lornajarrettblanchard

–190 CDC WONDER. (Average hypothermia death rate was 0.088 per 100,000 population. )

Alabama 2 0.054
Arizona 7 0.306
Arkansas 2 0.093
California 21 0.097
Connecticut 5 0.162
Delaware 1 0.170
Florida 5 0.059
Georgia 3 0.059
Illinois 4 0.035
Indiana 2 0.037
Iowa 2 0.069
Kansas 2 0.088
Louisiana 2 0.051
Maine 2 0.187
Maryland 3 0.072
Massachusetts 24 0.417
Michigan 6 0.066
Minnesota 12 0.306
Mississippi 3 0.125
Missouri 6 0.125
Montana 1 0.133
New Jersey 8 0.109
New York 27 0.150
North Carolina 3 0.054
North Dakota 1 0.156
Ohio 1 0.009
Oklahoma 4 0.144
Oregon 2 0.086
Pennsylvania 9 0.076
Rhode Island 3 0.318
Tennessee 4 0.094
Texas 10 0.080
Virginia 2 0.040
Washington 1 0.028

Source

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Compressed Mortality File 1968-1978. CDC WONDER Online Database, compiled from Compressed Mortality File CMF 1968-1988, Series 20, No. 2A, 2000. Accessed 12-14-2021 at: https://wonder.cdc.gov/mortSQL.html

–359 CDC Wonder. (Average hypothermia death rate was 0.167 per 100,000 population. )

Death rate for hypothermia per 100,000 population.

Alabama 3 0.082 Ohio 10 0.093
Alaska 8 2.156 Oklahoma 4 0.144
Arizona 10 0.437 Oregon 3 0.129
Arkansas 2 0.093 Pennsylvania 18 0.151
California 6 0.028 South Carolina 8 0.276
Connecticut 1 0.032 South Dakota 7 1.027
Delaware 1 0.170 Tennessee 3 0.070
District of Columbia 1 0.141 Texas 6 0.048
Florida 2 0.023 Utah 4 0.323
Georgia 8 0.158 Vermont 1 0.209
Idaho 2 0.240 Virginia 20 0.396
Illinois 18 0.159 West Virginia 6 0.326
Indiana 5 0.167 Wisconsin 13 0.285
Iowa 8 0.278 Wyoming 2 0.525
Kansas 8 0.351
Kentucky 8 0.231
Louisiana 4 0.103
Maine 2 0.187
Maryland 3 0.072
Massachusetts 2 0.035
Michigan 11 0.121
Minnesota 20 0.510
Mississippi 7 0.292
Missouri 8 0.167
Montana 11 1.468
New Jersey 6 0.082
New Mexico 21 1.805 Highest loss of life of any State.
New York 8 0.044
North Carolina 14 0.253
North Dakota 17 2.660 Highest loss of life per 100,000 population of any State.

Source

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1968-1978. CDC WONDER Online Database, compiled from Compressed Mortality File CMF 1968-1988, Series 20, No. 2A, 2000. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-icd8.html on Oct 10, 2021 7:38:41 PM

Illinois:
–47 IL Department of Public Health. 27 Years Ago In IDPH History. Accessed 9-14-2016.

Mississippi:
–13 CDC Wonder. Compressed Mortality, 1968-1975. St. Louis Encephalitis search (ICD-8 062.3)

CDC: “St. Louis encephalitis (SLE) virus is spread to people by the bite of an infected mosquito. Most people infected with SLE virus do not have symptoms. Those people who do become ill may experience fever, headache, nausea, vomiting, and tiredness. Some people may develop neuro-invasive disease, such as encephalitis (inflammation of the brain) or meningitis (inflammation of the membranes that surround the brain and spinal cord). In rare cases, long-term disability or death can occur. There are no vaccines to prevent or medicines to treat SLE. You can reduce your risk of infection with SLE virus by using insect repellent, wearing long-sleeved shirts and long pants, and taking steps to control mosquitoes indoors and outdoors.”

“Transmission: St. Louis encephalitis (SLE) virus is spread to people through the bite of an infected mosquito. Mosquitoes become infected when they feed on birds that have the virus in their blood.

“Birds that live in urban-suburban areas, such as the house sparrow, pigeon, blue jay, and robin, are common SLE virus hosts. The principal vectors are Culex species mosquitoes, including Cx. pipiens and Cx. quinquefasciatus in Eastern states, Cx. nigripalpus in Florida, and Cx. tarsalis and members of the Cx. pipiens complex in Western states.

“People do not develop high enough levels of the virus in their blood to infect mosquitoes. As a result, people are considered “dead-end” hosts for SLE virus. However, the levels of SLE virus in people’s blood is enough to spread the infection through blood transfusions, though this very rarely occurs.

Illinois Dept. of PH: “Illinois suffered the nation’s worst epidemic of St. Louis encephalitis in 1975, resulting in 578 cases and 47 deaths. It was the first major outbreak of a mosquito-borne disease in the state since 1930, when malaria sickened more than 300 Illinoisans.”

Source

Illinois Department of Public Health. 27 Years Ago In IDPH History. Accessed 9-14-2016 at: http://www.idph.state.il.us/webhistory14.htm

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1968-1978. CDC WONDER Online Database. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-icd8.html on Dec 15, 2021 8:50:41 PM

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “St. Louis Encephalitis.” (Webpage). Accessed 12-15-2021 at: https://www.cdc.gov/sle/index.html

–71  Blanchard tally from State breakouts below.

 

Summary of State Breakouts Below

 

Iowa                ( >6)

Maryland       (    2)

Michigan        (  32)

New York       (    5)

Ohio               (>12)

Pennsylvania (  11)

Virginia          (    2)

West Virginia            (   1)

 

Breakout of Winter-Weather-Related Fatalities by State (and localities where noted)

 

Iowa                (>6)

—>6  Traffic accidents “on slick highways.” United Press International, 12-2-1974.[1]

—  1  West Point RR1. Car goes into ditch on snowy road; driver uses tractor to retrieve; turns over.[2]

 

Maryland       (   2)

–2  Garrett Co. House fire; fire equipment “hampered by snow and hazardous road conditions.”[3]

 

Michigan        ( 32)

—  32  “…persons dead of heart attacks brought on by various forms of exertion in the snow.”[4]

–>27  AP. “Worst Snowfall of Century…27 Dead in [MI].” Hillsdale Daily News, MI. 12-3-1974, p. 18.

—  27  UPI. Heart attacks shoveling snow.[5]

—  18  Detroit, Dec 1-2. Heart attacks shoveling snow.[6]

 

New York       (   5)

–3  Monroe County, Dec 2. Heart attacks shoveling snow. NOAA. Storm Data, 16/12, 1974, p. 4

–1  Monroe County, Dec 2. Auto accident on slick road. NOAA. Storm Data, 16/12, 1974, p. 4.

–1  Ontario, Wayne Co., Dec 2. Auto accident, snow-covered road. Storm Data, 16/12, 1974, p4.

 

Ohio               (>12)

—>12  Schmidlin and Schmidlin. Thunder in the Heartland. 1996, p. 57.[7]

Breakout of fatalities by locality where we have seen reporting:

—    2  Cincinnati, Dec 2. Heart attacks shoveling snow; Harold Boyd, 52; Chris Stocker, 80.[8]

—    1  Cleveland, Dec 1. Heart attack shoveling snow; Municipal court Judge Joseph Sterns, 72.[9]

—    1  Dover, Dec 1 or 2. Heart attack while shoveling snow.

—    1  Sheffield Lake, OH, Dec 2. Heart attack while shoveling snow; Grant Eugene Reed, 70.[10]

 

Pennsylvania ( 11)

–11  Blanchard tally. (Include the Clarion County traffic fatality not included in Storm Data.)

–10  Environmental Data Service, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 16, No. 12, December 1974, p. 5.[11]

–1  Electrocution; male stepped onto fallen power line.

–2  Heart attacks shoveling snow.

–7  Traffic accidents.

–4  Car catches fire after getting stuck in snow, State Route 251, Beaver Co.[12]

–1  Farmington Twnsp. Clarion Co., Dec 2. Truck skids on “ice-covered…highway…into a tree.” (Cook)[13]

 

Virginia          (   2)

–1  Ivanhoe, Wythe Co., Dec 1. Hypothermia; Randolph Hinds “found frozen to death…at home.”[14]

–1  Speedwell, Wythe Co., Hypothermia; Albert Park; body found in stranded car, Rte. 19.[15]

 

West Virginia            (  1)

–1  No detail. Environmental Data Service, NOAA. Storm Data, V16/N12, Dec 1974, p.6.

–1  Terra Alta, WV-7, Dec 1. Car gets stuck in snow; girl, 14, gets out to push; hit by oncoming car.[16]

 

Narrative Information

 

Dec 3 overview: “A storm that carried its fury from the Midwest to the East Coast left more than 35,000 persons stranded today. Michigan officials called the snow storm the worst since 1886. National Guard heavy equipment was mobilized in western Maryland and several communities were virtually isolated in Pennsylvania. The story was the same in parts of Ohio and West Virginia.

 

“Traffic began moving slowly in Ohio’s northern counties early today although authorities reported some 1,000 motorists in northwest Ohio were still stranded. The Toledo highway patrol post said patrolmen were working continuously in an effort to find shelters for the stranded motorists and remove abandoned cars from the highways. More than 10,000 persons were stranded in the Lucas County-Toledo area yesterday. One lane of I-75 north was opened but still slippery and dangerous. Other roads in the Lucas County area were in good condition. Many schools remained closed. Authorities in Ashland County [OH] reopened one lane of I-71 north at 6 a.m. today, but a Highway Patrol spokesman said ‘certain places on the road are just like ice’ and cautioned motorists against unnecessary driving. There also were many cars and trucks abandoned alongside I-71. In Wooster [Wayne County, OH], where a state of emergency was declared yesterday, all roads were slippery and dangerous. Schools there remained closed today. About half the schools in the Cleveland area, mostly in the suburbs, stayed shut down today….

 

“The National Weather Service said snow flurries over Michigan would push down into Ohio later in the day but are not expected to add significantly to the weekend snowfall.. The Weather Service warned of hazardous driving conditions on routes east of Ohio and said snow showers would continue in extreme eastern Ohio. Windy conditions will exist from eastern Ohio eastward today and diminish by evening.

 

“The American Red Cross estimated 35,000 stranded in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Maryland, and reports indicated thousands more were trapped by snow-blocked highways in other states.

 

“In southwest Virginia, two persons froze to death. More than 18 inches of snow blanketed parts of the state.

 

“Dozens more died across the storm front in weather-related traffic accidents. In Michigan alone, 27 persons died of heart attacks suffered while shoveling snow. Many homes and other buildings were left without power, schools and shops were closed, and for the first time in its history, the Detroit Daily News — the nation’s largest afternoon newspaper — was unable to publish because it could not deliver its papers….

 

“Light snow continued to fall in western Maryland last night on top of 30 inches already on the ground. Most roads were open, but state police with the aid of 15 National Guard trucks worked last night to clear 20 miles of U.S. Route 40 from Frostburg in western Allegany County west to Keysers Ridge [Garrett County, MD]. ‘We don’t know how many people are out there,’ Maryland state police spokesman Bill Clark said. ‘It’s a tedious thing to get by blocked cars and the rescue operation is going slowly.’

 

“Detroit received 18.9 inches of snow, and hundreds of schools and thousands of offices, banks, stores and plants were closed. Some companies even bought radio time to tell workers to stay home. Helicopters circling over Ann Arbor, Mich., said it looked like a ghost town. Detroit police said the storm even put crime at a standstill, with the city going 42 hours without a homicide. The bloodless period ended with a shooting last night — in an argument over a parking space.” (United Press International. “Big storm moves eastward, 35,000 travelers left stranded.” Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, OH. 12-3-1974, p. 26.)

 

Iowa

 

Dec 1: “Winter’s first major snowstorm caused near-blizzard conditions just south of the tri-state area yesterday before churning eastward out of the Upper Midwest early today. Although the National Weather Service predicted clearing skies and little chance of more snow today, Dubuque area lawmen warned holiday weekend travelers that cold temperatures could keep roads slippery in spots.

 

“Tri-state sheriffs reported snow accumulations ranging from three to seven inches last night. Slick driving conditions contributed to a rash of accidents and at least one fatality Friday night and Saturday…In Dubuque alone, police investigated more than 25 traffic accidents from Friday afternoon, when snow began to accumulate, to last night.

 

“Storm warnings stretched as far east as Pennsylvania, and most Midwestern states issued weather warnings for travelers….

 

“In the Dubuque area, many sheriffs reported slick highways and snowpacked rural roads, with snow drifting in many locations.

 

“The storm dumped more than a foot of snow on southeast Iowa, virtually paralyzing that region. Thunderstorms crackled across the lower Mississippi River Valley, soaking areas from southern Illinois to Louisiana.

 

“As the storm moved eastward early today, it changed from snow to sleet and rain in some areas. But further eastward, rain was expected to turn to snow as rains moved over the Appalachians and headed toward western Maryland and northwestern Virginia.” (Telegraph Herald, Dubuque, IA. “Snow to end, but ice may linger.” 12-1-1974, p. 1.)

 

Maryland

 

NOAA: “December 1…Storms. A wide spread storm moved thru the state on December 1^st damaging areas from the Atlantic westward to the mountains.

 

Tidal areas had winds gusting to 60 mph, high tides 3 to 6 feet above normal and wind driven waves up to 6 to 8 feet in spots. Destroyed or damaged were seawalls, bulkheads, piers, marinas, small craft and some buildings. Beaches were eroded and low areas flooded. Along the Western Chesapeake, Anne Arundel, Calvert, St. Mary’s and Charles Counties suffered damage along the Bay and also along the Potomac and Patuxent Rivers. Along the Eastern Chesapeake damage was less severe, but occurred in southern Dorchester and Somerset Counties. Along the Atlantic Coast Ocean City suffered relatively little damage as compared to the bordering Delaware Coast. Damage was limited to a buckled boardwalk and debris.

 

Interior. Violent wind and rain storms accounted for damage in the interior counties. Falling limbs and trees caused wide spread electrical outages and blocked roads. High winds tore off roofs, awnings, damaged barns and sheds, signs and flying debris broke windows and windshields. Heavy rain flooded basements and closed roads when streams overflowed.

 

Garrett and Allegany Counties. High winds, heavy wet snow and electrical storms caused incalculable damage and inconveniences in the two western counties. Heavy snow, up to 30 inches, and high winds crippled traffic, broke lines, towers, antenna and trees. 3000 persons were stranded and 400 cars abandoned along a 20 mile stretch between Frostburg and Keysers Ridge. Drifting kept the roads closed for the next two days. The weight of the snow and winds extensively broke trees and knocked out communications and utilities for 23,500 persons from 24 hours to 6 days. 15 to 20 inch think ice and snow accumulations and lightning knocked out cable TV antenna, microwave and relay towers. The storm was described as one of the most damaging to lines and facilities.

 

Michigan

 

NOAA: “Wayne, Oakland, Monroe, Washtenaw, Macomb and Lenawee Counties. December 1. All Day…Heavy Snow. Snow depth averaged 15”, up to 21.2 inches at Beverly Hills. Man died of exposure in Monroe Co….” (Environmental Data Service, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 16, No. 12, December 1974, p. 3.)

 

Dec 3: “More than 27 persons suffered fatal heart attacks and thousands were snowbound as southeast Michigan dug out from its worst snowfall of the century. Police said all the deaths came in heart attacks suffered by people trying to shovel away the blizzard’s fallout.

 

“Most businesses, industry and government institutions were scheduled to re-open today after the economy of the area ground to a halt on Monday [Dec 2]. Some schools remained closed.

 

“More than 11,000 weekend travelers worked all Monday to free their cars from roadside ditches and drifts after spending Sunday night in a variety of public buildings.

 

“The 18.9 inch snowfall was the greatest ever recorded in the Detroit area since 24.5 inches accumulated in 1886. Flurries continued most of Monday, but the forecast for today mentioned no snow.

 

“The storm, which blasted the area from Sunday morning until early Monday, brought traffic to a virtual standstill until road crews began opening the highways Monday afternoon. The Monroe County area, hardest hit, still had many blocked roadways Monday night.

 

“Thousands of motorists tried in vain to make their way through snowbound streets, and some 5,000 ended up calling the Michigan Auto Club for emergency road service.

 

“With car and bus travel almost impossible, thousands filled the available Amtrak trains to New York and Chicago. At Detroit Metropolitan Airport, stranded travelers scrambled to get seats on any flight available once service resumed….

 

“Some 4,500 persons were jammed into Monroe-area schools, churches, and fire stations after being stopped cold Sunday night. In Jackson and Washtenaw counties, 2,200 and 3,000 persons found overnight lodging care in the Red Cross and scattered public buildings. About 1,900 persons were stranded Sunday night in Calhoun County.

 

“Detroit public schools, and many others inn the southeast corner of Michigan remained closed today, but officials said that classes would resume on Wednesday. Wayne State in Detroit and University of Michigan campuses at Ann Arbor and Dearborn were to resume classes today, officials said.

 

“Airport services resumed in mid-morning on Monday after overnight shutdowns at both Windsor and Detroit Metro airports. However, car traffic from the Detroit airport into the city was slow, with the Interstate 94 freeway still slippery.

 

“The heavy snow and strong winds interrupted electric service to about 14,000 Consumers Power Co. customers. Most of the outages lasted two to three hours, officials said. Hardest hit were the Adrian and Temperance areas where line crews reported difficulty in getting to some of the customers because of ice and snow or roads.

 

“Snowfall records showed Coldwater with 4 inches; Lansing, 6; Jackson, 9; Flint, 8 and Cleveland, 10. Two newspapers, the Detroit News and the Wayne Daily Eagle, failed to publish Monday editions.

 

“The snow force cancellation of Monday’s state House of Representatives session, and the Senate failed to get a quorum when just 15 members appeared….

 

Hundreds of cars abandoned on freeways and roads hampered snowplows, blocking them in some areas. National Guardsmen worked through the night using snowmobiles, trucks and tracked vehicles to rescue stranded motorists.” (Associated Press. “Worst Snowfall of Century Leaves 27 Dead in Michigan.” Hillsdale Daily News, MI. 12-3-1974, p. 18.)

 

Ohio

 

Dec 2: “Sections of northern Ohio were isolated Sunday by an erratic snowstorm that dealt heavy blows to some areas while virtually passing over others. More than a foot of snow fell on Toledo and Akron, blocking highways and causing power outages. But Sandusky, east of Toledo, escaped the brunt of the storm and Youngstown reported only an inch of snow on the ground.

 

“All highways in and out of Toledo were clogged by a 14-inch snowfall and bus and airline service was canceled there, leaving hundreds of travelers stranded. Both U.S. 23 and Interstate 75 were closed at Toledo. The Ohio Turnpike remained open, but traffic ground to a crawl near Toledo. Hotels and motels in Toledo and Bowling Green were jammed with stranded motorists and the American Red Cross set up emergency shelters to accommodate travelers. The only highways open from Ohio o Michigan were those in Williams County in the extreme northwestern corner of the state, according to the state highway patrol.

 

“Akron had about a foot of snow on the ground and most roads in Summit and Portage counties were either closed or nearly impassable.

 

“Numerous school closings were reported throughout the hard-hit areas. Classes also were canceled today at the University of Toledo. Bowling Green State University and Kent State University.

 

“There also were numerous power outages as the clinging wet snow snapped power lines. A broken power line in Toledo was blamed for a fire that burned a branch library to the ground. Damage was estimated at $1 million.

 

“Cleveland had about six inches of snow. Most streets and highways there were open, but I-271 was closed from the turnpike south….

 

“One death was attributed to the weather in Cleveland. Municipal Court Judge Joseph Sterns, 72, collapsed and died while shoveling snow….

 

“Elsewhere in the state, Zanesville reported eight inches on the ground, Dayton seven inches, Columbus three inches and Marietta and Cincinnati, two inches….” (Associated Press. “Snow paralyzes much of Northeast Ohio.” Times Reporter, Dover, OH. 12-2-1974, p. 1.)

 

Pennsylvania

 

NOAA Storm Data: “Western. 11/30-Night-12/1…10 [killed]…Electrical and heavy snow.

 

“Heavy wet snow, beginning late at night Saturday, November 30 accompanied by thunder and lightning in many localities and continuing throughout the night as it moved through Western Pennsylvania, accumulated to depths ranging from 6 to 30 inches. Most of the damage was caused by the weight of the snow and ice, although additional damage from high winds and lightning was reported. Hazardous driving conditions were present throughout all the district. Travelers returning home from Thanksgiving holidays, students returning to school, hunters setting out for the first day of deer-hunting season…all were stranded all over Southwestern Pennsylvania. Interstate highways were blocked by heavy snow and stranded vehicles; Pennsylvania Turnpike was closed from Irwin to Carlisle. Trees, power and utility lines were down throughout all the southwestern counties of Pennsylvania. This caused a loss of light, heat and refrigeration to much of the district for periods of time ranging from a few hours up to more than a week. In a number of locations, especially in Fayette, Somerset and Westmoreland counties, hospitals were forced to use emergency power for up to 8 hours. The loss of electrical power also meant no fuel for a number of relief vehicles since the pumps were powered by electricity. Radio stations were off the air and TV cables were down. High-tension lines were down across many roads, closing the roads or at best severely restricting traffic. A number of transformers and tree fires were reported and thousands of lead lines from poles to homes and lines leading to remote settlements were broken by the weight of the ice and snow. These lines were frequently snapped at intervals of a hundred feet or so, so that it meant a literal new installation rather than a simple repair

 

“The counties most seriously affected reported as follows:

 

Allegheny….

Greene….

Washington….

Lawrence….

Fayette….

Beaver….

Somerset….

Erie….

(Environmental Data Service, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 16, No. 12, December 1974, p. 5.)

 

Virginia

 

NOAA: “West. The first major snow storm of the year began Saturday afternoon [Nov 30] and before letting up Sunday left the Blue Ridge and Shenandoah Mountains with up to 22 inches of snow in Bland County, with 6 to 12 inches being an average figure and over 800 people stranded. Many areas reported sleet, heavy rain, high winds and thunderstorms before the snow finally dominated. Extensive power failures and tree damage resulted. Structural damage was reported in Montgomery, Augusta and Rockingham Counties….” (Environmental Data Service, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 16, No. 12, December 1974, p. 6.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “New Storm Swirls Out of the Pacific.” Winchester Evening Star, VA. 12-4-1974, p. 12. Accessed 11-25-2018: https://newspaperarchive.com/winchester-evening-star-dec-04-1974-p-12/

 

Associated Press. “Ohioans Dig Out of First Major Snowstorm of Winter.” Herald-Star, Steubenville, OH, 12-3-1974, p. 13. Accessed 11-24-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/steubenville-herald-star-dec-03-1974-p-13/

 

Associated Press. “Snow paralyzes much of Northeast Ohio.” Times Reporter, Dover, OH. 12-2-1974, p. 1. Accessed 11-24-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/dover-times-reporter-dec-02-1974-p-1/

 

Associated Press. “Worst Snowfall of Century Leaves 27 Dead in Michigan.” Hillsdale Daily News, MI. 12-3-1974, p18. Accessed 11-24-2018: https://newspaperarchive.com/hillsdale-daily-news-dec-03-1974-p-34/

 

Associated Press. “Wreck Kills Girl.” Beckley Post-Herald, WV, 12-2-1974, p. 6. Accessed 11-25-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/post-herald-dec-02-1974-p-6/

 

Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, OH. “Elyria, area deaths.” 12-3-1974, p. 26. Accessed 11-24-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/elyria-chronicle-telegram-dec-02-1974-p-60/

 

Cumberland News. “Garrett House Fire Claims Mother, Son.” 12-3-1974, p. 16. Accessed 11-24-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/cumberland-news-dec-03-1974-p-15/

 

Environmental Data Service, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 16, No. 12, December 1974. Asheville, NC: EDS/NOAA. Accessed 11-25-2018 at: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/IPS/sd/sd.html?_finish=0.1810420393027058

 

Evening Democrat, Fort Madison, IA. “Killed after pulling car from ditch.” 12-2-1974, p. 1. Accessed 11-25-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/fort-madison-evening-democrat-dec-02-1974-p-1/

 

Leader-Times, Kittanning, PA. “Clarion Area Lumberman Crash Victim.” 12-3-1974, p. 1. Accessed 11-24-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/kittanning-leader-times-dec-03-1974-p-1/

 

Schmidlin, Thomas W. and Jeanne Appelhans Schmidlin. Thunder in the Heartland: A Chronicle of Outstanding Weather Events in Ohio. Kent State University Press, 1996, 362 pages.

 

Southwest Times, Pulaski, VA. “Heavy County Snowfall Leaves Motorists Stranded.” 12-2-1974, p. 1. Accessed 11-25-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/pulaski-southwest-times-dec-02-1974-p-1/

 

Telegraph Herald, Dubuque, IA. “Snow to end, but ice may linger.” 12-1-1974, p. 1. Accessed 11-25-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/dubuque-telegraph-herald-dec-01-1974-p-1/

 

United Press International. “Big storm moves eastward, 35,000 travelers left stranded.” Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, OH. 12-3-1974, p. 26. Accessed 11-24-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/elyria-chronicle-telegram-dec-02-1974-p-60/

 

United Press International. “Much of N. East Staggers Under Major Winter Storm.” Evening Observer, Dunkirk-Fredonia, NY. 12-2-1974, p. 1. Accessed 11-25-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/dunkirk-evening-observer-dec-02-1974-p-1/

 

United Press International. “Southeastern Michigan, Detroit are Digging Out.” Holland Evening Sentinel, MI. 12-3-1974, p. 1. Accessed 11-24-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/holland-evening-sentinel-dec-03-1974-p-1/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] UPI. “Much of N. East Staggers Under Major Winter Storm.” Evening Observer, Dunkirk, NY. 12-2-1974, p. 1. “Almost one foot of snow hit southeastern Iowa, causing the death of at least six persons traveling on slick highways.”

[2] Victim identified as Anthony Herman Grelk, 23. (Evening Democrat, Fort Madison, IA. “Killed after pulling car from ditch.” 12-2-1974, p. 1.)

[3] Killed were Annie Opel, 70, and son Simon Opel, 32, who resided on Rock Lodge Road between McHenry and Bittinger. (Cumberland News. “Garrett House Fire Claims Mother, Son.” 12-3-1974, p. 16.)

[4] Associated Press. “New Storm Swirls Out of the Pacific.” Winchester Evening Star, VA. 12-4-1974, p. 12.

[5] UPI. “Big storm moves eastward, 35,000 travelers…stranded.” Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, OH. 12-3-1974, p. 26.

[6] UPI. “Southeastern Michigan, Detroit are Digging Out.” Holland Evening Sentinel, MI. 12-3-1974, p. 1.

[7] “At least a dozen Ohioans died after shoveling the deep, heavy snow.”

[8] AP. “Ohioans Dig Out of First Major Snowstorm of Winter.” Herald-Star, Steubenville, OH, 12-3-1974, p. 13.

[9] Associated Press. “Snow paralyzes much of Northeast Ohio.” Times Reporter, Dover, OH. 12-2-1974, p. 1.

[10] Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, OH. “Elyria, area deaths.” 12-3-1974, p. 26.

[11] Besides the ten deaths NOAA attributes to the winter weather, it notes, without including in their tally, the death of  “A father and 3 young children burned to death in a mobile home fire which was possibly storm-related.”

[12] Mother and three children. It is our assumption that these four deaths were included in the traffic accident county, since the even was noted two paragraphs earlier in the Beaver County narrative.

[13] Victim identified as Anthony Wayne Cook Jr., of Cooksburg. (Leader-Times, Kittanning, PA. “Clarion Area Lumberman Crash Victim.” 12-3-1974, p. 1.)

[14] Southwest Times, Pulaski, VA. “Heavy County Snowfall Leaves Motorists Stranded.” 12-2-1974, p. 1.

[15] Southwest Times, Pulaski, VA. “Heavy County Snowfall Leaves Motorists Stranded.” 12-2-1974, p. 1.

[16] Associated Press. “Wreck Kills Girl.” Beckley Post-Herald, WV, 12-2-1974, p. 6.

— 92 Faith, Nicholas. Black Box: Why Air Safety is no Accident. London: Boxtree, 1996.
— 92 NTSB AAR Trans World Airlines…727-231, N54328, Berryville, VA, Dec 1, 1974 1975,
— 92 Suburban Emergency Management Project. “Horrific TWA Crash…” Nov 20, 2008.

Narrative Information

NTSB: “At 1110 e.s.t., December 1, 1974, Trans World Airlines, Inc., Flight 514, a Boeing 727-231, N54328, crashed 25 nautical miles northwest of Dulles International Airport, Washington, D. C. The accident occurred while the flight was descending for a VOR/DME approach to runway 12 at Dulles during instrument meteorological conditions. The 92 occupants — 85 passengers and 7 crewmembers — were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the crew’s decision to descend to 1,800 feet before the aircraft had reached the approach segment where that minimum altitude applied. The crew’s decision to descend was a result of inadequacies and lack of clarity in the air traffic control procedures which led to a misunderstanding on the part of the pilots and of the controllers regarding each other’s responsibilities during operations in terminal areas under instrument meteorological conditions. Nevertheless, the examination of the plan view of the approach chart should have disclosed to the captain that a minimum altitude of 1,800 feet was not a safe altitude.

Contributing factors were:

(1) The failure of the FAA to take timely action to resolve the confusion and misinterpretation of
air traffic terminology although the Agency had been aware of the problem for several years.

(2) The issuance of the approach clearance when the flight was 44 miles from the airport on an unpublished route without clearly defined minimum altitudes; and

(3) Inadequate depiction of altitude restrictions on the profile view of the approach chart for the VOR/DME approach to runway 12 at Dulles International Airport.” (NTSB 1975, 1-2)

“Trans World Airlines, Inc., Flight 514 was a regularly scheduled flight from Indianapolis, Indiana, to Washington, D. C., with an inter mediate stop at Columbus, Ohio. There were 85 passengers and 7 crewmembers aboard the aircraft when it departed Columbus….

“At 1036, the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) informed the crew of Flight 514 that no landings were being made at Washington National Airport because of high crosswinds, and that flights destined for that Airport were either being held or being diverted to Dulles International Airport.” (NTSB 1975, 2-3) ….

“…it is clear that this was an operational accident and that the crew knowingly descended to approximately 1,800 feet after being cleared for the approach. The basic questions requiring resolution are (1) why did the crew knowingly descend to 1,800 feet in an area where the terrain obstacles extended almost up to that altitude; and (2) why did the approach clearance not include
an altitude restriction under the circumstances of this case….” (NTSB 1975, 27)

“Controllers are trained in the air traffic control procedures and the terminology associated with IFR navigation. Pilots, on the other hand, are trained in the operation of the aircraft, air traffic control procedures, and terminology essential to safe operation of aircraft in the airspace system. However, as this case demonstrates, imprecise terminology, unresolved differences of opinion, and unnoticed changes in the definitions and procedures can result in an inadequate understanding on the part of one or both of the participants in the air traffic control situation….

“At the Safety Board’s public hearing, FAA witnesses testified that they were not aware that there was any potential misunderstanding on the part of pilots as to the meaning of the term “cleared for the approach, ” in a case where a nonprecision approach is made, particularly when the clearance was issued a long distance from the airport. The evidence, however, does not support this conclusion, since, for several years prior to this accident, various organizations had perceived a problem in the use of the term “cleared for the approach.”

“Ironically, approximately 6 weeks before the TWA accident an air carrier flight, after being “cleared for the approach,” descended to 1,800 feet while outside of the Round Hill intersection during a VOR/DME approach to runway 12 at Dulles. The carrier involved had implemented an anonymous safety awareness program, was in fact made aware of the occurrence, and subsequently issued a notice to its flightcrews to preclude the recurrence of a near-fatal misinterpretation of an approach clearance. The Board is encouraged that such safety awareness programs have been initiated. It is through such conscientious safety management that the expected high level of safety in air carrier operations can be obtained. In retrospect, the Board finds it most unfortunate that an incident of this nature was not, at the time of its occurrence, subject to uninhibited reporting and subsequent investigation which might have resulted in broad and timely dissemination of the safety message issued by the carrier to its own flightcrews”

“Both the USAF and TWA had pointed out to the FAA that the terminology “cleared for the approach” could be misinterpreted and that pilots might understand that they could descend unrestricted unless a specific altitude restriction was included in the clearance. With respect to the crew of TWA 514, the conversation in the cockpit as reflected in the CVR transcript permits no other conclusions than that they assumed the clearance received permitted an unrestricted descent to 1,800 feet. Sub-questions requiring discussion are whether other available information should have indicated to the crew the unsafe nature of such a descent and why the crew was not alerted at least to the point of making inquiry to ATC.

“Considering the number of times the captain examined this chart after being informed that he was to divert to Dulles he should have realized that the minimum altitude of 1,800 feet might not be a safe altitude. Although the captain did not know his exact position relative to the terrain when he received the approach clearance, the Board believes that with his VOR tuned to Armel and with the information provided by that navigational aid, he should have been able to read his DME range from Armel. At the time he received the clearance, he was about 44 nmi from Arme1 on the 300° radial inbound to the station. By reference to the approach chart, he should also have been able to identify the high obstacles between that position and the Round Hill intersection. With that information, he should have been able to determine that 1,800 feet was not an adequate altitude to provide terrain clearance of 2,000 feet in this designated mountainous area. If he did not realize that he was over a designated mountainous area, he should have applied terrain clearance of 1,000 feet as prescribed for nonmountainous areas. He did notice the 3,400 feet associated with the course between Front Royal and Round Hill. That should have suggested that he should reexamine his decision regarding the descent to 1,800 feet. If he had questioned the controller regarding the minimum altitude in the area of his aircraft, he should have received information that would have alerted him that he could not descend to 1,800 feet until after he passed Round Hill.

“The information available to the pilot, including the approach chart, should have alerted the crew that an unrestricted descent would be unsafe. It does appear to the Board that there was a deficiency in the chart. This particular approach chart depicted the profile view from the final approach fix to the airport. It did not depict the intermediate fix, Round Hill, with its associated minimum altitudes. This information was available from the plan view of the chart, but it appears
that the crew gave their primary attention to the profile. If this was the case, it may have led the crew to discount the other information available on the chart and to continue their descent on the assumption that it was permissible by reason of the clearance they received.

“The second major question deserving consideration is the role of the ATC system in this accident, specifically why TWA 514 was not given an altitude restriction in its approach clearance. The testimony of all FAA witnesses, including the controller, was consistent in stating that Flight 514 was not a “radar arrival;” that because of this fact the controller was not required to implement the provisions of paragraph 1360 of the FAA Handbook 7110.8C; and that they considered TWA 514, after intercepting the 300° radial of Armel, as proceeding on its own navigation and as being responsible for its own obstacle clearance….

“The counterposition is that Flight 514 was operating in a radar environment, was receiving at least one type of radar service, and was on a course which would lead directly to the Round Hill intermediate approach fix. Furthermore it had been advised that the reason for the vector to the 300° radial was for a VOR/DME approach for runway 12. Consequently, it should have received services, including altitude restrictions. as set forth in Paragraph 1360 of 7110.8C.

“In evaluating these facts, the one issue present is whether the handling of Flight 514 required the provision of an altitude restriction. FAA witnesses agreed that, had Flight 514 been classified as a radar arrival within the meaning of the handbook, the flight would have been given an altitude restriction until it reached Round Hill. In resolving this issue, the Board has been troubled by the fact that ATC procedures are almost always dependent upon the usage of certain specified phrases and terms, many of which have no established definitions and mean different things to controllers and pilots.

“The term “radar control” is an example. The pilot witnesses believed that, when they were operating in a traffic control radar environment, they were being controlled by radar. The controller group was aware that this was not always the case, but the FAA apparently did not perceive the difference of understanding, and the efforts made by the FAA to clarify when an aircraft was or was not radar controlled did not eliminate the confusion.

“The Board concludes that based on the criteria in 7110.8C the system allowed for the classification and handling of Flight 514 as a nonradar arrival. The Board, however, believes that the flight should have been classified and handled as a “radar arrival.”….

“The system should clearly require controllers to give the pilots specific information regarding their positions relative to the approach fix and a minimum altitude to which the flight could descend before arriving at that fix. Pilots should not be faced with the necessity of choosing from among several courses of action to comply with a clearance.

“The Board believes that the clearance, under these circumstances, should have included an altitude restriction until the aircraft had reached a segment of the published approach procedure or the issuance of the approach clearance should have been deferred until the flight reached such segment. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the clearance was inadequate and its issuance and acceptance was the result of a misunderstanding between the pilot and the controller….” (NTSB 1975, 29-32)

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that it is essential that a lexicon of air traffic control words and phrases be developed and made available to all controllers and pilots who operate within the National Airspace System. Additionally, there should be one book of procedures for use by both pilots and controllers so that each will understand what to expect of the other in all air traffic control situations. This manual must be used in the training of all pilots and controllers.” (NTSB 1975, 33)

“The issue of when flights are or are not radar arrivals must also be resolved. It is difficult for a pilot who is operating in a radar environment and communicating with a radar controller to realize that, under some circumstances, his flight is, without formal notification, considered to be a nonradar arrival and subject to a different ATC procedure. Specifically, he may not realize that the responsibility for obstacle clearance shifts from the controller to the pilot under some circumstances without the pilot being specifically informed. While the Safety Board recognizes that the FAA is concerned about radio frequency congestion in busy terminal areas, any control procedure which effects a change in the responsibility for providing terrain clearance must be communicated and clearly understood by both pilots and controllers. If radar service is terminated, the crew should be so informed. Then they will be prepared to resume the responsibility for navigation which was vested in the controller while the flight was classified and handled as a radar arrival….” (NTSB 1975, 34)

“In summary, this accident resulted from a combination of conditions which included a lack of understanding between the controller and the pilot as to which air traffic control criteria were being applied to the flight while it was operating in instrument meteorological conditions in the terminal area. Neither the pilot nor the controller understood what the other was thinking or planning when the approach clearance was issued. The captain did not react correctly to his own doubt about the line of action he had selected because he did not contact the controller for clarification. The action of the other air carrier pilot who questioned the clearance he received about 1/2 hour before the accident is the kind of reaction that should be expected of a pilot suddenly confronted with uncertainty about the altitude at which he should operate his aircraft.

“The Board again stresses that it is incumbent upon air carrier management to assure the highest possible degree of safety through an assertive exercise of its operational control responsibility. This management function must assure that flightcrews are provided with all information essential to the safe conduct of flight operations. Furthermore, the air carrier must assure that its flightcrews are indoctrinated in the operational control precept and that during flight the final and absolute responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight rests solely with the captain as pilot-in-command regardless of mitigating influences which may appear to dilute or derogate this authority.

“Whereas the air carriers and the pilots are expected to perform their services with the highest degree of care and safety, this same high level of performance must be expected from the management of the air traffic control system and the controller. The instant case provides a classic and tragic example of a pilot and controller who did not fully comprehend the seriousness of the issuance and acceptance of a clearance which was not precise or definitive. The pilot should question a clearance which leaves any doubt as to what course of action should be followed. The Board also believes that it is incumbent upon the controller to ascertain beyond a doubt that the terminology of a clearance conveys the intent to the pilot, and to question the pilot if there is any doubt that he has understood it and is initiating actions compatible with the intent of the clearance.” (NTSB 1975, 35-36)

“The FAA was not responsive to the long standing, expressed needs and concerns of the users of the Air Traffic Control System with regard to pilot/controller responsibilities pursuant to the issuance of an approach clearance for a nonprecision approach. Furthermore, the FAA did not provide users of the Air Traffic Control System with sufficient information regarding the services provided by the system under specific conditions.” (NTSB 1975, 39)

“Subsequent to the accident the FAA amended 14 CFR 91.75(a) to reemphasize that “If a pilot is uncertain of the meaning of an ATC clearance, he shall immediately request clarification from ATC.” (NTSB 1975, 36)

“Subsequent to the accident, the FAA has taken several actions in an effort to prevent recurrence of this type of accident.

1. The FAA has directed that all air carrier aircraft be equipped with a ground proximity warning system by December 1975.

2. The FAA has revised the provisions of 14 CFR 91 with regard to pilot responsibilities and actions after receiving a clearance for a nonprecision approach.

3. The FAA has established an incident reporting system which is intended to identify unsafe operating conditions in order that they can be corrected before an accident occurs.

4.The FAA has changed its air traffic control procedures to provide for the issuance of altitude restrictions during nonprecision instrument approaches.

5. The FAA is installing a modification to the ARTS III system that will alert air traffic controllers when aircraft deviate from predetermined altitudes while operating in the terminal area.” (NTSB 1975, 40-41) ….

“McAdams and Haley, Members, dissenting:

“We do not agree with the probable cause as stated by the majority. In our opinion, the probable cause was the failure of the controller to issue altitude restrictions in accordance with the Terminal Air Traffic Control Handbook 7110.8C, paragraph 1360(c), and the failure of the pilot
to adhere to the minimum sector altitude as depicted on the approach plate or to request clarification of the clearance. As a result, the pilot prematurely descended to 1, 800 feet.

“The flight was a radar arrival and, therefore, entitled to altitude protection and terrain clearance. If the controller, as required by the then-existing procedures for radar arrivals, had issued altitude restrictions with the approach clearance or had deferred the clearance, the accident probably would not have occurred. On the other hand, if the pilot had either maintained the minimum sector altitude of 3,300 feet as depicted on the approach plate, or requested clarification of the clearance, there would not have been an accident.

“The majority states (p. 32):

“The Board concludes that based on the criteria in 7 110.8C the system allowed for the classification and handling of Flight 514 as a nonradar arrival. The Board, however, believes that the flight should have been classified and handled as a ‘radar arrival. ‘ ”

“This statement cannot be reconciled with the probable cause as stated by the majority. If the majority believes that under all the circumstances the flight should have been classified and handled as a radar arrival, then the flight was in fact a radar arrival and the probable cause should so state, It is not possible to determine from the majority opinion whether Flight 514 was a radar or a nonradar arrival.

“The Board attributes the failure of the controller to handle the flight as a radar arrival to be a terminology difficulty between pilots and controllers, There was no terminology difficulty. The plain fact of the matter is that the controller simply did not treat the flight as a radar arrival as he
should have. All the criteria of paragraph 1360 for a radar arrival were present. Neither the pilot nor the controller had terminology difficulties. The pilot assumed he was a radar arrival and would be given altitude restrictions if necessary. Not having received such restrictions, he initiated a descent to 1,800 feet….

“In any event, we can only conclude that, in not handling the flight a radar arrival, the Dulles controller did not properly apply the provisions of the controller’s handbook. Furthermore, it appears from the testimony of other controllers at the hearing that they would have handled the flight a similar manner, which may in turn indicate a lack of understanding comprehension by controllers generally regarding the application of paragraph 1360….

“The real issue in this accident is not one of inadequacy of terminology or lack of understanding between controllers and pilots. Rather, it is a failure on the part of both the controllers and pilots to utilize the ATC system properly and to its maximum capability.” (NTSB 1975, 45-52)

SEMP: “At 11:10 a.m., December 1, 1974, TWA Flight 514, a Boeing 727 flying in bad weather, crashed into the wooded slope of a 1,725-feet mountain about 25 nautical miles northwest of Dulles International Airport (first opened in 1962), Washington, D.C., killing all 92 people aboard (85 passengers and 7 crew members) and destroying the plane. (1) It was the worst air disaster of 1974.

“The crash not only extinguished 92 precious lives, it also severed the main underground phone line to the federal government’s classified underground complex designed to serve as a headquarters for high government officials in the event of nuclear war, and divulged to the American public the hitherto unknown existence of the facility.

“The secret complex was one and one-half miles from the crash site. “People who went to the rescue noticed much more than the federal government would have preferred,” writes former FEMA Director Julius W. Becton, Jr. “The rescue crews found it mighty strange that cars were parked in the middle of nowhere near the mountaintop, and that was how the cover was blown for Mouth Weather, which is a classified, underground shelter for a sizeable number of people near the Pennsylvania border.” ….

“Flight 514 was a regularly scheduled flight from Indianapolis, Indiana, to Washington, D.C., with an intermediate stop at Columbus, Ohio…. Flight 514 departed Columbus at 10:24. Twelve minutes later, the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center informed the crew of Flight 514 that “no landings were being made at Washington National Airport because of high crosswinds, and that flights destined for that Airport were either being held or being diverted to Dulles National Airport. At 10:42, Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control cleared Flight 514 to Dulles via the Front Royal VOR, and to maintain flight level….

“The controller subsequently testified that he noticed on the radarscope that the flight’s altitude was about 2,000 feet just before he called them. The flight data recorder readout indicated that after the aircraft left 7,000 feet, the descent was continuous with little rate variation until the indicated altitude was about 1,750 feet…The accident occurred on the west slope of Mount Weather, Virginia, about 25 nautical miles from Dulles, at an elevation of about 1,670 feet.” ….

“The wreckage covered an area about 900 feet long and 200 feet wide. “The evidence of first impact was trees whose tops were cut off about 70 feet above ground. The elevation at the base of the trees was 1,650 feet. After about 500 feet of travel through the trees, the aircraft struck a rock outcropping at an elevation of about 1,675 feet. Numerous heavy components of the aircraft were thrown forward of the outcropping. “The wing flaps, wing leading edge devices, and the landing gear were retracted.” The crash was not a survivable event….”(SEMP, “Horrific TWA Crash…” November 20, 2008)

Sources

Faith, Nicholas. Black Box: Why Air Safety is no Accident. London: Boxtree, 1996.

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Trans World Airlines, Inc. Boeing 727-231, N54328, Berryville, Virginia, December 1, 1974 (NTSB-AAR-75-16). Washington, DC: NTSB, Nov 26, 1975. At: http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR75-16.pdf

Suburban Emergency Management Project. “Horrific TWA Crash Inadvertently Exposed Fed’s Classified Mount Weather Installation, 1974.” Biot Report #565, November 20, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.semp.us/publications/biot_reader.php?BiotID=565

 

–72 Kimura. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Ed., 1946-1993, V.1. 4-11-1994, p. 2-16.
–72 NTSB. AAR. Eastern Air Lines… N8984E, Charlotte, NC, Sep 11, 1974. May 23, 1975.

Narrative Information

NTSB: “About 0734 e.d.t., on September 11, 1974, Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Flight 212, crashed 3.3 statute miles short of runway 36 at Douglas Municipal Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina. The flight was conducting a VOR DME nonprecision approach in visibility restricted by patchy dense ground fog. Of the 82 persons aboard the aircraft, 11 survived the accident. One survivor died of injuries 29 days after the accident. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and fire.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the flightcrew’s lack of altitude awareness at critical points during the approach due to poor cockpit discipline in that the crew did not follow prescribed procedures.” (NTSB-AAR-75-9; from NTIS Abstract)

“…Flight 212…operated as a scheduled passenger flight from Charleston, South Carolina, to Chicago, Illinois, with an en route stop at Charlotte…” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 2)

“The accident occurred during daylight hours at 35″ 09′ 14″ N. latitude and 80° 55p 34″ W. longitude. Eleven persons who saw the aircraft just before the crash agreed that (1) the aircraft was much lower than those they were accustomed to seeing or hearing on this approach and (2) other than the low altitude and the loud engine noise associated with the flight, there was nothing unusual about the appearance of the aircraft….” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 5)

“The aircraft struck the ground in an open field. The field was surrounded by dense woods and underbrush. At initial impact, the right wingtip struck and broke tree limbs about 25 feet above the ground. About 16 feet above the ground, the left wing struck and sheared a cluster of pine trees….

“As the aircraft continued 198 feet beyond the initial impact point, the left wingtip contacted the ground and made a m r k 18 feet long. After the aircraft had traveled 550 feet beyond the initial impact point, the left wing contacted other trees and the wing broke in sections; at this point, ground fire began and spread in the direction of travel of the aircraft until the aircraft came to rest. The right wing and right stabilizer were sheared off. The remainder of the aircraft — the fuselage and part of the empennage section — continued through a wooded area. The fuselage breakup was more severe in this area. The aircraft wreckage came to rest in a ravine 995 feet from the initial impact point….” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 9)

“Of the 71 persons who died as a result of the accident, 31 passengers and 1 crewmember died of impact injuries. Twenty-five passengers died of burns and smoke inhalation; seven passengers died of burns only; one passenger died of smoke inhalation. The remaining five passengers and the flight attendant located in the aft section of the fuselage died because of a combination of factors. The passenger who survived the crash, but who died 29 days later, received impact injuries and severe burns….

“Survivors who had been wearing double-knit garments of manmade fibers reported that these materials melted, adhered to their skin, and could not be removed. One survivor stated that half of his burns were caused by the double-knit material….” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 11)

“This was a partially survivable accident. Only a small section of the cabin, near the tail of the aircraft, retained its structural integrity. Most of the structure was destroyed and, in most cases, the occupant restraint system failed. Finally, fire occurred in the cabin during the breakup of the aircraft and continued to burn until extinguished by the fire department.

“All survivors in the rear of the aircraft were either thrown out of the wreckage or escaped through holes in the fuselage. The surviving passenger and the two surviving crewmembers in the front of the aircraft escaped through a cockpit window.

“The forward cabin entry door was found partially open but was blocked by a fallen tree. Because of the position of the wreckage, the ground blocked the forward galley door. The center fuselage overwing escape windows were destroyed by fire. The auxiliary exit in the tail of the aircraft was useable; however, it was not used for escape….” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 12)

“The accident cannot be attributed to malfunctions of ground facilities, the aircraft, or its systems. Although there was a minor air traffic control deficiency concerning acknowledgement of receipt of ATIS information, ATC procedures were not involved i n the accident. Therefore, the Safety Board focused its analysis on the operational, weather, and human-factor aspects of the approach and the survivability of the accident….” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 14)

“During the descent, until about 2 minutes and 30 seconds prior to the sound of impact, the flightcrew, engaged in conversations not pertinent to the operation of the aircraft. These conversations covered a number of subjects, from politics to used cars, and both crewmembers expressed strong views and mild aggravations concerning the subjects discussed. The Safety Board believes that these conversations were distractive and reflected a casual mood and lax cockpit atmosphere, which continued throughout the remainder of the approach and which contributed to the accident. The overall lack of cockpit discipline was manifested in a number of respects…where the flightcrew failed to adhere to recommended or required procedures….”

“It is noteworthy that at 0732:41, during the latter part of the discussion regarding Carowinds Tower, the terrain warning alert sounded in the cockpit, signifying that the aircraft was 1,000 feet above the ground. This warning should have been particularly significant to the flightcrew, if heeded, since it would have made them aware that the aircraft had pre-maturely descended through the FAF crossing altitude of 1,074 feet above touchdown elevation. Obviously, the crew was not so alerted, since the descent continued.. Based on pilot testimony taken at the hearing, it appears that the crew’s disregard of the terrain warning signal in this instance may be indicative of the attitudes of many other pilots who regard the signal as more of a nuisance than a warning. If this is indeed the case, the Board believes that airline pilots should reexamine their attitudes toward the terrain warning alert, lest the purpose for which the device vas installed be defeated. Although the repetitious sounding of the alarm may have a tendency to undermine its effectiveness, this accident points up the importance of devices designed to enhance altitude awareness at critical points in an instrument approach….

“The Board has been unable to determine the precise reason for the almost total lack of altitude awareness on the part of the crew throughout the approach….The most likely explanation of why Flight 212 was unable to establish visual contact with the runway environment, whereas other flights were able to do so and thereby complete the approach, is that Flight 212, flying at a lower altitude, initially entered the fog bank at a point farther from the runway threshold and thus had a greater slant-range distance through which to sight the runway markings through the fog….” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 15-17)

“By virtue of training, experience, cockpit instrumentation, navigational aids, and approach plates, this crew was well equipped to accomplish the approach to Charlotte safely, and there is no causal factor beyond the flightcrew itself which would account for their failure to do so. This accident exemplifies the. absolute necessity of strict adherence to prescribed procedures, particularly those pertaining to altitude awareness, during an instrument approach….” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 18)

“The weather in the Charlotte area was characterized by shallow, patchy ground fog such that VMC existed above the fog bank, but that visibility was drastically reduced within the fog….” (NTSB-AAR-75-9, 20)

Baron: In 1981 the FAA publishes the “Sterile Cockpit Rule:”

“The sterile cockpit rule was implemented to eliminate non-essential chatter between the pilots during critical phases of flight. A 1974 accident investigation by the NTSB revealed that distractions and discussions of non-relevant flight issues were causal factors leading to the crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 212 in Charlotte, North Carolina (NTSB, 1974). In that crash, 71 of 82 people lost their lives because the pilots were discussing politics rather than the plans for their approach to Charlotte Douglas Airport in bad weather. The new rule was to prevent this type of non-essential chatter below 10,000 feet and reads as follows:

Sec. 121.542 Flight crewmember duties.

(a) No certificate holder shall require, nor may any flight crewmember perform, any duties during a critical phase of flight except those duties required for the safe operation of the aircraft. Duties such as company required calls made for such nonsafety related purposes as ordering galley supplies and confirming passenger connections, announcements made to passengers promoting the air carrier or pointing out sights of interest, and filling out company payroll and related records are not required for the safe operation of the aircraft.

(b) No flight crewmember may engage in, nor may any pilot in command permit, any activity during a critical phase of flight which could distract any flight crewmember from the performance of his or her duties or which could interfere in any way with the proper conduct of those duties. Activities such as eating meals, engaging in nonessential conversations within the cockpit and nonessential communications between the cabin and cockpit crews, and reading publications not related to the proper conduct of the flight are not required for the safe operation of the aircraft.

(c) For the purposes of this section, critical phases of flight includes all ground operations involving taxi, takeoff and landing, and all other flight operations conducted below 10,000 feet, except cruise flight. [Note: Taxi is defined as “movement of an airplane under its own power on the surface of an airport.”]

[Doc. No. 20661, 46 FR 5502, Jan. 19, 1981]
(Source: U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access, 2004, 14CFR121.542).” (Baron, Robert. “The Cockpit, the Cabin, and Social Psychology,” AirlineSafety.com.)

Sources

Baron, Robert. “Cockpit Discipline,” Aero Safety World, December 2007, pp. 47-48. Accessed at: http://www.flightsafety.org/asw/dec07/asw_dec07_p47-48.pdf

Baron, Robert. “The Cockpit, the Cabin, and Social Psychology,” AirlineSafety.com. Accessed 4-9-2020 at: https://web.archive.org/web/20131204222509/https://airlinesafety.com/editorials/CockpitCabinPsychology.htm

Kimura, Chris Y. World Commercial Aircraft Accidents 3rd Edition, 1946-1993, Volume 1: Jet and Turboprop Aircrafts. Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Risk Assessment and Nuclear Engineering Group. 4-11-1994.

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Douglas DC-9-31, N8984E, Charlotte, North Carolina, September 11, 1974. Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted May 21, 1975. Accessed 4-9-2020 at: https://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR75-09.pdf

–88 Associated Press. “88 Feared Dead in Crash.” Austin Daily Texan. 9-9-1974, p. 19.
–>13 U.S.
–88 Associated Press. “Air Crash Victims Recovered.” Star-News, Pasadena CA. 9-10-1974, A2.
— 20 U.S. (3 crew, 17 US citizens)
–88 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AMFMP, 3/1, March 1983.
–88 NTSB. AAR, Trans World Airlines…Boeing 707…in the Ionian Sea, [Sep] 8, 1974. 1975, 1.
–88 New York Times. “TWA Lists Passengers.” 9-9-1974, p. 7.

–>19 U.S. We have been able to authenticate 19 U.S. lives lost from newspaper sources below.

Narrative Information

NTSB Synopsis: “At 0940 Greenwich mean time, September 8, 1974, Trans World Airlines, Inc., Flight 841, crashed into the Ionian Sea about 50 nmi west of Cephalonia, Greece. There were 79 passengers and 9 crew-members on board; no one survived. The aircraft was destroyed.

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the detonation of an explosive device with the aft cargo compartment of the aircraft which rendered the aircraft uncontrollable.

1. Investigation

“1.1 History of the Flight: Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 841, a Boeing 707-331B, N8734, was a regularly scheduled international passenger and cargo flight from Ben Gurion International Airport. Tel Aviv, Israel, to John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, New York. En route stops were scheduled at Athenai Airport in Athens, Greece, and Leonardo Da Vinci Airport in Rome, Italy.

“The flight departed Tel Aviv at 0613, 43 minutes late because it was delayed by passenger security procedures. There were 105 passengers., 9 crewmembers, and 5,186 lbs. of cargo aboard. The cargo consisted of mail, checked baggage, airfreight, and company material; 3,875 lbs. was placed in the front cargo compartment and 1,311 lbs. was placed in the rear cargo compartment. No restricted articles were loaded.

“At 0804, Flight 841 landed at Athens. The crew had not reported any mechanical difficulties while en route, nor was any maintenance required or accomplished at Athens. Fifty-six passengers deplaned and their baggage and some cargo was offloaded.

“Thirty passengers boarded the flight at Athens, bringing the number of passengers to 79. Most of the checked baggage for the boarding passengers was placed in the aircraft’s forward cargo compartment. Some baggage and cargo were loaded in the rear cargo compartment where containers are not used. The rear compartment is normally used for cargo, mail, and the checked baggage of late arriving passengers.

“According to TWA ground service personnel in Athens, one transit cargo container with bags destined for Rome was left unopened, in the front cargo compartment. Four containers were offloaded and emptied, and three were then refilled with originating bags. The four containers, including the empty one, were then placed aboard. The originating Athens mail was also loaded into the forward compartment. Baggage handlers stated that there were 30 to 35 passenger bags in the rear cargo compartment en route from Tel Aviv and destined for Rome or New York; however, they could not recall exactly how many pieces of checked baggage were loaded in that compartment at Athens.

“Three thousand lbs. of jet A-1 fuel was added at Athens; additional oil was not required. According to the TWA servicing crew, no un-identified or unknown personnel were seen in the loading area while TWA 841 was on the ground at Athens.

“The flight filed an instrument flight plan with an estimated 1 hour 48 minutes flight time to Rome and requested a flight level of 35,000 feet (FL 350). Athens control cleared the flight to Rome, via Airway Green 8, at FL140. After takeoff, the flight was to proceed via Standard Instrument Departure No. 6, then to Korinthos (Corinth), to maintain FL 120 until given further clearance…

“At 0912, the flight departed Athens. At 0930, TWA 841 reported level at FL 280 and acknowledged ATC instructions to maintain that altitude and to report upon reaching the next Flight Information Region (FIR). This was the last known radio transmission of the flight. All contacts had been routine flight reports.

“At 0939, Pan American Flight 110 (Pan Am 110), eastbound from Rome, Italy, to Beirut, Lebanon, at FL 330 on Airway Green 8, entered the Athens FIR, reported to Athens ATC, and gave an estimated arrival time at Araxos of 9751. At 0940, the captain of Flight 110 alerted Athens ATC that he had seen ‘a four-engine aircraft going down in flames at their position, which as about 100 nmi west of Araxos…

“Communication between Pan Am 110 and Athens ATC was weak, so Olympic Airlines Flight 201, which was flying in the area, relayed messages between Pan Am 110 and ATC. For the next several minutes, both Athens ATC and Olympic Flight 201 attempted to make radio contact with TWA 841 but were unsuccessful. At 0943, after Olympic Flight 201 asked Pan Am 110 what type aircraft was on fire, Pan Am 110 replied that there had been a mistake, since the aircraft was not burning. The Pan American pilot said that he thought the airplane was a B-707 and that it was a TWA aircraft. He also stated that it appeared that an engine had separated from the aircraft. When asked by Olympic Flight 201 if he saw the engine falling or the aircraft falling, the pilot said, ‘No, the aircraft is falling too. I saw an aircraft pitch up into a steep climb then roll over on its back and start in a dive, then a slow spiral…’

“Immediately after Pan Am 110 described the falling aircraft, Athens ATC telephoned Brindisi and other control centers, followed by inquiries to airports in the area of the TWA flight. The Greek Search and Rescue (SAR) Control Center was notified and a Greek SAR C-47 aircraft was dispatched. About 2 ½ hour after the accident, the crew of this aircraft reported debris and bodies at coordinated 38⁰ 25′ north latitude and 19⁰ 22′ east longitude. [pp. 1-3] ….

“The captain [Pan Am] stated that he first saw Flight 841 at the 11 o’clock position, on a reciprocal heading, about 4 to 7 miles away, and about 4,000 feet below him. The aircraft appeared to be in level flight and in normal configuration. The captain had no reason to be concerned about that aircraft and looked away for a few moments. Ehen he saw the aircraft again it was in a steep climb attitude, which kept increasing. He also thought he saw an object behind the left wing of the aircraft, about a wingspan away. When the aircraft passed abeam, it had reached about the same altitude as Pan Am 110. It then rolled to the left into a steep descent, and was rolling to the left as it disappeared from his view. At that time, he noticed that an engine was missing and speculated that the object he had seen when he first saw the aircraft in a steep climb might have been the No. 2 engine. He also was aware of a considerable amount of debris below his own flight level. He did not see any smoke; however, he did see a whitish vapor coming from the left wing and believed it to be fuel. He said that the debris he noted below Flight 841 looked like pieces of paper fluttering down. He indicated that there was one large rectangular piece and that the debris appeared to shine. He estimated that there were about 25 to 30 pieces of debris through which Flight 841 descended and thought that the debris was at Flight 841’s original flight level. The captain commented that he thought that no attempt was made to recover. He saw at least one full 360⁰ roll as the aircraft went down. The captain estimated that his observations lasted about 20 seconds…. [p.4]

“…. The bodies of 24 passengers were recovered from the sea….[p.5]

“…Neither the FDR [flight data recorder] nor the CVR [cockpit voice recorder] was recovered….” [p.7]

“1.12.4 Recovery

“By the time the FDR pinger was located, two British explosives experts had completed their examination of selected debris in the Safety Board’s laboratory and had concluded that the physical evidence indicated the detonation of an explosive device.” [p.11]

“….FBI Report

“The FBI conducted two laboratory examinations of recovered debris…[p.17] it was concluded that the objects from which these metal parts originated were damaged as a result of exposure to the detonation of a high order explosive.’….The FBI findings were consistent with, and corroborated, the findings of the RARDE [Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment, UK Department of Defense]….” [pp. 17-18]

“1.17.1 Security

“Investigation disclosed that Flight 841’s passengers and luggage had been processed in Tel Aviv and Athens….In Tel Aviv, these procedures included the examination of all carry-on and checked baggage, while in Athens, only the carry-on baggage was examined. TWA procedures in Athens insured that no unaccompanied checked baggage would be loaded on the aircraft. After the accident, the security examinations at Athens were increased to include examination of checked baggage….” [p.19]

“1.17.2 TWA Rome, Italy, Incident

“On August 26, 1974, there was an incident involving TWA Flight 841 from Athens to Rome. When the ramp agent in Rome opened the rear cargo compartment door, he noticed smoke. Maintenance personnel and airport authorities responded immediately with firefighting equipment, and the smoke source was suppressed. All bags were removed and it was determined that the ag that caused the fire was the property of a passenger who readily came forward and identified it. Italian authorities examined the bag and concluded that the fire probably began when the batteries of a tape recorder caused leaked lighter fluid to ignite. Bothe items were in the suitcase. The aircraft was not damaged, and the passenger was allowed to continue to his destination.

“On September 18, 1974, the suitcase and its contents were delivered to the FBI laboratory in Washington, D.C. The FBI found small particles of unconsumed C-4, a military-type high explosive, and other evidence of an ‘improvised explosive device or bomb which malfunctioned, resulting in a fire, rather than the intended detonation.’

“When it became evident that this suitcase had contained an explosive device, attempts were made to determine the whereabouts of the passenger who had identified the suitcase. These attempts have been unsuccessful to date….” [p. 19]

Analysis and Conclusions

“2.1 Analysis

“….Based on the abrupt initial change in Flight 841’s flightpath, the vapor from the left wing, and the probability that the No. 2 engine mounting structure was overloaded, the Safety Board believes that there were sudden and violent inputs into the rudder and elevator controls in excess of the crew’s and the control system’s capabilities. Simultaneous mechanical pitch and yaw inputs of that magnitude can be accounted for by the detonation of an explosive device. Therefore, based on the available evidence the Safety Board concludes that the detonation of such a device affected the elevator and rudder control cables which caused the pitchup and uncontrollable descent….

“In conclusion, the Safety Board believes that the detonation of an explosive device in the aft cargo compartment bucked and damaged the cabin floor in such a manner that one or more of the elevator and rudder system control cables was stretched and, perhaps, broken. The resultant displacement of the control surfaces caused a violent pitchup and yaw and made the aircraft uncontrollable….”
[pp. 21-22]

Newspapers

Sep 9, AP: “Athens (AP) – A TWA Boeing 707 jetliner crashed into the stormy Ionian Sea off Greece on Sunday, and Greek aviation officials said all 88 persons aboard were believed killed. Airline officials said 17 Americans including an infant, were aboard the plane. Italian police said two of the victims were Frederick Hare, an officer of Johnson & Johnson, and his wife Peggy of Raritan, N.J. A Johnson & Johnson spokesman in New Jersey confirmed that Hare is an executive with the company….The nationalities of 30 passengers who joined the flight in Athens and the nine crew members were not immediately known…” (Associated Press. “88 Feared Dead in Crash.” Austin Daily Texan. 9-9-1974, p. 19.)

Sep 9, Oakland Tribune, CA: “Four members of a Richmond [wester Contra Costa County, CA] family were among the 88 persons who are believed to have been killed when a TWA jetliner crashed into the Ionian Sea yesterday after leaving Athens. Mrs. Alice Benedict, 36, her two sons and a stepdaughter, all returning from a summer vacation with Mrs. Benedict’s relatives in Greece, were among the passengers aboard the ill-fated flight. Her husband, Lee H. Benedict, a computer programmer who lives at the family home at 721 Yuba St., was described as being in deep shock. In addition to his wife, two sons, Jeff 7, and Jimmy, 5, and stepdaughter, Mary Yerondopolis Benedict, 16, were on the plane.

“In all, 13 Californians, including three children flying alone, were aboard the flight to Los Angeles….

“Spokesmen for TWA in New York and Los Angeles told The Tribune that other passengers included three children of Dr. and Mrs. George Argyropoulos of Pasadena, Dimitrios, Monica and Spiros. The family had spent a summer vacation in Greece. Dr. Argyropoulos had returned to California earlier, and the three children had been put on the plane in Athens by their mother, who was to follow later.

“Also believed lost in the crash were Alex Karas of Fresno, his wife, Elaine, an infant son, Peter, and another member of the family, Spiros Karas, and two people from Modesto, Mrs. Joanna Wallace and her son, Gregory….

“TWA said the members of the flight crew were Capt. Don H. Holliday, First Officer John L. Cheshire and Flight Engineer Ralph H. Bosh, all based in New York. It said the six cabin attendants were Europeans.” (Oakland Tribune, CA. “Bay Family Among 88 Plane Dead.” 9-9-1974, pp. 1 and 10F.)

Sep 9, NYT: “Following is a list of crew and passengers aboard the Trans World Airlines plane that crashed yesterday off Greece The list was supplied by the airline’s New York office. The names of the six cabin crew members have not yet been released.

“Crew Members

HOLLIDAY, Capt. Don H. [New York City]
CHESHIRE, Jon L., first officer [New York City]
BOSH, Ralph H., flight engineer [New York City]

“New York-Bound Passengers

ARGYROPOULOS, D. (child) [Pasadena, CA]
ARGYROPOULOS, M. (child) “
ARGYROPOULOS, S. (child) “
BENEDICT, Mrs. Alice [Richmond, CA]
BENEDICT, Jeff (child) “ [Son of Alice]
BENEDICT, Jimmy (child) “ [Son of Alice]
BENEDICT, Miss Mary [Richmond, CA] [Stepdaughter of Alice]
BHAMBHAN
CHAKALAKIS, Mr. A.
CHINOY
DENKI
DICKER, Mr. and Mrs.
GILDAY [John] [Fort Worth, TX]
ISRAEL
KARAS, Mr. Alex [Fresno, CA, husband of Elaine, father of Peter]
KARAS, Mrs. J,
KARAS, Mrs. Elaine [Fresno, CA, wife of Alex]
KARAS, Peter (infant) [Fresno, CA, son of Alex]
KARAS, Mr. Spiros [Fresno, CA?] [Was member of Karas fam.]
LESPERARCE
LOWE
MICHEL
MICHEL
ORPHAN, K. (child)
ORPHAN, Mrs. M. E.
ORPHAN, T. (child)
PETRACOS, Mr. C.
SHAH
SHAH (infant)
STEFANIS, Mr. D.
STEMNIS, Miss S.
WALLACE, Mr. Gregory [Modesto, CA]
WALLACE, Mrs. Joanna [Modesto, CA]

“Rome-Bound Passengers
ABE
AMOUR
BARD, Mr. and Mrs.
GENHARD
GIOGI, S. A.
HARE, Mr. [Raritan, NJ]
HARE, Mrs. [Raritan, NJ]
KALZMAN, Mr. and Mrs.
KINJO
KINJO
KORRINGA, Miss M.
KOTANI
MARDKHAH
MICHEL, Mrs. Valentine
MILIANO, Mrs. Stelia
MIYAGI
NAKAHARA
NAKAIMA
NISHIMURA
REED, Dr. Dan
ROSENVASSER
SAKAMOTONN
SANMUGHATHANI, Mr. and Mrs.
SANTO, Mr. E. Jose
SCOPINCH
SEMIRAMIS, Miss Helene
SHAI, Mr. and Mrs.
SHOJI
SOJMEKA
STOHLMAN, Mr. and Mrs.
SUWANI, Mr. Ibrahim
SUWANI, Calyopatra (infant)
TARAGIMA
THEODORE, Stylianoa (child)
TOMA.
TORJMAN
TORJMAN
TORJMAN
TORJMAN
UECHIC”

(New York Times. “TWA Lists Passengers.” 9-9-1974, p. 7.)

Sep 10: “Athens (AP) – A U.S. 6th Fleet plane on Monday flew in the first bodies recovered from the Ionian Sea where a Trans World Airlines jetliner crashed, presumably killing all 88 persons aboard. The plane from the aircraft carrier Independence brought 18 bodies to the U.S. Air Force base near Athens airport for identification and examination to determine cause of death….

“The missing included 20 Americans, three of them crew members and three others members of the Argyropoulous family of Sierra Bonita Lane, Pasadena: Spires, 12; Demitris, 10; and Monica, 8…..

“…a group calling itself the Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine said in Beirut that one of its men set off an explosive device as the plane left Greek air space….Other Palestinian groups dismissed the bombing claim as Zionist propaganda. But the Nationalist Youth group said in Paris Monday it was planning more actions against airlines serving Israel. It said the operation was meant to execute six members of an Israeli death squad….” (Associated Press. “Air Crash Victims Recovered.” Star-News, Pasadena CA. 9-10-1974, p. A-2.)

Sep 10: “A member of Bell Helicopter’s engineering management team at Hurst was aboard the commercial TWA airliner which went down at sea Sunday some 100 miles off the coast of Greece. Bell officials have received confirmation that John F. Gilday was a passenger on Trans World Airlines flight 841, returning from a company business trip. He has been a senior project engineer for the company’s model 47 – the world’s first commercial licensed helicopter, and the more recent light-turbine model 206 JetRanger. His current title is senior project engineer for lightweight helicopters.” (Grand Prairie Daily News, TX. “Bell engineer on downed flight.” 9-10-1974, p. 8.)

Sources

Associated Press. “88 Feared Dead in Crash.” Austin Daily Texan. 9-9-1974, p. 19. Accessed 12-17-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/austin-daily-texan-sep-09-1974-p-19/

Associated Press. “Air Crash Victims Recovered.” Star-News, Pasadena CA. 9-10-1974, p. A-2. Accessed 12-17-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/star-news-sep-10-1974-p-3/

Eckert, William G., MD “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, vol. 3, No. 1, March 1983.

Grand Prairie Daily News, TX. “Bell engineer on downed flight.” 9-10-1974, p. 8. Accessed 12-17-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/grand-prairie-daily-news-sep-10-1974-p-8/

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report, Trans World Airlines, Inc., Boeing 707-331B, N8734, in the Ionian Sea, September 8, 1974. Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted March 26, 1975. Accessed 12-16-2021 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR7507.pdf

New York Times. “TWA Lists Passengers.” 9-9-1974, p. 7. Accessed 12-17-2021 at: https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/09/archives/twa-lists-passengers-crew-members.html

Oakland Tribune, CA. “Bay Family Among 88 Plane Dead.” 9-9-1974, p. 1. Accessed 12-17-2021 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/oakland-tribune-sep-09-1974-p-1/

Thompson Funeral Home & Crematory. Obituaries. “Jean Gilday, November 12, 1925 – May 4, 2020.” Accessed 12-17-2021 at: https://thompsonfunerals.com/obituaries/jean-gilday/603/

–12 Jones, Jon C. “A Brief Look At The Hotel Fire Record.” Fire Journal, May 1981, p. 41.
–12 National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996, p. 138.
–12 NFPA. Summary of Fire Incidents 1934-2006 in Hotel Fires in the United States. 2008.
–12 National Fire Sprinkler Association. F.Y.I. 1999, p. 6.

Narrative Information

NFPA 1975: “Hotel. Twelve Fatalities. Aug. 25, 1974, Berkeley Springs, W.Va.

“The four-story hotel had been built in 1880, with additions made in 1898 and 1907. Construction consisted of brick walls with wood joists. There was neither a sprinkler system nor a fire de¬tection system. Small mercantile buildings adjoined the hotel. At the time of the fire, the hotel had some long-term residents and also accommodated transients.

“The hotel operator had been awakened about 2:40 am by someone wanting to rent a room. The operator noticed nothing unusual, and went back to bed. Just after 3:00 am, a passing policeman discovered a fire on the first floor of the hotel. He stopped a passing motorist and directed him to rouse the hotel’s guests; then he drove a block to the fire station, where the alarm was sounded at 3:05 am. The Fire Department reached the scene at about 3:15 am and began evacuating the building. The fire spread rapidly through the first floor, and rescuers were not able to reach all of the occupants on the upper floors. Twelve of them died in the fire.

“Fire spread rapidly up open stairways, the elevator shaft, and through interior wood lathe and plaster interior walls that had no fire-stopping capability. The Fire Department requested help from surrounding towns at 3:25 am, A total of 22 fire engines with 400 fire fighters fought the fire, but the entire structure was involved about an hour after the fire was discovered. Adjacent mercantile buildings were also involved. The town’s water sup¬ply was nearly exhausted, and water was pumped from nearby natural springs.

“Investigators believe that the fire smoldered for about two hours in the central area of the basement before being dis¬covered. The exact cause of the fire was not determined. Loss was estimated about $250,000.” (Fire Journal. “Bimonthly Fire Record.” National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 69, No. 2, March 1975, p. 64.)

Sources

Fire Journal. “Bimonthly Fire Record.” National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 69, No. 2, March 1975, p. 64.

Jones, Jon C. “A Brief Look At The Hotel Fire Record.” Fire Journal, May 1981, p. 41.

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at: http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

National Fire Protection Association. Summary of Fire Incidents 1934-2006 in Hotel Fires in the United States as Reported to the NFPA, with Ten or more Fatalities. Quincy, MA: NFPA, One-Stop Data Shop, Fire Analysis and Research Division, January 2008, 4 pages. Accessed at: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/Press%20Room/Hotelfirefatalitiesreport.pdf

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf

–4 Post Advocate, Alhambra, CA. “4 Killed in LAX Bombing,” Aug 6, 1974.
–3 Los Angeles Times. “Before Brussels, LAX was repeatedly a target of Terrorism.” 3-22-2016.
–3 Newsweek. “T is for Terror,” July 9, 2003.

Narrative Information

Newsweek: “Feb. 27 – I got a letter from the Alphabet Bomber the other day…. So I opened it. There were indeed copies of several papers, and scrawled on the back: “DEAR MR. DICKEY: YOU COULD ASCEND TO WORLD PROMINENCE BY BEING THE FIRST WHO UNDERSTOOD THIS LETTER. M. KURBEGOVICH.”….

“It described Muharem Kurbegovic…as tall, blond, blue-eyed and originally from Sarajevo, having immigrated to the United States in 1967: ‘Subject gained notoriety as the ‘Alphabet Bomber’ in 1974 by firebombing the houses of a judge and two police commissioners, firebombing one of the commissioner’s car [sic], burning down two Marina Del Rey apartment buildings and bombing the Pan Am Terminal of Los Angeles International Airport, killing three people and injuring eight.’ Convicted in 1980 on ‘25 counts of Murder, Arson, Illegal Use of Explosives and related charges. Sentenced to life in prison, the subject has whiled away the hours in San Quentin [where he then was] by mailing death threats against U.S. presidents and other U.S. and foreign officials.’

“Kurbegovich, as he now spells his name, was in fact more dangerous than the Unabomber of the 1990s, and a great deal more frightening…

“Kurbegovich, an engineer who worked for aerospace industries and pretended to be a deaf-mute to evade the Vietnam-era draft, was a denizen of public libraries in that pre-Internet age. From them he pulled together what were then just-declassified cookbooks for weapons of mass destruction. A quarter century before Osama bin Laden’s training camps taught holy warriors how to generate poisonous cyanide gas near the air-conditioning intakes of high-rise buildings, Kurbegovich bought 25 pounds of potassium cyanide and nitric acid to do just that. He hid it so effectively in his Los Angeles apartment that the police didn’t find the chemical stockpile until he told them about it—more than two years after his arrest.

“Yet what made Kurbegovich’s reign of terror in the summer of 1974 so intense and, for a few weeks, so successful was his ability to integrate conventional bombs and the threat of chemical weapons into a strategy that today’s U.S. military would call ‘information warfare.’ His first chemical attack was by postcard. On July 7, 1974, he left a tape cassette in a planter at the Los Angeles Times claiming he put nerve gas on tiny lead disks hidden under 11-cent stamps on postcards mailed June 15 to all nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. As he explained on the tape, ‘Each postcard shows the Palm Springs [Calif.] home of entertainer Bob Hope and reads as follows: ‘It is justices of your greatness that made this nation so great. Respectfully, Bob Hope’.’ As it turned out, nine such postcards had indeed been intercepted at the Palm Springs post office on June 16, where the canceling machines had broken the tiny vials under the stamps. The foreman thought they were toy caps.

“Kurbegovich admitted a few weeks later, in another threatening tape, that the postcards were a hoax and the liquid in the vials innocuous. But he knew it was the idea that sowed terror as much as the reality. ‘A reasonable man will pause to think if someone points a gun at him,’ he said, ‘whether the gun is loaded or empty.’ It’s the same idea now embraced, on a much more horrendous scale, by Osama bin Laden and his acolytes….

“Kurbegovich was ‘a terrorist ahead of his time,’ writes Jeffrey Simon in the Monterey Institute’s 2002 volume on Toxic Terror, which is the most thorough analytical account I’ve seen. Though Kurbegovich had no organization and no outside support, he claimed to be Isak Rasim, military commander of a group he called Aliens of America. He was dubbed ‘The Alphabet Bomber’ after he dropped off an audiotape at a CBS affiliate in the aftermath of the gory LAX attack. ‘The first bomb was marked with the letter A, which stands for airport,’ he said. ‘The second bomb will be associated with the letter L, etc., until our name has been written on the face of this nation in blood.’ After a grim panic seized the city, he sent a warning about the next device, planted in a Greyhound bus station, in a locker—thus L. When it was found and eventually defused, it was the most powerful explosive device the bomb squad had ever handled. ‘He had credibility,’ the state prosecutor told Simon later. ‘He had the city of L.A. in fear.’

“The Alphabet Bomber was caught, at last, because his targets were too personal. His apocalyptic terrorism had grown out of a private vendetta against a judge and commissioners he blamed for preventing him from opening a hall for ‘taxi dancers,’ where women were paid to slow-dance with lonely men like him. He’d been caught in a lewd situation in one such hall, and that compromised his chances to start his business, even threatened his chances of becoming an American citizen. So the central demands of his terrorist campaign were an end to immigration and naturalization laws, as well as any laws about sex. CIA voice analysis of his tapes pinpointed Kurbegovich’s Yugoslav origins. Court records of the cases handled by his first targets—the judge and the police commissioners—triangulated his identity. He was tailed for a while, then picked up after dropping off yet another threatening tape in the bathroom of a family restaurant….” (Newsweek. “T is for Terror,” July 9, 2003.)

Sources

Los Angeles Times. “Before Brussels, LAX was repeatedly a target of Terrorism.” 3-22-2016. Accessed 12-21-2021 at: https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-before-brussels-lax-was-target-of-terrorism-20160322-story.html

Newsweek. “T is for Terror,” July 9, 2003. Accessed at: http://www.lafire.com/famous_fires/MajorIncident-index.htm

Post Advocate, Alhambra, CA. “4 Killed in LAX Bombing,” 8-6-1974. Accessed at: http://www.lafire.com/famous_fires/MajorIncident-index.htm

–24 Lathrop. “Discotheque Fire – Twenty-Four Dead.” Fire Journal, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov 1974.
–24 National Fire Protection Assoc. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1974.” V69, N4, July 1975, p. 11.
–24 National Fire Sprinkler Association. F.Y.I. 1999, 7.
–24 New York Times. “25 Years Later, Disco Fire Haunts Its Survivors, July 1, 1999.

Narrative Information

Lathrop/NFPA: “On June 30, 1974, a fire of incendiary origin killed 24 people in a young adults’ night club in Port Chester, New York. The fire started in an adjacent occupancy and the smoke suddenly entered the dimly-lit disco¬theque. The band leader requested the patrons to leave in an orderly fashion, and more than 400 people evacuated the building. Fire fighters rescued more than 30 people; 24 victims were trapped and killed by the heavy smoke conditions.

“The night club, called Gulliver’s, was part of a small shopping center on the Connecticut-New York border that also housed a bowling alley, a men’s clothing store, and a barber shop.

“The one-story building was constructed of concrete- block walls, with wood flooring. The built-up roof was on a plywood deck on wood joists on steel beams sup¬ported by metal posts. The interior partitions were of wood-frame construction, except as otherwise noted in Figure I. All parts of the building except that occu¬pied by the bowling alley had a full basement. The bowling alley had a crawl space below.

“The first floor of Gulliver’s had an entry foyer, a lobby, bar, rest rooms, kitchen, and dining room. Be¬neath this area, in the basement, were storage areas, offices, dressing rooms, and a service bar. The dance- floor level was approximately five feet lower than the first-floor level and had a crawl space below that was used as a storage area. The only ways off the dance floor were a pair of adjacent open stairs, one to the basement and the other to the first-floor level.

“In Gulliver’s, the floors were plywood covered with carpet with foam rubber backing. The wall covering in the dining room, lobby, and foyer was a plastic imitation barn board panel glued to either gypsum or existing plywood paneling. The walls on the dance- floor level had some of the plastic paneling, but con¬sisted for the most part of plywood panels over…gypsum board. The ceilings throughout Gulliver’s were suspended panels in metal frames.

“The area of origin was in a basement section under the men’s shop, which the bowling alley rented. A stairway in the bowling alley went down to a doorway in the concrete block wall that separated the bowling alleys from the rest of the shopping center. The door¬way gave direct access to the rented basement area. That area contained a children’s playroom and storage space, which were separated from each other by wood¬panel-on-wood-stud partitions that did not extend to the suspended ceiling. The playroom had wall-to-wall indoor-outdoor carpeting that was placed over an ex¬isting rug in some areas and over tile in others. This basement area contained a considerable amount of combustible material. The wall that separated the playroom and storage area from the dance-floor level was constructed in such a way that a large void existed inside the wall… Separation of this area from the rest of the basement was provided by an 8-inch cement-block wall; however, this wall extended only to the bottom of the joists.
“On Saturday evening, June 29, Gulliver’s was occupied by an estimated 500 people. This estimate varies according to witnesses; however, based on descriptions of the crowd, conditions in the discotheque, and the size of the area available, the estimated figure seems reasonable. At approximately 1:00 am, people in the service bar area in the basement at the foot of the stairs to the dance floor noted smoke coming in from another area of the building ( the storage area occu¬pied by the howling alley ). Reportedly, someone went to call the Fire Department, while another person notified the band leader, who asked the patrons to leave. An orderly evacuation reportedly began. How¬ever, within a minute, heavy smoke started to come up the stairs from the service bar area and the al¬ready dimly-lit discotheque blacked out. As the smoke poured up the stairway from the basement, occupants of the dance floor tried to leave by the adjacent stairs to the first floor, the only way out. Even though the “up” stairs were 5½ feet wide, the crowd could not escape fast enough and people started to lose con¬sciousness near the stairs.
“Shortly after 1:00 am, the Greenwich, Connecticut Fire Department received what sounded like a prank phone call reporting smoke around Gulliver’s. However, they dispatched a full first-alarm assignment of two engines, one truck, and one squad. The units arrived within two minutes and notified Port Chester, New York, of a working fire on the State line. Calls were put out for ambulances and extra equipment. The Fire Departments were faced with an extremely difficult situation. People were lying in the parking lot, and the building was heavily charged with smoke, with people inside. Wearing self-contained breathing apparatus, fire fighters from both Departments entered the building and rescued an estimated thirty people, mostly from the area of the stairs leading from the dance floor. The heat then intensified considerably and they were forced to retreat.
“After the fire was extinguished, the remaining bodies were removed from the dance-floor area; twenty-four people had died.” (Lathrop, James K. “Discotheque Fire – Twenty-Four Dead.” Fire Journal, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov 1974, National Fire Protection Association.)

NFPA: “Discotheque, Port Chester, New York. On June 30, 1974, a fire of incendiary origin killed 24 people in a young adults’ night club. The fire started in an adjacent occupancy and the smoke suddenly entered the dimly lit discotheque. The band leader requested the patrons to leave in an orderly fashion, and more than 400 people evacuated the building. Fire fighters rescued more than 30 people; 24 victims were trapped and killed by the heavy smoke conditions.” (National Fire Protection Assoc. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1974.” V69, N4, July 1975, p. 11.)

NYT: “Judy Grella, now Judy Acosta, 43, was one of at least 200 young people crowded into Gulliver’s, a sprawling bar, restaurant and discotheque, after midnight on June 30, 1974…. Just before 1 in the morning , George Chase, a singer performing with his band, Creation, announced that there was a small fire next door and urged everyone to leave calmly. For the most part the dancers did, funneling through a four-foot wide staircase of six steps that took them up to the dining area of the split-level and out the front door. But within seconds, a rush of acrid smoke engulfed the dance floor and blinded more than 100 stragglers, leaving them gasping for air and trapped behind a staircase clogged with fallen bodies.

“Twenty-four young men and women were killed by the smoke and fire, their cars sitting in the parking lot, their parents at home waiting for them to return….

“The fire at Gulliver’s was the deadliest dance club fire in the United States in more than a generation — the Coconut Grove fire in Boston in 1942 had killed 491 and the Happy Land fire in the Bronx in 1990 was to kill 87 — and it called attention to the dangers of herding young people into windowless underground rooms without smoke alarms, sprinklers, fire-resistant walls or limits on occupancy.

“In the aftermath, some municipalities put safeguards against fires into effect, but it was not until 1980, when a blaze at Stouffer’s Inn in Westchester killed 26 — that lawmakers in Albany overcame landlord resistance and approved tougher fire safety legislation.

“The authorities arrested a 22-year-old Greenwich laborer, Peter Leonard, and charged him with setting the fire to conceal his burglary of cigarette machines in the bowling alley behind Gulliver’s. Two guilty verdicts for murder were overturned because Mr. Leonard’s confession was first found to be coerced and then found to have been made without the presence of his lawyer. In 1986, though, he pleaded guilty to reckless manslaughter and was sentenced to the time he had already served — about 12 years….” (NYT. “25 Years Later…”, July 1, 1999.)

Sources

Lathrop, James K. “Discotheque Fire – Twenty-Four Dead.” Fire Journal, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov 1974, National Fire Protection Association.

National Fire Protection Association. “Multiple-Death Fires, 1974.” Vol. 69, No. 4, July 1975, pp. 9-11.

National Fire Sprinkler Association, Inc. F.Y.I. – Fire Sprinkler Facts. Patterson, NY: NFSA, November 1999, 8 pages. Accessed at: http://www.firemarshals.org/data/File/docs/College%20Dorm/Administrators/F1%20-%20FIRE%20SPRINKLER%20FACTS.pdf

New York Times. “25 Years Later, Disco Fire Haunts Its Survivors, July 1, 1999. Accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/01/nyregion/25-years-later-disco-fire-haunts-its-survivors.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss