–10 AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 01081959.
–10 CAB. AAR. Southeast Airlines…Near Tri-City Airport, Bristol, Tennessee, Jan 8, 1959.
–10 Eckert. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” AJFMP, 3/1, March 1982, Table 1.
–10 Kingsport News, TN. “None Survive Plane Crash. Guard is Posted Over 10 Bodies.” 1-10-1959, p1.
–10 NFPA. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1959.” Quarterly of the NFPA, V53, July 1960, p. 28.
Narrative Information
U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Synopsis: “On January 8, 1959, about 2032 e. s. t., a DC-3, Southeast Airlines Flight 308, struck a mountainside [Mt. Holston, TN] during an ILS approach to the Tri-City Airport, Tennessee. The aircraft was demolished by the impact and subsequent fire. All occupants – seven passengers and three crew members – received fatal injuries.
“The evidence indicates Flight 308 departed Nashville, Tennessee, with an inoperative radio compass. Although the flight was cleared by way of low frequency airway Green 5, it does not appear that the facilities defining this airway were used. Upon arriving in the Tri-Cities area the aircraft was east of its intended track and erroneously identified the reporting point from which an ILS approach procedure was to be initiated. During the instrument approach, which was conducted in snow showers, the flight missed the outer marker. The approach was continued under instrument conditions without utilizing the VOR facility which would have been of assistance in confirming the flight’s position. Without having clearly established his position, the pilot flew 15 miles beyond the outer marker and descended to an altitude too low to clear high terrain in this area.
Investigation… “Flight 306 is a regular trip which originates in Memphis, Tennessee. Scheduled stops are made at Nashville and Knoxville and the flight terminates at Tri-City….
“At Memphis, the crew made normal preparations for the flight. The weather was checked and the necessary flight papers were filed, including an instrument flight rules flight plan. After receiving IFR clearance to Nashville, the flight departed Memphis at 16303 1 with Captain Bond in command and proceeded uneventfully until reaching the Nashville area. Approaching Nashville, Flight 308 was given radar vectoring to the ILS final approach course by Nashville approach control. It then landed at 1807, 19 minutes late.
“Captain Bond stated in his testimony at the public hearing that during the approach to Nashville, First Officer Irwin was unable to pick up the compass locator at the outer marker on the ADF (Automatic Direction Finding Receiver). The captain and first officer attempted several times to tune the radio but were unable to receive either an aural, signal or a visual indication from the ADF pointer. Captain Bond stated that upon landing he informed Captain Gollmier of the malfunction but did not make an entry in the log concerning it….
“At 2032, because there was other traffic in the area, the controller called Flight 308 to ask its position. The captain, who occupied the right seat, at this time asked if the glide slope was operating. The controller advised that it was and asked if flight 308 was inbound to the outer marker. The captain then stated that his ADF was acting up; that he did not pick up the outer marker either aurally or visually and that they were making a procedure turn. The controller acknowledged and asked the flight’s altitude. No further word was received from the flight and it must be presumed that the aircraft crashed immediately after its final transmission….
At approximately 2052, after Flight 308 had failed to respond to any radio calls, the controller initiated accident search procedures. The pilot of Piedmont Flight 383 flew in the ILS approach area on his departure from Tri-City in an attempt to locate Flight 308 which was presumed down. He did not see any sign of the aircraft and reported that the reduced visibility and low ceiling in the area of Holston Lake prevented any further search.
“The wreckage was located January 9, 1959, about 1130 by a Tennessee Air National Guard aircraft on the northwest side of the Holston mountain range 18.75 n. m. (nautical miles) east of the Tri-City Airport… The terrain in which the aircraft crashed was extremely rugged and heavily wooded. A ground party led by Civil Air Patrol personnel reached the scene late in the afternoon after an arduous climb up the snow-covered mountainside and reported back that there were no survivors. A study of the impact area revealed that the aircraft, while on a course of 235 degrees, first struck several trees which severed the left wing approximately 21 feet from the tip and destroyed a portion of the horizontal stabilizer.
“It could be seen from the initial impact marks that the aircraft was in level flight longitudinally with an angle of bank to the right of less than 10 degrees when it struck the trees growing on the 35-degree slope, at an elevation of 3,140 feet near the crest of the mountain. As it continued into the trees, parts separated and finally the outer right wing panel was severed by another tree. The remainder of the aircraft continued over the crest of the hill without hitting the ground. Its forward motion was then stopped by contact with several large trees and it fell to the ground in an upright position. The cabin section of fuselage with the empennage attached then rolled 180 degrees to the right and came to rest inverted across the stub of the right wing….
“The company witness …[testifying at CAB hearing] said that the ADF is not an essential piece of radio equipment for the ILS procedure. However, he said a properly operating ADF [Automatic Direction Finder] is required by Civil Air Regulations and company regulations for flight in instrument weather conditions. In such conditions the company considers it a “no go” item. He said also that when malfunction occurs to This unit or other such item, company policy requires that it be noted in the aircraft log and corrective action be taken before originating a flight segment. As stated before, Captain Bond made no entry in the flight log concerning the ADF although he was certain that it was not operating. Records indicate that no maintenance was performed on the receiver during the stops at Nashville or Knoxville….
Analysis “Examination of the wreckage of N 18941 revealed no evidence of any failure or malfunction of either the airframe or the powerplants. There was no indication of fire in flight and all components of the airframe were accounted for in the wreckage. Both engines and propellers were capable of normal operation prior to impact. From this evidence it is clear that no structural or mechanical failure or malfunction occurred which in any way contributed to the cause of this accident.
“Examination of the radio equipment of N 18941 indicated that the crew was not utilizing all the facilities available to them. First, the No. 2 navigation receiver was not tuned to a frequency of any facility in the area. It is therefore presumed that the No. 2 navigation receiver was not in use….
“Second, as near as can be determined the low frequency receiver was tuned between 325 kcs. And 349 kcs. Again, this frequency is unrelated to that of any facility in this area which could be utilized by this receiver….
“Two inferences arise because the radio compass was not tuned to the frequency of a facility which would assist in determining position along the localizer. The first is that the automatic direction finding feature was not functioning or was not being used. The second is that the radio compass was entirely inoperative and neither the visual presentation nor the audio signals could be received.
“During the last transmission from the flight, the pilot stated that “. . . his AIF was acting up.” In addition, Captain Bond testified that he was unable to receive either visual or aural signals on the ADF prior to landing at Nashville. The evidence also indicates that he informed Captain Gollmier of the malfunction at Nashville bit that no maintenance was performed there or at Knoxville. It is therefore reasonable to presume that the ADF was completely inoperative and further that the crew was aware of the situation prior to takeoff from Nashville….
“It is apparent that the flight finally realized it had missed the outer marker and must have realized they were east of it, because they started their turn. Both crew members were familiar with the Tri-City Airport and facilities, and both must have been well aware of the terrain variations in the area. When they realized they were east of the outer marker an unknown distance, the first and only proper action was to execute a missed-approach procedure, climbing to 5,500 feet on the west course of the localizer….
“It is impossible to rationalize the pilot’s thoughts concerning the absence of outer marker and glide slope indications….
Conclusions “On the basis of all the evidence, the Board concludes that the radio compass (ADF) was inoperative and could not be used either for navigation along the low frequency radio range or receive the compass locators associated with the ILS. Further, the Board believes this condition was known to the crew at Nashville. It is also obvious that they did not use the other low frequency receiver aboard the aircraft because the flight was not on Green Airway 5 as it neared Tri-City. As stated before, the Board believes that the 65-degree radial of the Knoxville VOR was used to navigate to Tri-City and was also used to locate Gray intersection. It is concluded that the flight was east of its intended course and reported as being over Gray when it was actually several miles east of Gray. This conclusion is inescapable in view of all the known facts….
“The Board cannot conceive of any justification for the manner in which this flight was conducted. The purpose of the company regulation requiring an operable ADF for IFR flight is to prevent just this type of accident. The Board concludes that the malfunctioning ADF should have been noted in the aircraft log. Ample facilities were available at Nashville and Knoxville for corrective action to be taken before takeoff.
“When Captain Gollmier chose to continue the flight in violation of company regulations it would have been expected that he use all other radio equipment available to him. This was not done.
“All the radio aids in the Tri-City area are maintained by the Federal Government for the use of all pilots. While the use of an radios may not be mandatory for IFR flight, good operating practices dictate a maximum cross-check of all available facilities. If Flight 308 had utilized either the low frequency receiver on the Tri-City range or the No. 2 navigation receiver on the VOR, this accident would in all probability have been avoided.
“The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the pilot to identify Gray intersection properly and his decision to continue an ILS approach contrary to company and regulatory procedures.” (CAB. AAR. Southeast Airlines…Near Tri-City Airport, Bristol, Tennessee, Jan 8, 1959.)
Newspaper
Jan 10: “Bodies of 10 victims of a Southeast Airlines plane crash lay under blankets brought by would-be rescuers and a layer of snow Friday night while guards watched over them in the numbing cold. An attempt to bring the bodies down from near the top of snow-capped Holston Mountain is scheduled today.
“Wreckage of the plane, missing since 8:23 p.m. Thursday [Jan 8] when it failed to make a scheduled landing at Tri-City Airport, was spotted about noon by one of several search planes combing the area east of the airport.
“The first ground party, climbing laboriously up the steep, snowy slope, reached the scene in mid-afternoon. They found no indication that any of the seven passengers and three crew members had survived the crash for even a few minutes.
“Most of the wreckage had burned. Three charred bodies were in the wreckage and the others, untouched by the flames, were scattered over a compact area of several hundred square feet. ‘Ten persons were reported aboard the place and we accounted for 10 bodies,’ Dr. Robert A Jackson of Johnson City reported. ‘All 10 persons apparently died instantly in the crash.’….
The victims were:
Pilot Robert Goilmier, Kingsport
Co-pilot Robert Erwin, Kingsport.
Stewardess Miss Wanda Nalley, Johnson City.
J.A. Bradley, Kingsport accountant.
Mr. and Mrs. Frank Halstead, Indian Springs.
W.L. Dennie, Johnson City, general traffic manager of East Tennessee and Western North Carolina Motor Transport Co.
Dr. L. R. Hasche, Johnson City, Jonson City, president of the Hasche Engineering Co. and former research director of Tennessee Eastman Co. in Kingsport.
Robert Matthews, Nashville, a civilian employee of the Army Engineering Corps., headed for the Holston Ordnance Works, Kingsport.
James A. Porter, Nashville, also a civilian employee of the Army engineers accompanying Matthews….
“The plane plunged into the side of the mountain at the junction of Carter, Johnson and Sullivan counties in the northeast tip of East Tennessee. The area is some 30 miles east of Kingsport. It was the first major accident for Kingsport-owned Southeast, which started operations two years ago as an intrastate airline.
“The crash scene is pocked with bluffs and gorges, some areas almost inaccessible, even on foot. Fine powdery snow fell steadily through the night and morning, making all roads in the area dangerously slick.
“Gollmier’s last radio message said visibility was bad. The airport control tower said there was some haze but estimated visibility at five miles….” (Kingsport News, TN. “None Survive Plane Crash. Guard is Posted Over 10 Bodies.” 1-10-1959, p. 1.)
Sources
AirDisaster.com. Accident Database. Accident Synopsis 01081959. Accessed at: http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/view_details.cgi?date=01081959®=N19841&airline=Southeast+Airlines
Civil Aeronautics Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Southeast Airlines DC-3, N 18941, Near Tri-City Airport, Bristol, Tennessee, January 8, 1959. Washington, DC: CAB, Sep 11, 1959, 15 p. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=8&name=*P%3A%5CDOT%5Cairplane%20accidents%5Cwebsearch%5C010859.pdf
Eckert, William G. “Fatal commercial air transport crashes, 1924-1981.” American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1982, Table 1.
Kingsport News, TN. “None Survive Plane Crash. Guard is Posted Over 10 Bodies.” 1-10-1959, p. 1. Accessed 12-16-2022 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/kingsport-news-jan-10-1959-p-1/
National Fire Protection Association. “Large Loss of Life Fires of 1959.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 53, July 1960, pp. 7-38.
