lornajarrettblanchard

–588 CDC Wonder. (Average hypothermia death rate was 0.23 per 100,000 population.)

Death rate for hypothermia per 100,000 population, where noted.

Alabama 16 0.39
Alaska 14 2.45 Highest loss of life per 100,000 population of any State.
Arizona 16 0.42
California 23 0.08
Colorado 17 0.50
Georgia 13 0.20
Illinois 63 0.54 Highest loss of life of any State.
Indiana 14 0.25
Kentucky 12 0.32
Michigan 24 0.26
Minnesota 20 0.45
Missouri 19 0.37
New Jersey 15 0.19
New Mexico 24 1.54
New York 25 0.14
North Carolina 27 0.40
Ohio 18 0.16
Pennsylvania 17 0.14
Tennessee 12 0.24
Texas 21 0.12
Virginia 16 0.25
Wisconsin 12 0.24

Source

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998. CDC WONDER On-line Database, compiled from Compressed Mortality File CMF 1968-1988, Series 20, No. 2A, 2000 and CMF 1989-1998, Series 20, No. 2E, 2003. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-icd9.html on Sep 4, 2021 8:29:37 PM

–81  CDC Wonder. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998. ICD-9 code 052 (Chickenpox).

 

California      17        0.06

 

Narrative Information

 

CDC: “Chickenpox is a very contagious disease caused by the varicella-zoster virus (VZV). It causes a blister-like rash, itching, tiredness, and fever. The rash appears first on the stomach, back and face and can spread over the entire body causing between 250 and 500 itchy blisters. Chickenpox can be serious, especially in babies, adults, and people with weakened immune systems. The best way to prevent chickenpox is to get the chickenpox vaccine.” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Chickenpox (Varicella).” 7-1-2016 update.)

 

Blanchard note: States and DC not shown indicate that the “total” function was “disabled” because there were fewer than 10 deaths. Puerto Rico is not included in CDC Wonder.

 

Sources

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Chickenpox (Varicella).” 7-1-2016 update. Accessed 11-26-2018 at: https://www.cdc.gov/chickenpox/about/index.html

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC Wonder On-line Database. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998. ICD-9 code 052 (Chickenpox), 1991. Published 2003. Accessed 1-19-2019 at: https://wonder.cdc.gov/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

–59  CDC Wonder. Compressed Mortality, 1979-1998 Results, Meningococcal Meningitis. 1992.

 

Narrative Information

 

Meningococcal Meningitis (ICD-9 Code 036.0)[1]: “Meningococcal disease can refer to any illness caused by the type of bacteria called Neisseria meningitidis, also known as meningococcus… These illnesses are often severe and can be deadly. They include infections of the lining of the brain and spinal cord (meningitis) and bloodstream infections (bacteremia or septicemia). These bacteria spread through the exchange of respiratory and throat secretions like spit (e.g., by living in close quarters, kissing). Doctors treat meningococcal disease with antibiotics, but quick medical attention is extremely important. Keeping up to date with recommended vaccines is the best defense against meningococcal disease.” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Meningococcal Disease. 4-9-2018 update.)

 

Sources

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998 on CDC WONDER Online Database, released 2003. ICD-9 code 036.0, Meningococcal Meningitis, 1991. Accessed 1-18-2019 at: https://wonder.cdc.gov/

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Meningococcal Disease. 4-9-2018 update. Accessed 10-3-2018 at: https://www.cdc.gov/meningococcal/index.html

 

 

 

 

[1] ICD-9 is the 9^th revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, a medical classification list by the World Health Organization.

–1,713  CDC Wonder. Compressed Mortality File, 1979-1998. ICD-9[1] code 010-018.[2]

 

Alabama                      47      1.15     (Yellow highlighting denotes above average death rate.)

Arizona                         24      0.63

Arkansas                       28      1.17

California                   199      0.65

District of Columbia     14      2.32

Florida                        111      0.83

Georgia                        54      0.81

Hawaii                          12      1.05

Illinois                          93      0.80

Indiana                                      31      0.55

Kentucky                      28      0.75

Louisiana                      49      1.15

Maryland                      22      0.45

Massachusetts              25      0.42

Michigan                      41      0.44

Mississippi                   14      0.54

Missouri                       22      0.43

New Jersey                   74      0.95

New Mexico                 12      0.77

New York                   293      1.62

North Carolina              40      0.59

Ohio                              40      0.37

Oklahoma                     17      0.54

Oregon                                      12      0.41

Pennsylvania                74      0.62

South Carolina              37      1.04

Tennessee                     40      0.80

Texas                          107      0.61

Virginia                        26      0.41

Washington                  14      0.28

West Virginia               13      0.72

Wisconsin                     18      0.36                 US population size used — 253,088,068

 

Narrative Information

 

Tuberculosis: “Tuberculosis (TB) is caused by a bacterium called Mycobacterium tuberculosis. The bacteria usually attack the lungs, but TB bacteria can attack any part of the body such as the kidney, spine, and brain. Not everyone infected with TB bacteria becomes sick. As a result, two TB-related conditions exist: latent TB infection (LTBI) and TB disease. If not treated properly, TB disease can be fatal.

 

“TB bacteria are spread through the air from one person to another. The TB bacteria are put into the air when a person with TB disease of the lungs or throat coughs, speaks, or sings. People nearby may breathe in these bacteria and become infected.

 

“TB is NOT spread by:           Shaking someone’s hand.

Sharing food or drink.

Touching bed lines or toilet seats.

Sharing toothbrushes.

Kissing.

 

“When a person breathes in TB bacteria, the bacteria can settle in the lungs and begin to grow. From there, they can move through the blood to other parts of the body, such as the kidney, spine, and brain.

 

“TB disease in the lungs or throat can be infectious. This means that the bacteria can be spread to other people. TB in other parts of the body, such as the kidney or spine, is usually not infectious.

 

“People with TB disease are most likely to spread it to people they spend time with every day. This includes family members, friends, and coworkers or schoolmates.” (CDC. Tuberculosis (TB). 3-20-2016 update.)

 

Tuberculosis:  “Tuberculosis (TB) is an infectious disease and was greatly feared well into the 20th century. Frequently called “consumption,” TB was often fatal. By 1943 it was the No. 3 cause of death in Tennessee. The “White Plague,” so named because of its strikingly pale victims, carried a social stigma similar to that of AIDS in recent years. …residents fought the location of a TB hospital in their neighborhood, claiming that property values would plummet.

 

“Tuberculosis is a contagious lung disease (though it can attack other parts of the body) spread through the air. It is highly controlled today with early detection and antibiotics. Around 1900, the average hospital stay for a TB patient was three years….”  (Tennessee State Library and Archives. Disasters in Tennessee. “Epidemic Scourges in Tennessee.” Nashville.)

 

Sources

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998. CDC Wonder Online Database, released 2003. ICD-9 Codes 010-018, Tuberculosis (1991). Accessed 1-17-2019 via: https://wonder.cdc.gov

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Tuberculosis (TB). 3-20-2016 update. Accessed 10-16-2018 at: https://www.cdc.gov/tb/topic/basics/default.htm

 

Tennessee State Library and Archives. Disasters in Tennessee. “Epidemic Scourges in Tennessee.” Nashville. Accessed 10-18-2013 at: http://www.tennessee.gov/tsla/exhibits/disasters/epidemics.htm

[1] ICD-9 is the 9^th revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, a medical classification list by the World Health Organization — International Classification of Diseases for short.

[2] States not listed indicates deaths were under ten and thus not noted by the CDC. Puerto Rico not included by CDC.

—  13  Deseret News, Salt Lake City. “Coalinga Pileup Tops a List of Nation’s Worst.” 12-1-1991

–>12  Knoxville News Sentinel. “Fog in 1990 sparks Tennessee’s deadliest car wreck.” 10-28-2012.

—  12  NTSB. HAR. Multiple Vehicle Collisions…Fire…Fog I-75… Calhoun, TN, Dec 11, 1990.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB: Synopsis:  “About 9: 10 a.m. on December 11, 1990, a tractor-semitrailer in the southbound lanes of 1-75 near Calhoun, Tennessee, struck the rear of another tractor-semitrailer that had slowed because of fog. The uninjured truck drivers exited their vehicles and attempted to check for damage. After the initial collision, an automobile struck the rear of the second truck and was in turn struck in the rear by another tractor-semitrailer. Fire ensued and consumed two trucks and the automobile. Meanwhile, in the northbound lanes of 1-75, an automobile struck the rear of another automobile that had slowed because of fog. Then, a pickup truck and two other automobiles became involved in the chain-reaction rear end collision. No fatalities, injuries, or fires occurred. Subsequently, 99 vehicles in the northbound and southbound lanes were in multiple-vehicle chain-reaction collisions that killed 12 people and injured 42 others.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the multiple-vehicle collisions on 1-75 near Calhoun, Tennessee, was drivers responding to the sudden loss of visibility by operating their vehicles at significantly varying speeds.

 

The safety issues discussed in this report include:

• Non-uniform driver behavior during limited-visibility conditions.
• Detection of limited-visibility conditions.
• Limited-visibility countermeasures.
• Hazardous materials container performance.

 

“As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board made recommendations addressing these issues to the United States Department of Transportation; the Federal Highway Administration; the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; the Tennessee Department of Transportation; the Tennessee Highway Patrol; the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators; the Research and Special Programs Administration; Hercules, Incorporated; the Charleston Volunteer Fire Department; the American Automobile Association; and the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

“As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board made the following recommendations:

 

to the U. S. Department of Transportation:

 

“Incorporate fog and other limited-visibility condition countermeasures in demonstration projects of the Intelligent Vehicle Highway System program. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-86)

 

to the Federal Highway Administration:

 

“Following completion of the National Cooperative Highway Research Program Project 20-5, Topic 23-12, “Reduced Visibility on the Highway,” ensure the continued development of effective fog and other limited-visibility countermeasures and make information about these countermeasures available to States on a timely basis. (Class II, Priority Action)(H-92-87)

 

“In cooperation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the American Automobile Association, and the American Driver and Traffic Safe Education Association, review and update driver license, educational, and remedial training materials to ensure that guidance for driving during limited-visibility conditions is uniform and complete and is included in commercial driver license materials. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-88)

 

to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

 

“In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, the American Automobile Association, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, and the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, review and update driver license, educational, and remedial training materials to ensure that guidance for driving during limited-visibility conditions is uniform and complete. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-89)

 

“In cooperation with the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, develop model test questions for licensing examinations on driving during limited-visibility conditions. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-90)

 

to the Research and Special Programs Administration:

 

“Require that attachments to all U.S. Department of Transportation-authorized hazardous materials packagings be designed to minimize the risk of puncturing other hazardous materials packagings during an accident situation. (Class II, Priority Action) (1-92-1)

 

“Revise requirements for pressure-relief venting on U.S. Department of Transportation specification 57 portable tanks used to transport dicumyl peroxide and other products with similar rapid decomposition characteristics to insure that the pressure-relief systems prevent overpressure rupture of tanks from a rapid product decomposition reaction. (Class II, Priority Action) (1-92-2)

 

to the Tennessee Department of Transportation:

 

“In cooperation with the Tennessee Highway Patrol, revise the 1992 Tennessee Department of Transportation and Tennessee Highway Patrol Plan of Action and the Surveillance and Response Plan. The plans should provide for the immediate detection of traffic flow disruption and fog, uniform driver response to reduce and maintain traffic speed in advance of and through the hazardous area, enforcement of countermeasures, and a public information and education program to ensure that motorists receive specific behavioral guidance for the fog-prone area. (Class II, Priority Action)(H-92-91)

 

to the Tennessee Highway Patrol:

 

In cooperation with the Tennessee Department of Transportation, revise the 1992 Tennessee Department of Transportation and Tennessee Highway Patrol Plan of Action and the Surveillance and Response Plan. The plans should provide for the immediate detection of traffic flow disruption and fog, uniform driver response to reduce and maintain traffic speed in advance of and through the hazardous area, enforcement of countermeasures, and a public education program to ensure that motorists receive specific behavioral guidance for the fog-prone area. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-92)

 

to the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators:

 

“Notify your members of the circumstances of the accident on Interstate 75 near Calhoun, Tennessee, as discussed in this report. Also, develop inserts concerning countermeasures that motorists should consider when driving during fog and other limited-visibility conditions and advise your members to enclose such inserts with driver license renewals, motor vehicle registration renewals, and similar mailings. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-93)

 

“In cooperation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the American Automobile Association, the Federal Highway Administration, and the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, review and update driver license, educational, and remedial training materials to ensure that guidance for driving during limited-visibility conditions is uniform and complete. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-94)

 

“In cooperation with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, develop model test questions for licensing examinations on driving during limited-visibility conditions. Provide this information to your members for inclusion in driver manuals. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-95)

 

to Hercules, Incorporated:

 

“Modify the design of the fork lift truck channels on U.S. Department of Transportation specification 57 portable tanks to minimize the risk of puncturing other portable tanks during an accident situation. (Class II, Priority Action) (1-92-3)

 

to the Charleston Volunteer Fire Department:

 

“Provide all personnel with the training necessary to identify hazardous materials in accidents, to recognize the immediate dangers posed, and to determine appropriate initial emergency response actions. (Class II, Priority Action) (I-92-4)

 

to the American Automobile Association:

 

“In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, and the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association, review and update driver license, educational (including Triptik maps), and remedial training materials to ensure that guidance for driving during limited-visibility conditions is uniform and complete. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-96)

 

to the American Driver and Traffic Safety Education Association:

 

“In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, the National Traffic Safety Administration, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, and the American Automobile Association, review and update driver license, educational, and remedial training materials to ensure that guidance for driving during limited-visibility conditions is uniform and complete. (Class II, Priority Action) (H-92-97).” (NTSB. HAR. Multiple Vehicle Collisions… Fire…Fog I-75… Calhoun, TN, Dec 11, 1990.)

 

Knoxville News Sentinel, Oct 28, 2012: “…The fog that shrouded Interstate 75 near Calhoun in McMinn County two weeks before Christmas swallowed at least a dozen lives that morning of Dec. 11, 1990. Even the exact cause of the foggy pileup, the worst such crash in Tennessee history, remains unclear more than 20 years later.

 

“Police, drivers and others had warned for years about the dangers of the heavy fog that persistently hung over the five-mile stretch of highway near the Hiwassee River. Witnesses later compared the fog bank that December day to “throwing a blanket over your windshield.” The wreckage that resulted from the 99-car pileup that day made determining who crashed first almost impossible. Drivers who instantly lost visibility instinctively hit their brakes and slammed into each other willy-nilly in a matter of minutes.” (Knoxville News Sentinel, TN (Matt Lakin). “Fog in 1990 sparks Tennessee’s deadliest car wreck.” 10-28-2012.)

 

Sources

 

Deseret News, Salt Lake City. “Coalinga Pileup Tops a List of Nation’s Worst.” 12-1-1991. At:  http://www.deseretnews.com/article/196628/COALINGA-PILEUP-TOPS-A-LIST-OF-NATIONS-WORST.html

 

Knoxville News Sentinel, TN (Matt Lakin). “Fog in 1990 sparks Tennessee’s deadliest car wreck.” 10-28-2012. Accessed 4-29-2016 at: http://www.knoxnews.com/news/local/fog-in-1990-sparks-tennessees-deadliest-car-wreck-ep-359829614-356511081.html

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Highway Accident Report. Multiple Vehicle Collisions and Fire, During Limited Visibility (Fog) on Interstate 75 Near Calhoun, Tennessee, December 11, 1990 (NTSB HAR-92/02; NTIS PB92-016202). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted 9-28-1992. Accessed 4-29-2016 at: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR9202.pdf

 

–8  NTSB AAR. Airlines, Inc., Flights 1482 and 299 Runway Incursion…Collision… 1991, p11.

–8  Sturkey. Mid-Air: Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts… 2008, p. 358.[1]

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB Factual Information:

 

“1.1     History of the Flights

 

“1.1.1  General

 

“On December 3, 1990, at 1345 [1:45] eastern standard time, Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight 1482, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9, and Northwest Airlines flight 299, a Boeing 727 (B-727), collided near the intersection of runways 09/27 and 03C/21C at Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport (DTW), Romulus, Michigan. The DC-9 was to be a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and the B-727 was to be a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Memphis, Tennessee. Both airplanes were operating under Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 121 and instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time at DTW. The B-727 was on its takeoff roll on runway 3C at the time of the collision, and the DC-9 had taxied onto the runway just prior to the accident. The B-727 was substantially damaged, and the DC-9 was destroyed during the collision and subsequent fire. Of the 40 passengers and 4 crewmembers aboard the DC-9, 7 passengers and 1 flight attendant received fatal injuries. None of the 146 passengers and 8 crewmembers on the B-727 were injured.

 

“1.1.2  B-727 Taxi and Takeoff Activity

 

“Flight 299 was initially scheduled to depart at 1210, but an airplane change delayed the flightcrew from boarding the incoming airplane until 1245 at Gate F11. Following normal turnaround procedures, the flight was pushed back for taxi around 1331. The flight was initially cleared by the west ground controller to runway 3C via a right turn from the gate, and to gold short of Oscar 7, a taxiway just short of the C concourse…The flightcrew noted that the visibility was ¾ mile, as reported on Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) information Delta. They also noted that the visibility was deteriorating as they began taxiing.

 

“The flightcrew of the B-727 was instructed to contact the east ground controller near Oscar 9 and was then instructed to taxi to runway 3C via Oscar 6, to Foxtrot taxiway, and to advise the east ground controller when crossing runway 9/27. The captain then asked the first officer to monitor the radio for updated ATIS information and to check the company [end of p.1] takeoff visibility minimums for runway 3C. The takeoff minimum for runway 3C was ¼ mile visibility, which coincided with the ¼ mile visibility when being broadcast as part of the new ATIS information Echo. As they taxied through the Oscar 6 area, the flightcrew observed an NWA DC-9 taxiing eastbound on the Outer taxiway toward Oscar 4. This airplane was NWA flight 1482, the DC-9 involved in this accident. The B-727 captain stated, ‘I lost sight of this aircraft as it taxied away from me. It appeared to be entering an area of lower visibility.’ Shortly thereafter, they also heard a discussion on east ground control frequency concerning a taxiing airplane missing the Oscar 6 intersection.

 

“The B-727 then crossed runway 9/27 and the crew reported to the ground controller that they were clear of that runway. They continued taxiing along Foxtrot taxiway as the No. 3 engine was started. As they turned onto Xray taxiway, ground control requested their position, then cleared them to the local control frequency. At this time, the captain noted that he could see, ‘…the end of the apron of 3X…,’ a distance of approximately 1,800 feet. The second officer commented around that time that the weather was deteriorating significantly. The B-727 then stopped at the hold line for runway 3C and reported to the local controller at 1344:08 that they were ready for takeoff. The flight was cleared for takeoff at 1344:15. Power was advanced at 1345:03, 48 seconds after the receipt of takeoff clearance. The captain later testified at the Safety Board’s public hearing that since the ATIS was reporting ¼ mile visibility and he had adequate visual references to maintain the runway centerline, he believed that his decision to take off was correct.

 

“Five seconds into the takeoff roll the first officer stated, ‘Definitely not a quarter mile, but ah, at least they’re callin’ it.’ According to the flightcrew, the airplane entered an area of reduced visibility as it accelerated through about 100 knots. The captain stated that the DC-9 suddenly appeared on the right side of the runway in the path of the right wing of the airplane. He then shouted and moved his body to the left while moving the yoke to the left and slightly aft. Following the impact at 1345:40, he rejected the takeoff and stopped the airplane using maximum braking. The collision occurred 1 minute and 25 seconds after the tower cleared the B-727 for takeoff.

 

“1.1.3  DC-9 Preflight Activity

 

“This flight was the captain’s first without supervision after extended period off flying status for medical reasons….[p.4]

 

“1.1.4  DC-9 Taxi Activity

 

“At 1335:31, the DC-9 was cleared to taxi from Gate C18 by the west ground controller with the following instructions:

 

1482, right turn out of parking, taxi runway 3 Center, exit ramp at Oscar 6, contact ground now 119.45.

 

“The captain stated that the visibility was deteriorating as they began taxiing, but he was able [to] find and follow the ‘yellow line’ {the taxiway centerline}. The captain testified that he intercepted the taxiway centerline at or near the point where it forks to the left to become the centerline of the Outer taxiway heading east. About this time, the first officer stated, ‘Hey , it looks like it’s goin’ zero zero out here.’ Shortly thereafter, ground control requested their position. The first officer reported that they were abeam the fire station. At this time, they were given an additional taxi clearance: ‘Roger, Northwest 1482, taxi Inner, Oscar 6, Fox, report making the, ah, right turn on Xray.’ About ½ minute later, the first officer stated, ‘Guess we turn left here.’ When the captain expressed some doubt about this left turn, the first officer replied, ‘Near as I can tell. Man, I can’t see [expletive] out here.’

 

“At 1339:22, the captain stated, ‘Well anyway, flaps twenty and takeoff check when you get the time.’ The first six items on the takeoff checklist were then completed by the crew.

 

“In a subsequent discussion with ground control about their position, the first officer stated to the controller: ‘approaching the parallel runway on Oscar 6…headed eastbound on Oscar 6 here…’ He then said that they had missed Oscar 6 and that they ‘…see a sign here that says, ah, the arrows to Oscar 5. Think we’re on Foxtrot now.’ According to the first officer, he realized that they had missed taxiway Oscar 6 after he observed the sign for that taxiway behind him. The controller then stated ‘Northwest 1482, ah, you just approach[ed] Oscar 5 and you are you on the Outer?’ The first officer responded ‘yeah, that’s right.’

 

“Ground control then gave the additional taxi instruction: Northwest 1482, continue to Oscar 4, then turn right on Xray.

 

“The captain continued to taxi eastbound on the Outer taxiway at a very slow rate. The first officer estimated later that during this period the visibility was about 500 to 600 feet… [end p. 5]

 

“Beginning at 1342:00, as the airplane was nearing the Outer/Oscar 4 intersection, the following dialogue occurred between the captain and first officer (F/O):

 

Captain:           This, this a right turn here, Jim?

 

F/O:                 That’s the runway.

 

Captain:           Okay, we’re goin’ right over here then [possible query].

 

F/O:                 Yeah, that way. [pause of 21 seconds] Well, wait a minute. Oh, # this, uh,

1. [pause of 8 seconds] I think we’re on ah, Xray here now.

 

Captain:           Give him a call and tell him that, ah….

 

F/O:                 Yeah, this is nine. We’re facing one six zero yeah. Cleared to cross it.

 

Captain:           When I cross this which way do I go? Right?

 

F/O:                 Yeah.

 

Captain:           This, this is the active runway here, isn’t it?

 

F/O:                 This is, should be nine and two seven. [pause of 5 seconds] It is. [pause of

3 seconds] Yeah, this is nine two seven.

 

Captain:           Follow this. [Unintelligible word] we’re cleared to cross this thing. You

sure?

 

F/O:                 That’s what he said, yea. [pause of 2 seconds] But this taxi light takes

us….[pause of 2 seconds]. Is there a taxiway over there?

 

“At this point, the captain of the DC-9 set the parking brake. Also at this time, 1343:24, the B-727 crewmembers were performing their takeoff checklist and were 1 minute and 36 seconds from beginning their takeoff roll. Intracockpit dialogue in the DC-9 continued:

 

Captain:           Nah, I don’t see one. [pause of 11 seconds] Give him a call and tell him that, ah, we can’t see nothin’ out here.[2] [pause of 32 seconds until the captain released the parking brake, followed by 16 second pause] Now what runway is this? [pause of 7 seconds] This is a runway.

 

F/O:                 Yeah, turn left over there. Nah, that’s a runway too. [end of p. 7]

 

Captain:           Well tell him we’re out here. We’re stuck.

 

F/O:                 That’s zero nine.

 

“At this time, 1344:40, the B-727 flight engineer was calling the takeoff checklist complete, and the airplane was about 24 seconds from beginning its takeoff roll. At 1344:47, the captain of the DC-9 attempted to contact ground control. However, because he was initially transmitting on some unknown frequency or over the interphone, he was unable to make contact until 11 seconds later. The dialogue in the cockpit of the DC-9 and radio transmissions beginning at 1344:47 are as follows:

 

Captain to ground:      Hey, ground, 1482. We’re out here we’re stuck….we can’t see

anything out her. [lapse of 8 seconds] ah, ground, 1482. [unsuccessful transmissions]

 

Ground control:           Northwest 1482, just to verify, you are proceeding southbound on Xray now and you are across nine two seven.

 

Captain to ground:      Ah, we’re not sure, it’s so foggy out here we’re completely stuck here.

 

Ground control:           Okay, ah, are you on a ru- taxiway or on a runway?

 

Captain to ground:      We’re on a runway we’re right by ah zero four.

 

Ground control:           Yeah, Northwest 1482 roger, are you clear of runway 3 Center?

 

F/O [to captain]:          We’re on runway 21 Center.

 

Captain to ground:      Yeah, it looks like we’re on 21 Center here.

 

Captain or F/O:           [expletive]

 

[Pause of 10 seconds from captain’s last transmission to ground control.]

 

Ground control:           Northwest 1482, y’say you are on 21 Center?

 

Captain to ground:      I believe we are, we’re not sure.

 

F/O [to captain]:          Yes we are.

 

[Pause of 5 seconds from captain’s last transmission to ground control.] [end of p. 8]

 

Ground control:           Northwest 1482 roger, if you are on 21 Center exit that runway immediately sir.

 

“The two airplanes collided 7 seconds after this last instruction from the ground controller….

 

“Following the collision, the captain shut off the fuel control levers. The first officer stated that he instinctively ducked over to the left as the B-727 wing tip grazed his side of the cockpit. An evacuation of passengers was ordered immediately over the airplane public address system by the captain. The tail cone exit was not opened during the evacuation. The external tail cone release was not activated by any flight crewmember or airport rescue and fire fighting (ARFF) personnel. The internal tail cone release mechanism was later found to have been mechanically inoperable. A flight attendant and a passenger succumbed in the tail cone. [end of p. 9] ….

 

 

“…DC-9…General Damage Description

 

“The interior of the passenger cabin was extensively damaged by the fire. All cabin sidewall and ceiling panels, stowage bins and seat cushions, except for some small pieces, were destroyed by fire….

 

“The airplane’s fuselage was cut in a straight line just below the bottom of the windows on the right side of the airplane. The cut line remained along the right side of the fuselage, and the fuselage structure above this cut line to the top was destroyed by fire. The majority of the fuselage was burned from just aft of the cockpit to just forward of the aft bulkhead, from the top to just above the window line on the left side of the airplane.

 

“The accessory compartment between the aft pressure bulkhead and the fiberglass tail cone contained considerable amounts of soot. Plastic electrical wiring support loops and insulation on some small wires in that area had melted…. [p. 26]

 

“1.13.3  Injury and Fatality Descriptions

 

“No persons on the B-727 were injured. Seven passengers and one flight attendant on the DC-9 died. The flight attendant was found face down on the tail cone catwalk with her head directly under the tail-cone release handle and the male passenger who had sustained a minor head injury was found aft of the tail cone slide pack… Both victims died of asphyxia secondary to smoke and soot inhalation and both were within reach of the tail-cone emergency release handle.

 

“Three male passengers who occupied seats 7F, 9F, and 12F were the only persons to die from massive blunt force trauma. A female passenger seated in 6F and a male passenger originally seated in 12D died of asphyxia secondary to smoke and soot inhalation. The male was found in the aisle at row 11, and both of these victims were severely burned. A male passenger assigned to seat 10D, who was found in the aisle at row 9, died of thermal injuries; no traumatic injuries or smoke and soot inhalation were detected….

 

“The cabin of the DC-9 was consumed by fire. The fuel vent surge tank in the right wing of the B-727 was probably ruptured as the wing sliced through the fuselage of the DC-9….

 

“The passenger in seat 11D stated that flames erupted ‘almost immediately.’ The passenger in seat 6B said that after the impact he saw a flame that looked like a ‘blow torch’ coming into the cabin at the right rear. The passenger in seat 15A saw flames along the right side of the fuselage immediately after impact. [end of p. 34]

 

“1.14.3  Fire Fighting….

 

“…the Fire Chief stated that he decided not to have his fire fighters attempt to jettison the DC-9 tail-cone externally because the cabin was totally engulfed in fire and the cabin environment appeared to be nonsurvivable. He also said that flames on the ground in the area of the tail-cone presented an unacceptable risk to his fire fighters. At the public hearing for this investigation, he stated that another reason why he did not want the tail-cone jettisoned was because it would vent the fire within the fuselage…. [p. 36]

 

Analysis

 

“2.1 General

 

“The investigation clearly indicated that when the accident occurred the DC-9 was positioned on active runway 3C/21/C and the B-727 was on its takeoff roll.

 

“The Safety Board…concludes that the visibility was so poor at the runway intersection that neither airplane had time to visually acquire and evade the other prior to the collision…. [p. 50]

 

“2.2.2  Role Reversal in Cockpit

 

“The Safety Board believes that a nearly complete and unintentional reversal of command roles took place in the cockpit of the DC-9 shortly after taxiing began. The result was that the captain became overly reliant on the first officer. The captain essentially acquiesced to the first officer’s assumption of leadership. This role reversal contributed significantly to the eventual runway incursion…. [p. 53]

 

“….by the time the airplane was on the Outer taxiway, the captain apparently believed that the first officer knew what he was doing and where the airplane was located. Unfortunately, as was revealed later, the first officer was not aware of his location and did not inform the captain of this problem. The Safety Board believes that if the pilots had admitted to themselves that they were lost at that point, and if they had acknowledged this to the ground controller around 1339, they might have prompted the controllers to take appropriate action, which could have prevented the accident. The captain, however, apparently believed that the first officer knew where he was, and the first officer apparently could not bring himself to admit, or was not aware, that his assertive directions had placed the airplane in this predicament…. [p. 55]

 

“At 1340, the ground controller transmitted: ‘Northwest 1482, continue to Oscar 4 then turn right on Xray.’ This transmission, in retrospect, may have confused the flightcrew and adversely affected their subsequent actions because they did not have to go as far as the centerline for taxiway Oscar 4 to turn right onto taxiway Xray…. [p. 56]

 

“2.3.2  Ground Controller’s Actions

 

“In analyzing this accident in retrospect, the Safety Board examined the actions that could have been taken by the ground controller to prevent the runway incursion….he could have requested to local controller to suspend takeoff activity until he was certain that the DC-9 was in fact across runway 9/27 of the Oscar 4 area and established on taxiway Xray…. [p. 61]

 

“3.2  Probable Cause

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a lack of proper crew coordination, including a virtual reversal of roles by the DC-9 pilots, which led to their failure to stop taxiing their airplane and alert the ground controller of their positional uncertainty in a timely manner before and after intruding onto the active runway.

 

“Contributing to the cause of the accident were (1) deficiencies in the air traffic control services provided by the Detroit tower, including failure of the ground controller to take timely action to alert the local controller to the possible runway incursion, inadequate visibility observations, failure to use progressive taxi instructions in low-visibility conditions, and issuance of inappropriate and confusing taxi instructions compounded by inadequate backup supervision for the level of experience of the staff on duty; (2) deficiencies in the surface markings, signage, and lighting at the airport and the failure of Federal Aviation Administration surveillance to detect or correct any of these deficiencies; and (3) failure of Northwest Airlines, Inc., to provide adequate cockpit resource management training to their aircrews.

 

“Contributing to the fatalities in the accident was the inoperability of the DC-9 internal tail-cone release mechanism. Contributing to the number and severity of injuries was the failure of the crew of the DC-9 to properly execute the passenger evacuation.

 

4. Recommendations

 

“As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations:

 

–to the Federal Aviation Administration:

 

Improve standards for airport marking and lighting during low-visibility conditions, such as standards for more conspicuous marking and lighting; evaluation of unidirectional taxi lines for use on acute angle taxiways; and requirements for stop-bars or position-hold lights at all taxiways that intersect active runways. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-91-54)

 

Identify, at all 14 CFR 139 certificated airports, complex intersections, where a potential for pilot confusion exists. Where needed, require additional lighting and signs. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-91-55)

 

Require that CFR 139 certificated airports use reflectorized paint for airport surface markings. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-91-56) [end of p. 79]

 

Require that CFR 139 certificated airports install semi-flush runway edge lights in accordance with Advisory Circular 150/5340-24. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-91-57)

….

Include guidance in Advisory Circular 150/5220-4, Water Supply Systems for Aircraft Fire and Rescue Protection, that addresses the need for fire departments to be notified in a timely manner when hydrants and water supply systems used for fire fighting are inoperable. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-91-59)

….

Require that air traffic control tower managers reemphasize the concept and use of progressive taxi/progressive ground movement instructions during low-visibility ground operations in local Operations Position Standards Handbooks. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-91-61)

 

Require that air traffic control tower managers emphasize to local controllers the need for positive determination of airplane departures in IFR[3] conditions when direct visual observations of departing airplanes are not possible. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-91-62)

….  [p. 80] ….

 

–to Northwest Airlines, Inc.:

 

Immediately institute comprehensive line crewmember Cockpit Resource Management training as a part of Northwest Airlines’ Line-Oriented Flight Training and coordinated crew training programs. (Class II, Priority Action) (A-91-69)

….

 

“Jim Burnett, Member [NTSB] filed the following concurring statement:

 

“I concur with the final report but would have preferred to include as part of the final report two findings and one recommendation which were a part of the staff’s draft report but which were not adopted by the full Board.

 

“The two findings are:

 

The local controller, realizing that an aircraft might be on the active runway, failed to issue a safety alert or other advisory about this possibility to the flightcrew of the B-727.

 

The DC-9 tail-cone was not jettisoned by the fire fighters; and the possible hazard, as well as the potential for fire ventilation, did not justify this lack of action….” [p. 82]

 

(NTSB. Aircraft Accident Report. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Flights 1482 and 299 Runway Incursion and Collision, Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport, Romulus, Michigan. 1991)

 

Sources

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Flights 1482 and 299 Runway Incursion and Collision, Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport, Romulus, Michigan (NTSB/AAR/91/05). Washington, DC: Adopted 6-25-1991, 178 pp. Accessed 8-29-2018 at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR9105.pdf

 

Sturkey, Marion F. Mid-Air: Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts from Military and Airline Mid-Air Collisions. Plum Branch, SC: Heritage Press International, 2008.

 

 

[1] Section heading is: “Lost in Blinding Fog.”

[2] At page 57 the NTSB report notes: “The first officer did not comply with this order and, after a lapse of about 13 seconds, responded incorrectly to another ground control request for their position.” The Safety Board believes that if the first officer had obeyed the captain immediately, the air traffic controllers might have taken more timely action to stop the B-727 takeoff.”

[3] Instrument Flight Rules.

–300  CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code.[1]

–239  Blanchard tally of State breakouts below.

 

Summary of Heat Fatalities by State (where identified)

 

Arizona                       30

Arkansas                     17

California                    44

Colorado                       1

Florida                         10

Georgia                       13

Illinois                         13

Louisiana                     21

Mississippi                   14

Missouri                      13

North Carolina              7

Oklahoma                    11

Oregon                                      1

South Carolina            11

Tennessee                      1

Texas                           29

Utah                              2

Washington                   1

 

Breakout of Heat Fatalities by State

 

Arizona                      (30)

–30  State. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code.

—  4  State, June 22-28. National Climatic Data Center. Storm Data, 32/6, June 1990, p. 34.

–15  Maricopa County. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code.

—  3  Phoenix, June 26. LA Times. “Blistering Heat Shatters Records 2^nd Straight Day.” 6-29-90.[2]

—  1  Phoenix, June 27. Male, 58, working outside his home; died after body temp reached 108°.[3]

—  1  Tucson, June 7. Extreme body heat; female, 37, fell asleep outside after drinking alcohol.[4]

 

Arkansas                    (17)

–17  State. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

—  2  Hot Springs, July 8. Heat-related causes; elderly couple in their home. Storm Data 32/7, 23.

—  1  Little Rock, July 5. Heatstroke; female, in her apartment. NCDC Storm Data 32/7, p. 23.

—  1  North Little Rock, July 10. Heatstroke; male found dead in his apt. Storm Data 32/7, p. 23.[5]

—  1  Pine Bluff, Jefferson County, June 19. Heat-related causes; female. Storm Data 32/6, p. 36.

—  1  Pine Bluff, July 3. Apparent heatstroke; male, found dead at home. Storm Data 32/7, p. 23.

 

California                   (44)

–44  State. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

–11  Los Angeles County. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code.

—  1  Pacoima, June 26. Heat exhaustion; boy, 4, accidentally locked in parked car.[6]

 

Colorado                    (   1)

— 1  Cheyenne Wells, July 9. Heat exhaustion; well digging company worker, one week on job.[7]

 

Florida                        ( 10)

— 10  Lushine, James B. Figure 3, “Annual Temperature Deaths, Florida, 1979-1999.”[8]

 

Georgia                      (13)  CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

 

Illinois                         (13)  CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

 

Louisiana                   ( 21)

— 21  Statewide. NYT. “41 Heat-Related Deaths in Louisiana Nearly Double…” 8-18-1998.[9]

— 20  State. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

—   1  Eunice, June 21. Heatstroke, female, 46. NCDC Storm Data, 32/6, June 1990, p. 124.

—   1  Shreveport, June 19. Heatstroke; male, 52. NCDC Storm Data, 32/6, June 1990, p. 124.

—   1  Shreveport, June 20. Heatstroke; male, 75. NCDC Storm Data, 32/6, June 1990, p. 124.

 

Mississippi                  (14)  CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

 

Missouri                     (13)

—  13  State. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

–~12  MO DHSS. Data & Statistical Reports. “Hyperthermia Mortality, Missouri 1980-2013.”[10]

 

North Carolina          (   7)

— 7  Mirabella and Richardson. “Heat-Related Fatalities in North Carolina.” (Figure 1)

 

Oklahoma                  (  11)

–11  Garwe (OK Dept Health). “Heat-Related Deaths, Oklahoma, 1990-2001,” 5-31-2002, p.1.[11]

–10  State. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

—  1  Enid, July 8.

—  1  Muskogee, July 8. Excessive heat. NCDC, Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 7, July 1990, p. 115.

—  1  Purcell, Aug 27. Heart failure attributed to excessive heat, home with no AC; female, 80.[12]

 

Oregon                       (   1)

— 1  Pistol River, July 10. Heat exhaustion; male logger, 2^nd day on the job and out-of-shape.[13]

 

South Carolina          (11)

–11  State. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

—  1  Columbia, July 10. Heat prostration; female outdoors. NCDC, Storm Data, 32/7, 1990, 131.

—  1  Darlington Co., June 15. Heat exhaustion; male, 58. NCDC, Storm Data, 32/6, 1990, p.213.

—  1  Dorchester County, June 21. Heat stress; male, 67. NCDC, Storm Data, 32/6, 1990, p. 213.

—  1  Dorchester County, July 9. Heatstroke; male, 81. NCDC, Storm Data, 32/7, 1990, p. 131.

—  1  Florence, July 12. Heatstroke complications, male, 70, outdoors. Storm Data 32/7, p. 132.

—  1  Kershaw County, June 7. Heat exhaustion; male, 58. NCDC, Storm Data, 32/6, 1990, p213.

—  1  Spartanburg, July 12. Extreme heat possibly contributed to death; male, 67.[14]

 

Tennessee                   (  1)

— 1  Nashville, June 10. Heat exhaustion; male, second-story apartment. Storm Data, 32/6, 223.

 

Texas                          (29)

–29  State. CDC WONDER. ICD-9 E900 excessive heat and hyperthermia code

—  1  Caldwell, Aug 20. Heat exhaustion; mail oil rig company worker. OSHA.[15]

—  1  Caprock Canyons State Park no. of Quitaque, June 17. Female hiker, 36, after getting lost.[16]

—  1  Dallas, June 26. Hyperthermia. NCDC Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1990, p. 232.

—  1  Fort Worth, July 3. Heat exhaustion; male working outdoors for garbage collection co.[17]

—  2  Northern TX, June 16-20. Excessive heat (several days heat index 105 to 115°).[18]

—  1  Weatherford, July 2. Heatstroke in a residence. NCDC Storm Data, 32/7, July 1990, p. 136.

 

Utah                            (  2)

— 1  Escalante, Challenger Foundation Pgm., June 27. Heatstroke; female, 16.[19]

— 1  St. George, Summit Quest, May 9. Heat exhaustion/dehydration/alt. sickness; female, 15.[20]

 

Washington                (  1)

— 1  Aberdeen, July 11. Heatstroke; male logging company worker, first day on job. OSHA.[21]

 

Narrative Information

 

NCDC on Western United States Heat in June: “June 1990 was a hot month over most of the United States; record and near record heat peaked over much of the western half of the United States generally between the 26^th and the 28^th. Some cities which set all-time record high temperatures (for any date) include: Phoenix, Arizona (122° on the 26^th); Tucson, Arizona (117° on the 26^th); Los Angeles (Civic Center), CA (112° on the 26^th); Lubbock, Texas (110° on the 24^th), and Pueblo, Colorado (108° on the 29^th).

 

[Also noted in a follow-on table are illustrative high temperatures for other western states:

 

Swan Falls, ID, June 30 (106°);

Russell Springs, KS, June 28 (111°);

Terry, MT, June 26 (107°);

Beaver City, NE, June 28 (109°);

Laughlin, NV, June 26 (122°);

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, near Carlsbad, NM, June 24 (115°);

Chattanooga, OK, June 26 (108°);

Medford, OR, June 21 (104°);

Oelrichs, SD, June 27 (106°);

Zion National Park, June 27 (112°);

Worland FAA Airport, June 30 (107°).] (NCDC Storm Data, 32/6, June 1990, p. 29.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “Texas heat wave continues.” Galveston Daily News, TX, 6-20-1990, p. 4-A. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/us/texas/galveston/galveston-daily-news/1990/06-20/page-4?tag

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998. ICD-9 E900 code for excessive heat and hyperthermia for 1990. CDC WONDER On-line Database, compiled from Compressed Mortality File CMF 1968-1988, Series 20, No. 2A, 2000 and CMF 1989-1998, Series 20, No. 2E, 2003. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cmf-icd9.html on Jun 26, 2017 1:56:04 PM

 

Garwe, Tabitha, M.P.H., Epidemiologist, Injury Prevention Service, OK DPH. ). “Heat-Related Deaths, Oklahoma, 1990-2001.” Oklahoma City, OK: Oklahoma State Department of Health, 5-31-2002. Accessed 11-8-2015 at: http://www.ok.gov/health2/documents/Heat_Deaths_1990-2001.pdf

 

Indiana Gazette, Indiana, PA. “Heat wave scorches Southwest” (cont. from p. 1), 6-27-1990, p. 6. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/us/pennsylvania/indiana/indiana-gazette/1990/06-27/page-6?tag

 

Los Angeles Times (Eric Malnic and Penelope McMillan). “Blistering Heat Shatters Records 2^nd Straight Day.” 6-28-1990. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: http://articles.latimes.com/1990-06-28/news/mn-990_1_heat-shatters-records

 

Lushine, James B. “Underreporting of Heat and Cold Related Deaths in Florida.” Miami, FL: National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office, NOAA. 1-6-2009 modification. Accessed 11-1-2015 at: http://www.srh.noaa.gov/mfl/?n=fla_weather_casualties

 

Mirabelli, Maria C. and David B. Richardson. “Heat-Related Fatalities in North Carolina.” American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 95, No. 4, April 2005, pp. 635-637. Accessed 9-2-2015 at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449233/

 

Missouri Department of Health & Senior Services. Data & Statistical Reports. Chart: “Hyperthermia Mortality, Missouri 1980-2013.” DHSS. Accessed 11-19-2015 at: http://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/hyperthermia/data.php

 

National Climatic Data Center. Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1990. Asheville, NC: NCDC, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/orders/IPS/IPS-2C0F4B49-8D31-47FC-AA49-77E6078C9060.pdf

 

National Climatic Data Center. Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 7, July 1990. Asheville, NC: NCDC, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/orders/IPS/IPS-C048E59E-05B5-4087-89EC-AC6F549918B4.pdf

 

National Climatic Data Center. Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 8, Aug 1990. Asheville, NC: NCDC, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/orders/IPS/IPS-6852CAB1-D433-4CCE-B498-9E6F5AB910E2.pdf

 

New York Times. “41 Heat-Related Deaths in Louisiana Nearly Double Old Record.” 8-18-1998. Accessed 1-3-2016 at: http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/18/us/41-heat-related-deaths-in-louisiana-nearly-double-old-record.html

 

Occupational Safety & Health Administration. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 100021963 – J W. Gibson Well Service.” OSHA, US Dept. of Labor. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=100021963

 

Occupational Safety & Health Administration. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 106605181 – Waste Management of Fort Worth.” OSHA, US Dept. of Labor. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=106605181

 

Occupational Safety & Health Administration. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 108264615 – Conifer Douglas Co.” OSHA, US Dept. of Labor. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=108264615

 

Occupational Safety & Health Administration. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 111579959 – Skookum Logging.” OSHA, US Dept. of Labor. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=111579959

 

Occupational Safety & Health Administration. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 115556292–H & K Oil Fields Services, Inc.” OSHA, US Dept. of Labor. Accessed 5-1-2016: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=115556292

 

Salt Lake Tribune, UT. “Utah wilderness therapy deaths.” 7-13-2003 and 10-11-2007. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/news/ci_7139316

 

United Press International. “Alcohol Linked to Arizona Sunbather’s Death. Los Angeles Times, 6-9-1990. Accessed 5-1-2016 at: https://www.google.com/#q=1990+california+heat+hyperthermia+deaths+

 

[1] The CDC data for States below totals 214. The difference between this number and 300 for the U.S. is that the CDC “suppresses” (does not show) figures for States where loss-of-life was fewer than ten.

[2] Another sources writes “Fire Department spokesman…said the heat was suspected in the deaths of three men – one whose body was found in his home Tuesday after he called a doctor Monday night to complain of symptoms of heat exhaustion, another found behind a downtown building, and a third found on a street.” (Indiana Gazette, Indiana, PA. “Heat wave scorches Southwest” (continued from p. 1), 6-27-1990, p. 6.)

[3] Los Angeles Times (E. Malnic and P. McMillan). “Blistering Heat Shatters Records 2^nd Straight Day.” 6-28-1990.

[4] United Press International. “Alcohol Linked to Arizona Sunbather’s Death. Los Angeles Times, 6-9-1990.

[5] Shows 2 deaths in column for deaths, but describes only one.

[6] Los Angeles Times (E. Malnic and P. McMillan). “Blistering Heat Shatters Records 2^nd Straight Day.” 6-28-1990.

[7] OSHA. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 100021963 – J W. Gibson Well Service.”

[8] Figure 3 is a chart showing heat deaths in one color and cold deaths in another on the same horizontal bar for each year. Fatality range on left of chart is in increments of five, going up to thirty. The bars for each year are shown diagonally and do not show numbers. This does not make them readily readable. Thus one has to measure the bar showing the lowest combined deaths (1979), which appears to show one cold death and one heat death. With the unit of measurement of one death then measured against the heat portion of all the other bars, one can get an approximation of the heat deaths for each year. I say “approximate” in that by this method we counted 133 heat deaths over the 21-year period included in the graph, whereas the text of the article notes that there were 125. The article notes that the data came from death certificates collected by the Public Health Statistics Section, Office of Vital Statistics, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.

[9] “New Orleans…the previous record [heat-related deaths]…21 in 1990.”

[10] We say “about” 12 deaths in that chart plots fatalities by increments of 10 on the left axis and years along the bottom, with a line connecting dots. Takes interpretation, even with enlargement.

[11] From Figure 1. “Heat-Related Deaths by Year, Oklahoma, 1990-2001.” Deaths in Figure 1 are denoted by a horizontal bar, against backdrop of horizontal lines in increments of five. The precise number of deaths is not given, thus one has to make an educated guess in looking at the Figure and contrasting one bar against others. The year 1990 seems quite clearly to show eleven deaths and the bar for 2001.

[12] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 8, Aug 1990, p. 119. Notes outdoor temp. reached near 100°.

[13] OSHA. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 108264615 – Conifer Douglas Co.”

[14] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 7, July 1990, p. 132.

[15] OSHA. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 115556292–H & K Oil Fields Services.”

[16] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1990, pp. 239-240. Age of victim, identified as Johnnie Ward, is from: Associated Press. “Texas heat wave continues.” Galveston Daily News, TX, 6-20-1990, p. 4-A.

[17] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Data, 32/7, July 1990, p. 137. Also OSHA Inspection 106605181, noting 1^st day on job.

[18] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1990, p. 230.

[19] Salt Lake Tribune, UT. “Utah wilderness therapy deaths.” 7-13-2003 and 10-11-2007. Identified victim as Kristen Chase of Florida, who died of heatstroke three days after arrival while on a kike in Kane County.

[20] Salt Lake Tribune, UT. “Utah wilderness therapy deaths.” 7-13-2003 and 10-11-2007. Identified victim as Michelle Sutton of CA, who died while hiking south of St. George on the Arizona Strip on sixth day in the program.

[21] OSHA. Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries. “Inspection: 111579959 – Skookum Logging.”

–12  Blanchard tally based on State breakouts below.

–10  NYT (Yarrow). “Storm Batter the East Coast from Georgia to Delaware.” 10-13-1990.

—  7  Srock et al. “Composite and Case Studies of Precipitation…U.S. Landfalling…” 16C.6

 

Georgia                      (5)

— 5  Drownings. NYT. “Storm Batter the East Coast from Georgia to Delaware.” 10-13-1990.[1]

— 2  Jefferson County. Drownings.[2]

— 1  Richmond County, Augusta. Drowning; male, 80, swept away after leaving car.[3]

— 0  NCDC. Storm Events Database. Search Results for All Counties in Georgia.[4]

 

North Carolina          (2)

–12  Traffic accidents, males.[5]

 

South Carolina          (5)

— 5  NWS. Flooding in [SC]. “Tropical Depression Klaus & Tropical Storm Marco of 1990.”

–4  Kershaw County. Vehicle drownings after dam failure;[6] two adults, 2 children.[7]

–1  Spartanburg County. Toddler drowned in rain-swollen creek.[8]

 

Narrative Information

 

NWS: “The flooding that occurred during October 10-13 and October 22, 1990, was the result of the remnants of Hurricane Klaus, Tropical Storm Marco and their northward movement and interaction along a stalled frontal boundary. The event produced major flooding across the state, especially central South Carolina. There were 5 deaths blamed on the flooding. The flooding caused 4 deaths in Kershaw County, when a dam burst, sending water across a road trapping the people in their vehicle. Another death occurred in Spartanburg County when a toddler drowned in a rain-swollen creek. In the Pee Dee and Santee River Basins, the floods washed out or caused the closing of more than 120 bridges on secondary road systems. There were 17 earthen dams that failed and 81 that were damaged from overtopping. The government declared 13 counties Federal Disaster Areas. The total damage of property and crops was around $12 million ($22 million in 2013 dollars). Rainfall totals were excessive, including one unofficial report of nearly 17 inches in the town of Rembert. These rainfall totals were some of the highest recorded in 100 years.” (NWS. Flooding in South Carolina. “Tropical Depression Klaus & Tropical Storm Marco of 1990.”)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “8 dead on storm-ravaged East Coast.” Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, OH. 10-13-1990, A-8. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=7965925&sterm

 

Associated Press. “Storms squeeze Carolina, South.” Corbin Times Tribune, KY. 10-12-1990, p. 12. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=223940737&sterm=tropical+storm

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. “All Available Event Types…between 10/10-1990 and 10/22/1990 (13 days).” Accessed 6-4-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/listevents.jsp?eventType=ALL&beginDate_mm=10&beginDate_dd=10&beginDate_yyyy=1990&endDate_mm=10&endDate_dd=22&endDate_yyyy=1990&county=ALL&hailfilter=0.00&tornfilter=0&windfilter=000&sort=DT&submitbutton=Search&statefips=13%2CGEORGIA

 

National Hurricane Center (Max Mayfield). Preliminary Report, Tropical Storm Marco, 9-13 October 1990. Miami, FL: NHC, National Weather Service, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. At: http://www.wunderground.com/data/storm_radar/stormwalletold/atlantic/atl1990-prelim/marco/marco.pdf

 

National Weather Service. Flooding in South Carolina (webpage). “Tropical Depression Klaus & Tropical Storm Marco of 1990.” Silver Spring, MD: NWS, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Accessed 6-4-2014 at: http://www.floodsafety.noaa.gov/states/sc-flood.shtml

 

New York Times (Andrew L. Yarrow). “Storm Batter the East Coast from Georgia to Delaware.” 10-13-1990. Accessed 6-4-2014 at: http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/13/us/storms-batter-the-east-coast-from-georgia-to-delaware.html

 

Srock, Alan F., Lance F. Bosart, and John E. Molinari (Dept. Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, University of Albany/SUNY). “Composite and Case Studies of Precipitation Distribution in U.S. Landfalling Tropical Cyclones.” American Meteorological Society. Accessed 6-4-2014 at: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:MVBvn5paAkMJ:https://ams.confex.com/ams/pdfpapers/75992.pdf+&cd=6&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

 

 

 

 

 

[1] “In Georgia, the authorities said that at least five people had drowned in flood waters.”

[2] Associated Press. “8 dead on storm-ravaged East Coast.” Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, OH. 10-13-1990, A-8.

[3] Associated Press. “8 dead on storm-ravaged East Coast.” Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria, OH. 10-13-1990, A-8.

[4] “All Available Event Types…between 10/10-1990 and 10/22/1990 (13 days).”

[5] Associated Press. “Storms squeeze Carolina, South.” Corbin Times Tribune, KY. 10-12-1990, p. 12.

[6] NWS. Flooding in South Carolina. “Tropical Depression Klaus & Tropical Storm Marco of 1990.”

[7] Associated Press. “Storms squeeze Carolina, South.” Corbin Times Tribune, KY. 10-12-1990, p. 12.

[8] NWS. Flooding in South Carolina. “Tropical Depression Klaus & Tropical Storm Marco of 1990.”

— 13  Associated Press. “Air Force jet crashes; 13 die.” Kokomo Tribune, IN. 8-29-1990, p. 25.

— 13  ASN. Accident description. USAF Lockheed C-5A Galaxy. Ramstein AFB, 29 Aug 1990.

— 13  Baugher, Joseph F.  1968 USAF Serial Numbers.  1-10-2012 revision.

— 13  Galveston Daily News, TX. “Newspaper: USAF crews pushing safety limits.” 8-31-90, 7B.

— 13  Gero, David. Military Aviation Disasters: Significant Losses Since 1908. 1999, p. 152.

 

Narrative Information

 

ASN: “The C-5 Galaxy was en route to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, carrying medical supplies, food and aircraft maintenance equipment for U.S. troops sent to Saudi Arabia following the Aug. 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. An intermediate stop was planned at Frankfurt-Rhein-Main AFB (FRF), Germany to have a fuel leak repaired.

“Immediately after lifting off the runway at Ramstein (RMS), the airplane stopped accelerating at a speed of 161 kts. It stopped climbing at 50-100 feet and the crew members experienced severe buffeting of the airplane. The left wing dropped and contacted a large pine tree, ripping off the nr.1 engine. The C-5 rolled left and crashed. Investigators concluded that the there had been an uncommanded and inadvertent deployment of the nr.1 engine thrust reverser during takeoff.”[1] (Aviation Safety Network.  Accident Description. United States Air Force, Lockheed C-5A Galaxy, Ramstein AFB (RMS) (Germany), 29 Aug 1990.)

 

Baugher: “Lockheed C-5A Galaxy….0228 (c/n 500-0031, 60th MAW) crashed after takeoff Aug 29, 1990 at Ramstein AB, Germany.  13 of 17 aboard killed.”  (Baugher. 1968 USAF Serial Numbers.  1-10-2012 rev.)

 

Gero: “Date: 29 August 1990 (00:34). Location:  Near Kaiserslautern, Germany….

 

“Operated by the Military Airlift Command, the wide-bodied jet transport crashed and burned in a field immediately after taking off from Ramstein Air Base, killing 13 of the 17 American military personnel aboard.  The survivors, who included one member of the aircraft’s crew of eight, suffered various injuries.

 

“Bound for Rhein-Main Air Base, also in Germany, the C-5 had just lifted off from Runway 27 when it began to drift to the left, initially clipping a number of trees with its port wing.  Ultimately, it struck the ground approximately 3,000ft (1,000m) from the end of the runway and 500ft (150m) south of its extended centreline.

 

“The accident occurred in darkness, and there was thunderstorm activity in the area at the time, with broken layers of cumulo-nimbus and alto-cumulus clouds at 5,000ft (1,500m) and 10,000ft (3,000m), respectively.  Investigation revealed some physical evidence that a power plant thrust reverser had deployed during the take-off, but there was no absolute proof of such an occurrence nor how it could have happened. It was concluded, however, that such a deployment must have involved either its No 1 or 2 engines, and had to be uncommanded. Under the circumstances, the resulting asymmetri­cal thrust condition would have led to a loss of control.” (Gero, David. Military Aviation Disasters: Significant Losses Since 1908. 1999, p. 152.)

 

AP, Aug 29: “Ramstein, West Germany (AP) — A giant Air Force cargo jet loaded with supplies for U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf crashed and burned shortly after takeoff today. Officials said 13 people on board were killed.  Air Force spokesman Doug Moore said the Lockheed C-5A had 17 military personnel aboard, most of them reservists who had volunteered for the round-the-clock deployment aimed at discouraging further Iraqi aggression.

 

“The plane, which can lift about a quarter million pounds, crashed in a field a quarter mile from the Ramstein Air Base runway at 12:30 a.m., said Capt. Ed Worley, another Air Force spokesman.  He said the jet was headed for Frankfurt’s Rhein-Main base, about 90 miles to the northeast, and then on to the Persian Gulf.

 

“Cathy Cox, an Air Force spokeswoman, said the death toll climbed to 13 after the recovery of the bodies of two people who had been unaccounted for in the fiery crash. The bodies of 10 others were recovered earlier, and one person died of injuries in the hospital.  Ms. Cox said the four others who had been on the plane were in stable condition at the U.S. Army’s nearby Landstuhl hospital.  No civilian casualties were reported.

 

“Journalists were not immediately allowed to see the crash site, where search teams combed through charred wreckage. Col. Brian R. Fullerton, an Air Force spokesman, said the plane was carrying no hazardous cargo. The plane’s cargo included food, medical supplies and aircraft maintenance equipment, according to Moore. The cause of the crash was under investigation.

 

“Ramstein, the largest U.S. Air Force base in Europe, has been a stopover point for the steady stream of U.S. planes headed to and from the Middle East.

 

“Worley said the C-5A belonged to the 60th Airlift Wing at Travis Air Force Base in California. He said it was flown by a crew from Kelly Air Force Base in Texas. At Kelly, base spokeswoman Maj. Donna Pastor said 10 reservists with the base’s 433rd Military Airlift Wing were aboard the plane — eight crew members and two maintenance personnel. She said the other seven on the plane were from other Air Force bases in the United States.

 

“The 433rd had not been called to active duty, but some reservists with the wing were voluntarily participating in Operation Desert Shield after arranging time off from their civilian jobs.

 

“The C-5A and C-5B are the largest transport planes in the Air Force fleet and each costs about $148 million.

 

“Under Desert Shield, begun after Iraq’s Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait, the United States and other Western and Arab countries have sent troops, equipment and warships to the gulf region to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraq and to pressure Baghdad into withdrawing from Kuwait.

 

“The crash today occurred a day after the second anniversary of a mid-air collision during an air show at Ramstein that killed 70 people. On Aug. 28, 1988, three Italian planes crashed during maneuvers and flaming wreckage flew into the crowd of spectators.

 

“The crash of a C-5A on April 4, 1975, in Saigon[2] killed more than 200 people, including more than 100 orphan children being flown to the United States in the evacuation from South Vietnam.” (AP. “Air Force jet crashes; 13 die.” Kokomo Tribune, IN. 8-29-1990, p. 25.)

 

AP, Aug 31: “Frankfurt, West Germany (AP) – The military’s Stars and Stripes newspaper said Thursday that some U.S. Air Force crews flying troops and supplies to Saudi Arabia suffer from fatigue and are pushing safety to the limit.

 

“Also Thursday, Wolfgang Hofmann, a spokesman for U.S. Air Force Europe at Ramstein Air Base, said it may take weeks to determine the cause of the crash of a U.S. Air Force C-5A transport plane Wednesday that killed 13 people and injured four….

 

“Stars and Stripes, an authorized but unofficial military publication, interviewed a C-5 crew at Rhein-Main Air Base near Frankfurt just hours after the Ramstein crash. “Considering fatigue, limited crew rest and the long days we’re working, we’ve shaved the safety margin in some instances as narrow as it should be shaved,” the newspaper quoted U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Jack Gray as saying.  Gray is the commander of a C-5 flight from Dover Air Force Base, Del. He said

he wouldn’t speculate on what caused the Ramstein crash.  But Gray and his crew admitted fatigue has been a major concern during Desert Shield, in which they have flown several missions to Saudi Arabia.

 

“The newspaper quoted Maj. Tarn Rogers as saying: “You can get burned out very easily. Guys can become walking zombies almost incapable of making good judgments.” Many crews get only a 10-to-l2-hour layover after arriving in Germany from the United States before flying on to Saudi Arabia, Stars and Stripes reported. Officials at Ramstein said the crew of the C-5A that crashed had a 24-hour break, before taking off.” (Associated Press. “Newspaper: USAF crews pushing safety limits.” 8-31-90, Galveston Daily News, TX. 7B.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “Air Force jet crashes; 13 die.” Kokomo Tribune, IN. 8-29-1990, p. 25. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=115565503

 

Associated Press. “Newspaper: USAF crews pushing safety limits.” 8-31-1990, Galveston Daily News, TX. 7B. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=112838967

 

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. United States Air Force, Lockheed C-5A Galaxy, Ramstein AFB (RMS) (Germany), 29 Aug 1990. Accessed 3-5-2012 at:

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19900829-0

 

Baugher, Joseph F. 1968 USAF Serial Numbers.  1-10-2012 revision. Accessed 3-5-2012 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1968.html

 

Gero, David. Military Aviation Disasters: Significant Losses Since 1908. UK and Newbury Park, CA: Patrick Stephens Limited, an imprint of Hayes Publishing, 1999.

 

 

 

[1] Cites:  Mike Miller E-mail, 2-19-2012; and Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12-17-1990/

[2] Not included in our compilation in that this event occurred in a war-zone.

— 29  Grazulis. Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991. 1993, p. 1990.

— 29  NCDC. “Plainfield/Crest Hill (Illinois) Tornado of August 28, 1990.” Storm Data, 32/8, 8.

— 29  NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F5, 11.2 miles, Will Co., IL, 37:00.

 

Narrative Information

 

Grazulis: “IL  AUG 28, 1990 1430 29k 350inj 600y 16m F5.  KENDALL/WIL — The deadliest and most damaging tornado of the year moved SE from near Oswego to the west part of Joliet, passing through and devastating Plainfield. Losses totaled about $165,000,000. The first four miles produced only Fl and F2 damage. F3 damage occurred in Wheatland Plains where 12 homes were destroyed and 50 were damaged. Plainfield incurred F5 damage with deaths in at least seven different subdivisions. Million of dollars in damage occurred as three schools were destroyed, with deaths at two of them. Millions more occurred at shopping malls, apartment complexes, and other businesses. At the Crest Hill Lakes, eight people were killed as three buildings with 100 apartments were destroyed. Some people were thrown to their death into corn fields from their apartments. Over 300 homes were destroyed and over 800 were damaged. The final damage was on the west side of Joliet where Fl and F2 winds destroyed three homes and damaged 88 others. The tornado struck without warning….”  (Grazulis.  Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991. 1993, p. 1990.)

 

NCDC Storm Data: “The deadliest tornado of 1990 (track length of 16.4 miles) killed 29 people and caused at least 350 injuries as it ravaged parts of Kendall and Will counties in northeastern Illinois on the afternoon of August 28^th. This southwestward moving tornado was on the ground from approximately 2:15 p.m. CST to 2:45 p.m. CST. The tornado was most destructive from Plainfield to Crest Hill. The same storm system (which displayed supercell characteristics during much of its life span) also produced large hail and damaging winds from near Rockford, Illinois, to central Indiana; damage in Kendall and Will counties alone was in excess of $160 million.

 

“The tornado produced F5 damage as it approached the western part of Plainfield. As the tornado travelled through Plainfield and Crest Hill, it destroyed several schools with enrollments totaling over 1,500 pupils. Fortunately, classes had not been scheduled to start until the next day, August 29^th. Thus a much higher toll was probably averted.

 

“No known photographs or videos of the actual tornado exist. The tornado was embedded in heavy rain and hail during most of its lifetime, thus preventing visual warning of the impending event. This strongest U.S. August tornado since at least 1950 had a path width which ranged from 200-yards wide to a half mile wide, yet the core of the tornado was very tight, at times only 20 to 30 feet in diameter.

 

“This tornado was the worst single killer tornado in the U.S. since May 22, 1987, when 30 people died at Saragosa, Texas….” (NCDC. “Plainfield/Crest Hill (Illinois) Tornado of August 28, 1990.” Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 8, August 1990, p. 8.)

 

NCDC on Kendall, Will Counties F5 Tornado, Oswego, Plainfield, Joliet, 14:30, Aug 28, 1990: “A large, killer tornado spun a path of destruction across Kendall and Will counties late in the afternoon. This unusual, late August tornado killed 29 people and seriously injured at least 350….It first touched down at Oswego at about 1430 CST and moved southeast, crossing the Kendall-Will County border 6 miles south of their north border, and lifted at about 1450 CST in Joliet. The damage path was 16.4 miles long and ranged from 200 yards to a half-mile wide.

 

“….As it approached Plainfield it reached maximum intensity F5…six people were killed, 55 homes were destroyed and 205 damaged…At Saint Mary Immaculate, three people died….

 

“….At Crystal Lawns two people died, 69 homes were destroyed and 324 damaged…At Warwick Estates the tornado was F3 to F2 intensity, killed two people, destroyed 50 homes, and damaged 31 homes…At Crest Hill Lakes it killed eight people, some of whom were thrown into corn fields from their apartments, destroyed three buildings containing 100 apartments and did over $5 million damage. On Cedarwood Drive two people were killed….” (NCDC Storm Data, 32/8, Aug 1990, pp. 59-60.)

Sources

 

Grazulis, Thomas P. Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991: A Chronology and Analysis of Events. St. Johnsbury, VE: Environmental Films, 1993.

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Data, Vol. 32, No. 8, August 1990. Asheville, NC: NCDC, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 168 pages. Accessed 4-30-2016 at: http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/swdi/stormevents/pub-pdf/storm_1990_08.pdf

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, Illinois, Will County, F5, 11.2 miles, 8-28-1990, 37:00. Accessed 4-30-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=10003586