lornajarrettblanchard

— 6 Fergus Falls Journal, MN. “Six killed in fire at Duluth.” 12-29-1975, p. 2, col. 1.
— 6 Lima News, OH. “Six claimed in resort fire.” 12-29-1975, B9.

Narrative Information

Associated Press: “Duluth, Minn. (AP) — Six persons were killed early Sunday when fire erupted at a small resort hotel north of Duluth. They apparently died of smoke inhalation before flames swept through the budding, officials said. The victims included three children of the resort’s owners and three members of another family.

“Mr. and Mrs. David Eckman, the resort owners, were out snowmobiling when the fire occurred. Both parents were treated for shock at a Duluth hospital after they discovered the tragedy.

“The Eckmans had operated the Breezy Point inn on Island Lake, five miles north of Duluth, for about one year.

“The chief of the Gnesen Township volunteer firemen, Joe Tarnowski, said that when he arrived at the scene the 50-by-60 foot building was entirely in flames, and the walls and roof had collapsed. The Inn was built mostly of logs, with a wood frame addition.

“Authorities said the fire apparently started in a bar area, at the opposite end of the building from where the six victims were sleeping. ‘The last place to go was the sleeping quarters. They were dead before the fire hit them,’ said Capt. William Evans of the sheriff’s office.

“It may not be possible to determine the cause of the fire, said a deputy state fire marshal, Arnold Johnson of Moose Lake.

“The St. Louis County Sheriff’s office said the dead were Robert Frankfourth, 39, his wife Karen, 32…their daughter Brenda, 12, all of rural Duluth, and Kim Eckman, 13, a sister Tammy, 9, and brother David, 5.” (Lima News, OH. “Six claimed in resort fire.” 12-29-1975, B9)

Sources

Fergus Falls Journal, MN. “Six killed in fire at Duluth.” 12-29-1975, p. 2, col. 1. Accessed 12-2-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/daily-journal-dec-29-1975-p-2/

Lima News, OH. “Six claimed in resort fire.” 12-29-1975, B9. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=16200278

–>14 Garofoli. “Remember the Gartland!/Wall dancers invoke deadly ’75 fire…” SFGate, 9-14-2002.
— 14 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 137.
— 14 NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1973,” Fire Journal. Vol. 70, No. 4, July 1976, p. 28.
— 13 NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1973,” Fire Journal. Vol. 70, No. 4, July 1976, p. 29.
— 12 NFPA. “Bimonthly Fire Record,” Fire Journal, Vol. 70, No. 2, March 1976, p. 53.

Narrative Information

Garofoli: “Before the dot-coms swarmed, before the crepe shops opened, the Mission District was shaped by arson fires. And none seared a more lasting legacy on the neighborhood than the blaze that ripped through the Gartland Apartments, killing at least 14 people in the predawn hours of Dec. 12, 1975….

“Police counted 11 arson fires within an eight-block area around the Gartland in the year before it burned…. some of the fires [were dubbed] “arson-for-profit,” attempts to capitalize on growing real estate interest in one of San Francisco’s sunniest neighborhoods….

“Nobody was ever charged in connection with the blaze…

“The Fire Department’s report lists 14 dead, 15 firefighters injured and four residents burned. But [SF Fire Capt. and arson inspector] Carr said, “There’s no way of telling how many people were in that building.”

“Within days, the building was razed. And it stayed that way for years, a gaping hole that became known as the Gartland Pit….” (Garofoli, Joe. “Remember the Gartland!/Wall dancers invoke deadly ’75 fire as rallying cry for affordable housing.” SFGate, 9-14-2002.)

NFPA Fire Journal, July 1976: “Residential. Apartment building, San Francisco, California. Shortly after 3:30 on the morning of December 12, the occupants of this five-story apartment building awoke to discover a fire in the hallway of the building.

“The fire of incendiary origin spread rapidly up open stairways and through corridors, trapping tenants in their rooms. Although the Fire Department was able to rescue a majority of the residents over ladders, 13 perished in the fire. Eleven fire fighters, plus 14 additional tenants, were injured.” (NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1973,” Fire Journal. Vol. 70, No. 4, July 1976, p. 29.)

NFPA Fire Journal, March 1976: “Apartment Building. Suspicious Origin; 12 Killed, December 12, 1975, San Francisco, Calif.

“This 95-foot-by-100-foot, five-story-and-basement apartment building was built in 1912. The walls were brick, and floors and roof were of wood construction. The building had an open center stairway and three metal fire escapes from windows on two sides. There was no smoke or heat detection, no alarm system, no sprinkler protection, no portable extinguishers, and no smoke barriers between the corridors and open stairwell. The building did have two dry standpipe systems on the outside for Fire Department use and two wet standpipe systems inside for occupant use, although some of the hose valve handles were missing from the inside stations.

“The first floor was occupied by a gift shop, barber shop, café, club, and a 25¢ ‘peep shop.’ One or two of the first-floor store areas were vacant. The upper floors consisted of 59 apartment units, 14 on the second floor and 15 each on the third, furth, and fifth floors. Approximately 17 of the apartments were vacant at the time of the fire, but reportedly there were people living in some of the vacant units. About 120 people were believed to be in the building when the fire occurred.

“The fire was first detected by occupants some time around 3:40 am when they either heard the fire or saw the smoke or flames coming through their apartment doors. One woman yelled out her window to a man across the street, asking him to call the Fire Department. The Fire Department received the alarm at 3:43 am. The first arriving units could see flames coming out of the upper windows and called a second alarm at 3:46 am. Occupants of the building were unable to use the stairs or fire escapes, and those who were saved were taken down Fire Department ladders.

“Fire fighters had just entered the first floor lobby to reach the stairs when the stairs collapsed, driving the fire fighters out and sending 10 to the hospital with injuries. The fire had burned through the roof at this point, and a third alarm was called at 3:47. The fourth alarm was struck at 3:54, and a fifth alarm at 4:06 am. The fire was under control at 4:51 am. Twelve occupants were killed and ten are still unaccounted for. The identification of the victims has been difficult because a large portion of the upper floors collapsed, burying many of the victims.

“A series of incendiary fires in the area and the rapid spread of fire in the building, plus other facts regarding the incident, have caused authorities to list this as a fire of suspicious origin. Eleven fire fighters were injured fighting the fire. Damage is estimated at $290,000.” (NFPA. “Bimonthly Fire Record,” Fire Journal, Vol. 70, No. 2, March 1976, pp. 53-54.)

Newspapers

Dec 12, Oakland Tribune: “At least ten persons died shortly before dawn today as flames swept with explosive speed through a five-story Mission District Hotel in what police consider an arson-homicide. Firemen were continuing to comb the remains of the gutted Gartland Apartments-Hotel [495 Valencia St.] …for additions to the toll of nine bodies found in the ruins. Another victim died at San Francisco General Hospital…. All those who escaped from the 60-unit apartments did so down hastily erected firemen’s ladders….

“Police Inspector Jack Cleary said he considers the fire a homicide case after talking with [a] second floor resident…[who] reported a heavy smell of gasoline shortly before the fire broke out.

“First arriving firemen, about 4 a.m. reported seeing ‘a number of persons engulfed in flames’ as fire erupted from doors, windows, and exploded out the roof.” (Oakland Tribune. “10 Die in S.F. Holocaust,” December 12, 1975.)

Dec 13, UPI: “San Francisco (UPI) – Investigators are concentrating on known arsonists in their investigation of a fast-moving blaze that killed 12 persons as it roared through a condemned apartment building. Investigators said ‘incendiary material’ was found in the five-story building in the multiracial Mission District. One survivor said he smelled gasoline shortly before he realized there was a fire.

“Firemen also picked through the charred rubble for other possible victim’s in Friday’s predawn blaze.

“Nine of the 17 persons who were injured were reported in stable condition at San Francisco General Hospital. The others had been treated and released. One of the injured was a fire lieutenant who suffered disfiguring burns on his face. He had been scheduled to retire about four hours after the start of the blaze.

“Mayor Joseph Alioto told newsmen that police were looking for a ‘well-known arsonist.’ Police declined to comment on his statement.

“Alfred Goldberg, superintendent of the Bureau of Building Inspection, said the apartment was condemned in 1973 for 40 safety violations, including faulty wiring and enclosed stairways. In January, he said, the owner was sued. The building was owned by the Summit Land Co., a family firm headed by Mrs. Beatrice F. Presant, widow of an Oakland physician. Her attorney, Charles Morgan, said he was familiar with the lawsuit and it specified certain violations, ‘but I think most of those violations had been corrected.’

“Some area residents criticized the Fire Department for failing to arrive at the scene quick enough. Fire Chief Keith Calden denied this and said, ‘A minute is a long time when you’re standing in the window of a burning building.’….” (United Press International. “SF Arsonists Sought in Building Fire.” The Times, San Mateo, CA. 12-13-1975, p. 1.)

Dec 15, UPI: “San Francisco (UPI) – Firemen Sunday found the grisly remains of what may be the 13th victim of the arson-caused Gartland Apartments fire and Battalion Chief John Sherratt said he expects still more bodies will be found. Investigators probing the gutted apartment building found a human leg in the charred rubble but were not certain if it was a 13th victim or belonged to one of the dozen bodies already found in the wake of the Friday fire.” (United Press International. ‘13th Victim Found.” Red Bluff Daily News, CA. 12-15-1975, p. 1.)

Dec 17, Oakland Tribune: “Four of the 12 persons who died in a deliberately set fire that destroyed a five story apartment building at 495 Valencia St. in San Francisco last Friday were identified by the city coroner’s office yesterday. Dr. Boyd Stephens said identification in most cases involved the use of dental charts because the bodies were badly charred and in some cases partially cremated. Stephens said the identified victims are Martha Engledow, about 70; James Ward, about 60; Rose McKinness, 23, and her 18-month-old son, Christopher. Ward was resuscitated by fire fighters at the scene but died several hours later at the hospital. The coroner’s office has been unable to determine yet whether additional bone fragments found in the debris are from the same 12 bodies or belong to additional unknow victims. Stephens said 11 residents are unaccounted for.” (Oakland Tribune, CA. “S.F. Fire Victims Identified.” 12-17-1975, p. 5.)

Dec 19, AP: “San Francisco (AP) – Authorities say they may never know the exact number of persons who died when an arson fire gutted a condemned apartment building here last week. Twelve bodies were found when fire fighters searched through the smoldering building after the blaze last Friday. Only four have been positively identified and authorities say 11 residents still are unaccounted for. Assistant fire chief Andrew Caspar said that there is ‘always the possibility of finding more bodies, but it’s an intangible.’ He said fire fighters will continue searching for several more days, but they can’t explore some areas because of the precarious condition of floors and walls. He said the whole central area of the five-story building had collapsed….” (AP. “Exact SF Fire Toll May Never Be Known.” The Register, Santa Ana, CA. 12-19-1975, C4.)

Sources

Associated Press. “Exact SF Fire Toll May Never Be Known.” The Register, Santa Ana, CA. 12-19-1975, p. C4. Accessed 10-18-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/santa-ana-register-dec-19-1975-p-28/

Garofoli, Joe. “Remember the Gartland!/Wall dancers invoke deadly ’75 fire as rallying cry for affordable housing.” SFGate, 9-14-2002. Accessed 10-18-2021 at: https://www.sfgate.com/politics/joegarofoli/article/Remember-the-Gartland-Wall-dancers-invoke-2770426.php

Oakland Tribune, CA. “10 Die in S.F. Holocaust,” 12-12-1975. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=31325421

Oakland Tribune, CA. “S.F. Fire Victims Identified.” 12-17-1975, p. 5. Accessed 10-18-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/oakland-tribune-dec-17-1975-p-5/

Oakland Tribune, CA. “Still No Suspects In Arson Deaths.” 12-14-1975, p. 3C. Accessed 10-18-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/oakland-tribune-dec-14-1975-p-5/

National Fire Protection Association. “Bimonthly Fire Record,” Fire Journal, Vol. 70, No. 2, March 1976, pp. 52.54.

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

United Press International. ‘13th Victim Found.” Red Bluff Daily News, CA. 12-15-1975, p. 1. Accessed 10-18-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/red-bluff-daily-news-dec-15-1975-p-1/

United Press International. “SF Arsonists Sought in Building Fire.” The Times, San Mateo, CA. 12-13-1975, p. 1. Accessed 10-18-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/san-mateo-times-dec-13-1975-p-86/

— 29 Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). 1982, p. 417.
— 29 History.com. “This Day in History. 1975, Nov 10. Cargo ship suddenly sinks…Superior.”
— 29 Nash. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters… 1977, p. 709.
— 29 Posner. “The Edmund Fitzgerald’s Legend Lives On…,” Globe and Mail, Mar 25, 2010.
— 29 Stonehouse. Lake Superior’s Shipwreck Coast. 1985, p. 207.
— 29 Swayze. Great Lakes Shipwrecks Beginning with the Letter “F.”
— 29 Swayze. Shipwreck! A Comprehensive Directory…Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes. 1992, p. 87.
— 29 USCG. Marine Casualty Report. SS Edmund Fitzgerald…Lake Superior… 1977.
— 29 Wikipedia, “SS Edmund Fitzgerald.”
— 29 Wolff. Lake Superior Shipwrecks: Complete Reference to Maritime Accidents… 1990, 217.

Narrative Information

Great Lakes & Seaway Shipping: “The U.S. Coast Guard’s report on the sinking of the Edmund Fitzgerald was released on August 2, 1977. It cited faulty hatch covers, lack of water tight cargo hold bulkheads and damage caused from an undetermined source as the cause of her loss.” (Great Lakes & Seaway Shipping News Archive. Report News (August 2009).)

Great Lakes & Seaway Shipping News: “The National Transportation Safety Board unanimously voted on March 23,1978, to reject the U. S. Coast Guard’s official report supporting the theory of faulty hatches in their EDMUND FITZGERALD investigation. Later the N.T.S.B. revised its verdict and reached a majority vote to agree that the sinking was caused by taking on water through one or more hatch covers damaged by the impact of heavy seas over her deck. This is contrary to the Lake Carriers Association’s contention that her foundering was caused by flooding through bottom and ballast tank damage resulting from bottoming on the Six Fathom Shoal between Caribou and Michipicoten Islands.” (Great Lakes & Seaway Shipping News Archive. Report News (March 2009).)

History.com. “This Day in History 1975: Cargo Ship Suddenly Sinks in Lake Superior”:

“On this day in 1975, the SS Edmund Fitzgerald sinks in Lake Superior, killing all 29 crew members on board. It was the worst single accident in Lake Superior’s history. The ship weighed more than 13,000 tons and was 730 feet long. It was launched in 1958 as the biggest carrier in the Great Lakes and became the first ship to carry more than a million tons of iron ore through the Soo Locks.

“On November 9, the Fitzgerald left Superior, Wisconsin, with 26,000 tons of ore heading for Detroit, Michigan. The following afternoon, Ernest McSorely, the captain of the Fitzgerald and a 44-year veteran, contacted the Avafor, another ship traveling on Lake Superior and reported that his ship had encountered “one of the worst seas he had ever been in.” The Fitzgerald had lost its radar equipment and was listing badly to one side.

“A couple of hours later, another ship made contact and was told that the Fitzgerald was holding its own. However, minutes afterward, the Fitzgerald disappeared from radar screens. A subsequent investigation showed that the sinking of the Fitzgerald occurred very suddenly; no distress signal was sent and the condition of the lifeboats suggested that little or no attempt was made to abandon the ship.

“One possible reason for the wreck is that the Fitzgerald was carrying too much cargo. This made the ship sit low in the water and made it more vulnerable to being overwhelmed by a sudden large wave. The official report also cited the possibility that the hatches to the cargo area may have been faulty, leading to a sudden shift of the cargo that capsized the boat.

“The Fitzgerald was eventually found 530 feet below the surface, 17 miles from Whitefish Bay, at the northeastern tip of Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. The ship had broken into two parts that were found approximately 150 feet apart. As there were no survivors among the 29 crewmembers, there will likely never be a definitive explanation of the Fitzgerald’s sinking.

“The Fitzgerald’s sinking was the worst wreck in the Great Lakes since November 29, 1966, when 28 people died in the sinking of the Daniel J. Morrell in Lake Huron.

“The disaster was immortalized in song the following year in Canadian folk singer Gordon Lightfoot’s ‘The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald’.” (History.com. This Day in History 1975: Cargo Ship Suddenly Sinks in Lake Superior.)

Posner: “The Edmund Fitzgerald’s Legend Lives On…,” Globe and Mail, Mar 25, 2010:

‘In the first episode of Dive Detectives, a new series for History Television, the father-and-son diving team of Mike and Warren Fletcher from Port Dover, Ont., conclude that a gigantic, 50-foot rogue wave – not human error – was responsible for sinking the Edmund Fitzgerald….

“Carrying 26,000 tonnes of iron ore, the Edmund Fitzgerald – at 220 metres long, one of the largest boats ever built for Great Lakes transport – left Superior, Wisc. On the evening of Nov. 9, 1975, bound east for a steel mill on Zug Island, near Detroit. The next day, it encountered a fierce early winter storm, with hurricane-force winds in excess of 50 knots.

“For hours, it was buffeted by sea and wind, eventually taking on water, losing radar, and beginning to list. Captain Ernest M. McSorley, struggling to get the freighter to the Canadian coast, said over the radio it was “one of the worst seas I’ve ever been in.” Seventeen miles offshore, it sank 160 metres to the muddy bottom.

“Twenty-nine lives were lost….

“Conducting a marine casualty report, the U.S. coast guard concluded that the boat sank because the cargo hatches were ‘improperly serviced.’ In other words, the crew left them open, allowing the holds to fill with water and dooming the ship.

“Families of crew members, other Great Lakes captains and marine engineers have long disputed the verdict. The first response to a storm as savage as the one the freighter faced, they note, would have been to secure the metal clamps that sealed the cargo holds.

“Pointing the finger at ‘human error’ prevented lawsuits against the boat’s owners, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Milwaukee, or its operators, Oglebay Norton Corp.

“But other theories have also been suggested, including the suggestion that the ship may have been damaged by running aground or been victimized by a rogue wave….

“Once regarded as maritime myths, rogue waves, scientists now say, occur when a group of waves, travelling in different directions and speeds, coalesce into a single new wave, maximizing destructive power. Any wave 2.6 times the height of a significant wave could be regarded as a rogue wave. Such waves, sometimes known as ‘three sisters,’ were spotted on the lake the day of the disaster by other ships.

“Using the Institute for Ocean technology in St. John’s, the Fletchers deploy wave-generating technology to simulate the conditions faced by the Edmund Fitzgerald. Their tests demonstrate how the force of the freak wave, crashing down on the mid-section of the boat – already low in the water because of its heavy cargo – might have caused it to split in two. Captain Chris Hearn, director of the Centre for Marine Simulation at Memorial University, says such a wave, in combination with the age of the vessel and its heavy load, is the most likely cause of the catastrophe.” (Posner. “The Edmund Fitzgerald’s Legend Lives On…,” March 25, 2010.)

USCG Abstract: “On the evening of 10 November 1975, the SS Edmund Fitzgerald, while in a severe storm, with a full cargo of taconite pellets, sank in eastern Lake Superior at 46⁰ 59.9′ N, 85⁰ 06.6W, approximately 17 miles from the entrance to Whitefish Bay, Michigan. All of the 29 crewmen on board at the time of the casualty are missing and presumed dead…

“The Commandant concurred with the Marine Board that the most probable cause of the sinking was the loss of buoyancy resulting from massive flooding of the cargo hold.…The vessel dove into a wall of water and never recovered, with the breaking up of the ship occurring as it plunged or as the ship struck the bottom.” (United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report. SS Edmund Fitzgerald; Sinking in Lake Superior on 10 November 1975 with Loss of Life. Washington DC, Commandant, USCG, July 26, 1977, 121 pages.)

Wolff: “A sinister reminder that Lake Superior could still be the Grim Reaper came on the evening of November 10. The 729-foot Edmund Fitzgerald, flagship of the Columbia Transportation fleet, Oglebay Norton Company, mysteriously plunged to the bottom in the midst of an intense storm hovering over the eastern lake. Lost with the Fitzgerald were Captain Ernest M. McSorley of Toledo and his 28-man crew….” (Wolff, Julius F., Jr. Lake Superior Shipwrecks: Complete Reference to Maritime Accidents and Disasters. 1990, p. 217.)

Sources

Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.

Great Lakes & Seaway Shipping News Archive. “Report News, August 2009.” Accessed at: http://www.boatnerd.com/news/archive/8-09.htm

Great Lakes & Seaway Shipping News Archive. “Report News, March 2009.” Accessed at: http://www.boatnerd.com/news/archive/3-09.htm

History.com. “This Day in History. 1975, November 10. Cargo ship suddenly sinks in Lake Superior.” Accessed 7-22-2020 at: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/cargo-ship-suddenly-sinks-in-lake-superior

Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Pocket Books, Wallaby, 1977, 792 pages.

Posner, Michael. “The Edmund Fitzgerald’s Legend Lives On…but with a Major Change,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 3-25-2010. Accessed at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com:80/news/national/the-edmund-fitzgeralds-legend-lives-on-but-with-a-major-change/article1511191/

Stonehouse, Frederick. Lake Superior’s Shipwreck Coast. AuTrain, MI: Avery Color Studios, 1985.

Swayze, David D. Great Lakes Shipwrecks Beginning with the letter “F.” Accessed at: http://www.boatnerd.com/swayze/shipwreck/f.htm

United States Coast Guard, Marine Board of Investigation. Marine Casualty Report. SS Edmund Fitzgerald; Sinking in Lake Superior on 10 November 1975 with Loss of Life (Report No. USCG 16732/64216). Washington DC, Commandant, USCG, July 26, 1977, 121 pages. Accessed at: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/docs/boards/edmundfitz.pdf

Wikipedia. “SS Edmund Fitzgerald.” Accessed 12-29-2008 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Edmund_Fitzgerald

Wolff, Julius F., Jr. Lake Superior Shipwrecks: Complete Reference to Maritime Accidents and Disasters. Duluth, MN: Lake Superior Port Cities, Inc., 1990.

–93  Blanchard tally of U.S. Territory of Puerto Rico, Haiti, Dominican Republic, U.S. States.

–68  Blanchard tally of Puerto Rico and U.S. States.

Summary of U.S. State and Territory Breakouts Below

Connecticut               (  2)

Florida                       (  5)

Massachusetts           (  1)

New York                   (  5)

Pennsylvania             (  9)

Puerto Rico                (44)

Virginia                      (  1)

West Virginia            (  1)

            Total                 68

 

Breakout of Fatalities by U.S. States and Territory of Puerto Rico

 

U.S. Territory of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico       (44 {were also 19 missing}^[2])

–44  Blake, et al. The Deadliest…[US]Tropical Cyclones…1851 to 2010. Aug 2011, p. 7.^[3]

–44  Sullivan. “Landslide Toll Termed Worst in U.S. History.” New York Times, 10-10-1985.

–34  NHC. “Hurricane Eloise, Sept. 13-24, 1975.” Climatological Data (Sep 1975), p. 5.^[4]

–2  Utuado, Sep 16. Crushing, municipal building collapses.^[5]

–1  Burning; oil refinery worker; flood waters caused electrical fire in control room.^[6] –2  Drownings.^[7]

–2  Electrocutions.^[8]

 

United States (Mainland):   (24)

–24  Blanchard tally based on State and locality breakouts below.

–21  Hebert. “Atlantic Hurricane Season of 1975.” MWR, V104, Apr 1976, 455.

 

U.S. Southeast:                      (  7)

—  7  Blanchard tally based on State and local breakouts below (FL, 5; VA, 1; WV, 1).

—  4  NHC. “Hurricane Eloise, September 13-24, 1975.” Climatological Data, 26/9, p. 5.^[9]

–2  “…two of them [of the four] were related to heart attacks.”^[10]

 

Florida                                   (  5)

–5  Blanchard tally based on locality breakouts below.

–4  Anderson. “Sunday Marked 37 Year Anniversary of Hurricane Eloise.” WJHG, 9-24-2012.

–4  Bay Co. (indirect). Bay Co. “Hurricane Eloise.” Bay County CRS Progress Report 2014, p.2.

–4  Panama City Beach, Bay Co. Florida Memory – Div. of Library & Info. Services.^[11]

–1  Panama City. Heart attack (cardiac arrest); female.^[12]    

–1  Fort Walton Beach, Okaloosa County. Heart attack in an emergency shelter; male.^[13]

 

Virginia                                  (  1)

–1  Charlottesville, US Hwy. 29; car goes into 40-foot hole in road created by rainfall.^[14]

 

West Virginia                        (  1)

— 1  Rupert vicinity, Meadows River. Drowning; small child.^[15]

 

U.S. Northeast:                     (17)

–17  Blanchard tally based on State and locality breakouts below.

–17  NHC. “Hurricane Eloise, September 13-24, 1975.” Climatological Data, 26/9, p. 5-6.^[16]

 

Connecticut:              (  2)

–2  State. One confirmed, the Watertown presumed drowning of boy, noted below.^[17]

–2  Westchester County. Thompson (National Climatic Center). Sep 1975, p. 23.^[18]

–1  Watertown. Drowned; boy, 14, swept from raft in rain-swollen Steele Brooke.^[19]

 

Massachusetts:          (  1)

–1  Shirley, Rte. 2-A, Sep 25. Car skids into tree, rain-slick road; Nichole Randall, 6.^[20]

 

New York:                 (  5)

–3  Binghamton, NY. Susquehanna River. Drowning of firemen in rain-swollen river.^[21]

–2  Westchester County. Thompson (National Climatic Center). Sep 1975, p. 23.^[22]

–Mt. Pleasant. Drowning; boy, 11, attempting to save boy, 8, in storm sewer.^[23]

–White Plains. Water sweeps over Hutchinson Riv. Pkwy., unidentified person.^[24]

 

Pennsylvania:            (  9)

—  9  Blanchard tally based on locality breakouts below.

—>6  State.^[25]

—  1  Carlisle. Apparent heart attack in car; John Rossenberry Sr., 62.^[26]

—  1  Farrandsville, Clinton Co. Vehicle plunged into flood water. Audrey Allen, 39.^[27]

—  1  Huntington. Heart attack “struggling to save…property from damage.” Male, 66.^[28]

—  1  Lemoyne. Heart attack “struggling to save…property from damage.” Male, 77.^[29]

—  1  Newburg, Franklin County. Drowning in stream near home; boy, 21-months-old.^[30]

—  1  Philly. Drowning; man, 30, found as water receded from railroad underpass.^[31]

—  1  Reading. Presumed drowning in creek when raft overturns; male, 18.^[32]

—  1  Wellsboro. Heart attack “struggling to save…property from damage.” Male, 41.^[33]

—  1  York vic. Drowning; female, 83,^[34] in her car as she was trying to flee floods.^[35]

 

Elsewhere other than U.S.

— 18  Haiti. NHC. “Hurricane Eloise, September 13-24, 1975.” Climatological Data, 26/9, p. 5.

—>6  Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo, Ozama River flooding. Drownings.^[36]

— 25  Hispaniola (Haiti and Dominican Republic).^[37]

 

Causes of Death (U.S. and Puerto Rico)

 

Building Collapse:    (  2)

–2  Utuado, Puerto Rico, Sep 16. Crushing, municipal building collapses.

 

Drownings:                (14)

–1  CT. Watertown. Drowned; boy, 14, swept from raft in rain-swollen Steele Brooke.

–3  NY. Binghamton. Susquehanna River. Drowning of firemen in rain-swollen river.

–1  NY. Westchester Co., Mt. Pleasant. Boy, 11, attempting to save boy, 8, in storm sewer.

–1  NY. Westchester Co., White Plains, Hutchinson River Parkway, unidentified person.

–1  PA. Farrandsville, Clinton Co. Vehicle “plunged into flood water.” Audrey Allen, 39.

–1  PA. Newburg, Franklin County. Drowning in stream near home; boy, 21-months-old.

–1  PA. Philadelphia. Drowning; man, 30, found as water receded from railroad underpass.

–1  PA. Reading. Presumed drowning in creek when raft overturns; male, 18.

–1  PA. York vic. Drowning; female, 83, “in her car as she was trying to flee…floods.”

–2  PR. Drownings

–1  WV. Rupert vicinity, Meadows River. Drowning; small child.

 

Electrocutions:          (  2)

–2  PR. Electrocutions

 

Fire:                           (  1)

–1  PR. Burning; oil refinery worker; flood waters caused an electrical fire in control room.

 

Heart Attacks:          (  6)

–1  Fort Walton Beach, Okaloosa County. Heart attack in an emergency shelter; male.

–1  FL. Panama City. Heart attack (cardiac arrest); female.

–1  PA. Carlisle. Apparent heart attack in car; John Rossenberry Sr., 62.

–1  PA. Huntington. Heart attack “struggling to save…property from damage.” Male, 66.

–1  PA. Lemoyne. Heart attack “struggling to save…property from damage.” Male, 77.

–1  PA. Wellsboro. Heart attack “struggling to save…property from damage.” Male, 41.

 

Traffic Accident:      (  1)

–1  MA. Shirley, Rte. 2-A, Sep 25. Car skids into tree, rain-slick road; Nichole Randall, 6.

 

Washed-Out Road:   (  1)

–1  VA. Charlottesville, US Hwy. 29; car goes into 40-foot hole in road created by rainfall.

 

Unidentified:             (41)

—  1  CT.

—  3  FL.

–37  PR.

Narrative

 

Hebert: “Eloise was the most deadly and destructive hurricane season, and the only one to make landfall in the United States. It was the first major hurricane to strike the Panama City area in this century. This was the fourth consecutive year with only one U.S. landfall of a named storm in contrast to a long-term average of three per year. Once again no hurricane affected the Atlantic coast or peninsular Florida.” (Hebert. “Atlantic Hurricane Season of 1975.” MWR, V104, Apr 1976, pp. 453, 455.)

 

“The disturbance which spawned Eloise left the African west coast on 6 September as a rather unimpressive system on satellite photographs although the Dakar, Senegal, upper air sounding gave evidence of a fairly strong cyclonic circulation at lower levels. The disturbance moved westward at an average speed of 13 kt during the next six days. Satellite photographs and ship reports gave evidence of a very gradual increase in convection and organization during this time. The first sign that a weak depression had formed came early on 13 September….” (p. 458)

 

“A NOAA reconnaissance aircraft reported winds reached minimal hurricane force prior to the center striking the northeast coast of the Dominican Republic late on 16 September….Few storms fail to intensify as they move through the Yucatan Channel into the Gulf of Mexico, and Eloise was no exception. An approaching upper level trough in the westerlies caused Eloise to turn to the north on 21 September….Eloise [regained] hurricane force on the morning of 22 September in the central Gulf of Mexico about 300 n mi south of New Orleans….” (p. 459)

 

“Eloise continued strengthening until landfall about midway between For Walton Beach and Panama City shortly after 1200 GMT 23 September. At that time it was moving towards the north northeast at better than 20 kt. The hurricane weakened rapidly after landfall as drier, cooler air was drawn into its circulation. Eloise was downgraded to a tropical storm by 1600 GMT 23 September while over east central Alabama, a tropical depression by early evening while over eastern Tennessee, and lost all tropical characteristics by the time it reached extreme western Virginia on the morning of 24 September. A low pressure center identifiable as the remnant of Eloise was no longer discernable later that day. However, the moisture brought northward by the hurricane combined with an old frontal system over the northeastern United States to produce heavy rainfall and serious flooding until skies cleared on 27 September.” (p. 459)

 

“Meteorological Data, Deaths, Damage Estimates…Northern Leeward Islands, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic and Haiti. The primary effects of Eloise in these areas was flooding resulting from torrential rains and consequent deaths and damages. Total storm rainfall amounts ranged from 5-10 inches from St. Kitts and St. Martin westward across St. Croix to Puerto Rico with amounts of 10-20 inches common over eastern and southwestern Puerto Rico. The greatest total reported was 26.7 inches near Sabana Grande in southwest Puerto Rico….” (p. 460)

 

“United States…Southeast….Measurements of high water marks by the U.S. Corps of Engineers, Mobile District, indicate hurricane tides of 12-16 ft above mean sea level (MSL) occurred from just east of Fort Walton Beach to south of Panama City….Preliminary reports indicate at least 10 tornadoes occurred from northeastern Florida to western North Carolina, causing no deaths and only minor damage….” (p. 461)

 

“Northeast….the combination of the moisture brought northward by Eloise and a stagnant frontal zone produced rainfall amounts greater than 5 inches over eastern Virginia, extreme eastern West Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, the eastern half of Pennsylvania, and southeastern and south central New York state. Storm totals exceeded 10 inches along some of the eastern mountain slopes and in southeastern New York with the maximum of slightly over 14 inches recorded near Harrisburg, Pa. Major flooding took place on the Chemung, Susquehanna, Potomac and Shenandoah rivers with flash floods along smaller rivers and streams…..” (p. 461)

 

Newspapers

 

Sep 29:  “….President Ford declared a 30-county area of Pennsylvania a major disaster area, clearing the way for millions of dollars in aid to homeowners, farmers and communities along the Susquehanna River, gorged by a stormy backlash from Hurricane Eloise….Pennsylvania was hardest hit by the storm and a civil defense spokesman pegged damages at more than $150 million. The flood knocked out 13 water supply plants and 16 sewage treatment plants, forcing residents of small towns to boil their drinking water. Some 3,300 National Guardsmen who assisted Saturday in evacuating about 26,000 persons from their homes turned their efforts towards the cleanup on Sunday….” (United Press International. “Floodwaters from Eloise recede; six persons die.” South Mississippi Sun, Biloxi, 9-29-1975. p. 1.)

 

Sep 29: “….The U.S. Geological Service rated it a 60-year flood, the kind that can be expected, statistically, once in 60 years.”  (Associated Press. “Thousands Return To Flooded Homes.” Titusville Herald, PA. 9-29-1975, p. 1.)

Sources

 

Anderson, Bryan. “Sunday Marked 37 Year Anniversary of Hurricane Eloise.” WJHG, 9-24-2012. Accessed 9-18-2014 at: http://www.wjhg.com/home/headlines/Sunday-Marked-37-Year-Anniversary-of-Hurricane-Eloise-170908641.html

 

Associated Press, Miami. “Eloise Could Intensify.” Indiana Evening Gazette, Indiana, PA. 9-20-1975, p. 3. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=115766722&sterm

 

Associated Press, Harrisburg PA. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-1975, p. 8. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=140384297&sterm

 

Associated Press. “Floods claim eight lives.” Sun Herald, Biloxi, MS. 9-28, 1975, p. A-4. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=184663526&sterm=hurricane+eloise

 

Associated Press. “Hurricane blasts eastern Cuba.” Journal News, Hamilton, OH. 9-18-1975, p. 36. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=81645919&sterm=hurricane

 

Associated Press, San Juan. “Hurricane Slashes Past Puerto Rico.” Anderson Herald, IN. 9-17-1975, p. 1. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=76930329&sterm

 

Associated Press. “Thousands Return To Flooded Homes.” Titusville Herald, PA. 9-29-1975, p. 1. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=105987341&sterm

 

Barnes, Jay. Florida’s Hurricane History. Chapel Hill and London: UNC Press, 1998.

 

Bay County, Florida. “Hurricane Eloise.” Bay County CRS [Community Rating System] Progress Report 2014. 6-27-2014. Accessed 9-18-2014 at: http://www.baycountyfl.gov/community/pdf/crs-report.pdf

 

Blake, Eric S and Christopher W. Landsea (NHC) with Ethan J. Gibney, National Climatic Data Center (Asheville, NC). The Deadliest, Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones From 1851 to 2010 (and Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts). Miami, FL: National Hurricane Center, National Weather Service, August 2011. Accessed 5-21-2014 at: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/nws-nhc-6.pdf

 

Caraganis, Nick. “Chelmsford, Shirley mishaps take two lives.” The Sun, Lowell, MA. 9-26-1975, p. 1. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=55373454&sterm

 

Department of Natural Resources, Planning Area (San Juan, PR) and Ralph M. Field and Associates, Consultant. Coastal Flood Hazards and Responses in Puerto Rico: An Overview. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Feb 1980, p. 19. Accessed 9-18-2014 at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-gf85-c6277-1980/html/CZIC-gf85-c6277-1980.htm

 

Florida Memory – Division of Library & Information Services. “Storm damage from Hurricane Eloise – Panama City Beach, Florida.” Accessed 9-18-2014 at: http://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/117537

 

Hebert, Paul J. (National Hurricane Center). “Atlantic Hurricane Season of 1975.” Monthly Weather Review, Vol. 104, April 1976, pp. 453-465. Accessed 9-17-2014 at: http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/general/lib/lib1/nhclib/mwreviews/1975.pdf

 

Lebanon Daily News, PA. “Cloudiness Is Forecast Here.” 9-30-1975, p. 2. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=97839229&sterm=hurricane+eloise

 

National Hurricane Center (Miami). “Hurricane Eloise, September 13-24, 1975.” Climatological Data National Summary, Vol. 26, No. 9, Sep 1975. Environmental Data Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, pp. 4-7. Google digitized and accessed 9-16-2014 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=UiMIAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

Sullivan, Walter. “Landslide Toll Termed Worst in U.S. History.” New York Times, 10-10-1985. Accessed 9-18-2014 at: http://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/10/us/landslide-toll-termed-worst-in-us-history.html

 

Thompson, Herbert J. (Office of Hydrology). “General Summary of National Flood Events, September 1975.” Climatological Data National Summary, Vol. 26, No. 9, Sep 1975. Environmental Data Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, pp. 23-56. Accessed 9-17-2014 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=RSxRAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

Tyrone Daily Herald, PA. “Scattered Storms Highlight Weather.” 9-30-1975, p. 2. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=102967731&sterm=hurricane+eloise

 

United Press International. “Disasters Declared in Eastern Areas.” Sandusky Register, OH. 9-27-1975, p. A-8. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=138716217&sterm

 

United Press International, Harrisburg. “Eloise flooding leaves trail of death, destruction in Pa.” Pocono Record, PA. 9-29-1975, 1. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=87398561&sterm=hurricane+eloise

 

United Press International. “Floodwaters from Eloise recede; six persons die.” South Mississippi Sun, Biloxi, 9-29-1975. p. 1. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=184782249&sterm=hurricane+eloise

 

United Press International. “Susquehanna 10 Feet Above Flood.” Leader-Times, Kittanning, PA. 9-27-1975, p. 1. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=96297262&sterm

 

Wikipedia. “Hurricane Eloise.” 9-13-2014 update. At: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Eloise

 

 

 

 

[1] National Hurricane Center shows dates as Sep 13-24. We start with Sep 16 when Tropical Storm Eloise hit Puerto Rico, and we end on the 27^th when Eloise remnants, causing flooding and  taking lives, cleared.

[2] “There were 34 deaths (with 29 additional people unaccounted for)…” (Department of Natural Resources, Planning Area (San Juan, PR. Coastal Flood Hazards and Responses in Puerto Rico: An Overview. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Feb 1980, p. 19.) In that we use Blake, et al. figure of 44 deaths, we have somewhat arbitrarily cut the notation of 29 missing down to 19 missing. Besides the flooding there were mudslides which perhaps accounts for the “missing” or “unaccounted for.”

[3] Table 2. “Mainland U.S. tropical cyclones causing 25 or greater deaths 1851-2010.” Addendum (Not Atlantic/Gulf Coast), noting “Eloise (Puerto Rico)” with 44 deaths from Eloise while it was a Tropical Storm.

[4] “There were 34 confirmed deaths in Puerto Rico. Also: Hebert. “Atlantic Hurricane Season of 1975.” MWR, V104, Apr 1976, 455. An AP report of Sep 20 writes that in addition to “At least 34 persons…reported killed, 29 [were] missing and 275 injured…[and] thousands others were relocated from flooded homes.” Also notes that on Sep 19 President Ford “declared Puerto Rico a disaster area…” (Indiana Evening Gazette, PA. “Eloise Could Intensify.” 9-20-1975, p. 3.)

[5] Associated Press, San Juan. “Hurricane Slashes Past Puerto Rico.” Anderson Herald, IN. 9-17-1975, p. 1. Credits PR Civil Defense headquarters for the report.

[6] Associated Press, San Juan. “Hurricane Slashes Past Puerto Rico.” Anderson Herald, IN. 9-17-1975, p. 1

[7] Associated Press, San Juan. “Hurricane Slashes Past Puerto Rico.” Anderson Herald, IN. 9-17-1975, p. 1

[8] Associated Press, San Juan. “Hurricane Slashes Past Puerto Rico.” Anderson Herald, IN. 9-17-1975, p. 1.

[9] “There were four storm related deaths, although none occurred as a direct result of the winds or storm surge during the passage of Eloise.” Also: Hebert. “Atlantic Hurricane Season of 1975.” MWR, V104, Apr 1976, 455.

[10] Wikipedia. “Hurricane Eloise.” 9-13-2014 update.

[11] “Storm damage from Hurricane Eloise – Panama City Beach, Florida” website.

[12] Jay Barnes. Florida’s Hurricane History. Chapel Hill and London: UNC Press, 1998, p. 244.

[13] Jay Barnes. Florida’s Hurricane History. Chapel Hill and London: UNC Press, 1998, p. 244.

[14] AP. “Thousands Return To Flooded Homes.” Titusville Herald, PA. 9-29-1975, p. 1.

[15] “…small stream flooding was reported in the New River Basin from rains of 3 to 4.5 inches on the 17^th and 19^th, and again on the 22d-24^th from rains of 4 to 5 inches associated with the remnants of Hurricane Eloise. A small child drowned in the Meadows River near Rupert, WV, during the latter event.” (Thompson. “General Summary of National Flood Events, September 1975.” Climatological Data National Summary, Vol. 26, No. 9, Sep 1975, p. 31.)

[16] “The 17 deaths in the area were mostly drownings.”

[17] AP. “Thousands Return To Flooded Homes.” Titusville Herald, PA. 9-29-1975, p. 1.

[18] Thompson. “General Summary of National Flood Events, September 1975.” Climatological Data National Summary, Vol. 26, No. 9, Sep 1975, p. 24.

[19] Daniel Byrnes identified as presumed drowning victim, missing two days. (AP. “Thousands Return To Flooded Homes.” Titusville Herald, PA. 9-29-1975, p. 1.)

[20] Nick Caraganis. “Chelmsford, Shirley mishaps take two lives.” The Sun, Lowell, MA. 9-26-1975, p. 1. We do not include the second of the two lives lost – identified as the “mysterious” death of a woman on Rte. 3 in Chelmsford. Article cites Chelmsford Police Chief to effect that “the woman had been dragged by a car in the northbound lane of Rte. 3…the driver of the vehicle…was signaled to stop by a motorist who noticed that a body was being dragged on the undercarriage of the car.” The driver said he didn’t know that he was dragging the woman. Was arrested and charged with operating vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Does not appear to be storm-related.

[21] Tyrone Daily Herald, PA. “Scattered Storms Highlight Weather.” 9-30-1975, p. 2. Writes that “…Fire Chief John Cox, 55, and Fire Capt. Donald McGeever, 53 drowned Monday [Sep 29] while trying to recover the body of another fireman in the Susquehanna. The firemen’s boat overturned as they tried to hook a line to Rockbottom Dam [Binghamton, NY] in order to search for the body of fireman John Russell, 26. Russell drowned Sunday [Sep 28] while going to the aid of two young men whose rubber raft capsized while they tried to go over the dam.”

[22] Both Mt. Pleasant and White Plains are in Westchester County, thus the two drowning deaths we show for these localities are apparently the ones referred to.

[23] United Press International. “Disasters Declared in Eastern Areas.” Sandusky Register, OH. 9-27-1975, p. A-8.

[24] United Press International. “Disasters Declared in Eastern Areas.” Sandusky Register, OH. 9-27-1975, p. A-8.

[25] UPI. “Floodwaters from Eloise recede; six persons die.” South Mississippi Sun, 9-29-1975. p. 1. It is clear that the reference is to deaths in PA: “Raging floodwaters on the Susquehanna River [central PA] caused by Hurricane Eloise receded Sunday, leaving behind death and destruction estimated at $150 million in one of the worst floods in Pennsylvania’s history. At least six persons lost their lives.”

[26] United Press International. “Disasters Declared in Eastern Areas.” Sandusky Register, OH. 9-27-1975, p. A-8. Victim identified in: AP, Harrisburg PA. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-1975, p. 8.

[27] Associated Press, Harrisburg PA. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-1975, p. 8.

[28] Victim identified as Wilbur Waite in: AP. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-1975, 8.

[29] Victim identified as Ross W. Krow. (AP. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-1975, 8.)

[30] United Press International. “Disasters Declared in Eastern Areas.” Sandusky Register, OH. 9-27-1975, p. A-8. Newburg identified as locality in: UPI. “Susquehanna 10 Feet Above Flood.” Leader-Times, Kittanning, PA. 9-27-1975, p. 1. Victim identified as Jacob Flaud in: AP. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-1975, 8, which wrote that he “fell into water that flooded a field near his home.”

[31] Victim identified as R. T. Peebles in: AP. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-1975, 8. See, also: Thompson (National Climatic Center). Sep 1975, p. 25.

[32] United Press International. “Disasters Declared in Eastern Areas.” Sandusky Register, OH. 9-27-1975, p. A-8. Age from: Thompson (National Climatic Center). Sep 1975, p. 25.

[33] Victim named as Joseph Cunningham: AP. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-75, 8.

[34] UPI, Harrisburg. “Eloise flooding leaves trail of death, destruction in Pa.” Pocono Record, PA. 9-29-1975, 1.

[35] United Press International. “Disasters Declared in Eastern Areas.” Sandusky Register, OH. 9-27-1975, p. A-8. Flood victim identified as Mrs. George Ruby in: Associated Press, Harrisburg PA. “Flood assistance centers will open.” Bradford Era, PA. 9-30-1975, p. 8.

[36] Associated Press. “Hurricane blasts eastern Cuba.” Journal News, Hamilton, OH. 9-18-1975, p. 36.

[37] Hebert. “Atlantic Hurricane Season of 1975.” MWR, V104, Apr 1976, 455.

–10  Liefer, G. P. Broken Wings: Tragedy & Disaster in Alaska Civil Aviation. 2003, p. 284.

–10  NTSB AAR. Wien Air Alaska…Gambell, St. Lawrence Island, Alaska, Aug 30, 1975. 1976.

–7  passengers.

–3  crewmembers. (p. 1)

 

Narrative Information

 

National Transportation Safety Board: “At approximately 1357 Bering daylight time, August 30, 1975, Wien Air Alaska, Inc., Flight 99, crashed into Sevuokuk Mountain, Gambell, Alaska, while attempting to land at Gambell Airport. There were 28 passengers and 4 crewmembers on board. Seven passengers and three crewmembers were killed; the aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire.

 

“The weather was characterized by low ceilings and low visibilities. Sea fog was reported to be moving in an easterly direction across the airport and toward the mountain.

 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flightcrew’s failure to adhere to prescribed company instrument approach procedures while attempting to land in adverse weather conditions…

 

“Wien Air Alaska Flight 99, a Fairchild F-27B, N4904, was a regularly scheduled passenger and cargo flight from Nome, Alaska, to Savoonga and Gambell–two villages on St. Lawrence Island, Alaska.” (NTSB, 1976, 1)

 

At 1216, on August 30, 1975, Flight 99 departed Nome and landed at Savoonga at 1306. The aircraft departed Savoonga at 1327 with an estimated time en route of 15 minutes to Gambell. There were 32 persons on board–28 passengers and 4 crewmembers.

 

When the Wien agent at Gambell heard Flight 99’s radio transmissions after takeoff from Savoonga, she activated the Gambell Nondirectional Beacon (NDB).

 

“According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, the crew identified the Gambell NDB shortly after departing Savoonga and contacted the Wien agent at Gambell…The crew gave their estimated time of arrival and requested the weather. The agent replied, “Our current weather is partial obscured sky. Visibility 1 to 1/2 miles 1 mile to 1/2 mile with … and fog. Temperature is 47O, wind is calm, altimeter 29.70.” Soon thereafter, Flight 99 questioned the visibility; the agent replied that it was, ‘sometimes about 5 miles, it’s very hard to tell . . . .’

 

“When the flight arrived in the Gambell area, the captain, who was flying the aircraft, remarked to the first officer that fog appeared to be a problem. He also stated, ‘We’ll take a shot from this way and if we can’t make it, we’ll come around and hit it from that side. If we can’t make it from there, we’ll turn out and (come in underneath it).’

 

“The pilot then made several attempts to land. According to some surviving passengers, the aircraft descended to a low altitude over the tundra to the south of the airport during one of the approaches.

 

“During another of the approaches, ground witnesses saw the aircraft make a low pass down the runway and then a right turn out to sea before it disappeared into the fog. Some of the survivors, including the flight attendant, believed that the aircraft touched down on this approach. The CVR indicates that the crew had the runway in sight but decided to execute a missed approach because they were too far down the runway to land safely.  Flight data recorder (FDR) information shows that the aircraft descended to within a few feet of the surface.

 

“According to correlated CVR/FDR information, the aircraft then turned right, flew north, and make a relatively steep turn to the right. During this turn, the first officer said that a 155O heading inbound would be perfect. Cockpit conversations during the rollout indicated that the flight passed the NDB while on a heading of 140 [degrees]. The captain then called for final flaps and landing gear.

 

“When last observed by ground witnesses, the aircraft was heading southeast. It flew over a beach and near boat racks located about 240 yards northeast of the NDB. It continued its course and passed over the eastern end of some newly constructed houses just north of Troutman Lake, which is located between the runway and Sevuokuk Mountain. Ground witnesses stated that the landing gear was lowered before they saw the aircraft disappear into the fog. Ground witnesses and survivors of the crash generally agreed that there was a considerable amount of patchy fog in the area and that visibility ranged from 1/4 to 1½ miles.

 

“A heading of 140° was maintained for about 28 seconds until the aircraft struck Sevuokuk Mountain at an altitude of 424 feet. Several of the passengers could see the ground and were aware of their position relative to the village of Gambell. Some of them realized that the aircraft was going to hit the mountain and braced themselves.

 

“Shortly after the aircraft entered the fog and just before impact, some witnesses and survivors heard an increase in engine sound.”  (NTSB 1976, pp. 2-3)

 

“The aircraft crashed into the northwest slope of Sevuokuk Mountain at an altitude of 424 feet. The first impact mark was found 134 feet below a 558-foot ridge. The aircraft overturned during the crash and came to rest inverted and heading opposite the direction of flight….” (NTSB 1976, 7)

 

“The seven fatally injured passengers sustained severe impact injuries and three of them were burned extensively…” (NTSB 1976, 8)

 

“The survivors reported that fire erupted in the vicinity of the left engine immediately after the crash. They said that the fire spread slowly, but gradually to the cabin area, which provided time for the rescue of all but one of the injured passengers.

 

“The crash site was accessible only to hand-held fire extinguishers, which the local residents carried to the scene and used on the fire. The fire eventually burned itself out…”

 

“This accident was partially survivable. The decelerative forces were within human tolerance; however, the aircraft sustained severe structural damage and overturned. Most seats came loose when the floor lost its structural integrity. Some occupiable areas of the aircraft, including the cockpit, were crushed.

 

“In addition, there was sufficient time for the survivors to escape or to be rescued before the fire intensified. Some passengers escaped from the wreckage unaided. An Alaska State Trooper, who was a passenger, rescued approximately 15 survivors from the wreckage. The Trooper said that nearly all survivors had to be unbuckled from their seats which, in most cases, had broken loose and were piled up. After he had the survivors out of the aircraft, he carried them away from the wreckage.  He was assisted by local residents who arrived at the scene about 30 minutes after the accident.”[1]  (NTSB 1976, 9)

 

“In addition t o the poor condition of the airport lighting, the contrast between the runway at Gambell and its immediate surroundings is poor, especially when visibility is low. There are no runway centerline markings, threshold markings, touchdown zone markings, or other visual markings to aid in distinguishing the runway from surrounding terrain. Runway contrast is further reduced by snow in the winter months. These conditions also exist at other airports in Alaska which are certificated for air carrier operations….

 

“…the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

 

1. Insure that certificated airports in Alaska comply with the provisions of 14 CFR 139 — specifically those provisions which require that airport lighting systems and similar equipment be maintained in an operable condition and that NOTAMs be issued regarding the conditions of such items, as needed. (Class I1 – Priority followup)

 

1. Expedite existing programs and initiate additional programs to install and improve facilities at certificated airports in Alaska so that the visual conspicuity of runway environments is improved. (Class 11 – Priority followup),” (NTSB 1976, 46, Appendix J)

 

(National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Wien Air Alaska, Inc. Fairchild F-27B, N4904, Gambell, St. Lawrence Island, Alaska, August 30, 1975 (NTSB-AAR-76-1).  Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted January 7, 1976, 49 pages.)

 

Sources

 

Liefer, G. P. Broken Wings: Tragedy & Disaster in Alaska Civil Aviation. Blaine, WA: Hancock House, 2003.

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Wien Air Alaska, Inc. Fairchild F-27B, N4904, Gambell, St. Lawrence Island, Alaska, August 30, 1975 (NTSB-AAR-76-1).  Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted January 7, 1976, 49 pages. Accessed at:  http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR76-01.pdf

 

[1] Liefer writes: “All of the survivors were helped or carried off the mountain, many over several miles of rugged terrain, before arriving in Gambell. A village health nurse was the only person in the community trained to administer first aid, and for several hours she did her best treating the various injuries. Addditional medical personnel and supplies arrived from Nome later that evening….A Coast Guard C-130 aircraft transported them to medical facilities in Anchorage the next morning.” (p. 284.)

–10 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. FARS 1975-2010 Fatality Analysis
–10 Yuma Daily Sun, AZ. “Crash Kills 10 on Reservation.” 7-4-1975, p. 1.
— 7 Danville Register, VA. “Seven Persons Are Killed in Collision.” 7-4-1975, p. 2.

Narrative Information

July 4, Associated Press: “Page, Ariz. (AP) – Seven persons were killed Thursday in a head-on collision between a pickup truck-camper and a car in an isolated area of the Navajo Reservation, authorities said.

“Witnesses said the truck landed atop the car and the camper was thrown from the rest of the wreckage. The accident occurred on State Route 98 about 60 miles south of the Utah border.

One person taken to a hospital in the reservation community of Tuba City, about 55 miles west of the crash site, underwent surgery.

“Bob Red, a trading post operator, said the car and truck collided on a wide, straight highway. ‘There’s been a lot of traffic on this highway today. It’s Social Security check day and a lot of traffic goes through here on the way to Page,’ Red said.” (Danville Register, VA. “Seven Persons Are Killed in Collision.” 7-4-1975, p. 2.)

July 4, Associated Press: “Page, Ariz. (AP) – Ten persons, all Indians, died when their pickup truck and sedan slammed headon in an isolated area of the Navajo Reservation in northern Arizona, authorities said.

“The crash occurred Thursday afternoon on State Route 98 about 50 miles southeast of here. The curs looked like they ‘melted together,’ said Dr. Scott Hobson, of the nearby Kayenta Public Health Service Clinic. Hobson was one of two physicians called to the scene. Witnesses said following the impact the truck landed atop the car and the camper it was carrying was thrown from the rest of the wreckage. ‘They just hit and both of them kind of accordioned on the front,’ said Hobson. ‘The tails of each vehicle were just kind of up in the air.’

“Department of Public Safety Patrolman Andy Chanoki of Page, one of the first to arrive on the scene, said ‘there were people all over the road.’ All but one person were thrown from the vehicles. The victims included seven adults and three children.

“Investigators said eight persons were in the sedan….Officers said the other two victims were in the pickup truck….

“The accident occurred, officers said, when Begishe’s pickup truck crossed the center line and struck the other vehicle headon. Chanoki said the car was westbound toward Page and the truck was eastbound. He said both vehicles were traveling an estimated 70 miles an hour when the crash occurred.

“Bob Red, operator of the Kaibita Trading Post 17 miles west of the crash, reported the accident to Navajo police after a tourist rushed in and told him of the accident. ‘He was excited and said to call for help.’ Red said. ‘He said at least two ambulances, would be needed. Then he turned around and left.’ The accident occurred on a new stretch of highway on high desert plateau land.” (Yuma Daily Sun, AZ. “Crash Kills 10 on Reservation.” 7-4-1975, p. 1.)

Sources

Danville Register, VA. “Seven Persons Are Killed in Collision,” 7-4-1975, p. 2. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=95476311

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Partial Data Dump of Crashes Involving 10 or More Fatalities, by Year, Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 1975-2009 Final and 2010 ARF. Washington, DC: NHTSA, pdf file provided to Wayne Blanchard, 1-26-2012.

Yuma Daily Sun, AZ. “Crash Kills 10 on Reservation.” 7-4-1975, p. 1. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=50521134

–12 Associated Press. “Fire claims 12th victim. Corvallis Gazette-Times, OR. 10-14-1975, p. 5.
–12 Jones. “A Brief Look At The Hotel Fire Record.” Fire Journal (NFPA), May 1981, p. 41.
–12 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Key Dates in Fire History. 1996.
–11 Associated Press. “Fire toll now 11.” Corvallis Gazette-Times, OR. 7-16-1975, p. 3.
–11 NFPA. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1975.” Fire Journal, Vol. 70, no. 4, July 1976, p. 52.
–11 NFPA. Summary of Fire Incidents 1934-2006 in Hotel Fires in the United States. 2008.
–10 AP. “Tenth victim of Portland fire.” The Daily Chronicle, Centralia, WA. 7-14-1975, p. 11.
— 9 UPI. “Suspect in Fire Freed.” The Times, San Mateo, CA, 7-10-12975, p. 4.
— 8 Wheeler. “Oregon Fire Takes 8 Lives; Man Held on Arson Charges,” July 8, 1975.

Narrative Information

NFPA: “Transient hotel, Portland Oregon. On July 7, a fire of incendiary origin extensively damaged this transient hotel, hilling 11 occupants and injuring 26 others. The three-story building of ordinary construction was a temporary house for about 50 persons on the night of the fire. The first floor was occupied by six businesses; the upper two stories were the hotel. There was no sprinkler protection or fire detections system.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1975.” Fire Journal, Vol. 70, no. 4, July 1976, p. 52.)

Newspapers

July 8: “Portland, Ore. (UPI) – Eight men were killed and 26 persons injured, eight of them critically, when an arson-caused fire swept through the Pomona Hotel on skid row late Monday night. John A. Newvine, 62, who lives 17 blocks from the Pomona, was charged early today with arson and homicide, Portland Police Bureau Capt. Richard Walker said. Newvine gave no reason for setting the fire, Walker said. “When we got there people were hanging by their fingertips from a third floor ledge,” Portland Fire Bureau assistant Chief Wayne Lambeth said. “You’d see one face at a window and rescue him and another one would be right behind him. ‘We had people laying all over the sidewalk — some dead, some alive’.” (Wheeler. “Oregon Fire Takes 8 Lives; Man Held on Arson Charges,” Nashua Telegraph, NH, July 8, 1975.)

July 10: “Portland, Ore. (UPI) – The death toll in Portland’s worst fire, an arson set blaze in the rundown Pomona Hotel on skid row Monday night, rose to nine Wednesday, and police released a suspect in custody for lack of sufficient evidence….Newvine had been held in jail without bail after being arrested following a report from a service station attendant that a man ‘about 70 years old’ had bought 50 cents wroth of gasoline in a two-gallon can moments before the fire, which smelled strongly of gasoline fumes…” (United Press International. “Suspect in Fire Freed.” The Times, San Mateo, CA, 7-10-12975, p. 4.)

July 12: “Portland, Ore. (AP) – A 57-year-old man has been charged with reckless homicide in connection with a hotel fire that killed nine people. Roy Jennings Beard of Portland was being held without bail for arraignment Monday after his arrest on Friday.

“Twenty-five men were also injured in the fire which swept through the three-story Pomona Hotel in Portland’s skid road district Monday night.

“Fire investigators said gasoline apparently was poured down a stairway from a second-floor landing of the hotel before the blaze broke out.” (Associated Press. “Man charged in hotel fire.” Eau Claire Leader-Telegram, WI. 8-12-1975, p. 2A.)

July 14: “Portland, Ore. (AP) – A tenth victim of last week’s fire at the Pomona Hotel on skid row in Portland died Sunday at a hospital. He was 60-year-old Keith Milsap. Eight residents of the hotel died the night of the fire last Monday and another resident died of injuries in a hospital last week….” (AP. “Tenth victim of Portland fire.” Daily Chronicle, Centralia, WA. 7-14-1975, p. 11.)

July 16: “Portland (AP) – The death toll from the devastating July 7 fire in the Pomona Hotel here rose to 11 Tuesday. Robert Platero, 50, died at Good Samaritan Hospital.” (Associated Press. “Fire toll now 11.” Corvallis Gazette-Times, OR. 7-16-1975, p. 3.)

Oct 14: “Portland (AP) – The death of 46-year-old William Hysmith during the weekend was the 12th death resulting from a fire July 11 at the Pomona Hotel on Portland’s Skid Road. Hysmith suffered burns and smoke inhalation during the fire, which was caused by arson.

“Eight residents died the night of the fire and three died in hospitals during the next several days. Twenty-five other people were injured.

“Roy Jennings Beard, 57, a transient, was charged with reckless homicide an was sent to Oregon State Hospital.” (Associated Press. “Fire claims 12th victim. Corvallis Gazette-Times, OR. 10-14-1975, p. 5.)

Sources

Associated Press. “Fire claims 12th victim. Corvallis Gazette-Times, OR. 10-14-1975, p. 5. Accessed 10-19-2021 at: https://www.newspapers.com/clip/35699976/corvallis-gazette-times/

Associated Press. “Fire toll now 11.” Corvallis Gazette-Times, OR. 7-16-1975, p. 3. Accessed 10-19-2021 at: https://www.newspapers.com/clip/35699927/corvallis-gazette-times/

Associated Press. “Man charged in hotel fire.” Eau Claire Leader-Telegram, WI. 8-12-1975, p. 2A. Accessed 10-19-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/eau-claire-leader-telegram-jul-12-1975-p-3/

Associated Press. “Tenth victim of Portland fire.” The Daily Chronicle, Centralia, WA. 7-14-1975, p. 11. Accessed 10-19-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/centralia-daily-chronicle-jul-14-1975-p-11/

Jones, Jon C. “A Brief Look At The Hotel Fire Record.” Fire Journal (NFPA), May 1981, pp. 38-41.

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at: http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

National Fire Protection Association. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1975.” Fire Journal, Vol. 70, no. 4, July 1976, p. 52.

National Fire Protection Association. Summary of Fire Incidents 1934-2006 in Hotel Fires in the United States as Reported to the NFPA, with Ten or more Fatalities. Quincy, MA: NFPA, One-Stop Data Shop, Fire Analysis and Research Division, January 2008, 4 pages. Accessed at: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/Press%20Room/Hotelfirefatalitiesreport.pdf

United Press International. “Suspect in Fire Freed.” The Times, San Mateo, CA, 7-10-12975, p. 4. Accessed 10-19-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/san-mateo-times-jul-10-1975-p-4/

Wheeler. Dean B. “Oregon Fire Takes 8 Lives; Man Held on Arson Charges.” Nashua Telegraph, NH, July 8, 1975. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/PdfViewerTags.aspx?img=71555680&firstvisit=true&src=search&currentResult=0

–115 Emergency Management Net. “Airplane Accidents 1969-1979.”
–115 History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, June 24, 1975. Eastern Flight 66 Crashes…
–113 Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). New York.
–113 NTSB. AAR. Eastern Air Lines…Kennedy Int. AP, Jamaica, NY, June 24, 1975. 1976.
–113 NYCdata. Disasters, New York City (NYC). “Eastern Airlines Flight 66 Crash – 1975.
–113 Wikipedia. “Eastern Air Lines Flight 66.”
–112 Darby. “Cracking the Microburst Code.” Aero Safety World, March 2011, p. 53.

Narrative Information

History.com: “An Eastern Airlines jet [124 on board (NationMaster.com)] crashes near John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City , killing 115 people on this day in 1975. The Boeing 727 was brought down by wind shear, a sudden change in wind speed or direction.

“On the afternoon of June 24, the New York area experienced severe thunderstorms with heavy winds and rain. Thunderstorms often cause microbursts, damaging downbursts of wind that can be immensely destructive and are particularly dangerous to air travel. Two different flights arriving at John F. Kennedy Airport in Queens, New York, reported significant problems with winds as they brought their planes in on runway 22. Air-traffic controllers, however, ignored the warnings and kept the runway open.

“Eastern Airlines Flight 66 from New Orleans was about a mile from the runway when it was lifted suddenly and violently by the wind, then was immediately pushed downward. The plane struck a row of lights that tore off the outer portion of the left wing. It proceeded to crash into more light poles and broke into pieces just above the ground.

“Only seven passengers and two flight attendants survived the fiery crash, all with serious injuries. The remaining 109 passengers and six crew members lost their lives. Wind shear remains a serious threat to flying, but significant advances in identifying areas and times of concern have virtually eliminated deadly crashes caused by sudden winds.” (History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, June 24, 1975. Eastern Flight 66 Crashes at J.F.K.”)

NTSB: “About 1605 e.d.t. on June 24, 1975, Eastern Air Lines Flight 66, a Boeing 727-225, crashed into the approach lights to runway 22L at the John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. The aircraft was on an ILS approach to the runway through a very strong thunderstorm that was located astride the ILS localizer course. Of the 124 persons aboard, 113 died of injuries received in the crash. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the aircraft’s encounter with adverse winds associated with a very strong thunderstorm located astride the ILS localizer course, which resulted in a high descent rate into the non-frangible approach light towers. The flightcrew’s delayed recognition and correction of the high descent rate were probably associated with their reliance upon visual cues rather than on flight instrument references. However, the adverse winds might have been too severe for a successful approach and landing even had they relied upon and responded rapidly to the indications of the flight instruments.

“Contributing to the accident was the continued use of runway 22L when it should have become evident to both air traffic control personnel and the flightcrew that a severe weather hazard existed along the approach path.” (NTSB 1976, 1)

“On June 24, 1975, Eastern Air Lines Flight 66, a Boeing 727-225, N8845E. operated as a scheduled passenger flight from New Orleans, Louisiana, to New York, New York. The flight departed New Orleans about 1319 e.d.t. with 116 passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard. It proceeded to the John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.

“Eastern 66 arrived in the New York City terminal area without reported difficulty, and, beginning at 1535:11, Kennedy approach control (Southgate arrival controller) provided radar vectors to sequence the flight with other traffic and to position it for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 22L at the Kennedy airport. The flight had received a broadcast on the automatic terminal information service (ATIS). which gave in part the 1251 Kennedy weather observation and other data as follows: “Kennedy weather, VFR, sky partially obscured, estimated ceiling 4,000 broken, 5 miles with haze.. .wind 210° at 10, altimeter 30. 15. Expect vectors to an ILS runway 22L, landing, runway 22L, departures are off 22R.. . .”

“At 1551:54, the Southgate arrival controller broadcast to all aircraft on his frequency, ‘ . . .we’re VFR with a 5-mile, light, very light rain shower with haze, altimeter check 30. 13.. . .It’s ILS 22L, also.’ At 1552:43, the controller transmitted, “All aircraft this frequency, we just went IFR with 2 miles very light rain showers and haze. The runway visual range is—not available, and Eastern 66 descend and maintain four thousand…” Eastern 66 acknowledged the transmission.

“Eastern 66 was one of a number of aircraft that were being vectored to intercept the ILS localizer course for runway 22L. At 1553:22, the flight contacted the Kennedy final vector controller, who continued to provide radar vectors around thunderstorms in the area, to sequence the flight with other traffic, and to position the flight on the localizer course. About 1557:21, the flightcrew discussed the problems associated with carrying minimum fuel loads when confronted
with delays in terminal areas. One of the crewmembers stated that he was going to check the weather at the alternate airport, which was LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York. Less than a minute later, one of the crewmembers remarked, “…one more hour and we’d come down whether we wanted to or not.” At 1559:19, the final vector controller transmitted a message to all aircraft on his frequency that “a severe wind shift” had been reported on the final approach and that he would report more information shortly.

“Eastern Air Lines Flight 902, a Lockheed 1011, had abandoned its approach to runway 22L at 1557:30. At 1559:40, Eastern 902 reestablished radio communications with the Kennedy final vector controller, and the flightcrew reported, “. . we had.. . a pretty good shear pulling us to the right and.. .down and visibility was nil, nil out over the marker.. . correction.. .at 200 feet it was.. . nothing.” The final vector controller responded, .”Okay, the shear you say pulled you right and down?” Eastern 902 replied, “Yeah, we were on course and down to about 250 feet. The airspeed dropped to about 10 kn below the bug and our rate of descent was up to 1,500 feet a minute, so we put takeoff power on and we went around at a hundred feet.”

“Eastern 902’s wind shear report to the final vector controller was recorded on Eastern 66’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR). While Eastern 902 was making this report, the captain of Eastern 66, at 1600:33, said, you know this is asinine.” An unidentified crewmember responded, “I wonder if they’re covering for themselves”

“The final vector controller asked Eastern 66 if they had heard Eastern 902’s report. Eastern 66 replied, ‘. . .affirmative, ‘ The controller then established the flight’s position as being 5 miles from the outer marker (OM) and cleared the flight for an ILS approach to runway 22L. Eastern 66 acknowledged the clearance at 1600:54.5, “Okay, we’ll let you know about the conditions.” At 1601:49. 5, the first officer, who was flying the aircraft. called for completion of the final checklist. While the final checklist items were being completed, the captain stated that the radar was, “Up and off.. . standby.” At 1602:20, the captain said, ‘.. . I have the radar on standby in case I need it, I can get it off later.”

“At 1602:42, the final vector controller asked Eastern 902, “. . .would you classify that as severe wind shift, correction, shear?” The flight responded, “Affirmative..”

“At 1602:50.5, the first officer of Eastern 66 said, “Gonna keep a pretty healthy margin on this one.” An unidentified crewmember said, “I.. .would suggest that you do.” The first officer responded, “In case he’s right..”

At 1602:58.7. Eastern 66 reported over the OM, and the final vector controller cleared the flight to contact the Kennedy tower. At 1603:12.4, the flight established communications with Kennedy tower local controller and reported that they were, “outer marker, inbound.” At 1603:44, the Kennedy tower local controller cleared Eastern 66 to land. The captain acknowledged the clearance and asked, “Got any reports on braking action. ..?” The local controller did not respond until the query was repeated. At 1604:14.1, the local controller replied, “No, none, approach end of runway is wet.. .but I’d say about the first half is wet–we’ve had no adverse reports.”….

“Both flight attendants who were seated in the aft portion of the passenger cabin, described Eastern 66’s approach as normal—there was little or no turbulence. According to one of the attendants, the aircraft rolled to the left, and she heard engine power increase significantly. The aircraft then rolled upright and rocked back and forth. She was thrown forward and then upright: several seconds later she saw the cabin emergency lights illuminate and oxygen masks drop from their retainers. Her next recollection was her escape from the wreckage.

“Witnesses near the middle marker (MM) for runway 22L saw the aircraft at a low altitude and in heavy rain. It first struck an approach light tower which was located about 1,200 feet southwest of the MM; it then struck several more towers, caught fire, and came to rest on Rockaway Boulevard. Initial impact was recorded on the CVK at 1605:11.4…”

“Five witnesses located along the localizer course, from about 1.6 miles from the threshold of runway 22L, to near the MM, described the weather conditions when Eastern 66 passed overhead as follows: heavy rain was falling and there was lightning and thunder; the wind was blowing hard from directions ranging from north through east….” (NTSB 1976, 1-4)

“Flying Tiger Line Flight 161, a DC-8, had preceded Eastern 902 on the approach and had landed on runway 22L about 1550:15. After clearing the runway, at 1557:30, the captain reported to the local controller: “I just highly recommend that you change the runways and land northwest, you have such a tremendous wind shear down near…the ground on final.” The local controller responded, ,”Okay, we’re indicating wind right down the runway at 15 kn when you landed.” At 1557:50, the captain of Flight 161 said, “I don’t care what you’re indicating; I’m just telling you that there’s such a wind shear on the final on that runway you should change it to the northwest.” The local controller did not respond. At 1557:55, he transmitted missed approach directions to Eastern 902 and-asked “…was wind a problem?” Eastern 902 answered, “Affirmative.”….” (NTSB 1976, 5)

“At 1526 the National Weather Service Forecast Office (NWS), located in midtown Manhattan, issued a strong wind warning which was valid from 1600 to 21000. The warning called for gusty surface winds to 50 kn from the west in thunderstorms in the New York City terminal area. The NWS distributed the warning to various facilities in the area, including the Kennedy control tower and approach control and Eastern Air Lines operations at the Kennedy Airport. There was no evidence that the warning was disseminated to flightcrews operating in the area.”

“About 8 minutes before the accident, the NWS weather radar located at Atlantic City, New Jersey, showed that an area of thunder-storm activity was centered along the northern edge of Kennedy Airport. The area was oriented west-northwest to east-southeast and was 30 to 35 miles long and about 15 miles wide. Several groups of thunderstorm cells in the area had tops which exceeded 50,000 feet. The tropopause was reported at 46,500 feet. About the time of the accident, the largest group of cells, moving east-southeast at a speed of 30 to 35 kn, merged with a smaller group of cells, moving east-northeast at a speed of about 20 to 25 kn; the cells merged over the approach course to runway 22L. There is no evidence that this information was available to either air traffic control (ATC) agencies or flightcrews who were operating in the
New York City terminal area.

“The NWS terminal forecast for Kennedy Airport, which was valid before Eastern 66 departed New Orleans, called for thunderstorms and moderate rain showers after 1800. The forecast was amended at 1430 to include thunderstorms and moderate rain showers after 1515. At 1545, the forecast was further amended to call for thunderstorms, heavy rain showers with visibilities as low as 1/2 mile, and winds from 270° at 30 kn with gusts to 50 kn after 1615. There was no evidence that the flightcrew of Eastern 66 received any of these forecasts.

“At the time of the accident, there was no SIGMET [Significant Meteorological Information] in effect for the New York City terminal area.” (NTSB 1976, 8)

“At 1604:52.6, the captain said, “I have approach lights,” and the first officer said. “Okay.” At 1604:54.7, the captain again said, “Stay on the gauges, ” and the first officer replied, “I’m with it.” N8845E then was passing through 400 feet, and its rate of descent increased from an average of about 675 feet per minute (fpm) to 1,500 fpm. The aircraft rapidly began to deviate below the glideslope, and 4 seconds later, the airspeed decreased from 138 kn to 123 kn in 2.5 seconds.

“N8845E continued to deviate further below the glideslope, and 1605:06.2, when the aircraft was at 150 feet, the captain said, “runway in sight.” Less than a second later, the first officer said, “I got it.” The captain replied, “got it? ” and a second later, at l605:10.2, an un-intelligible exclamation was recorded, and the first officer commanded, “Takeoff thrust.” The sound of impact was recorded at 1605:11.4.” (NTSB 1976,11)

“Most of the passengers died from severe multiple impact injuries. Some of them also suffered varying degrees of burns. Each of the surviving passengers sustained burns which varied from first to third degree over 30 to 70 percent of the body. Some of these passengers also received impact injuries and fractures.

“Fire erupted after the left wing failed and released fuel as the aircraft skidded through the approach light towers. There were numerous ignition sources–hot engine components, electrical wiring in the aircraft, the approach light system, and the street light system–and many friction sources. Destruction of the fuselage caused more fuel to be released, and the fire continued to burn after the aircraft came to rest.” (NTSB 1976,14)

“The fire department’s rapid response prevented fatal burns to the 9 passengers who ultimately survived; some were found lying in pools of fuel and fire-extinguisher foam.” (NTSB 1976,15)

“It is clear from surface weather reports, weather radar data, and witness and pilot statements that a large area of very strong thunder-storms accompanied by strong, variable, and gusty surface winds was moving rapidly along the northern perimeter of Kennedy Airport between 1540 and 1620. The storm area was moving east-southeasterly, and about 1550 it began to seriously affect safe approach operations to runway 22L. Although the weather along the final approach course to that runway deteriorated rapidly from about 1550 to the time of the accident, the approach paths to the northwest runways remained relatively unaffected by the storms. Significant clues (both visual and radar) were available to air traffic controllers and flightcrews alike to indicate the existence of these conditions on and near Kennedy Airport.” (NTSB 1976, 26)

“…the Safety Board concludes that had the thunderstorm activity been evaluated properly, it should have been apparent that the approach to runway 22L was unsafe and that approaches to that runway should have been discontinued. The Safety Board believes that ATC did not consider a runway change either before or after the Flying Tiger captain’s recommendation because a change of runways would have further increased traffic delays and would have increased the already heavy workload.

“When operating at capacity, the air traffic system in a high density terminal area tends to resist changes that disrupt or further delay the orderly flow of traffic. Delays have a compounding effect unless they can be absorbed at departure terminals or within the en route system. Consequently, controllers and pilots tend to keep the traffic moving. particularly the arrival traffic because delays involve the consumption of fuel and tardy or missed connections with other flights, which could lead to further complications. As weather conditions worsen, the system becomes even less flexible.” (NTSB 1976, 33)

“As a result of its investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board has issued the following recommendations to the Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration:

“1. Conduct a research program to define and classify the level of flight hazard of thunderstorms using specific criteria for the severity of a thunderstorm and the magnitude of change of the wind speed components … assured as a function of distance along an airplane‘s departure or approach flight track and establish operational limitations based upon there criteria.

“2. Expedite the program to develop and install equipment which would facilitate the detection and classification, by severity, of thunderstorms within 5 nmi of the departure of threshold ends of active runways at airports having precision instrument approaches.

“3. Install equipment capable of detecting variations in the speed of the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical components of the winds as they exist dong the projected takeoff and approach flightpaths within 1 nmi of the ends of active runways which serve air carrier aircraft.

“4. Require inclusion of the wind shear penetration capability of an airplane as an operational limitation in the airplane’s operations manual, and require that pilots apply this limitation as a criterion for the initiation of a takeoff from, or an approach to, an airport where equipment is available to measure the severity of a thunderstorm or the magnitude of change in wind velocity.

“5. As an interim action, install equipment capable of measuring and transmitting to tower operators the speed and direction of the surface wind in the immediate vicinity of all runway ends and install lighted windsocks near to the side of the runway, approximately 1,000 feet from the ends, at airports serving air carrier operations.

“6. Develop and institute procedures whereby approach controllers, tower controllers, and pilots are provided timely information regarding the existence of thunderstorm activity near to departure or approach flightpaths.

“7. Revise appropriate air traffic control procedures to specify that the location and severity of thunder-storms be considered in the criteria for selecting active runways.

“8. Modify or expand air traffic controller training programs to include information concerning the effect that winds produced by thunderstorms can have on an airplane’s flightpath control.

“9. Modify initial and recurrent pilot training programs and tests to require that pilots demonstrate their knowledge of the low-level wind conditions associated with mature thunderstorms and of the potential effects these winds might have on an airplane’s performance.

“10. Expedite the program to develop, in cooperation with appropriate Government agencies and industry, typical models of environmental winds associated with mature thunderstorms which can be used for demonstration purposes in pilot training simulators.

“11. Place greater emphasis on the hazards of low-level flight through thunderstorms and on the effects of wind shear encounter in the Accident Prevention Program for the benefit of genera? aviation pilots.

“12. Expedite the research to develop equipment and procedures which would permit a pilot to transition from instrument to visual references without degradation of vertical guidance during the final segment of an instrument approach.

“13. Expedite the research to develop an airborne detection device which will alert a pilot to the need for rapid corrective measures as an airplane encounters a wind shear condition.

“14. Expedite the development of a program leading to the production of accurate and timely forecasts of wind shear in the terminal area.”

(NTSB 1976, 40-42)

Darby: “Smith cites as an example of the prevailing attitude in aviation at the time, the accident involving Eastern Air Lines {EA} Flight 66 at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, in June 1975:

Reports to the JFK control tower from an aircraft awaiting takeoff that it was being buffeted by the storm’s high winds were disregarded by the air traffic controllers and, thus, not relayed to the aircraft on approach. Another airplane landing ahead of EA 66 barely avoided crashing. The flight crew of EA 66 know there was bad weather – it was visible on their on-board radar – but pressed on anyway. One hundred and twelve people were killed.

“The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined the probable cause to be [see NTSB report above]….

“But the probable cause was not the sort of adverse winds the NTSB had in mind, Smith says. [Meteorologist Ted] Fujita, called in to investigate the Flight 77 crash, ‘conducted a detailed study of the 11 aircraft that landed safely ahead of EA 66. He studied the weather, the radar and flight paths, and he talked with the surviving crews.’

“That led to a new and unorthodox theory, described in a 1977 paper by Fujita and Horace Byers, describing a previously unknown weather phenomenon they called a downburst – ‘a rapidly sinking column of air that originated in a thunderstorm and then spread out, and accelerated when it reached the ground,’ Smith says. ‘As the air spread out, it could reach speeds of 70 mph (113 kph) or more. A pilot flying through the sinking air, with its rapid change in wind speeds and directions, would be severely challenged to keep control of the plane.’

“Other meteorologists were unconvinced or expressed outright disbelief. No one had seen or recorded such a downburst. Fujita persevered in his research and identified ‘a smaller, more intense form of downburst he named a ‘microburst’. Yet even as Fujita’s body of evidence grew, many in both the meteorological and aviation communities remained deeply skeptical.’

“Smith himself, along with a companion in ‘storm chasing,’ helped provide additional evidence in the form of what he describes as ‘the first microburst ever photographed,’ near Wichita, Kansas… ‘Downbursts were further confirmed by Project NIMROD (Northern Illinois Meteorological Research on Downbursts), conducted in the Chicago area around O’Hare International Airport,’ Smith says.

“The Flight 66 accident helped motivate the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to begin installing the low level wind shear alert system (LLWAS) at U.S. airports.” (Darby. “Cracking the Microburst Code.” AeroSafety World, March 2011, p. 53.)

Wikipedia: “This accident lead to the development of the original low level windshear alert system by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration in 1976 that was installed at 110 FAA towered airports between 1977 and 1987.” (Wikipedia. “Eastern Air Lines Flight 66,” citing Meyer, Darin R. (1999-01-10). Study Of Network Expansion Llwas (Llwas-Ne)Fault Identification And System Warning Optimization Through Joint Use Of Llwas-Ne And Tdwr Data.)

Sources

Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). New York. Accessed 3-9-2009 at: http://www.baaa-acro.com/Pays/Etats-Unis/New%20York.htm

Darby, Rick. “Cracking the Microburst Code – Meteorology Confronts a Mysterious Threat to Flight Safety.” AeroSafety World, March 2011, pp. 52-54.

Emergency-Management.net. “Airplane Accidents 1969-1979.” Accessed at: http://www.emergency-management.net/avi_acc_1969_1979.htm

History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, June 24, 1975. “Eastern Flight 66 Crashes at J.F.K.” Accessed 12-7-2008 at: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=tdihArticleCategory&displayDate=06/24&categoryId=disaster

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. Boeing 727-225, N8845E, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, June 24, 1975. Washington, DC: NTSB, 3-12-1976. Accessed 4-9-2020 at: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR76-08.pdf

NYCdata. Disasters, New York City (NYC). “Eastern Airlines Flight 66 Crash – 1975. Accessed 4-9-2020 at: https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/nycdata/disasters/aircrafts-eastern_1975.html

Wikipedia. “Eastern Air Lines Flight 66.” Accessed 10-31-2009 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Air_Lines_Flight_66

–11  Best. “The Seminole County Jail Fire, Sanford, Florida.” Deadliest Prison Fires in…[US].

–11  National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, p. 173.

–11  National Fire Sprinkler Association.  F.Y.I.  1999, 7.

–11  UPI. “10 Inmates, Guard Die…Seminole Jail Fire.” Naples Daily News, FL. 6-10-1975, 2A

 

Narrative Information

 

Best (NFPA Fire Analysis Specialist): “Burning Urethane Mattresses in this institutional occupancy created a rapid buildup of intense heat and toxic smoke. Prisoners could not escape from their locked cells, and ten of the prisoners died before rescuers could reach them. One prison correctional officer died while attempting to free the inmates. Fire fighters were frustrated in their attempts to rescue prisoners because the jail keys had been left on the floor of fire origin in the confusion of the first few minutes. Also, one passageway, which before the fire had been designated by the Fire Department as a possible emergency evacuation route, was blocked by approximately 100 unclaimed bicycles on the day of the fire. The bicycles were going to be sold at an auction the following week…. [1^st page]

 

“There was no sprinkler protection, no smoke or fire detection system, and no alarm system in the jail. There was an emergency lighting system and standpipe hose system. One hose station was located immediately outside the room of fire origin on the second floor, and another hose station was located on the first floor. The second floor portable fire extinguisher cabinets and hose cabinet were locked and required a key for access. A key to the cabinets, with a wooden handle for easy identification, was located at the second-floor jailer’s station. The main exit from the second floor was an enclosed stairway to the first floor, located near the center of the building. A small elevator served the second floor, and [end of p.7] another stairway on the east side of the elevator led to the roof. The stairs and corridor to the roof were blocked by cartons of mattresses, pillows, and other storage. The only other means of egress from the second floor was the connecting passageway to the courthouse building. Doors on both ends of the connector were normally locked. There were no exit signs on any of the exit doors….

 

“Several master keys were required to open all the various cell and corridor doors. Separate keys controlled the cell corridor, section, and control-station doors. Control stations located in the north and south wings could all be opened by the same key. Control stations in the east wing were opened by a different key. Main access doors to all cells were opened from the same control station as the sliding doors for the cell or cell block, lint had a completely separate lock system. There were two sets of keys. One set was kept at the second-floor correctional officers’ post and the other at the first-floor shift supervisor’s post. Both sets of keys were normally used daily in routine work. Both sets were on the second floor when the fire started.

 

Background

 

“Two stacks of mattresses were stored in the room of fire origin on both the north and south walls. They were 25-inch-by-72-inch-by-3-inch thick penal mattresses that consisted of a urethane foam slab interior covered with a nylon-bonded vinyl cover, The foam was treated with chemicals and was advertised to comply with the ASTM 1692-67T general usage rating test. The cover was treated with chemicals to meet specifications as a flame-retardant fabric. A prominent notice on the manufacturer’s brochure stated:

 

Notice

Under actual fire conditions, this product, as well as sheets, blankets, pillows, towels, etc., will under some circumstances produce toxic fumes and dense smoke. Extreme care must be exercised to minimize the risk of all fires, most especially in close, poorly ventilated cells. This product cannot he ignited with lit cigarettes, however, open flame from matches, lighters, or burning newspapers will ignite this product for as long as the outside flame source is in contact with this mattress or pillow.

 

“The storage of mattresses in the room of fire origin had been going on for many years. The number of mattresses stored was unknown, but the stacks were reported to be from five feet to seven feet high. The mattresses on the north wall were piled on a metal bed frame.

 

The Fire

 

“There were 65 prisoners in the jail on June 9, 1975, when the fire occurred. Sixty were behind locked doors, one trustee was working outside, and four trustees were working in the kitchen and laundry on the first floor. Eight correctional officers were on duty and two were stationed on the second floor.

 

“The noon meal was delivered to the second floor at 11:55 am and the two correctional officers served the trustees first, then the inmates in N section, and then the inmates in S section. The door to the outer room of the segregated cells was unlocked so the two prisoners in the cells could be fed… One of the two prisoners, a juvenile located in the north cell, threw his drink at the correctional officer. The officer asked him what was wrong and he stated that he “wanted out” because his trial had been postponed a second time. The prisoner said he didn’t want anything to eat and was going to set the place on fire if he didn’t get out. The correctional officer locked the door and left to feed the prisoners in the other sections.

 

“The second correctional officer went downstairs and reported the problem with the inmate to the shift supervisor. The shift supervisor advised him to watch the prisoner and said that if the prisoner continued to cause trouble, he would be put in leg irons and handcuffs and confined to the holding cell on the first floor.

 

“The prisoner in the south segregated cell was just starting to eat his lunch when he noticed that the prisoner in the neighboring cell, who had threatened to start a fire, was throwing crumpled-up newspapers out the food opening of his cell door. The newspapers made a pile about one foot high and covered a large area of the floor. Soon after noticing that, the prisoner in the south cell saw fire and smoke and he started to holler for help. When the fire grew more intense he covered his head with a wet towel, lay down on the floor, and pulled his mattress on top of him.

 

“One of the correctional officers noticed smoke coming from the segregated cell area a few minutes later. He called to the other officer and they ran to investigate. One of them unlocked the outer door to the security cell area. When he looked inside and saw that the [end of p.8] mattresses were on fire, he shut the door again and went to get the standpipe hose outside the room of fire origin. The lock on the door to the hose cabinet had been broken at one time and repaired. The two correctional officers didn’t realize that the lock had been repaired and thought they needed a screwdriver to open the door. The second officer went after a screwdriver. The first officer called downstairs on the intercom and reported to the shift supervisor that there was a large fire on the second floor. He stayed as long as he could, then went downstairs to see if help was coming. The smoke was so heavy by this time that he had to crawl to the stairway. He got the standpipe hose from the first floor and went back up the stairs with a third officer, both men using wet towels to cover their faces. Just before the first correctional officer reported the fire, a trustee ran downstairs and reported the fire. The Sanford Fire Department was immediately notified by telephone.

 

“The two correctional officers crawled and felt their way along the second-floor corridor and opened the door to section N-I, but only three prisoners came out. The prisoners went down the stairs to the first floor, where other law enforcement officers took custody of them. The officers crawled back downstairs to get air, then repeated their trip to the second floor and opened the S-1 section. No prisoners came out. By this time the heat was so great that the officers retreated to the first floor again, leaving the keys in the door to S-1. One was nearly overcome by the smoke and heat, and was taken outside for oxygen….

 

“Evacuation of some prisoners had already taken place when the Fire Department arrived. There were no keys to the cell doors available for fire fighters to continue the evacuation of prisoners. Heavy smoke was billowing from the west side of the jail….

 

“The fire fighters were able to talk to the prisoners in the cells along the west wall and instructed them to lie on the floor and cover themselves with mattresses and blankets. The fire fighters then kept the prisoners wet with their hose lines until they could be evacuated.

 

“After receiving oxygen for about four minutes, the first correctional officer, who left the keys in the door, went back inside. Fire fighters and other correctional officers were trying to locate the keys. It took the correctional officer a couple of minutes to remember what had happened to the keys. When he remembered, he went back upstairs wearing breathing apparatus and recovered the keys. He then went back to N-2 with the fire fighters, who led all prisoners out of the building. They tried to get to S-2 and S-3 sections, but the heat from the classroom was so great that they couldn’t get by the classroom door.

 

“Other correctional officers donned breathing apparatus and went upstairs to assist. The smoke was heavy, about waist high. They asked for the standpipe hose cabinet key, but by that time the heat was too great for the correctional officers to get to the hose station. They then asked for keys to the cell areas and tried to enter N-1 and S-1. They finally got three prisoners out. They obtained the key to J-l, found three bodies by the door and dragged them downstairs. After searching J-l, they went to S-1 and found at least eight prisoners unconscious on the floor, and dragged them out.

 

“After searching the entire area, they still could not find the second correctional officer who had gone for the screwdriver. They entered the dispensary room by crawling along the floor and found the body of the officer by the air-conditioning unit. The second set of keys were found with the dead correctional officer.

 

“Correctional officers and fire fighters went to J [end of p. 9] section where the trustees were jailed, and dragged out the unconscious prisoners. Then F section was opened and all the juvenile prisoners and the one female prisoner left; one of the prisoners had to be carried out. Correctional officers and fire fighters again tried to get to S-3 section, and by this time the hose streams from outside the building had cooled the classroom area. Meanwhile, fire fighters had also entered this area with l½-inch hose lines. They were able to feel their way along the walls and open S-2 and S-3. All prisoners were evacuated from those cells.

 

“When all sections had been evacuated, officers opened the door to the corridor between the segregated cells and the outside wall. They discovered the inmate in the south segregated cell at that time- still alive. The correctional officers and fire fighters went back around to the cell entrance. The fire fighters cooled the walls and they were able to evacuate the prisoner. They also opened the north cell and recovered the body of the prisoner who is alleged to have been responsible for the fire and who was one of the fatalities.

 

“The fire fighters and the correctional officers again made a thorough cell-to-cell cheek of the entire second floor for any remaining inmates. Fire fighters used smoke ejectors and hose lines to clear the smoke from the jail, and the area was reasonably tenable 35 to 40 minutes after the Fire Department arrived. Evacuation of the prisoners took nearly an hour to complete.

 

Discussion

 

“….The fire was confined to the mattresses stored in the outer room of the segregated cell area; however, the wall tiles in the classroom on the south side of the room of origin were ignited by radiant heat. The tiles burned to within three to four feet of the floor, and the books and other combustible materials in the room were consumed….

 

“Numerous recommendations had been submitted to the County Jail Administration by the Seminole County Department of Fire Protection prior to the fire. The recommendations included the following:

 

• Provide breathing apparatus on both floors.
• Label doors as to use and provide illuminated exit signs.
• Remove all storage from the stairway to the roof.
• Provide a manual fire alarm system with connection to the Fire Department.
• Provide a smoke detection system.
• Provide additional exits and install access panels for the purpose of ventilation and rescue of trapped occupants.
• All security personnel should carry keys to all standpipe and fire extinguisher cabinets.
• Bedding should be noncombustible material.
• Provide a reliable holding area for inmates while an emergency in the occupancy exists.

“The breathing apparatus had been provided, with two units on each floor. A decision to install the recommended smoke detection system was made in March 1975, and the company arrived to start the installation on the day of the fire. Other recommendations had not been complied with.

 

Analysis

 

“Two breathing apparatus units and portable fire extinguishers on the second floor were not used. The standpipe hose on the second floor, less than two feet from the door of the room of fire origin, was not used because the lock was believed to be broken. There was reportedly no delay in notifying the Fire Department, however, keys were not available for Fire Department use. The sally port, which had been surveyed by the Fire Department as a possible route for removing prisoners from the jail in an emergency, was blocked by approximately 100 unclaimed bicycles that had been scheduled to be auctioned off during the week following the fire. An alternate route for evacuation of the prisoners the second-floor connecting passage to the jail was not used.

This fire points again to the need for penal institutions to be designed, constructed, maintained, and [end of p.10] operated so as to minimize the possibility of a fire requiring the evacuation of occupants. Because the safety of occupants of institutional buildings cannot be assured adequately by dependence on evacuation of the building, their protection from fire must be provided by appropriate arrangement of facilities, adequate staffing, and careful development of operating and maintenance procedures composed of the following:

 

• Proper design, construction, and compartmentation;

 

• Provisions for detection, alarm, and extinguishment; and

 

• Fire prevention and the planning, training, and drilling in programs for the isolation of fire and transfer of occupants to areas of refuge or for the evacuation of the building. (p. 17)

 

(Best, Richard. “The Seminole County Jail Fire, Sanford, Florida.” Fire Journal, Jan 1976, p. 7.)

 

June 10: “Sanford, Fla. (UPI) – Clean-up crews worked through the night to restore order to the blackened remains of the Seminole County Jail following a mattress fire Monday that escalated into a holocaust and claimed 11 lives. State and county fire marshals were expected to release a statement later today detailing their investigation of the blaze which swept through a portion of the second-floor jail shortly after noon Monday, engulfing inmates and jailers in flames and smoke.

 

“Ten convicts, including a juvenile, were killed in the fire as well as a jail guard. At least 39 inmates were taken to three area hospitals suffering from smoke inhalation but by 9 p.m. only 31 remained hospitalized. All were reported in good or fair condition. Inmates who were treated and released and those who escaped injury were transferred to the Orange County Jail.

 

“The fire, which began in a tiny hospital cell when an unidentified inmate set his mattress ablaze, spread quickly to an adjoining room where the rest of the jail’s mattresses were stored. The burning mattresses produced a thick, acrid smoke that hindered rescue efforts, according to Fire Chief John Harriett. “If you didn’t have respiratory protection, you couldn’t get up there,” Harriett said.

 

“It took firemen less than five minutes to reach the l5-year-old yellow masonry building in the heart of downtown Sanford. It took nearly an hour and 15 minutes to evacuate all 68 inmates and put out the blaze.

 

“John Fulenweider, chief investigator for the Seminole-Brevard State Attorney’s office, emerged from the adjoining courthouse building minutes after the blaze erupted and witnessed the rescue efforts. “It looked like a bake oven up there,” said Fulenweider. “I could hear the inmates screaming and yelling. They were screaming ‘Help, get us out. Get us out.’ I could hear them coughing. It was really pathetic.” Firefighters had to batter a hole through a side wall of the two-story building to battle the blaze.

 

“Jailers Robert O. Moore and Lt. Max Stewart were credited with assisting in the evacuation of prisoners as was inmate Elvis Webster, who reportedly “went back in (after being taken out) with a gas mask and dragged out three other men.” Moore, a 40-year-old father of four, later died of smoke inhalation.

 

“Others who died in the blaze, all inmates and all Floridians, were: Richard Lamar Skates, 23, Orlando; Ray McCall, 16, Orlando; Billy Gene McPeak, 21, Apopka; Elton Van Buren Hart, 44, Sanford; Ernest Campbell Jr., 28, Sanford; Fred Gaines, 54, Oviedo; Willie Levi Craig, 64, Sanford; Jesse Lee Allen, 24, Sanford; Peter John Muench, 24, Maitland, and William Eugene Smith, 30, Dade City.

 

“The flames were confined to the two-cell hospital unit and adjoining drunk tanks, which had been converted into a student classroom. But jail officials estimated “83 to 90 per cent of the jail” sustained smoke damage. Chief Deputy Duane Harrell said two inmates were confined in the small hospital unit.” (UPI, Sanford. “10 Inmates, Guard Die in Seminole Jail Fire.” Naples Daily News, FL. 6-10-1975, 2A.)

Sources

 

Best, Richard. “The Seminole County Jail Fire, Sanford, Florida.” Fire Journal, Jan 1976, 7 pages. Accessed 5-26-2015 at NFPA, Deadliest Prison Fires in the United States, at: http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fires-by-property-type/prisons-and-jails/deadliest-prison-fires-in-the-united-states

 

National Fire Protection Association. The 1984 Fire Almanac. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 1983.

 

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf

 

United Press International, Sanford. “10 Inmates, Guard Die in Seminole Jail Fire.” Naples Daily News, FL. 6-10-1975, 2A. Accessed 5-26-2015 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/us/florida/naples/naples-daily-news/1975/06-10/page-4?tag=seminole+county+jail&rtserp=tags/seminole-county-jail?psi=28&pci=7&ndt=ex&pd=10&pm=6&py=1975

–41 Blanchard tally from sources cited below.
–23 CH-53 crash on the way to U-Tapao, May 13. (Aviation-safety.net, Flight Safety Fndn.)
— 5 Flight crew. (all)
–18 USAF Security Police (all)
— 1 CH-53 Knife 21 crash. Wikipedia. “Mayaguez incident.” 11-23-2021 edit.
–13 CH-53 Knife 31 crash, East Beach. Wetterhahn. The Last Battle. 2002, p. 195-197.
–8 in the crash
–1 copilot
–5 Marines
–2 Navy corpsmen
–1 Marine drowned swimming from the wreck
–3 Marines killed by gunfire trying to reach the beach
–1 Marine died from wounds while clinging to the burning wreckage
— 1 Lance corporal Ashton Loney in combat with Khmer Rouge. Wetterhahn, p. 176-178.
— 3 Captured Marines executed (1 shot and two beaten to death). Wetterhahn, 286-289.
–41 History.com. “…American freighter ship Mayaguez seized by Cambodian navy.” 5-11-2021.
–41 Wikipedia. “Mayaguez incident.” 11-23-2021 edit.
–13 Knife 31 crash
–10 Marines
— 2 Navy corpsmen
— 1 Air Force crewman
— 1 Knife 21 crash (US Air Force crewman Elwood Eugene Rumbaugh).
Cites The Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The Wall-USA.
— 1 Marine killed in action on West Beach
— 3 Marines missing an action and presumed dead
–23 Crash on CH-63 on way to U-Tapai.
— 5 Flight crew
–18 USAF Security Police.
–16 Naval Historical Center. “FAQs…Casualties: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Personnel…”
— 2 Navy
–14 Marines

Narrative Information

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation on USAF Sikorsky CH-53C crash:

“13 May 1975, callsign “Knife 13”: CH-53 68-10933 departed from Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base with a crew of five and 18 USAF Security Police onboard to assist in the recovery operation of the SS Mayaguez.

“On May 13, 1975 at 2030 local time, 16 Sikorsky CH-53Cs took off from RTAFB Nakhon Phanom. Shortly after take-off, one of the helicopters, Serial Number 68-10933 from the 21st SOS, 56th SPS, fell out of formation, crashed and exploded on impact. All 23 aboard, including four crew, 18 USAF security police and one crew chief, were killed in the crash. Other CH-53s landed nearby, but exploding ammunition and burning fuel hindered all rescue attempts.

“One main rotor blade had separated from rotor head.

“The CH-53 crashed in the Phannanikhom District, 35 miles west of Nakhon Phanom. Officially, the CH-53C was on a routine training mission, but all 23 killed in the crash were awarded the Bronze Star posthumously.”

History.com: “May 12, 1975… The American freighter Mayaguez is captured by communist government forces in Cambodia, setting off an international incident. The U.S. response to the affair indicated that the wounds of the Vietnam War still ran deep.

“On May 12, 1975, the U.S. freighter Mayaguez and its 39-man crew was captured by gunboats of the Cambodian navy. Cambodia had fallen to communist insurgents, the Khmer Rouge, n April 1975. The Cambodian authorities imprisoned the American crew, pending an investigation of the ship and why it had sailed into waters claimed by Cambodia. The response of the United States government was quick. President Gerald Ford called the Cambodian seizure of the Mayaguez an ‘act of piracy’ and promised swift action to rescue the captured Americans.

“In part, Ford’s aggressive attitude to the incident was a by-product of the American failure in Vietnam. In January 1973, U.S. forces had withdrawn from South Vietnam, ending years of a bloody and inconclusive attempt to forestall communist rule of that nation. In the time since the U.S. withdrawal, a number of conservative politicians and intellectuals in the United States had begun to question America’s ‘credibility’ in the international field, suggesting that the country’s loss of will in Vietnam now encouraged enemies around the world to challenge America with seeming impunity. The Cambodian seizure of the Mayaguez appeared to be just such a challenge.

“On May 14, President Ford ordered the bombing of the Cambodian port where the gunboats had come from and sent Marines to attack the island of Koh Tang, where the prisoners were being held. Unfortunately, the military action was probably unnecessary. The Cambodian government was already in the process of releasing the crew of the Mayaguez and the ship. Forty-one Americans died, most of them in an accidental explosion during the attack. Most Americans, however, cheered the action as evidence that the United States was once again willing to use military might to slap down potential enemies.” (“This Day in History. May 12, 1975. American freighter ship Mayaguez seized by Cambodian navy.” 11-13-2009, updated 5-11-2021.)

Naval Historical Center: “ ‘Mayaguez Incident,’ battle with Khmer Rouge forces, Koh Tang Island, Cambodia, 14 May 1975…2 [Navy killed in action]…14 [Marine Corps killed in action] …” (Casualties: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Wounded in Wars, Conflicts, Terrorist Acts, and Other Hostile Incidents.”)

Sources

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation. ASN Wikibase Occurrence #56217. Accessed 12-3-2021 at: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/56217

History.com. “This Day in History. May 12, 1975. American freighter ship Mayaguez seized by Cambodian navy.” 11-13-2009, updated 5-11-2021. Accessed 12-3-2021 at: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/american-ship-mayaguez-seized

Naval Historical Center. “Frequently Asked Questions, Casualties: U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Wounded in Wars, Conflicts, Terrorist Acts, and Other Hostile Incidents.” Washington DC: Dept. of the Navy. Accessed 12-3-2021 at: http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq56-1.htm
Also at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/AMH-USNchron.htm

The Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The Wall-USA. “Elwood Eugene Rumbaugh.” Accessed 12-3-2021 at: http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=44849

Wetterhahn, Ralph. The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the end of the Vietnam War. Plumb, 2002. Cited in Wikipedia. “Mayaguez incident.” 11-23-2021 edit. Accessed 12-3-2021 at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayaguez_incident#cite_note-39

Wikipedia. “Mayaguez incident.” 11-23-2021 edit. Accessed 12-3-2021 at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayaguez_incident#cite_note-39