Some stood barefoot on the icy, slushy sidewalk.

“After the fire had been put out, the building was ordered evacuated. The Red Cross arranged for some of the 60 surviving residents to stay overnight in its headquarters at 66th Street and Amsterdam Avenue. Others were moved to nearby hotels. By late yesterday, all were in hotels, and the Red Cross had provided many with bags of second‐hand clothing.

“At his news conference, Commissioner O’Hagan said he had checked tape recordings at the Fire Department’s Communications Center in Central Park. They showed, he said, the first alarm was given at 12:21 A.M. from an alarm box at 94th Street and Riverside Drive. Three minutes later, he went on, at 12:24, an engine company was on the scene. The fire was declared under control at 2:39 A.M.

“The Commissioner said he had also checked with the Police Department to determine when it had received the first 911 call. This was at 12:19 A.M. and was promptly relayed to the Fire Department, he said…. It was “the severity of the fire,” rather than any delay in his men’s response to it, that caused the deaths, he said.

“The Commissioner noted that the adults in the ground‐floor apartment, where the fire broke out, were asleep at the time, and were awakened by the cries of the 4‐year‐old child, Harold Dieujuste, who died. This suggested that the fire could have got a strong hold before the alarm was raised, he said. As for the victims in the sixth‐floor apartment, Mr. O’Hagan said that firemen attempting to reach them from the roof had found the heat and smoke so intense that it was impossible to descend the fire escape, the only remaining access.” (New York Times. “City is Accused as Fire Kills 10.” 2-5-1976, p. 1.)

Sources

National Fire Protection Association. “1976 Multiple-Death Fires in the United States.” Fire Journal, Vol. 71, No. 5, September 1977, pp. 61-64.

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

New York Times. “10 Reported Dead and 1 Missing in Fire on the Upper West Side.” 2-4-1976, p. 1. Accessed 10-5-2021 at: https://www.nytimes.com/1976/02/04/archives/10-reported-dead-and-1-missing-in-fire-on-the-upper-west-side.html

New York Times. “City is Accused as Fire Kills 10.” 2-5-1976, p. 1. Accessed 10-5-2021 at: https://www.nytimes.com/1976/02/05/archives/city-is-accused-as-fire-kills-10-survivors-charge-a-delay-in.html

—  24  Cowan, David. Great Chicago Fires:  Historic Blazes That Shaped a City. 2001, 137.

—  24  National Bureau of Standards 1984, p. 2

—  24  NFPA. Deadliest fires in facilities for older adults Since 1950.  2003

—  24  NFPA. Investigation Report: Wincrest Nursing Home Fire.  Undated, p. 4.

—  24  National Fire Protection Association.  The 1984 Fire Almanac.  1983, p. 137.

—  24  National Fire Sprinkler Association. F.Y.I. 1999, p. 7.

—  23  City of Chicago. Report of the Investigation of the Wincrest Nursing Home Fire. 1976.

—  23  Emergency & Disaster Management, Inc.  Chicago Disasters.

—  23  Wikipedia.  “Wincrest Nursing Home Fire.”

—  22  National Fire Protection Association.  Preliminary Report:  Wincrest Nursing Home.

 

Narrative Information

 

City of Chicago: “The 1976 Wincrest Nursing Home Fire took place on Friday, January 30, 1976 in Chicago. The fire occurred when an arsonist set a wardrobe closet on fire at the Wincrest Nursing Home building. The alarm sounded at 11:30 a.m. and the fire was put out at 1:30 p.m. Although the building itself sustained minor smoke, fire and water damage, 24 people died from smoke inhalation. A 21 year old housekeeper was arrested by authorities and was charged with multiple accounts of arson.

“At the time of the fire, the building was occupied by 83 residents[1], three nurses, 2 aides and eleven office, kitchen and maintenance staff. 28 of the residents were in the chapel room on the third floor of the building.”  (Chicago. Report…Wincrest Nursing Home Fire, p. 9)

 

“Fire was reported in room 306 by a nurse’s aide who pulled the fire alarm box. The alarm was received by the Chicago Fire Department at 11:43 a.m. (CDT). Attempts to put out the fire by staff proved to no avail. The first fire engine arrived at the scene of the fire 3 minutes and 40 seconds later as nursing home staff evacuated the burning building. More fire engines arrived seconds later as smoke was seen rising from the top of the building.”   (Chicago. Wincrest., 10)

 

“At 11:46 A.M., firefighters fighting the fire, discovered the third floor heavily laden with smoke and trapped elderly patients in wheelchairs. The victims were immediately removed from the burning building and were transported to nearby hospitals.” (Chicago. Report…Wincrest Nursing Home Fire, p. 10)

 

“The fire was put out at 1:28 p.m. CDT. The room where the fire broke out was completely gutted and the adjacent corridor sustained only moderate smoke and heat damage. Three other rooms also suffered heat and smoke damage. No smoke damage was evident on the second or first floors and water damage was minor. However despite the minor damage to the building, 23 fatalities were reported due to smoke inhalation.”  (Chicago. Report…Wincrest…Home Fire, 11)

 

“An investigation made by the Chicago Police Department and fire department. The survivors claimed that the fire was started in a plywood wardrobe closet in Room 306 which was unoccupied at the time. Although the actual cause of the fire was unknown, the Police Bureau of Investigation arrested a housekeeper who was charged with multiple counts of arson. It is unclear, however, how the authorities determined that the fire was an act of arson, and the arsonist‘s motives for starting the fire were never noted.

“The investigation also indicated that the smoke and heat from the fire raced down the corridor and entered rooms where doors were left open. In addition, a window was left open, reducing the amount of smoke and toxic gas entering the chapel area and the lounge room thus preventing further fatalities. Investigators also cited the difficulty of moving elderly patients in wheelchairs to the nearby stairway and the inability of elderly patients of evacuating themselves from the third floor where the fire took place.” (Chicago. Report…Wincrest…Home Fire, 12)

 

The City of Chicago and the Board of Health made several safety improvements after the fire. These improvements include:

 

• Installing a sprinkler system in all new and existing nursing homes and that the new sprinkler systems must be connected with the fire alarm system.
• Requiring emergency training for all nursing home staff which includes transporting patients during an emergency, maintaining designated areas for family members and establish a roll call system for nursing home personnel.

 

• The abolishment of dead end corridors in nursing home.

 

• Requiring all nursing home management to have a background check on all nursing home employees.

 

• A disaster plan and regular emergency drills made by the Board of Health.

 

• A requirement of residents to wear identification bands.

 

• Stricter smoking rules were enforced after the fire. Now, residents or visitors must smoke in designated areas supervised by staff.”

 

(City of Chicago. Report of the Investigation of the Wincrest Nursing Home Fire. 1976.)

 

Cowan: “Fire was reported in room 306 by a nurse’s aide who pulled the fire alarm box. The alarm was received by the Chicago Fire Department at 11:43 a.m. (CDT). Attempts to put out the fire by staff proved to no avail. The first fire engine arrived at the scene of the fire 3 minutes and 40 seconds later as nursing home staff evacuated the burning building. More fire engines arrived seconds later as smoke was seen rising from the top of the building.”

 

“Hook-and-Ladder 47 was the first to arrive, within 3 minutes of the initial alarm.  Wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, the firefighters raced up the stairs to the top floor, then felt their way along the walls in the blinding smoke.  They found elderly residents either gasping for breath or already slumped over unconscious in their wheelchairs in the chapel.  Needing help to remove the victims, they placed a special call for three additional flying squads.  Three minutes later a 2-11 alarm was transmitted.  The city’s disaster plan alerting all area hospitals and social service agencies was also put into effect.”  (Cowan 2001, 137)

 

NFPA: “The Wincrest Nursing Home is a licensed intermediate care facility for 88 patients. Eighty-three patients were residents in the home when the fire occurred.[2][1] The home was Federally funded through the Medicaid program administered by the Illinois Department of Public Health.”  (NFPA Preliminary Report)

 

“Many of the Wincrest residents were in the chapel where a Mission Priest was conducting services when the fire occurred. Some were sitting on wooden pews at the front (south) of the chapel and many were in wheelchairs in the main area of the room.” (NFPA, Prelim. Report)

 

“The Administrator of the nursing home had been through the third floor area approximately twenty minutes before the fire. The nursing home engineer was rinsing the corridor floor shortly before the fire. A nurse’s aide was working in rooms on the third floor. She went downstairs and then returned by elevator to the third floor. She saw smoke coming from room 306 and she noted that the door to the room was open. She yelled to those in the chapel and a nurse came running. The nurse activated the fire alarm station nearest to the chapel and then shut the door to room 306. The nurse’s aide called the switchboard for help and then she began to evacuate residents from the rooms on the east end of the building.

 

“The building engineer was on the second floor when he heard the fire alarm. He rushed to the first floor and was told there was a fire on the third floor. When he arrived at room 306, the priest was using a portable fire extinguisher, trying to direct the extinguishing agent over the top of the open door onto the fire. The engineer entered the room with another extinguisher and attempted to extinguish the fire, but was driven out by the heat and smoke. He described the fire as coming from the top of a clothes wardrobe inside the room. The engineer went downstairs to get fresh air and then helped to evacuate residents.” (NFPA Preliminary Report)

 

“All residents who died were located in the chapel. Thirteen patients died initially, but others have died since the fire and the total now is 22 dead.”  (NFPA Preliminary Report)

 

Sources

 

City of Chicago. Report of the Investigation of the Wincrest Nursing Home Fire. 1976. Accessed at: http://tripatlas.com/1976%20Wincrest%20Nursing%20Home%20Fire

 

Cowan, David. Great Chicago Fires: Historic Blazes That Shaped a City. Lake Claremont Press, 2001, 169 pages. Partially digitized by Google. Accessed at:  http://books.google.com/books?id=ZHPg3siVm4EC

 

Emergency & Disaster Management Inc. Chicago Disasters. Accessed 1-22-2008 at:  http://www.emergency-management.net/chicago_di.htm

 

National Bureau of Standards. Fire Performance of Furnishings as Measured in the NBS Furniture Calorimeter, Part 1. Washington, DC: NBS, National Engineering Laboratory, Center for Fire Research, Department of Commerce, January 1984, 135 pages. Accessed at:  http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire84/PDF/f84002.pdf

 

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983 (p137).

 

National Fire Protection Association. Deadliest Fires in Facilities for Older Adults Since 1950.  Accessed 1-22-2009 at:  http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=795&itemID=20732&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fact%20sheets/Nursing%20homes/Deadliest%20fires%20in%20facilities%20for%20older%20adults

 

National Fire Protection Association. Preliminary Report: NFPA Fire Analysis Department, Wincrest Nursing Home. Boston, MA:  NFPA. Accessed 1-29-2009 at:  http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=hb9v19p0sd&doc.view=frames&chunk.id=div00008&toc.depth=1&toc.id=div00008&brand=calisphere

 

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf

 

Wikipedia. “1976 Wincrest Nursing Home Fire.” Accessed 1-29-2009 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1976_Wincrest_Nursing_Home_Fire

 

[1] Average age, 87 (Cowan 2001, p. 136)

[2][1] Average age, 87 (Cowan 2001, p. 136)

–20  Fremont Tribune. “Fremont residents recall Hotel Pathfinder explosion 35 years later.” 1-10-2011.

–20  Lincoln Journal Star. “12 of the deadliest disasters in Nebraska history.” 6-15-2017.

–20  National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Key Dates in Fire History.  1996.

–20  NFPA. U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State.  December 2008, p. 22.

–20  National Fire Sprinkler Association.  F.Y.I.  1999, 7.

–20  Omaha World-Herald. “Forty years ago, a hotel explosion killed 20…Fremont’.” 2-1-2016.

 

Narrative Information

 

2016, Omaha World Herald, NE: “Fremont, Neb. — …. natural gas that had been leaking into the basement of Fremont’s tallest building, the six-story Pathfinder Hotel, exploded with atomic fury. Chunks of sidewalk the size of compact cars were hurled into the air. The bottom two floors of the hotel collapsed into the basement. Windows were broken on buildings blocks away. Twenty died; 40 were injured….

 

“The hotel and eight other buildings had to be demolished, hastening the migration of businesses from the city’s downtown to its outskirts….‘It changed the history of Fremont,” said retired businessman Marv Welstead. “The city’s skyline was never the same.’….

 

“It took more than a year, and a federal grant, before demolition began on the 115-room Pathfinder. Welstead said it took 2½ years to get all of the damaged buildings torn down and lots cleaned up. It was more than a decade before new construction began on the rubbled lot along busy U.S. Highway 77 where the hotel stood….

 

“Built in 1917, the Pathfinder was still a hub of the community in 1976, even though many of its rooms had been converted to apartments for the elderly.

 

“The hotel had a cafe, a lounge, the Chamber of Commerce office, a drugstore, barber shop and the “Top of the Hotel Ballroom,” the site of holiday parties and other large gatherings. In its heyday, the hotel’s famous guests included evangelist Billy Sunday and Helen Keller….

 

“People started smelling gas about 6 a.m. on the day of the explosion, which occurred at 9:33 a.m. on a chilly Saturday.

 

“Extremely cold weather played into the tragedy. Workers had retrofitted 4-inch gas mains in the area by inserting 2-inch plastic pipes within them. Low temperatures, which fell to 25 below zero that winter, caused a new fitting to contract. It began leaking gas beneath the hotel… gas filled the basement of the hotel, which extended under the sidewalks surrounding the building. The blast not only blew out windows and collapsed the interior of the hotel but sent huge concrete chunks skyward.

 

“One crashed through the roof and into the basement of the Vienna Bakery across the four lanes of Broad Street (or U.S. 77) from the hotel. Another flattened a car. Besides the eight buildings that were torn down, the top stories of two other buildings, including Rump’s Furnace, had to be removed….” (Omaha World-Herald (Paul Hammell) NE. “Forty years ago, a hotel explosion killed 20 and ‘changed the history of Fremont’.” 2-1-2016.)

 

2017, Lincoln Journal Star, NE: “The Hotel Pathfinder explosion on Jan. 10, 1976, in Fremont killed 20 people and injured more than 40. It also changed the face of downtown….The blast was blamed on an underground gas coupling that pulled apart, and Northern Natural Gas Co. was found liable, the Fremont Tribune report said.” (Lincoln Journal Star. “12 of the deadliest disasters in Nebraska history.” 6-15-2017.)

 

Newspapers at the Time

 

Jan 10: “Fremont — At least four persons are dead and 50 to 100 are believed still trapped in the Pathfinder Hotel in Fremont following a mid-morning explosion and fire. At noon, rescue workers were unable to reach persons thought to be trapped on the lower of floors of the five-story hotel because the fire was still burning out of control three hours after the explosion. Gov. J. J. Exon has declared a state of emergency for the area. ‘It’s terrible. There are people screaming and crying outside the hotel. I’m afraid there are people inside there,’ said Alvin Jenson, the owner of a café across the street from the hotel. He said the blast knocked out all the windows and part of the ceiling of his business.

 

“At noon authorities cleared a two-block area around the hotel because of the strong smell of natural gas. Early reports speculated the hotel’s boiler had exploded.

 

“Mike Miller, administrator at th Dodge County Hospital, said 81 persons were brought in for treatment….Miller said about 10 of the 81 were hospitalized with a few in ‘fairly critical condition’ and others described as ‘walking wounded.’ In addition, others were treated and released.

 

“Authorities said occupants of the resident hotel were evacuated from the fourth and fifth floors immediately….Many of the hotel’s residents were elderly persons….

 

“One of the victims was identified as Mayne C. Spence, an elderly woman….

 

“The structure, built in 1920, was totally gutted. Cars parked in front of the building were blown in half.

 

“The blast shook the downtown area and shattered windows within a nine-block radius. It was heard by persons more than two miles from the scene….[A] witness said a window was blown out of a supermarket about 20 blocks away….

 

“Police and rescue units from Fremont and six other communities were called to the scene, as well as the National Guard and Army Reserve.” (Lincoln Evening Journal, Linda Ulrich, NE. “4 Die, 50-100 Are Trapped in Fremont Pathfinder Blast.” 1-10-1976, p. 1.)

 

Jan 11: “Fremont — At least 12 persons ere reported dead when firemen abandoned their search inside the Pathfinder Hotel about 10:30 Saturday [Jan 10] night…Fire Chief Howard Schneider said it will be resumed early this morning. Eight bodies were found Saturday night, Schneider said….National Guardsmen who were called in after Gov. J. James Exon declared a state of emergency, cordoned off the downtown area to keep out sightseers….

 

“Vera Scoville, 82, was on the fourth floor in the northwest corner of the building when the explosion occurred. She gave this account of her escape: ‘First there was a terrible shock and smoke was everywhere. I met some other ladies in the hall. We attempted to go to the elevator. The door was broken down. We tried the fire escape but we couldn’t get any doors open. Then we tried the baggage elevator, but it was broken down too. Then I found a little place where there wasn’t any smoke. I found a window that was intact and called for help….” (Sunday Journal and Star, Lincoln, NE. “12 Dead in Fremont Hotel Blast.” 1-11-1976, p. 1.)

 

Jan 12: “Authorities have released the identities of twelve victims of the explosion Saturday at the Pathfinder Hotel in Fremont. The dead are: [We put in alphabetical order and add from other sources. We have located identities for seventeen of the fatalities.]

 

1. [Arthur Chambers, hotel resident (it was believed).][1]
2. Chi-Ceung Chan, 29,[2] and his wife,
3. Kit Yeefu. Chan, 25, both of Lincoln, who were temporary employees of Brown Drug located in the hotel.
4. John Delashmutt, 83, hotel resident (husband of Ruth).
5. Ruth Delashmutt, 83,[3] hotel resident.
6. [Delores Fritz, 46, hotel worker.][4]
7. James Hanson, 89,[5] hotel resident.
8. [Susan K. Hokamp, 23. Rootsweb.ancestry.com. “Freemont Memorial Cemetery.” 2000.]
9. Louis T. Hruska, 59,[6] Fremont barber.”
10. [William D. Van Meter of Fremont, a district manager of the gas company.][7]
11. Carson Rebbe, 75, rural Hooper farmer.
12. Eunice M. Sexton, 83,[8] wife of Fremont superintendent of schools.
13. Mayme Spence, 82,[9] hotel resident.
14. Carl Strong, 44, Fremont gas company worker. [At the scene due to reports of gas smell.]
15. Mildred Sweringen, 52,[10] wife of Fremont Presbyterian minister.
16. [Mrs. Mary K. Toy, 35, real estate employee.][11]
17. James G. Walline,[12] 47, Fremont gas company worker. [There due to gas smell reports.]

 

(Lincoln Star, NE. “12 Victims Identified.” 1-12-1976, p. 1.)

 

Jan 14: “Freemont, Neb (UPI) — The 17^th and 18^th bodies were taken from the shattered Pathfinder Hotel today, bringing an end to a grim five-day search for victims of Saturday’s explosion, the worst disaster of its kind in Nebraska history.

 

“Dodge County Attorney F. A Gossett III said one of the bodies found today was that of William Van Meter of Fremont, a district manager of the gas company. Identification of the 18^th body was not definite but it was believed to be that of Arthur Chambers, a hotel resident….

 

“Fourteen persons remained hospitalized….” (Columbus Telegram, NE. “Locate 17^th, 18^th bodies in Fremont.” 1-14-1976, p. 10.)

 

Jan 15: “One of the victims found Wednesday was William Van Meter, district manager of the Nebraska Natural Gas Co. Van Meter had reportedly gone to the hotel in response to reports there was a smell of natural gas in the area. Two of the victims found earlier were also gas company employes. Gas company officials have maintained silence on reports that natural gas was leaking in the area of the hotel before the explosion

 

“Federal, state and local authorities are investigating the explosion, but no cause had been established. All debris pulled from the hotel was being taken to a special dump site. The hotel and the dump site ‘will be guarded and no unauthorized persons will be allowed in the area,’ Fremont Fire Chief Howard Schneider said….” (Columbus Telegram, NE. “Sunday day of mourning for 18 victims of Fremont hotel blast.” 1-15-1975, p. 3.)

 

Jan 20: “Fremont (AP) — Fremont Fire Chief Howard Schneider says a preliminary investigation into the Jan. 10 Pathfinder Hotel explosion and fire which killed 18 persons and injured over 40 others was caused by the ignition of a gas leak outside the building.  Several days of sub zero weather before the explosion could also have been a major causal factor of the blast, Schneider said. Schneider said his department, the U.S. Transportation Dept., the Nebraska State Fire Marshal’s Office and Nebraska Natural Gas Co., which services Fremont, are continuing their investigation of the blast. ‘On consideration of the preliminary reports from the agencies conducting the investigation…it would appear the cause of the explosion was escaping gas from a gas line located about 15 feet from the northwest corner of the building allowing gas to infiltrate the building. Ignition was from an unknown source,’ Schneider said….

 

“According to Schneider, Transportation Dept. investigators are now testing materials taken from the explosion site, among them a piece of plastic distribution line coupling from under the street directly north of the hotel. Schneider said he believes that the coupling on the two-inch line, which was broken, was the source of the natural gas leak. The pipe in the area was installed a year and a half ago, Schneider said. The fire chief also added some credence to earlier theories there was not one but a rapid chain reaction of several explosions. ‘Most of those in the hotel and nearby have said there was one sharp blast followed by some small thumps,’ Schneider said….” (Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Pathfinder Tragedy. Gas Leak Outside Hotel Might Have Caused Blast.” 1-20-1976, p. 1.)

 

Sources

 

Columbus Telegram, NE. “Locate 17^th, 18^th bodies in Fremont.” 1-14-1976, p. 10. Accessed 7-17-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/columbus-telegram-jan-14-1976-p-9/?tag

 

Columbus Telegram, NE. “Sunday day of mourning for 18 victims of Fremont hotel blast.” 1-15-1975, p. 3. Accessed 7-17-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/columbus-telegram-jan-15-1976-p-3/?tag

 

Fremont Tribune (Chris Zavadil), NE. “Fremont residents recall Hotel Pathfinder explosion 35 years later.” 1-10-2011. Accessed 7-17-2017 at: http://fremonttribune.com/news/local/fremont-residents-recall-hotel-pathfinder-explosion/article_3f168106-1cd9-11e0-98e0-001cc4c002e0.html

 

Justia US Law. “Strong v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 476 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Neb. 1979).” 7-26-1979. Accessed 7-17-2017 at: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/476/1170/1379006/

 

Lincoln Evening Journal, Linda Ulrich, NE. “4 Die, 50-100 Are Trapped in Fremont Pathfinder Blast.” 1-10-1976, p. 1. Accessed 7-16-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lincoln-evening-journal-jan-10-1976-p-1/?tag

 

Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8. Accessed 7-16-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lincoln-evening-journal-jan-13-1976-p-8/?tag

 

Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Pathfinder Tragedy. Gas Leak Outside Hotel Might Have Caused Blast.” 1-20-1976, p. 1. Accessed 7-17-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lincoln-evening-journal-jan-20-1976-p-1/?tag

 

Lincoln Journal Star. “12 of the deadliest disasters in Nebraska history.” 6-15-2017. Accessed 7-3-2017 at: http://journalstar.com/blogs/photofiles/of-the-deadliest-disasters-in-nebraska-history/collection_6ae50d55-7d8a-5b6f-b1c3-b0b54cfe84f0.html#8

 

Lincoln Star, NE. “12 Victims Identified.” 1-12-1976, p. 1. Accessed 7-16-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lincoln-star-jan-12-1976-p-1/?tag

 

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at:  http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

 

National Fire Protection Association (John Hall, Jr.). U.S. Unintentional Fire Death Rates by State. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 31 pages, December 2008.

 

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf

 

Omaha World-Herald (Paul Hammell) NE. “Forty years ago, a hotel explosion killed 20 and ‘changed the history of Fremont’.” 2-1-2016. Accessed 7-17-2017 at: http://www.omaha.com/news/nebraska/forty-years-ago-a-hotel-explosion-killed-and-changed-the/article_b6e5568e-c641-51ec-a965-f29b01241746.html

 

Rootsweb.ancestry.com. “Freemont Memorial Cemetery.” 2000. Accessed 7-17-2017 at: http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~nedodge/cemetery/memorial.txt

 

Sunday Journal and Star, Lincoln, NE. “12 Dead in Fremont Hotel Blast.” 1-11-1976, p. 1. Accessed 7-16-2017 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lincoln-star-jan-11-1976-p-1/?tag

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Columbus Telegram, NE. “Locate 17^th, 18^th bodies in Fremont.” 1-14-1976, p. 10.

[2] Was 28 according to: Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8. Article notes he was a dentistry graduate of the University of Nebraska.

[3] Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8.

[4] Fremont Tribune (Chris Zavadil). “Fremont residents recall Hotel Pathfinder explosion 35 years later.” 1-10-2011.

[5] Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8.

[6] Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8.

[7] Columbus Telegram, NE. “Locate 17^th, 18^th bodies in Fremont.” 1-14-1976, p. 10. Subsequent report notes he “had reportedly gone to the hotel in response to reports there was a small of natural gas in the area.”

[8] Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8.

[9] Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8.

[10] Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8.

[11] Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8; Justia US Law. “Strong v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 476 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Neb. 1979).”

[12] Middle initial from: Lincoln Evening Journal, NE. “Funerals Continue for Victims.” 1-13-1976, p. 8.