20th Century

–11 CDC Wonder. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998, 2003. Adenovirus, ICD-9, 079.0.

Breakout by Age Group, Deaths, and Death Rate Per 100,000

<1         5 0.129
1-4        2 0.013
10-14   1 0.005
25-34   1 0.002
45-54   2 0.006

Total 11 0.004 272,776,678 population

Narrative Information

CDC: “Adenoviruses are common viruses that cause a range of illness. They can cause cold-like symptoms, sore throat, bronchitis, pneumonia, diarrhea, and pink eye (conjunctivitis). You can get an adenovirus infection at any age. People with weakened immune systems or existing respiratory or cardiac disease are more likely than others to get very sick from an adenovirus infection…” (CDC. Adenoviruses. 4-26-2018 update.)

Sources

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Division of Viral Diseases. Adenoviruses. 4-26-2018 update. Accessed 10-24-2018 at: https://www.cdc.gov/adenovirus/index.html

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998 on CDC WONDER Online Database, released 2003. ICD-9 code 079.0, Adenovirus infection (1997). Accessed 11-8-2018 at: https://wonder.cdc.gov

Reference

Kajon, Adriana E., et al. “Molecular Epidemiology and Brief History of Emerging Adenovirus 14 — Associated Respiratory Disease in the United States.” The Journal of Infectious Diseases, Vol. 202, Issue 1, 7-1-2010. Accessed 10-24-2018 at: https://academic.oup.com/jid/article/202/1/93/890091

–89  CDC Wonder. Compressed Mortality, 1979-1998 Results, Meningococcal Meningitis.

 

California      12        Death rate 0.04          (Higher than average death rate.)

 

Narrative Information

 

Meningococcal Meningitis (ICD-9 Code 036.0)[1]: “Meningococcal disease can refer to any illness caused by the type of bacteria called Neisseria meningitidis, also known as meningococcus… These illnesses are often severe and can be deadly. They include infections of the lining of the brain and spinal cord (meningitis) and bloodstream infections (bacteremia or septicemia). These bacteria spread through the exchange of respiratory and throat secretions like spit (e.g., by living in close quarters, kissing). Doctors treat meningococcal disease with antibiotics, but quick medical attention is extremely important. Keeping up to date with recommended vaccines is the best defense against meningococcal disease.” (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Meningococcal Disease. 4-9-2018 update.)

 

Sources

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. Compressed Mortality File 1979-1998 on CDC WONDER Online Database, released 2003. ICD-9 code 036.0, Meningococcal Meningitis, 1997. Accessed 11-4-2018 at: https://wonder.cdc.gov/

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Meningococcal Disease. 4-9-2018 update. Accessed 10-3-2018 at: https://www.cdc.gov/meningococcal/index.html

 

 

[1] ICD-9 is the 9^th revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, a medical classification list by the World Health Organization.

— 10  Aiken Standard, SC. “Crash victims honored in military ceremony.” 12-8-1996, p. 2.

— 10  AP. “Shelton vote held up by AF crash query.” Pacific Stars and Stripes. 9-14-1997, 2.

— 10  ASN. USAF Lockheed HC-130P Hercules, 1996, Nov 22, off Cape Mendocino, CA.

— 10  Baugher, Joseph F. 1964 USAF Serial Numbers. 1-16-2012 revision.

— 10  Diehl. Silent Knights: Blowing the Whistle on Military Accidents…Cover-Ups. 2002, p. 99.

— 10  European Stars and Stripes. “Air Force admits errors, will reopen crash probe.” 1-17-98, 3

— 10  GlobalSecurity.org. “Military. HC-130P/N.”

— 10  Planecrashinfo.com. “1996. Accident Details. USAF…off Cape Mendocino, CA, Nov 22.”

— 10  Texas City Sun. “Air Force Plane Crashes in Pacific Ocean,” Nov 24, 1996, p. 7.

— 10  The Telegraph, Alton, IL. “Black boxes from military crash found.” 12-16-1996, p. 5.

— 10  Ukiah Daily Journal, CA. “Navy recovery specialists look for wreckage.” 12-2-1996, 12.

 

Narrative Information

 

ASN: “The HC-130 was enroute from North Island NAS when the crew reported that one engine was shut down and that they were having problems with another. The Hercules then reportedly suffered an electrical failure and was lost off the Californian coast.” (Aviation Safety Network.  Accident Description. United States Air Force, Lockheed HC-130P Hercules, 1996, Nov 22, off Cape Mendocino, CA.)

 

Baugher: “Lockheed HC-130H-LM Hercules….14856 (c/n 382-4072) converted to HC-130P, later NC-130H.  Ditched in Pacific Ocean off Cape Mendocino, CA Nov 22, 1996.  10 of 11 aboard killed.”  (Baugher, Joseph F.  1964 USAF Serial Numbers.  1-16-2012 revision.)

 

Diehl: “A few weeks after the crash, a memorial service is held in the city of Portland.  Three thousand people attend….But grief is not the only emotion running through this gathering, for they have heard stories that all the engines [four] failed without warning.  Furthermore, there is a rumor that this is not the first time such problems have occurred in a C-130. These people simply want to know why these airmen have died.

 

“But these civilians are apparently unaware that the Pentagon doesn’t release such information – It’s privileged.  Soon the outraged families and the community are demanding answers, without much success.

 

“Unfortunately for the Pentagon, these people are represented by a couple of newly elected senators who are not owned by the military establishment….Gordon Smith and Ron Wyden are a couple of straight shooters who cannot understand why the Pentagon will not just answer their constituents’ questions….

 

“…there are a few other very determined Oregonians who are not prepared to go quietly into oblivion.  They include three of the widows, Tawni Farrarini, Gayle Schott, and Sue McAuley.  These soccer moms, an unlikely trio of truth seekers, decide to force the massive Department of Defense bureaucracy to answer a few questions about the King-56 [plane’s call-sign] crash.

 

“The Pentagon quickly cranks up its ‘Maytag Mafia’ (so-called because these guys have more ‘spin cycles’ than the fanciest washing machine).  First they sequester the Safety Investigation Board to insure that nothing leaks about the contents of the ‘real’ inquiry.

 

“Next they produce the Accident Investigation Board’s report and its draftee president, Colonel Larry Landtroop. This confused colonel has thirty-five hundred hours flying the C-130, but like most board presidents, he has never investigated an accident before. His inadequate 456-page report concludes that the four engines failed because of ‘fuel starvation’ for ‘unknown’ reasons.[1]

 

“The widow’s and families grow increasingly displeased with the service’s handling of the investigation. These distraught people insist that they learn more from the press than from military officials….Nor do they understand why the service is so reluctant to recover the wreckage. Then, too, there are persistent but uncorroborated stories about dozens of similar problems occurring to other XC-130s. The Pentagon seems to be saying that it doesn’t know why this crash occurred, but it does now it must be only an isolated problem. Thus, the case is closed.

 

“Two other folks are also growing impatient with the Pentagon. Senators Smith and Wyden suggest that, because the Air Force apparently cannot figure out what caused the King-56 crash, perhaps the National Transportation Safety Board should be brought in to assist….The Pentagon quickly but politely dismisses this suggestion as simply naïve. It also ignores other suggestions to release the contents of the safety report, to raise the wreckage, or to conduct an in-depth review of the C-130 engine problems….

 

“Air Force chief of flight safety, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Farrier….suggests that the fact that there have been fifty-eight power-loss mishaps since 1987 ‘is not worrisome,’ considering the large size of the C-130 fleet.[2]….

 

“These kinds of remarks…do not sit well with th two senators, who discover the Pentagon’s Achilles’ heel.  The Defense Department, it seems, wants the Senate to quickly confirm the nomination of General Henry Shelton as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  This is the nation’s highest military post, and they expect a rubber stamp on his nomination. Senators Wyden and Smith, however, announce that they are placing a hold on confirming this nomination until they get some answers to their safety questions.[3]….

 

“The Pentagon invites the NTSB to read the safety report. It announces the undertaking of a ‘broad area review’ – headed by a two-star general….

 

“On January 15, 1998, in an auditorium in Portland, the Air Force offers its mea culpa.[4]  It seems its ninety-day broad area review has uncovered a few problems.  A succession of contrite briefers will explain how they have actually uncovered twenty-two major deficiencies.  There are also a total of seventy-one apparently ‘worrisome’ incidents reported, rather than the fifty-eight ‘nonworrisome’ occurrences mentioned earlier by the Pentagon safety expert….

 

“These people are dumbstruck upon learning that there are so many problems with the C-130 fleet.  Even more disconcerting is the fact their government could be so oblivious to these many safety deficiencies for so long. These simple, trusting Americans got a painful education on the Pentagon’s priorities.

 

“These twenty-two deficiencies ascribed to the C-130 fell into several categories. Eight of the most serious problems involved aircraft systems, such s old electrical wiring that had become defective. Another important aircraft deficiency was the limited number of channels on C-130 flight data recorders. These outdated ‘black boxes’ had made it impossible to establish the status of many systems that may have caused the accident….Eight other deficiencies dealt with technical manuals. These disclosures were some of the hardest for the families to swallow.  What the Air Force was saying was that those ‘bibles,’ which the crew members had tried to follow so religiously, did not contain some of the needed data or were simply wrong about other critical issues.

 

“Most painful of all was the fact that the manuals told the pilots to ditch the airplane rather than have the crew parachute to safety.[5] It turns out, historically that about 75 percent of people who have stayed aboard those c-130s that ditched, died. By contrast, only 10 percent of those who parachuted from other aircraft over water died.[6] (Diehl. Silent Knights: Blowing the Whistle on Military Accidents…Cover-Ups. 2002, p. 99-104)

 

GlobalSecurity.org: “HC-130P/N….On 24 April 1997 the Air Force released the aircraft accident investigation report on an Air Force Reserve HC-130P that crashed off the coast of California on 22 November 1996. Nine crewmembers and one passenger were killed and one crewmember was injured in the crash. The HC-130P and crew were en route to North Island Naval Air Station, Calif., from Portland International Airport on a routine over-water navigation training mission at the time of the accident. The crew and airplane were assigned to the 939th Rescue Wing (Air Force Reserve) at Portland International Airport, Ore. In the opinion of the accident investigator, the airplane’s engines ceased to operate due to lack of fuel flow. There was insufficient evidence to determine why the fuel ceased to flow to the engines. Portions of the aircraft’s wreckage, including the cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder, and one engine were recovered from the ocean floor at a depth of more than 5,100 feet by members of the U.S. Navy’s Deep Submergence Unit.

 

“In September 1997, then Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Sheila Widnall, directed “…a comprehensive review of flight safety issues associated with the C-130, including specifically the accident involving the HC-130P from the 939th Rescue Wing on 22 November 1996 and other incidents. The purpose of this review is to consider all the facts and theories of causation specific to the HC-130P accident and other incidents and to ensure that all appropriate steps are being taken to enhance the flight safety of the C-130 fleet…”

 

“King 56, the 939th Rescue Wing’s HC-130P which crashed 22 November 1996, crashed because its engines sequentially flamed out as a result of fuel starvation. This condition most likely occurred because the main tank fuel pump switches were in the “OFF” position when the right-hand fuselage tank, which was providing fuel to all four engines, emptied. With this tank empty, pressurized cabin air was then allowed, via open fuel valves, to enter the fuel supply manifolds for the engines. Flight testing on an HC-130 aircraft similar to King 56 repeatedly demonstrated that engines sequentially flame out when a fuselage tank was run empty with the main tank fuel pumps in the “OFF” position. With the main tank fuel pumps “ON,” there is a smooth transition from fuselage tank fuel to main tank fuel. If either the main tank pumps had been turned “ON,” or the cross-feed valves closed prior to the last engine flaming out, this aircraft could have been successfully recovered.” (GlobalSecurity.org.  “Military. HC-130P/N.”)

 

Newspapers and News Releases — Chronological

 

Nov 22: “….After the engine trouble, the crew reported complete electrical failure…Radio contact was lost around 7:30 p.m. and wreckage was found 90 minutes later….The plane was en route from the Portland Air Base to the North Island Naval Air Station near San Diego…”  (Frederick News, MD. “Air Force Rescue Plane Crashes,” 11-22-1996, p. 33.)

 

Nov 23: “An Air Force Reserve HC-130 Hercules rescue plane with 11 people on board crashed into the Pacific 200 miles west of San Francisco, Calif., Friday night during a routine training mission….The crew reported that one of the plane’s four propeller engines had shut down and that they were having trouble with another, said Col. Rick Davis, a spokesman for the 939^th Rescue Squadron in Portland, Ore., where the plane was based.”  (Syracuse Herald Journal, NY. “Air Force Reserve Plane Crashes in Pacific…,” 11-23-1996, 27)

 

Nov 24: “Eureka, Calif. – Rescuers hunted Saturday for survivors of an Air Force Reserve rescue plane that plunged into the frigid, shark-infested Pacific Ocean with 11 people on board.  One person was rescued alive….Two bodies were pulled from the 52-degree water at morning’s light, leaving eight men unaccounted for.

 

“Helicopter crews returning Saturday reported seeing a 40-foot section of one wing and a piece of the plane’s nose. The crews also reported seeing a number of sharks prowling the area…. Three empty life rafts were found in the water west of Cape Mendocino, about 200 miles north of San Francisco.

 

“One survivor…of Albany, Ore., was rescued late Friday night.  He was spotted clinging to a seat cushion by a helicopter crew using a powerful searchlight and night vision goggles…. [The survivor] told rescuers he saw no other survivors….”  (Texas City Sun. “Air Force Plane Crashes in Pacific Ocean,” 11-24-1996, p. 7.)

 

Nov 25: “….`We have officially changed the nature of the mission from a search and rescue mission to a search and recovery mission,’ said Air Force Reserve Col. Gene Garton, vice wing commander of the 304^th Rescue Squadron in Portland, Ore. ‘We are attempting to recover remains.  We don’t expect there to be any survivors.” (Doylestown Intelligencer, PA. “Military Crash: No More Survivors.” 11-25-1996, p. 15.)

 

Nov 26: “Arcata, Calif. – (AP)…. Two hours after the distress call, a Coast Guard helicopter located the crash site 40 miles off Point Mendocino.  Under the light of a full moon, Tech. Sgt. Robert Vogel of Albany, Ore., was spotted wearing a survival suit and clinging to a floating seat cushion in the 52-degree water….Vogel, a radioman on the aircraft, may have survived because the plane broke apart around him.  Garton said the radioman’s seat would be against a major bulkhead at the rear of the flight deck….” (Pacific Stars and Stripes, Tokyo. “Crews look for bodies, HC-130 wreckage.” 11-26-1996, 8.)

 

Dec 2: “San Diego – (AP) — Navy deep-sea recovery specialists were scheduled to leave today for the waters near Cape Mendocino in Humboldt to determine what caused last month’s crash of an Air Force rescue plane that killed 10 crewmen.

 

“Twenty members of the Deep Submergence Unit will attempt to locate and film the wreckage of the HC-130P Hercules that crashed 40 miles off Mendocino.

 

“The plane’s crew, reservists with the 939th Rescue Wing’s 304th Rescue Squadron in Portland, reported a faulty engine and electronic failure about 45 minutes before the aircraft vanished from radar…. It crashed after taking off from Portland at 5:30 p.m. in rainy, foggy weather….

 

“Tech. Sgt. Robert T. Vogel was pulled from the rough, 53-degree, shark-infested water by Coast Guard rescue cutters.  He was airlifted to a civilian hospital [in Arcata], where he was treated for a broken pelvis, hypothermia and cuts.

 

“The bodies of the aircraft’s commander, Capt. Robert P. Schott, 36, of West Linn and the mechanic, Staff Sgt. Ronald E. Garner Jr., 30, of Silverton, were recovered….

 

“The unit, which is based at Coronado’s North Island Naval Air Station, will search the waters off Mendocino aboard the Laney Chouest, a 260-foot civilian ship under contract to the Navy.  Using a tethered, remote-controlled submersible vehicle called Scorpio, the unit’s first goal will be to find the wreckage through sonar and photography. That will allow military officials to determine if retrieval is feasible.  Two key factors in determining whether retrieval is possible, Papp said, will be the depth at which the wreckage is found and the condition of the seas.

 

“The Scorpio has a depth range of about 5,000 feet, the minimum estimated depths of the waters where the Hercules crashed.”  (Ukiah Daily Journal, CA. “Navy recovery specialists look for wreckage.” 12-2-1996, p. 12.)

 

Dec 8: “Portland, Ore. — Hundreds turned out Saturday [Dec 7] for a tear-filled ceremony to honor 10 Air Force reservists killed in a crash off the California coast last month.  Nearly 3,000 people crowded a hangar at the Portland Air Base, crying as the airmen were remembered….”  (Aiken Standard, SC. “Crash victims honored in military ceremony.” 12-8-1996, p. 2.)

 

Dec 16: “Portland, Ore. (AP) – The Navy has located the black boxes from a military plane that crashed last month into the Pacific Ocean, killing 10 crew members, a naval commander said Sunday [Dec 15].  A remote-controlled submarine located the wreckage about 40 miles off Cape Mendocino, Calif., in water nearly a mile deep, Navy Lt. Cmdr. Jack Papp said Sunday from his home in San Diego. The unmanned submarine Scorpio, equipped with a video camera, located the boxes containing the cockpit voice recorder and night data recorder, Papp said in a phone interview….”  (The Telegraph, Alton, IL. “Black boxes from military crash found.” 12-16-96, 5)

 

June 18, 1997/Young: “Last Friday, the widows won a small victory when Oregon Sens. Gordon Smith and Ron Wyden successfully amended a military-spending bill, requiring the Department of Defense to review the way it conducts crash investigations and how it notifies families of accident victims. “It’s a step on the road to the bigger picture,” says Gayle Schott, one of several widows who’s lobbied for reforms of the military’s secretive crash investigations (“Why Did These 10 Men Die,” WW, June 18, 1997). “It feels good that we were able to make a significant contribution.”

“But as another widow, Sue McAuley, notes, “This bill would never have come about had we not felt driven to make a long list of all the bad treatment we received.” Schott says, for example, that during the first months of the investigation, both the media and Air Force wrongly reported “that we were getting things like counseling for our children, which we never got.” When the widows did ask for some things–such as a flight over the crash site–the Air Force rebuffed them. “Their answer was a flat ‘no,'” says widow Laura Wellnitz. “They said they were down one man,” she recalls. “Yeah, I thought, I’m down one man, too.”

“When the widows pushed, they met with callousness. One meeting with base commander Col. Rick Davis got off to a bad start, they say, when Davis entered the room and told the widows, “OK ladies, take your best shot. You’ve got 30 minutes, my horses are outside in the trailer.”[7]  “That comment,” says Schott, “will go down in infamy.” It’s not been easy, the widows say, to fight the Air Force while holding down their jobs and parenting their children….

“That means the widows will continue to crusade for reforms in the deeply flawed crash investigation process. “How can I teach my children honesty and accountability,” says Wellnitz, “when the government doesn’t practice it?”

 

“Editor’s note: The widows want to clarify one bit of confusion about reports that the Air Force assigned dollar values to the lives of their husbands ($1.1 million for each officer; an average of $197,000 for non-officers). This does not mean the families will receive that amount of money. Rather, it is the Air Force’s estimated cost of what it spent training the respective crew members.”  (Young, Bob. “Conduct Unbecoming. The King-56 widows finally feel like some of their pain has not been in vain.” Willamette Week, OR.  7-16-1997.)

 

Jan 14: “Washington — The Air Force will review the safety of its entire fleet of C-130 cargo planes, but it’s not clear whether that will satisfy an Oregon senator holding up a vote on the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., said Thursday [Sep 11] he was temporarily blocking the confirmation vote for Gen. Henry H. Shelton as the new Joint Chiefs chairman until he gets a better explanation for a C-130 crash that killed 10 Air Force Reservists from Oregon in November.

 

“Sen. Gordon Smith, R-Ore., said Thursday night that a discussion with senior Republicans on the Armed Services Committee and Air Force officials indicated that the military may be willing

to re-examine the cause of the crash with independent help from the National Transportation Safety Board.

 

“However, an Air Force spokeswoman said Friday the review would not delve into the specifics of the C-130 that took off from Portland, Ore., and plunged into the Pacific on Nov. 22,1996.  The Air Force has said fuel starvation caused the C-130 to lose power in its engines. However, the NTSB said information it received on the crash failed to support the Air Force’s explanation.”

(AP. “Shelton vote held up by AF crash query.” Pacific Stars and Stripes, Tokyo. 9-14-1997, 2.)

 

Jan 16: “Scott Air Force Base, Ill. — The team appointed to conduct a review of flight safety issues associated with the C-130 recently completed its report. That team, headed by Maj. Gen. Bobby O. Floyd, director of logistics, Air Mobility Command, was also chartered by the Secretary of the Air Force to look into the Nov. 22, 1996, accident involving the HC-130P from the 939th Rescue Wing, Portland, Oregon.

 

“Key recommendations the team has made include the following:

 

1. The Air Force should review and update the existing lead command directive (AFPD 10-9) to reflect changes which have occurred since the stateside theater airlift fleet transferred from Air Combat Command to Air Mobility Command in April 1997. It should ensure that cockpit instrumentation and aircraft modifications are standardized across a fleet of like aircraft and that the manuals used to maintain and operate the aircraft are up-to-date, easy to read, and standardized across the fleet.

 

2. The Air Force should consider the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board guidelines and experiences in arriving at a standardized set of digital flight data recorder flight parameters. This would ensure that essential flight data is captured for evaluation in future incidents and accidents.

 

3. The Air Force should review ditching and bailout procedures . Specifically, it should analyze previous ditching events and use this data to update and standardize flight manuals with a discussion of ditching survivability and techniques. It should ensure that the information concerning bailout in the flight manuals is consistent between models. The Air Force needs to require crews to review these procedures on the first leg of each over-water mission. Also, the Air Force should establish a standard life support equipment requirement for each mission design series.

 

4. The Air Force should fully fund a program to complete rewrites of its C-130 technical orders and should also fund an initiative currently underway to convert technical manuals from paper format to digital. New CD-ROM technology will make updating the technical manuals easier and less expensive.

 

5. The Air Force should recover selected wreckage from King 56, particularly the wing section, the fuselage tanks and the cockpit fuel gauges. These items would answer many open questions and provide additional information concerning various possible fuel-related scenarios.

 

“The review team studied the safety history of the C-130, examined air crew training and observed C-130 crew members and maintenance personnel on the job in order to get a first-hand look at any problems they may have encountered. They visited more than a dozen C-130 units during the course of the review.

 

“Experts from Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Materiel Command, and both the Guard and Reserve, along with a representative from the National Transportation Safety Board, comprise the review team. Industry representatives from Allison Engine Company, Lockheed-Martin Aerospace Systems and Hamilton Standard Propeller Systems have served as advisors to the team.

 

“The C-130 is considered to be one of the workhorses among military aircraft. C-130s have flown more than 14 million hours since entering the Air Force inventory in the mid-1950s, and the aircraft boasts one of the lowest accident rates among the Air Force’s aircraft inventory -about half the overall Air Force rate for fiscal 1997.” (Air Mobility Command (USAF) News Release. “Air Force team completes review of C-130 fleet.” 1-16-1998.”

 

Jan 17: “Washington (AP) — The Air Force is admitting mistakes in its probe of a cargo plane crash that killed 10 airmen and will go back into the Pacific Ocean to retrieve wreckage for further investigation.

 

“Additional review indicates fuel starvation is one of the most likely reasons the C-130 Hercules crashed off the coast of Northern California Nov. 22, 1996, according to congressional aides briefed on the latest results.  But a number of scenarios have yet to be ruled out, and the Air Force and National Transportation Safety Board want to continue examining the evidence, the aides said.  “They want to go back and try to recover the fuel tanks and gauges if possible, and a wing that might suggest some answers,” said David Seldin, press secretary to Sen. Ron Wyden, D. Ore.

 

“The Air Force Reserve crewmen — based in Portland, Wash. — were on a training flight to San Diego when, one by one, the engines stopped running. They repeatedly tried to restart the engines, but could not.

 

“In the latest report in conjunction with the NTSB, Air Force investigators identified more than 20 areas of concern, ranging from the physical condition of the plane to its training and operation, Seldin said.

 

“Air Force officials briefed family members in Oregon on Friday on the latest results.

 

“Wyden praised the Air Force’s decision to reopen the probe. “In a phenomenon too rare in the nation’s capital, a powerful arm of the federal government has admitted that it was wrong and it will work to make amends,” Wyden said. Wyden and Sen. Gordon Smith, R. Ore., temporarily blocked confirmation last year of Gen. Henry II. Shelton as the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a successful effort to force the Air Force to reopen its investigation.

 

“Family members of the victims had complained about the handling of the original probe, especially the decision to abandon efforts to recover some of the bodies and additional wreckage.

Several family members have filed a federal lawsuit against the manufacturers of the plane and engine.” (European Stars and Stripes. “Air Force admits errors, will reopen crash probe.” 1-17-98, 3.)

Sources

 

Aiken Standard, SC. “Crash victims honored in military ceremony.” 12-8-1996, p. 2. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=104087846

 

Air Mobility Command (USAF) News Release. “Air Force team completes review of C-130 fleet.” 1-16-1998.” Accessed 2-1-2016 at: http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/980115.htm

 

Associated Press. “Shelton vote held up by AF crash query.” Pacific Stars and Stripes, Tokyo, Japan. 9-14-1997, 2. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=133914640

 

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. United States Air Force, Lockheed HC-130P Hercules, 1996, Nov 22, off Cape Mendocino, CA. Accessed 3-24-2012 at:

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19961122-1

 

Baugher, Joseph F. 1964 USAF Serial Numbers. 1-16-2012 revision. Accessed 2-26-2012 at:  http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1964.html

 

Diehl, Alan E. Silent Knights: Blowing the Whistle on Military Accidents and Their Cover-Ups. NY: Bristol Park Books, 2002.

 

Doylestown Intelligencer. PA. “Military Crash: No More Survivors.” 11-25-1996, p. 15.  Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=31098407

 

European Stars and Stripes, Darmstadt, Germany. “Air Force admits errors, will reopen crash probe,” 1-17-98, 3. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=136223219

 

Frederick News, MD.  “Air Force Rescue Plane Crashes,” 11-22-1996, p. 33. Accessed at:  http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=12061933

 

GlobalSecurity.org.  Military. “HC-130P/N.” Accessed 3-24-2012 at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/hc-130p.htm

 

Pacific Stars and Stripes, Tokyo, Japan. “Crews look for bodies, HC-130 wreckage.” 11-26-1996, 8. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=133909447

 

Planecrashinfo.com. Accident Details. November 22, 1996, 19:30. USAF, off Cape Mendocino, CA, Nov 22.” Accessed 2-1-2016 at: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/1996/1996-70.htm

 

Syracuse Herald-Journal, NY. “Air Force Reserve Plane Crashes in Pacific Ocean.” 11-23-1996, p. 27. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=28327952

 

Texas City Sun. “Air Force Plane Crashes in Pacific Ocean.” 11-24-1996, p. 7. Accessed at:  http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=146459924

 

The Telegraph, Alton, IL. “Black boxes from military crash found.” 12-16-1996, p. 5. Accessed at:  http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=116729323

 

Ukiah Daily Journal, CA. “Navy recovery specialists look for wreckage.” 12-2-1996, p. 12. Accessed at:  http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=120481450

 

Young, Bob. “Conduct Unbecoming. The King-56 widows finally feel like some of their pain has not been in vain.” Willamette Week, OR.  7-16-1997. Accessed at:  http://wweek.com/___ALL_OLD_HTML/king-56-071697.html

 

 

[1] Cites Bryan Denson. “Suit Says Bad Part Caused Air Crash.” The Oregonian, 11-21-1997, D1 and D16.

[2] Cites: Brendan Sobie. “Air Force Maintains November C-130 Crash Was an Isolated Incident.” Inside the Air Force, Vol. 8, no. 29, 7-18-1997, p. 13.

[3] Cites: William Matthews. “Searching for Answers, At Senators’ Urging, Air Force to Review C-130 Safety.” Air Force Times, 9-29-1997, p. 18.

[4] Cites: David Castellon.  “More C-130 Wreckage to be Retrieved.” Air Force Times, 2-2-1998, 2.

[5] Cites: Associated Press. “Manuals May Have Mislead Crew.” Air Force Times, 12-8-1997, 8.

[6] Cites: Bryan Denson. “C-130 Crew Unaware of Risks.” The Oregonian [no date given].

[7] “The Air Force later states that it sees no problems with this commander’s attitude.”  (Diehl 2002, 100; cites Bryan Denson. “Air Force Finds No Violation in King Inquiry.” The Oregonian, 5-25-1999, E-1 and E-5.)

— 33  Engineering Failures Organization. Case Studies. “Puerto Rico Gas Explosion.” 2-9-2012.

— 33  NTSB. San Juan Gas Company…Propane Gas Explosion in San Juan [PR], Nov 21, 1996.

 

Narrative Information

 

EFO: “The Humberto Vidal Explosion (sometimes also referred to as the Río Piedras Explosion) was a gas explosion that occurred on November 21, 1996 at the Humberto Vidal shoe store located in Río Piedras, Puerto Rico. The explosion killed 33 and wounded more than 80 others when the building collapsed. It is considered one of the deadliest disasters to have occurred on the island.

 

“The investigation of the NTSB revealed that several persons had reported an alleged gas leak in the building in the days leading up to the explosion. The store had no gas supply, so another nearby gas line looked like the culprit. It was discovered that a gas pipe which carried the heavier-than-air propane gas was broken. A few years earlier, a water main was installed below, which bent the pipe in the process. When the pipe had been installed, it was already in tight bend, adding to its stress levels. The addition of the water main caused it to break.

 

“The deadly gas was able to get into the shop basement from migrating around and over pipes, causing the bad smell. However the biggest problem was that the gas company technicians were unable to detect the gas before the blast. Investigators discovered that holes used to detect gas below were only 46 cm (1.5 feet) deep when the gas was about 4 feet down, therefore, there was no way it could be detected in this manner. The most crucial error came in the basement inspection. The technician was supposed to turn his equipment on in fresh air before entering the building, but he instead turned it on once inside the building, thus detecting no gas.

 

“The ignition source was an air conditioning switch with heated wiring, causing the whole building to be stripped to its skeleton.

 

“The San Juan Gas Company vehemently denied responsibility and suggested that it could have been caused by sewer gas instead. However, the lighter-than-air sewer gas collects in the ceiling, while propane collects on the floor. The explosion showed that stored shoes were tossed up, meaning that the fuel had to be at ground level.” (Engineering Failures Organization. Puerto Rico Gas Explosion. 2-9-2012.)

 

NTSB Executive Summary: “About 8:30 a.m. on November 21, 1996, because of a propane gas leak, a commercial building in San Juan, Puerto Rico, exploded. Thirty-three people were killed, and at least 69 were injured.

 

“The building was in Rió Piedras, a shopping district in San Juan. The structure was a six-story mixture of offices and stores owned by Humberto Vidal, Inc. The company’s administrative offices occupied the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth floors, and the first and second floors housed a jewelry store, a record store, and a shoe store.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the propane gas explosion, fueled by an excavation-caused gas leak, in the basement of the Humberto Vidal, Inc., office building was the failure of San Juan Gas Company, Inc., (1) to oversee its employees’ actions to ensure timely identification and correction of unsafe conditions and strict adherence to operating practices and (2) to provide adequate training to employees. Also contributing to the explosion was (1) the failure of the Research and Special Programs Administration/Office of Pipeline Safety to oversee effectively the pipeline safety program in Puerto Rico, (2) the failure of the Puerto Rico Public Service Commission to require San Juan Gas Company, Inc., to correct identified safety deficiencies, and (3) the failure of Enron Corp. to oversee adequately the operation of San Juan Gas Company, Inc.[1]

 

“Contributing to the loss of life was the failure of San Juan Gas Company, Inc., to inform adequately citizens and businesses of the dangers of propane gas and the safety steps to take when a gas leak is suspected or detected.

 

“In its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board addressed the following safety issues:

 

• Adequacy of employee training.

 

• Need for an excavation-damage prevention program.

 

• Adequacy of maps and records of buried facilities.

 

• Adequacy of public education on what to do when the odor of gas is detected.

 

• Adequacy of the oversight of the San Juan Gas Company, Inc., from Enron Corp., the Puerto Rico Public Service Commission, and the Office of Pipeline Safety.

 

“As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board issues one safety recommendation to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation, three to the Research and Special Programs Administration, two to the Puerto Rico Public Service Commission, two to Enron Corp., and one to Heath Consultants, Inc. [p. vii.] ….

 

“The Accident….Week Preceding Accident — Many people later reported that they had detected the odor of gas inside buildings and along streets adjacent to the HV [Humberto Vidal] building for at least a week before the explosion.

 

“Several HV employees had worked in the basement and on the first floor early in the mornings before the air conditioning was started. They had smelled a strong odor that they identified as propane gas. Those who had worked in the basement complained of dizziness, nausea, and difficulty breathing while in the basement. One HV employee stated that most of the HV employees had smelled the gas odor, as did some customers. She said the odor was strongest in the basement, where merchandise was stored. The manager of the shoe store (who later died in the explosion) told her that he had advised one of the HV officials that employees could not go into the basement because of the strong smell of propane gas. [p. 1.]

 

“Some of the employees at the Chicken Kingdom had told their supervisor that they had smelled a strong odor of gas that came and went. The supervisor stated that he called the company that serviced his gas cooking equipment and had all of the equipment tested. No leaks were found. He stated that the equipment-company personnel assumed that the odor must be associated with gas work going on along Camelia Soto, since someone was constantly there checking for gas leaks.

 

“The administrator of the Chicken Kingdom stated that he used a pay telephone to report to the SJGC that his employees had smelled gas. The SJGC employee receiving the call asked for the street name. The administrator explained to him that the smell came and went. The SJGC employee said the gas company would take care of the problem. The administrator stated that the

SJGC employee did not ask for his name, for his company’s name, whether the smell was inside or outside, or any other questions. The administrator also said that the SJGC employee did not tell him what actions he should take. After he made the report, the administrator said, he saw an SJGC truck and SJGC employees working in the area and assumed that they had come in response to his call. He stated that he never smelled gas in the area while he was outside his building. He also said that during the week or so before the explosion, he had been in Joyería Super Precio, Disco Fiesta, and La California stores and had not detected the odor of gas. [p. 2.]

 

“The owner of Pepe Ganga stated that some of his employees had commented to him before the explosion about detecting an odor in the store that they thought might be propane gas. He said that he thought that the odor might have come from the exhaust fumes of the local bus or other vehicles using the street.

 

“Thursday, November 14. — According to the SJGC, the first report it received of the odor was on Thursday, November 14. The SJGC dispatcher on duty that morning said that the manager of the shoe store telephoned him at 8:15 a.m. The dispatcher said the manager told him that he smelled gas when he opened the store and that when he went into the basement, he could smell gas, although the odor was not very strong. The dispatcher stated that he recorded the call and told the manager what he told anyone who reported smelling gas—leave the basement door open and try not to turn on any electrical appliances or anything that has to do with electricity.

 

“The dispatcher sent a technician to investigate. The technician arrived at the shoe store about 9:30 a.m. and met with a store employee, probably the store manager. The two then walked down the basement stairs, which were on the east side of the building (the side next to La California). They walked to the north wall of the building (the wall along de Diego), where the manger pointed to the upper right part of the wall and said that the odor seemed to be coming from there. He told the technician that he smelled gas in the mornings when he entered the store. The technician had a gas detector with him, the kind that is not accurate unless it is turned on in an area that is free of gas. Once turned on and moved to an area that is suspected of containing gas, the detector will beep if it detects gas. The technician did not turn the detector on until he had been in the store for about 5 to 10 minutes. When he used it to test the basement air, the detector did not beep.

 

“According to the SJGC dispatcher, the technician spoke with him from the HV building and said that he smelled a slight odor of gas out on the street, but not in the basement.

 

“Friday, November 15. — On Friday, November 15, the SJGC sent a brigade to the building. The brigade, consisting of four men and a leader, arrived at 8:15 a.m. The leader had been told by his supervisor that the store manager was complaining of an odor of propane gas inside the building. When the brigade arrived, the store manager told the leader that he smelled propane gas in the store, and both men entered the basement by the stairs at the east wall. In the basement, they walked about 12 to 15 feet north from the stairs, and the manager told the leader that they had reached the spot where he had smelled gas and that the odor seemed to be coming down from the basement ceiling. According to the leader, both he and the manager agreed that they could not smell gas at that time. The leader later stated that the manager had told him that sometimes in the

morning when he opened the store he could smell gas. The leader did not have an instrument with him for testing the basement atmosphere for the presence of gas, so he went outside to test the underground with a combustible gas indicator (CGI). [p. 3.]

 

“The brigade made about 18 to 20 barholes[2] about 4 feet apart in de Diego and, according to the leader, about 18 to 20 inches deep or deeper. They began east of La California and proceeded west. The leader said that the CGI read 0 until it was about 2 to 3 feet beyond the east wall of the

HV building. In a barhole about 4 feet west, the CGI indicated about 2 to 3 percent on the lower explosive limit (LEL) scale. As the leader pumped the CGI to draw in more air from the barhole, the CGI reading dropped. He repeated the test several times, and each time he obtained the same result.

 

“The brigade continued its survey until it was within 20 to 30 feet of Camelia Soto, and the CGI continued to read 0. The leader called the gas company to find out whether any gas pipes went from the main to the HV building. The company told him about the old line that ran from the main into the building. The brigade excavated the area over the old line, located it, disconnected it from the main, and plugged the opening of the main. The leader stated that a laborer plugged the open end of the old line. (Inspection after the explosion found that the gas service pipe had not been plugged.)

 

“According to the leader, the brigade members used a soap solution to test for leaks in the part of the main they had uncovered. They detected no leaks, so they reburied the main and compacted the soil over and around it. The brigade leader stated that he told the manager to call the SJGC if he again smelled gas.

 

“Monday, November 18. — On Monday morning, November 18, an HV employee told the manager that the odor of gas in the shoe store was very strong. The manager told her that he had already spoken with the SJGC and that the company was not paying much attention. She later stated that he asked her to go to the basement with him and that she walked from the staircase about halfway to the north wall, but could not go any farther because the odor was strong enough to make her dizzy and nauseated. She had to go back upstairs to get some air.

 

“The following day, November 19, was a holiday, and the shoe store was closed.

 

“Wednesday, November 20. — The employee who had gone into the basement on Monday said that on Wednesday, November 20, the odor was still present and the smell appeared to be about the same. She stated that she did not go into the basement again because she was afraid. According to the SJGC dispatcher, an unidentified person (believed to be the store manager) called from the HV building a short time before 8 a.m. and said that a slight odor of gas was detectable in the building. The dispatcher did not record the call. The dispatcher stated that he used the November 14 work order to dispatch a brigade because ‘they keep on calling.’ He said that, as before, he advised the caller that the building should be left open.

 

“The dispatcher said that later in the morning a woman called to report an odor of gas in the building, but he did not take her name since the company had already dispatched a brigade. (According to the SJGC’s records, the only other call the SJGC received that day from the HV building was in the early afternoon.) Later that morning, when the store manager saw an HV official who worked in the building, he told the official about the odor. The official told the manager to open the door or get some fans if the smell got worse, as he did not want customers to smell the gas. Reportedly, the manager did not follow the instructions because it would have been difficult for him to watch the merchandise if the door were open.

 

“After the accident, the SJGC operations superintendent, the supervisor of the dispatcher, stated that he recalled the dispatcher telling him on November 20 about receiving a complaint from the store manager. The operations superintendent said that he responded to the complaint by dispatching a brigade leader and a five-person crew to investigate. He instructed them to go into the store and store basement and [end of p. 5.] to probe the street outside the store to make certain that there were no problems inside the building. He stated that he instructed the brigade leader to take all the time needed to investigate the report because the brigade leader who went to the building on November 15 had not gone all the way into the basement.

 

“The leader of the November 20 brigade stated that he understood that he was responding to a call reporting a strong odor of gas in the store. He was aware that other SJGC employees had previously responded to a similar complaint and that they had made some barholes. He said that when he arrived at the store, he talked to the manager, who, he claimed, said that he was not sure that what they were smelling in the basement was gas, but that his employees were telling him that it was gas. The leader said that he went throughout the basement with the manager checking for any gas pipe or odor of gas; he said he found neither. He did not use an instrument to check for gas, but he smelled a strong odor, which he believed to be the odor of rubber. He said that when he smelled what he believed to be rubber, HV employees were unpacking shoes, readying them to be put on shelves.

 

“According to two HV employees, no one worked in the basement on November 20 because the odor of gas was too strong. Merchandise arriving at the store that day was stored on the first floor instead of in the basement. One of the two employees reported entering the basement to look for merchandise requested by customers. She said that she tried holding her breath because of the odor. She estimated that she was in the basement about 5 minutes and became dizzy and nauseated. The other reported that he was unable to fully enter the basement because the “fumes” were too strong.

 

“Another HV employee, a messenger, said that he had walked with the store manager and the leader to the stairs. The messenger said that although he did not go into the basement, he became nauseated from the gas odor, as did another employee. The messenger stated that he stayed at the top of the stairs because the gas odor was too strong, but that the leader and the manager walked about halfway down the stairs. The messenger said that the two men did not go completely into the basement and that he overheard the leader say that it smelled like gas.

 

“Propane gas is heavier than air. The leader stated that he knew that propane gas tends to pool and not to rise when it is released underground and that it is therefore necessary to probe deeper into the soil because pockets of propane may be below the gas main. A few days after the explosion, the leader said the barholes his brigade had made were about 12 to 18 inches deep. He said that he did not verify the depth of the holes except by comparing their depth to the length of the probe for his CGI. He estimated the probe was 2 feet long.

 

“In January 1997, the leader said that he made new barholes rather than using the old ones because he recalled being instructed never to use old holes because water might have collected in them, which could damage the CGI. He claimed that he had observed the barholes to be about 2 to 2½ feet deep and was aware that the gas main was 2 feet deep. He said that, beginning at the intersection of Camelia Soto and de Diego, on the west side of the building, his brigade made barholes, first at 20-foot intervals and then at 10-foot intervals, to the east until they were about 15 to 20 feet from Monseñor Torres. He said he had had two reasons for thinking that he knew where the gas main on de Diego was: he had had previous experience with it; another brigade had marked the location of the gas main with crayon when it was repairing the service line to La Milagrosa School.

 

“The brigade made barholes at 10-foot intervals along both sides of Camelia Soto. (The barholes on the eastern side of Camelia Soto started about 5 feet south of the Chicken Kingdom and continued to de Diego. The barholes on the western side of Camelia Soto began at the Comerical Ubiñas gas service line and continued to de Diego.) The leader said he had decided on making barholes along Camelia Soto because he thought there was a gas main on Camelia Soto and that he had thought that gas might have migrated from the main on Arzuaga or the main on Camelia Soto to de Diego. (De Diego is downhill from Arzuaga.) He said that the crew found no indications of combustible gas in any of the holes they made that morning. [p. 6.]

 

“The leader said that had he known there was a gas service to the Chicken Kingdom, he would have probed over that line also. He said that he knew that a service line ran to the Comerical Ubiñas building because he could see the meter, but he was not aware that a service line ran to the Chicken Kingdom. He did not call the dispatcher to learn the locations of gas pipes in the area, nor did he use a pipe locator, the maps in his truck, or other means to locate the gas lines.

 

“The SJGC operations superintendent later testified that on November 20, the leader reported that he had found a power transformer that was leaking oil in the basement of the HV building. (The leader did not report this information when interviewed by a Safety Board investigator, nor was there a transformer in the basement.) The operations superintendent stated that the leader told him that his crew had used a soap-and-water solution to test the location where a gas service had once entered the building (the leader testified that he looked for evidence of gas lines entering the basement and found none) and at other locations, but found no areas indicating the entry of propane gas.

 

“The leader said that his CGI had been used by others the previous day and around noon he wondered whether it was operating correctly, since he had not found any indication of combustible gas in the barholes. He and the rest of the brigade drove to the SJGC shop, where they had the CGI tested. It was found to be functioning properly.

 

“Meanwhile, the HV messenger told the HV attorney that the gas odor was still in the basement and, at times, the odor could be detected in the stores in the building. According to the attorney, she called the SJGC after 1 p.m. and reported what the messenger had told her. On receiving her complaint, the SJGC dispatcher informed the operations superintendent. He radioed the leader, who was in the shop testing the CGI, and told him to return to the HV building to check again for gas leaks. He stated that he instructed the leader to test in all directions for leaks and to test even further from the building because he wanted to know why the HV employees were calling.

 

“The leader and the rest of the brigade returned to the HV building and re-tested all of the holes that had been made that morning. Again, they did not detect combustible gas. About 5 p.m., the brigade returned to the SJGC shop. The brigade leader talked with the maintenance and construction coordinator (MCC) and reported that his testing had not revealed evidence of combustible gas near the HV building. He also advised that a store employee had reported detecting the odor of gas that morning when the store was first opened. The MCC stated that he did not believe that there was a gas leak at the HV building because he knew the results obtained by previous crews and because he trusted his personnel and the instruments that they used.

 

“Thursday, November 21. — On November 21 about 6:45 a.m., air conditioning contractors (a father-and-son team) arrived to do the routine, monthly maintenance on the air conditioners that they had been doing for the past 10 years. They met the store manager and the messenger outside. According to the messenger, the manager opened the door to the store and said that he smelled gas. The messenger said his stomach became upset and he told the manager to call the SJGC because the odor was so strong. The manager turned on the lights, and the four men entered the building together. The manager and the contractors walked through the store to the elevator on the west side of the building. The son (the father died in the accident) later stated that when he entered the building, he did not detect any unusual odors but said the manager told him about detecting a strong odor of gas. The three used the elevator to go to the building receptionist area on the fourth floor, where the manager opened the office doors and left.

 

“According to the son, the building air conditioners usually were not turned on until 8 a.m. or later. It was usual for the store manager to turn on all the air conditioning units at their control panels; however, the son stated that when he worked on the basement air conditioner, he would turn the unit on and off as needed. To perform their work, the contractors would feel the air conditioner pipes after the air conditioner had run for a while to assess whether the machine was working properly, and [end of p. 7.] as needed, they would wash the compressor and filters.

 

“An employee who arrived at work between about 7 and 7:10 a.m. said that as she entered the building, she smelled the odor of gas, an odor that had been present for the past week and a half. She said the odor was strong enough that it ‘went over the top of the regular odor [shoes] of the store.’ She recognized the odor as propane gas because she had a propane gas stove at home. As she did most mornings during this period, she mentioned the odor to the store manager. He told her that he would call the gas company again that morning and that he was continuing to keep a log of his calls. (His call log was not found after the explosion.) The store manager’s brother entered the store, and the three of them were together until 8 or 8:05 a.m., when the employee left the building to get breakfast.

 

“The manager’s brother stated that when he entered the building, he smelled propane gas. The manager complained to him about the strong odor of gas and told him that he had become dizzy and nauseated. The manager asked him to go into the basement to check on the odor. The brother walked to the bottom of the basement stairs, sniffed the air, and would go no farther because his eyes became irritated and he could not stand the smell. He ran back upstairs, advised the manager to leave the building, and soon left himself.

 

“The son from the air conditioning contractor team said that he completed his work on the third and fourth floors about 7:50 and left the building. He stated that his father began working on the fifth floor and was to work all floors other than the third and fourth. The son said that he was aware of the odor produced by the shoes stored in the building and of the smell of propane gas from the pipe system. He stated that he did not detect the odor of gas that day in the areas he visited.

 

“In the meantime, the MCC had decided to send a third brigade, which he dispatched at 7. The workmen arrived about 7:30 and parked their truck on de Diego, in front of the building. The MCC said he sent the brigade to make sure there was no gas in the building and to learn what the HV employees were smelling when they opened the building.

 

“The brigade leader reported that he was given no instructions on contacts to be made at the building and that he had not been told that there had been previous complaints or what the previous SJGC crews had done. He said that because he was not told of the previous actions, he did not take with him any plans or other information about the gas piping in the area. He knew that there was suppose to be a map of the gas mains in the truck, but he did not consider the map important because he knew he could use his radio to obtain any information he needed.

 

“The leader said that he did not smell gas on the outside of the building when he arrived and that he did not see anyone at the store door. He believed the store had not yet opened because the outside roll-up door was halfway up and the inside door was closed. At no time did he or his brigade members meet with or talk to any HV employee. Without referring to the gas main map in the truck, he went to the barholes he saw in de Diego, beginning in front of the entrance to the HV building and extending west to the intersection of de Diego and Camelia Soto. He believed that the barholes had been made the previous day by another brigade. He stated that the holes were about 18 inches deep and about 6 feet north of the curb. He believed their locations to be over the gas main because he recalled the location of the gas main from an earlier time when he saw it exposed to reestablish gas service to the school across from the HV building. He inserted his CGI probe into the holes and tested in each. He detected no odor of gas, and his CGI did not register any indication of a combustible gas.

 

“The administrator of the Chicken Kingdom stated that as he drove past the HV building on his way to work, he saw the SJGC brigade [end of p. 8.] working in the area. He said that about a half hour before the explosion he detected a ‘little’ gas odor in the store when the breeze blew into the store.

 

“The leader had three new barholes made in de Diego, between the jewelry store and the manholes in the intersection of Camelia Soto and de Diego. He said that the holes were 18 inches deep and about in line with the previously made barholes that he had already tested that morning. No combustible gas was detected in the three new holes. Next he had the crew make more barholes in the intersection of Camelia Soto and de Diego. As soon as the barholes were made, just before 8:30, he used his CGI and obtained a reading of 20 percent on the gas scale, but he detected no odor of gas.

 

“About 5 to 10 seconds afterwards, while he was standing on the manhole cover and another employee was making another barhole, the explosion occurred. The force lifted him into the air and threw him about 15 to 20 feet to the north.

 

“People who were in the HV and adjacent buildings sustained minor to serious injuries. Those on the lower floors of the HV building received the more serious injuries. The bodies of the store manager and the air conditioning service technician were later found in the basement. Some people outside and near the HV building were severely injured or killed by debris propelled by the explosion.[3]….” [p. 9.]

 

“Survival Aspects. According to interviews, because most stores were not yet open, few shoppers were in the area at the time of the explosion and many employees had not yet arrived. The HV building usually held 50 or more employees, including 37 who worked in the offices, 7 who worked in the jewelry store, 12 who worked in the shoe store, and 2 who worked in the record store. Many other people worked in adjacent buildings, and hundreds of shoppers and tourists came into or passed by the building during shopping hours.

 

“Damage. The HV building was destroyed, as was a major portion of the building that housed La California. Several other nearby buildings suffered moderate to severe damage. [p. 11.]

 

“The first, second, and third floors of the HV building were shattered, and they dropped into the basement, as did portions of the fourth floor. The fifth and sixth floors remained relatively intact. The building’s structural columns and beams were severely damaged, and the Puerto Rico Housing Department declared the building unsafe and arranged for it to be demolished….[p. 11.]

 

(NTSB. Pipeline Accident Report. San Juan Gas Company, Inc/Enron Corp. Propane Gas Explosion in San Juan Puerto Rico, on Nov 21, 1996. Adopted 12-23-1997.)

 

Sources

 

Engineering Failures Organization. Case Studies in Engineering. “Puerto Rico Gas Explosion.” 2-9-2012. Accessed 2-4-2016 at: http://engineeringfailures.org/?p=695

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Pipeline Accident Report. San Juan Gas Company, Inc/Enron Corp. Propane Gas Explosion in San Juan Puerto Rico, on Nov 21, 1996. Washington, DC: NTSB/PAR-97/01, adopted 12-23-1997, 93 pages. Accessed 2-4-2016 at: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR9701.pdf

 

 

 

 

[1] The NTSB notes that  the San Juan Gas Company, Inc., was wholly owned by the Enron Corp.

[2] A hole made in soil or paving in order to test the subsurface atmosphere for existence of a combustible gas.

[3] Figure 3 notes there were 15 HV Building fatalities and 18 “Others,” none of whom were SJGC employees.

1996 — Nov 19, Runway Collision, United Express 5925 and King Air, Quincy AP, IL–    14

 

–14  NTSB. AAR. Runway Collision, United…5925…Beechcraft…Quincy, IL, Nov 19, 1996.

–14  Sturkey. Mid-Air: Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts… 2008, p. 417.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB: Executive Summary

 

“On November 19, 1996, at 1701 central standard time, United Express flight 5925, a Beechcraft 1900C, N87GL, collided with a Beechcraft King Air A90, N1127D, at Quincy Municipal Airport, near Quincy, Illinois. Flight 5925 was completing its landing roll on runway 13, and the King Air was in its takeoff roll on runway 04. The collision occurred at the intersection of the two runways. All 10 passengers and two crewmembers aboard flight 5925 and the two occupants aboard the King Air were killed. Flight 5925 was a scheduled passenger flight operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. The flight was operated by Great Lakes Aviation, Ltd., doing business as United Express. The King Air was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the pilots in the King Air A90 to effectively monitor the common traffic advisory frequency or to properly scan for traffic, resulting in their commencing a takeoff roll when the Beech 1900C (United Express flight 5925) was landing on an intersecting runway.

 

“Contributing to the cause of the accident was the Cherokee pilot’s interrupted radio transmission, which led to the Beech 1900C pilots’ misunderstanding of the transmission as an indication from the King Air that it would not take off until after flight 5925 had cleared the runway.

 

“Contributing to the severity of the accident and the loss of life were the lack of adequate aircraft rescue and fire fighting services, and the failure of the air stair door on the Beech 1900C to open.

 

“Safety issues discussed in the report include the importance of emphasizing careful scanning techniques during flight training, Beech 1900C certification standards and compliance with requirements on door jamming, the certification of small airports used by scheduled commuter airlines, and aircraft rescue and fire fighting protection on scheduled commuter aircraft having 10 seats or more. Safety recommendations concerning these issues were made to the Federal Aviation Administration.”  (NTSB. AAR, vi.)

 

“….Time and distance data from an Aircraft Performance and Visibility Study conducted by the Safety Board indicated that the King Air began its takeoff roll about 13 seconds before flight 5925 touched down on the runway at 1700:59. According to the occupants of the Cherokee, the King Air had been in position on the runway for about 1 minute before beginning the takeoff roll. The Cherokee pilot stated that he heard no takeoff announcement from the King Air over the CTAF, and none was recorded on the Beech 1900C CVR.” ((NTSB. AAR, p.3.)

 

“At 1701, during flight 5925’s landing rollout, the airplane collided with the King Air at the intersection of runways 13 and 04…. Rescuers reported that they heard signs of life when they first reached the Beech 1900C, but they were unsuccessful in their attempts to open the air stair door….”  (NTSB. AAR, p.4)

 

“Quincy Municipal Airport is an uncontrolled airport owned and operated City of Quincy, Illinois, which is located about 10 miles away from the airport.”  (NTSB. AAR, p.15.)

 

“Both airplanes came to rest with their wings interlocked, along the east edge of runway 13, approximately 110 feet east of where the skid marks converged near the intersection of runways 04 and 13. According to witnesses, both airplanes came to rest on their landing gear after the impact….At the accident site, investigators observed that the grass was burned for approximately 10 feet beyond the perimeter of the wreckage, and that fuel had saturated the grass for about 40 feet beyond the perimeter. A 5- by 8-foot area of fuel residue was observed on the runway area where the aircraft skid marks converged.”  (NTSB. AAR, p.18.)

 

“Rescue Attempts

 

“A pilot employed by the airport’s fixed-base operator (FBO) and two Beech 1900C-qualified United Express pilots who had been waiting for flight 5925 to arrive were the first people to reach the accident scene. One of the United Express pilots remained some distance from the airplanes while the other United Express pilot and the FBO pilot approached the airplanes. They saw that the King Air and the right side of the Beech 1900C were engulfed in fire. The United Express pilot said that he opened the left aft cargo door of the Beech 1900C and black smoke poured out. The FBO pilot said that he could not see the interior of the cabin through the passenger windows because the cabin appeared to be filled with dark smoke. They then ran to the forward left side of the Beech 1900C fuselage where the FBO pilot said he saw the captain’s head and arm protruding from her window on the left. She asked them to “get the door open.”

 

“The FBO pilot stated that he found the forward air stair door handle in the 6 o’clock (unlocked) position.  He said that he attempted unsuccessfully to open the door by moving the handle in all directions and pulling on the door. He said that he did not see any instructions for opening the door, but he was able to rotate the handle upward to the 5 o’clock position but no further. The United Express pilot stated that he then intervened because he believed that the FBO pilot probably did not know how to open the door. The United Express pilot stated that he depressed the button above the handle while rotating the handle from the 3 o’clock position downward to the unlocked position. He stated that the handle felt “normal” as he rotated it. However, he was unable to open the door. The FBO pilot then tried again to open the door by rotating the handle upward, but he was again unsuccessful.

 

“On January 3, 1997, the Safety Board issued urgent Safety Recommendation A-97-1, which asked the FAA to do the following:

 

Immediately issue a telegraphic [Airworthiness Directive] (AD) directing all Beechcraft 1900 operators to (1) conspicuously identify the external air stair exit door button with highly visible markings, (2) indicate that the button must be depressed while the handle is rotated, and (3) include an arrow to show the direction that the handle must be moved to open the door.  (NTSB. AAR, pp. 20-21.)

 

“….The Quincy Airport has an ARFF truck, which is staffed by QFD firefighters 15 minutes before and 15 minutes after the arrival and/or departure of an air carrier aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats. The truck at the airport was not staffed at the time of the accident because no air carrier aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats were landing or taking off.  According to the fire chief, after the accident, the QFD and the City of Quincy began to investigate ways to staff the ARFF truck at the airport during periods beyond that required by the FAA.”

 

“The flightcrew made radio transmissions about 30 miles out, at 1652:07, (“any traffic in the area please advise”); 10 miles out, at 1656:56, (“we’ll be inbound to enter on a left base for runway one three at Quincy any other traffic please advise”); 5 miles out, at 1659:29, (“just about to turn, about a six mile final for runway…one three, more like a five mile final for runway one three at Quincy;”); and on short final, at 1700:16, (“aircraft gonna hold in position on runway four or you guys gonna take off?”) Although these callouts did not exactly match those recommended in the AIM and AC 90-42F, they were appropriate for the straight-in approach being flown.  Even though under 14 CFR Part 91.113, flight 5925, as a landing aircraft, had the right of way over aircraft on the surface, the captain took the precaution of asking whether the airplane on the runway was going to hold or take off. It would have been prudent for the captain to refer specifically to the “King Air,” to leave no doubt about which airplane she was addressing; however, her transmission was sufficiently specific that she could reasonably expect to be understood.

 

The Cherokee pilot’s transmission, at 1700:28, (“seven six four six Juliet uh, holding uh, for departure on runway four….on the uh, King Air”) immediately followed the captain’s inquiry, and appeared to be in response to her question. The transmission was interrupted by the GPWS alarm in the Beech 1900C. Although it would have been prudent for the captain to ask that the transmission be repeated, her reply, at 1700:37, (“OK, we’ll get through your intersection in just a second sir… we appreciate that”) made it clear that she believed she was communicating with the airplane that was to take off next on the runway, and it would have been reasonable for her to expect a clarification if that was not the case.”  (NTSB. AAR, p. 43.)

 

“The airplane touched down at 1700:59. The captain was recorded as calling for “Max reverse” at 1701:01; expletives from the flightcrew were also recorded beginning at 1701:01, indicating that the flightcrew saw the King Air at that time. Skid marks indicate that they applied maximum braking beginning 3 seconds later until the time of impact at 1701:09.

 

“The Safety Board concludes that the flightcrew of flight 5925 made appropriate efforts to coordinate the approach and landing through radio communications and visual monitoring; however, they mistook the Cherokee pilot’s transmission (that he was holding for departure on runway 04) as a response from the King Air to their request for the King Air’s intentions, and therefore mistakenly believed that the King Air was not planning to take off until after flight 5925 had cleared the runway.”  (NTSB. AAR, pp. 43-44.)

 

“Although he had been sitting on runway 04 for about 1 minute, the King Air pilot began the takeoff without making a takeoff announcement over the CTAF.  Because of the delay between the announcement from the King Air that the King Air was taking the runway and the commencement of its takeoff roll, an additional takeoff announcement would have been prudent, and would have been consistent with common and expected practice at uncontrolled airports. Such an announcement would have afforded the Beech 1900C flightcrew the opportunity to take evasive action. Because no pilot would take off knowing that another airplane was about to land on an intersecting runway, the occupants of the King Air must have been unaware at the time they began their takeoff roll that an airplane was about to land. The Safety Board concludes that the failure of the King Air pilot to announce over the CTAF his intention to take off created a potential for a collision between the two airplanes.

 

“Had the occupants of the King Air been monitoring the CTAF, they should have heard the four announcements from flight 5925 indicating that the airplane was inbound to Quincy and was planning to land on runway 13. Also, they would most likely have answered the question that was directed at them, or corrected the misunderstanding resulting from the Cherokee pilot’s transmission. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the occupants of the King Air did not hear the transmissions from flight 5925 on the CTAF.”  (NTSB. AAR, pp. 44-45.)

 

“Witnesses indicated that the approaching Beech 1900C was visible from at least 10 miles out, 4 minutes before it landed. Although the Safety Board’s visibility study indicated that the view of the landing airplane from the cockpit of the King Air would have been partially or momentarily fully obstructed by the cockpit side posts during much of the Beech 1900C’s final approach to landing and during the King Air’s takeoff roll, those obstructions could have been easily overcome if the King Air’s occupants had moved their heads and bodies while scanning. If they had done so at any point during the last 4 minutes of the airplane’s approach, they would have been able to see the incoming airplane and would not have commenced their takeoff roll when they did. Therefore, it is clear that neither occupant of the King Air properly scanned for traffic.” (NTSB. AAR, pp. 45-46.)

 

“The King Air pilot’s flying history suggests that he may not have placed sufficient importance on the basics of safe flying. His previous gear-up incident during an instructional flight suggests carelessness, and his subsequent comments to the FAA indicate that he did not consider the incident significant. The fact that he sat on an active runway for an extended time and comments from students indicating that he seemed to be rushing them are consistent with a careless attitude. Further, during his last year as a TWA pilot, the pilot had been downgraded from captain to flight engineer because of poor performance during recurrent training….

 

“The King Air pilot might have been in a hurry to get home after a long day of flying potential purchasers of the King Air on a demonstration flight to Tulsa. After the King Air pilot returned to Quincy, two of the passengers said that he seemed to be “in a hurry” or “anxious to get home.”

A combination of these factors (preoccupation with providing instruction to the pilot/passenger, careless habits, possible fatigue, and rushing) could explain why the King Air pilot did not properly scan for traffic.” (NTSB. AAR, p. 46.)

 

“The Safety Board concludes that the occupants of the King Air were inattentive to or distracted from their duty to “see and avoid” other traffic. In light of the circumstances of this accident, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should reiterate to flight instructors the importance of emphasizing careful scanning techniques during pilot training and biennial flight reviews.”  (NTSB. AAR, p. 47.)

 

“Both the Cherokee pilot and the passenger saw the two airplanes converging. The Cherokee pilot had the opportunity to alert the pilots in the Beech 1900C to the situation, and it would have been prudent for him to do so. It should have been apparent from the Beech 1900C’s approach path, which would have been about a 90-degree angle to runway 04, that the runways intersected. Nonetheless, the Cherokee pilot stated that he did not realize the runways intersected. The Cherokee passenger said that he thought the airplanes would miss each other.  The Safety Board concludes that because of the Cherokee pilot’s inexperience, he probably did not realize that a collision between the two airplanes was imminent, and therefore he did not broadcast a warning.”  (NTSB. AAR, p. 48.)

 

“The autopsy reports revealed that the occupants of both airplanes died of carbon monoxide intoxication from the inhalation of smoke and soot from the postimpact fire or inhalation of products of combustion. They did not sustain blunt force trauma injuries that would have impeded their mobility or ability to evacuate.

 

“The bodies of the King Air’s occupants were found behind the seats in the cockpit, indicating that they were overcome by the effects of the fire before reaching an exit.

 

“Witnesses who ran to the scene immediately after the collision stated that they heard sounds of life from within the cabin of the Beech 1900C and that the captain talked to them from the cockpit….

 

“The body of flight 5925’s first officer was found between the air stair door and the forward right overwing exit. The exterior air stair door handle was in the unlocked position when the first people reached the accident scene, suggesting that the first officer followed company evacuation procedures and initially tried to open the air stair door but was unable to do so. Because the right overwing exits were near the fire on the right side of the cabin, he most likely proceeded toward the left overwing exit but was overcome by the effects of the smoke and fire before he could reach it. The rescuers did not observe any smoke coming from the left overwing exit, indicating that it was not opened.

 

“The Safety Board concludes that the impact forces were at a survivable level for the occupants of both airplanes. The Safety Board further concludes that the speed with which the fire enveloped the King Air and the intensity of the fire precluded survivability for the occupants of the King Air; however, the occupants of the Beech 1900C did not escape because the air stair door could not be opened and the left overwing exit hatch was not opened.”  (NTSB. AAR, 48.)

 

“The Safety Board concludes that the most likely reason that the air stair door could not be opened is that the accident caused deformation of the door/frame system and created slack in the door control cable. The Safety Board is concerned that the design and testing of the door did not account for minimal permanent deformation that could introduce slack into the door control system and ultimately disable the door. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should evaluate the propensity of the Beech 1900C door/frame system to jam when it sustains minimal permanent door deformation and, based on the results of that evaluation, require appropriate design changes.”  (NTSB. AAR, p. 49.)

 

“The Safety Board is further concerned that even though the impact forces from the accident were so mild that both airplanes came to rest on their landing gear and the occupants of the Beech 1900C sustained little or no injuries as a result, those same forces were apparently sufficient to cause the Beech 1900C’s air stair door to jam, preventing the occupants from using it to escape. Because the airplane was certificated by the FAA as having met the freedom from jamming requirements, the Safety Board attempted to analyze the adequacy of those requirements….

 

“The Safety Board concludes that the methods for showing compliance with the FAA’s certification requirement that external doors be reasonably free from jamming as a result of fuselage deformation are not clearly defined. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should establish clear and specific methods for showing compliance with the freedom from jamming certification requirements.”  (NTSB. AAR, pp. 49-50.)

 

“Emergency Response

 

“The Quincy Fire Department was 10 miles away, and it took about 14 minutes for its fire fighting units to arrive. In contrast, 14 CFR Part 139 requires that a certificated airport be capable of an immediate response time of 3 minutes by an on-site ARFF truck equipped with extrication tools and carrying extinguishing agent and properly trained firefighters. However, this requirement applies only when the airport is serving air carrier aircraft with a seating capacity of more than 30 passengers.

 

“Witnesses observed that the fire was burning on the right side of the Beech 1900C, about 1,800 feet from the airport’s ARFF truck. If properly staffed, that truck should have been able to reach the accident site in no more than 1 minute. Fire fighters might then have been able to extinguish or control the fire, thereby extending the survival time for at least some of the occupants of the Beech 1900C. Those occupants might then have had time to escape through the overwing exit hatch. Accordingly, the Safety Board concludes that if on-airport ARFF protection had been required for this operation at Quincy Airport, lives might have been saved.

 

“Therefore, the Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation A-94-204, which urges the FAA to do the following:

 

Permit scheduled passenger operation only at airports certificated under the standards contained in Part 139, “Certification and Operations: Land Airports Serving Certain Air Carriers.”

 

“The Safety Board concludes that although some communities may lack adequate funds to provide ARFF protection for small airports served by commuter airlines, commuter airline passengers deserve the same degree of protection from postcrash fires as air carrier passengers on aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats. Accordingly, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should develop ways to fund airports that are served by scheduled passenger operations on aircraft having 10 or more passenger seats, and require these airports to ensure that ARFF units with trained personnel are available during commuter flight operations and are capable of timely response….”  (NTSB. AAR, p. 51.)

 

Sturkey: “Synopsis: A Beechcraft 1900 Beechliner landed in clear weather at night. At the same time a Beechcraft A-90 King Air was taking off on an intersecting runway. The two aircraft collided at the runway intersection, and the post-crash fire killed all 14 people aboard both planes.” (Sturkey. Mid-Air: Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts from Military and Airline Mid-Air Collisions. 2008, p. 417.)

 

Sources

 

National Transportation Safety  Board. Aircraft Accident Report. Runway Collision, United Express Flight 5925 and Beechcraft King Air A90, Quincy Municipal Airport, Quincy, Illinois, November 19, 1996 (NTSB/AAR-97/04; PB97-910404).  Washington, DC:  NTSB, adopted July 1, 1997, 99 pages. Accessed at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/aar9704.pdf

 

Sturkey, Marion F. Mid-Air: Accident Reports and Voice Transcripts from Military and Airline Mid-Air Collisions. Plum Branch, SC: Heritage Press International, 2008.

 

 

— 8  AP. “Oregon highway collapses; eight dead in…storm.” Clovis News Journal, 11-21-1996.

— 8  News-Review Today (Roseburg, OR). “Douglas County’s Top 10 Disasters,” 6-27-2004.

 

Oregon           (5)

— 4  Nov 18. Moon Home landslide. AP. “Mudslide covers home, kills 4 inside.” 11-20-1996.

Male, 46, permanent home.  NCDC Storm Events Database. Flood, OR, Douglas, Nov

Female, 44, permanent home.

Female, 40, permanent home.

Female, 40, permanent home.

— 1  Nov 20 (body found). Delsa Lynn Hammer, 48; car pushed by mudslide into Umpqua Riv.[2]

 

Washington    (3)

–3  AP. “Oregon highway collapses; eight dead in Northwest storm.” Clovis News Journal, 11-21

–1  Moses Lake area, Nov 19. Pine tree snaps under heavy ice; crushes motor home; male, 29.[3]

–1  Tacoma area, Nov 19. Car spun out on snowy road, hit by semi; Timothy O’Brien, 29.[4]

–1  Yakima, Nov 19-20. Carport collapsed under heavy snow; male (Charles Wiltsey), 85.[5]

 

Narrative Information

 

NCDC on WA Ice Storm: “Before the freezing rain hit there was already 2 to 4 inches of snow on the ground. Between 1 and 1.5 inches of freezing rain fell over the Spokane area, knocking out power to 50% of the people and forcing the mayor to declare a state of emergency. It was the worst ice storm in 60 years, and the worst power outage in 108 years. 3 days after the storm, 100,000 people in the county were still without power. 6 days after the storm, 20,000 were still without power, with below freezing temperatures for most of the time. All the hotels and motels were full. School was closed for 3 days, and the airport was closed for several hours during the storm. Trees were down everywhere, and Gregory Carlson, 29, was killed when a pine snapped and crushed his motor home.” (NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Ice Storm, Washington, Moses Lake Area, Nov 19, 1996.)

 

Nov 20, AP: “Roseburg, Ore. – A rain-soaked hillside broke loose in southern Oregon, swallowing up a home and killing the four people inside. A newspaper delivery-man swept down the hill by a wall of mud and debris survived.” (AP, Roseburg, OR (Jeff Barnard). “Mudslide covers home, kills 4 inside.” Orange County Register, Santa Ana, CA. 11-20-1996, p. 20.)

 

Nov 21, AP: “Portland, Ore. (AP)….Eight people have died in the record storm that hit the Pacific Northwest this week. Tens of thousands of people remained without power Wednesday as residents worked to clear debris from fallen trees.

 

“Road crews removing debris from an Oregon highway Wednesday [Nov 20] found the body of Delsa Lynn Hammer, 48, of the coastal town of Coos Bay. Her car apparently had been pushed into the Umpqua River by a mudslide, said Douglas County sheriff’s Capt. Robert Stratton. Mudslides trapped about 30 vehicles along the highway late Monday….

 

“Three deaths in Washington were blamed on the snow and ice….” (AP, Portland, OR. “Oregon highway collapses; eight dead in Northwest storm.” Clovis News Journal, NM, 11-21-1996, p.1.)

 

News-Review Today: “In November 1996, an unrelenting rain fell on Douglas County, causing the deaths of eight people countywide.  In one day, Nov. 17, more than 4 inches fell in Roseburg and 7 inches in the hills. Flooding caused millions of dollars in damage to homes businesses and public roads. The biggest danger remained on the hillsides. Rick and Susan Moon and their friends Sharon Marvin and Ann Maxwell all died when a massive mudslide crushed the Moons’ home along Hubbard Creek Road near Umpqua. On Highway 38 west of Scottsburg, a series of mudslides buried motorist Delsa Lynn Hammer of Coos Bay, injured two others and stranded dozens for hours.

 

“On Nov. 21, as the South Umpqua River receded when the rain stopped, it left a sinkhole on Interstate 5 that damaged two semi trucks. Trampis Gress of Roseburg lost part of his right foot after he tried waving another semi away from the accident. Nine days later, a small mudslide blocked a car driven by Craig Appler, who was returning home to North Bend with his wife, Georgina, and their two young children, Daisha Ann, 2, and Austin Wayne, less than a year old. While backing away from the slide, their car was struck by a tractor-trailer heading the opposite direction. Only Craig Appler survived.”  (News-Review Today, Roseburg, OR.  27 June 2004.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press, Roseburg, OR (Jeff Barnard). “Mudslide covers home, kills 4 inside.” Orange County Register, Santa Ana, CA. 11-20-1996, p. 20. Accessed 2-1-2016 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=194552670&sterm

 

Associated Press, Portland, OR. “Oregon highway collapses; eight dead in Northwest storm.” Clovis News Journal, NM, 11-21-1996, p. 1. Accessed 2-1-2016 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=277971425&sterm=delsa+lynn+hammer

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database, Flood [actually a mudslide], Oregon, Douglas T NW & E, Nov 17-21-1996. Accessed 2-1-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5584186

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Oregon, Southern Coast, Nov 17-21, 1996. Accessed 2-1-2016: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5584187

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Heavy Snow, Washington, Tacoma Area, Nov 19, 1996. Accessed 2-1-2016: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5570839

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Heavy Snow, Washington, Yakima Valley, Nov 19-20, 1996. Accessed 2-1-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5571023

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Ice Storm, Washington, Moses Lake Area, Nov 19, 1996. Accessed 2-1-2016: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5571026

 

News-Review Today, Roseburg, OR. “Douglas County’s Top 10 Disasters,” 6-27-2004.  Accessed at: http://www.nrtoday.com/article/20040627/FEATURES/106280044

 

Orange County Register, Santa Ana, CA. “Muddy highway crash kills three in family.” 12-2-1996, p. 14. Accessed 2-1-2016 at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=194554395&sterm

 

 

[1] Not included is the Dec 1 death of three members of Appler family (wife/mother and two children) when their car was hit by a semi after they stopped at a mudslide near Elkton, Douglas County, on the Umpqua River.

[2] AP. “Oregon highway collapses; eight dead in Northwest storm.” Clovis News Journal, NM, 11-21-1996, p. 1; NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Oregon, Southern Coast, Nov 17-21, 1996.

[3] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Ice Storm, Washington, Moses Lake Area, Nov 19, 1996.

[4] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Heavy Snow, Washington, Tacoma Area, Nov 19, 1996.

[5] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Heavy Snow, Washington, Yakima Valley, Nov 19-20, 1996.

—  38  Blanchard tally of State totals below.

–~35  NYT (McFadden). “The Flooding After the Storm…Called Worst in Decades.” 1-22-1996.

—  33  NCDC, NOAA. The Winter of ´95 and ’96…A Season of Extremes. April 1996, p. 4.

 

Summary of Fatalities by State (Chronological)

 

New York       –10

Pennsylvania  –19

Vermont         —  2

Virginia          —  5

West Virginia —  2

 

Breakout of Fatalities by State and Locality (where noted)

 

New York       (10)

–10  Lumia. Flood of January 19-20, 1996 in New York State. USGS, 1998, p. 1.

–10  NCDC, NOAA. The Winter of ´95 and ’96…A Season of Extremes. April 1996, p. 4.

—  1  Cayuga Co., Jan 19-20. Flash flood, female, 29, in vehicle. NCDC Storm Events Database.

—  6  Delaware County, Jan 19-20. Flash flood; Males, 1, 3, 23, 27, 52 and female, 32, vehicular.[1]

—  1  Schenectady County, Jan 19-20. Mudslide caused by heavy rains; male, 42, outdoors.[2]

—  2  Schoharie Village, Jan 19-20. Males, 49 and 72, trapped by fast rising water at home.[3]

 

Pennsylvania  (19)

–19  NCDC, NOAA. The Winter of ´95 and ’96…A Season of Extremes. April 1996, p. 4.

–17  NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Search Results all PA Counties all Event Types.[4]

—  1  Bedford County, Jan 19. Truck swept away 2^nd attempt crossing flooded road; female, 62.[5]

—  1  Blair County, Geeseytown, Jan 19. Male, 17, surrounded by rising water and drowned.[6]

—  1  Blair County, Jan 19. Heart attack, female, 68, when home was surrounded by water.[7]

—  1  Cumberland Co., Middlesex, Jan 19. Male, 32, drove around a barricade, had to abandon car.[8]

—  4  Juniata Co., Jan 19. Flash flood; females, 34 and 35; males 38 and 8, after leaving cars.[9]

—  1  Lycoming Co., Cogan Station, Jan 19. Female, 38, fell from roof of her mobile home into water.[10]

—  1  Lycoming Co., Cogan Station, Jan 19. Male, 54, attempting to climb to roof of his trailer.[11]

—  1  Lycoming Co., March Hill, Jan 19. Male, 68; attempting to drive away from hunting cabin.[12]

—  2  Lycoming Co., Trout Run, Jan 19. Male, 77, wife, 75, swept away trying to drive from home.[13]

—  1  Lycoming Co., Williamsport, Jan 19. Female, 59, slipped off roof of her stalled truck in water.[14]

—  1  Montgomery Co., Lower Frederick Twp., Jan 19. Male, 47, drove into flooded Perkiomen Creek.[15]

—  1  Montgomery Co., Pottstown, Manatawny Creek. Jan 20. Male, 25, jumped or fell into creek.[16]

—  1  Montgomery Co. ~Providence Twp., Jan 19. Male, 41, tried to drive across flooded bridge.[17]

—  1  Snyder, Selinsgrove, Jan 19. Drowning; male, 75, in car after first refusing to evacuate.[18]

 

Vermont         (  2)

— 2  NCDC, NOAA. The Winter of ´95 and ’96…A Season of Extremes. April 1996, p. 4.

—  2  Franklin County (western), Jan 19 and 21. Female, 14, attempting to save father, 50.[19]

 

Virginia          (  5)

— 1  Albemarle County, Jan 19. Male, in vehicle. NCDC Storm Events Data Base, Flash Flood.

— 4  Culpeper Co., Hazel Riv., Jan 19-21. Vehicle driven into floodwater; males 16, 20; females 14, 15.[20]

 

West Virginia ( 2)

–2  NCDC, NOAA. The Winter of ´95 and ’96…A Season of Extremes. April 1996, p. 4.

–1  NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Search results all WV Counties, all event types.[21]

–1  Morgan County, Jan 19. Female, 51, vehicle. NCDC Storm Events Database. Flash Flood.

 

Narrative Information

General:

 

NCDC: “The sudden warm-up that followed [early Jan blizzard] proved to be almost as deadly and damaging as the blizzard itself. Burlington, VT recorded 65 F on January 19. Moderate to heavy rains (3.03 inches in 24 hours at Williamsport, PA) and rapid snowmelt triggered serious flooding along the Delaware, Susquehanna, upper Ohio, Potomac and James River basins, with crests as much as 20 feet above flood stage. The flooding killed 33 people, forced over 200,000 from their homes, and destroyed or damaged hundreds of roads and bridges.

 

“In Harpers Ferry, WV, where the Shenandoah and Potomac rivers meet, the water crested at 31 feet–13 feet above flood stage. USGS scientists estimated that the Potomac River crested at a flow of 312,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) at Point of Rocks, MD, nearing the level of 347,000

cfs reached in June of 1972 after rains from Hurricane Agnes. The Susquehanna River at Harrisburg, PA crested at 570,000 cfs, well below the flow of 1 million cfs reached in June 1972 from Hurricane Agnes.

 

“State officials reported flood fatalities as follows:

 

Pennsylvania–19  [Gelber (2006, 215), as well, notes 19 deaths.]

New York–10

West Virginia–2

Vermont–2

 

“No flood -related deaths have been reported from Maryland, Virginia, Ohio, or New Jersey. Presidential disaster declarations included the states of Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia and New York.”  (NCDC, NOAA. The Winter of “95 and ’96, 1996, p. 4.)

 

McFadden/NYT, Jan 22: “Swollen rivers and streams across the New York and mid-Atlantic regions receded yesterday as tens of thousands of evacuated residents returned to flood-ravaged homes and businesses in eight states, and public officials began to assess the costs of the worst flooding in decades. But the danger had not passed everywhere. Some 10,000 residents were still being evacuated yesterday from West Virginia towns along the surging Ohio River. About 1,100 homes on Wheeling Island, at Wheeling, were under six feet of water, their 3,000 occupants still refugees. So were the 700 residents of Port Deposit, Md., in the shadow of an overflowing river dam….

 

“Deep into a winter that has brought heavy snows, bitter cold, pounding rains and a January thaw that suddenly melted the mountainous snowpack across eight states, weekend floods added another misery for thousands along the great tree of eastern waterways: the Susquehanna, the Delaware, the Monongahela, the Ohio, the Allegheny, the Potomac and other rivers and their latticework tributaries.

 

“As the engorged rivers crested and fell, the toll of death and damage began to emerge, and emergency officials in many areas called it the worst flooding since Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972, which killed 48 people and left 220,000 homeless in Pennsylvania alone, or Hurricane Eloise, which caused 44 deaths and hundreds of millions in damage from the Caribbean to New England in 1975. Since Friday’s heavy rains and unseasonal warmth, which unleashed the melting and flooding, at least 35 weather-related deaths have been reported in the East, 10 of them in New York State. Five people are missing.

 

“While many rivers and streams crested above flood stage, all did not overflow their banks and many areas were spared. But flood damage was heavy in dozens of locales, including Pittsburgh; Wilkes-Barre; Cumberland, Md.; Wheeling, W.Va., and the devastated little village of Walton, N.Y., where almost every home and business was severely damaged….

 

“Pennsylvania appeared to have been hit hardest, and President Clinton yesterday declared the state a Federal disaster area, making available temporary housing, individual family and home repair grants, disaster unemployment benefits and low-interest loans for affected businesses and homeowners….” (NYT/McFadden. “The Flooding After the Storm: The Overview; Flooding Called Worst in Decades.” 1-22-1996.)

 

New York

 

Lumia: “Heavy rain during January 18-19, 1996, combined with unseasonably warm temperatures that caused rapid snowmelt, resulted in widespread flooding throughout New York State. Damages to highways, bridges, and private property exceeded $100 million. The storm and flooding claimed 10 lives, stranded hundreds of people, destroyed or damaged thousands of homes and businesses, and closed hundreds of roads. Forty-one counties in New York were declared federal disaster areas. The most severely affected region was within and surrounding the Catskill Mountains. Damages and losses within Delaware County alone exceeded $20 million.

 

“More than 4.5 inches of rain fell on at least 45 inches of melting snow in the Catskill Mountain region during January 18-19 and caused major flooding in the area. The most destructive flooding was along Schoharie Creek and the East and West Branches of the Delaware River….”

(Lumia. Flood of January 19-20, 1996 in New York State.   USGS, 1998, p. 1.)

 

NCDC on Schenectady County: Snowmelt and rain “resulted in widespread flooding across Schenectady County including the flooding of the Mohawk River and Schoharie Creek. Federal Disaster Assistance was made available by presidential declaration. Small streams flooded across the entire county which resulted in many road washouts. Flooding was extensive along the Mohawk River especially in the Stockade region of Schenectady. Over fifty people were evacuated from this area. In Schenectady heavy rains caused a mudslide in which mud and debris broke loose from a hillside and crushed a man who was fueling a vehicle at a gas station. Gallopville Road in Duanesburg was heavily damaged and Rosendale Road in Niskayuna was damaged by ice moving down the flooded Mohawk River.” (NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood [mudslide], NY, Eastern Schenectady, Jan 19-20, 1996.)

 

NCDC on Schoharie County: “An intense area of low pressure which was located over the Mid-Atlantic region on Friday morning January 19th produced unseasonably warm temperatures, high dewpoints and strong winds. This resulted in rapid melting of one to three feet of snow. In addition to the rapid snowmelt one to three inches of rain fell as the system moved northeast along the coast. This resulted in widespread flooding across Schoharie County and a record breaking flood on the Schoharie Creek. Federal Disaster Assistance was made available by presidential declaration. Village of Schoharie and Middleburgh saw the most severe flooding. Along the Schoharie Creek 55 single homes were destroyed, 125 suffered major damage, 316 suffered minor damage, 6 mobile homes were destroyed, 111 cattle were drowned and 375 acres of farmland was damaged. Two Village of Schoharie residents died due to exposure when fast rising waters trapped them in their home. At Priddle Camp near Esperance 15 homes were destroyed and 10 suffered major damage. Many roads were washed out across the county with 8.5 million dollars of damage incurred to county roads and bridges. Heavy damage occurred in the following places Stryker Road in the Town of Gilboa, Junction Road and bridge in Esperance, state route 900v and bridge at Gilboa, Sholtes and Schoonmaker bridges in Wright, River Street and route 30 in Middleburgh and route 7 over Schoharie Creek. In Middleburgh the downtown area was evacuated and in Schoharie several businesses were flooded including the Harva Company, The Printers and Great American.” (NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, New York, Schoharie, Jan 19-20, 1996.

 

Pennsylvania

 

NCDC: “The combination of snowmelt from the previous week’s two storms, unseasonably warm temperatures and an additional one to two inches of rain caused the flash flooding of almost every small stream and significant roadway flooding the afternoon and early evening hours on the 19th. Major flooding of the larger streams and rivers in Pennsylvania continued through the 21st. The flooding caused three deaths, all in Montgomery County, three injuries and about $50 million dollars in property damage. All of Pennsylvania was declared a disaster area and extra public assistance was given to Northampton, Bucks and Monroe Counties, the hardest hit counties in the Southern Poconos and Southeast Pennsylvania. In many places the Delaware River crested at its highest stage since 1955. Numerous vehicle rescues occurred. The following paragraphs will contain a county by county summary of damages along with specific stage information. [Bolding emphasis added.]

 

“….Berks County escaped with the least amount of damage and the lowest number of water rescues in the area. Ten people were evacuated along the Schuylkill River in Muhlenberg Township. Several homes were damaged. On the 19th a Sinking Spring man died after falling from a roof he was trying to clear of snow. The Schuylkill River in Berne crested at 14.32 feet at 1030 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 12 feet. The river crested at 15.85 feet in Reading at 6 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 13 feet….

 

“Bucks County, like Northampton County suffered from the combination of both small stream and large river flooding with townships along the Delaware River taking the brunt. About 5,000 persons (1,500 in Yardley) from nine communities were evacuated, mainly along the Delaware River from Riegelsville to Yardley on the 20th. A state of emergency was declared at 3 p.m. on the 20th. Seven bridges between Bucks County and New Jersey were closed. River Road, [PA] State Route 32, was clogged with up to four feet of ice chunks and debris (including floating propane tanks) almost along its entire county length. Pennsylvania State Route 611 was also closed in the northern part of the county. A mile-long stretch of ice closed the road near Riegelsville. Homes near the Paunnaccusing Creek were evacuated also as flooding along the Delaware River backed up the creek. One hundred homes in Quakertown were also flooded. Flooding damaged three ball fields in Sellersville. Ice jams along the Neshaminy Creek caused flooding in Croydon and Fergusonville. Yardley, Bridgeton and Tinicum Townships were the hardest hit communities along the Delaware on the 20th. About 65 people were rescued after refusing to evacuate or ignoring barricades. Two were treated for hypothermia. In Yardley, 230 homes suffered flood damage, 79 had major damage and 36 businesses also had flood damage. In New Hope, power was cut off for 28 hours because of the flooding. This village is a very popular tourist attraction and many restaurants’ food perished. Waterloo Street was hardest hit. In Tinicum Township, many side roads were washed out. About 50 to 60 homes had damage exceeding $1,000,000. About 450 homes throughout the county suffered flood damaged. The Neshaminy Creek in Langhorne crested at 14.98 feet at 1 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 9 feet. Along the Delaware River at Riegelsville it crested at 28.72 feet at 615 pm on the 20th. Flood stage is 19 feet. At New Hope, the river crested at 15.34 feet at 11 p.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 13 feet. At Trenton, the river crested at 22.19 feet at 130 a.m. on the 21st. Flood stage is 20 ft.

 

“In Carbon County, 17 of 23 townships reported flood damage. In all 365 homes suffered major flood damage and 1,185 suffered minor flood damage. In addition 6 apartment buildings, 13 businesses, 34 roads, 51 sewer lines, 13 electrical systems and 3 parks were damaged by the flooding. Palmerton and Parryville were the hardest hit townships. In Parryville, a mile long culvert was washed out. In Palmerton the flooding along the Aquashicola Creek on the 19th forced the evacuation of about 100 persons along a four block stretch of Delaware Avenue and a two block stretch of Lehigh Avenue. Residents returned to find their basements full of mud. The Lehigh River in Lehighton crested at 12.16 feet at 1 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 10 feet….

 

“In Chester County, 109 persons in an Avondale apartment were evacuated as the White Clay Creek flooded. Rescues were made from about a dozen homes and trailers along River Band road in west Chester. Seven major roads were closed due to flooding, including the intersection of the two busiest roads in the county…[US Rt. 30 and PA Rt. 100]. Flooding along the Brandywine Creek caused severe damage ($125,000) in the Brandywine Picnic Park in Birmingham. In all, 324 homes, 52 apartments, 21 businesses, 170 roads and 17 municipal parks were damaged. Five bridges suffered structural damage. The hardest hit communities were Avondale, Coatesville, Downingtown and Lenape. The Schuylkill River at Pottstown crested at 14.91 feet at 1 p.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 13 feet. The West Branch of the Brandywine Creek in Modena crested at 9.7 feet at 8 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 9 feet. The East Branch of the Brandywine Creek at Downingtown crested at 12.59 feet at 7 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 7 feet. The Brandywine Creek at Chadds Ford crested at 14.21 feet at 1 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 9 feet.

 

“In Delaware County, the Chester Creek in Chester flooded parklands and a bridge. Severe urban flooding caused many water rescues starting at 130 p.m. on the 19th. The Brandywine Creek at Chadds Ford crested at 14.21 feet at 1 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 9 feet. The Chester Creek in Chester crested at 11.20 feet at 5 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 8 feet….

 

“In Lehigh County, the heavy rain caused a 75 by 6 foot snow slide in South Whiteland Township which damaged two homes and caused one injury (severed fingers). Adams Island in Allentown was evacuated due to Lehigh River flooding. Pennsylvania State Route 309 was closed in Orefield due to flooding along the Jordan River. The river crested at 9.13 feet in Allentown at 230 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 7 feet. In Allentown firefighters responded to 123 calls of flooded basements, the most in twenty-two years. The Lehigh River at Walnutport crested at 12.3 feet at 9 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 8 feet. In Bethlehem, the river crested at 16.9 feet at 130 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 16 feet….

 

“In Monroe County, damage was estimated at $25 million dollars. The county was hit by flooding along the Delaware River in addition to the small stream flooding elsewhere. Three homes were completely destroyed, 134 suffered heavy damage and 1,426 suffered light damage. Six businesses also incurred heavy damage. On the 19th thirty major roadways were closed and two bridges were overrun by water. In Stroudsburg 45 persons were evacuated from the Glenbrook Apartments and 8 people were rescued from the flood waters in Barrett Township. Smithfield Township reported 15 homes suffered flood damage on the 19th. In Mount Pocono, a quarter-mile long road washout occurred. Flooding along the Delaware River caused considerable damage on the 20th in Shawnee and Price’s Landing. The 90 year-old Shawnee Inn and Country Club suffered extensive damage. Three hundred Shawnee residents were evacuated. The Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area suffered $2 million dollars in damage. The Lehigh River at Stoddardsville crested at 9.64 feet at 930 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 7 feet. The Tobyhanna Creek in Blakeslee crested at 11.67 feet at 1030 p.m. on the 19th. The Delaware River crested at 25.7 feet at 1 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 21 feet….

 

“All three of the flooding caused deaths occurred within Montgomery County. About 830 p.m. on the 19th a 47-year-old male drove into the flooded Perkiomen Creek at the intersection of Arcola and Level Roads in Lower Frederick Township. He climbed out of the car through the passenger side, but was unable to make it to shore. His body was found on the afternoon of the 20th near a sewage treatment plant. About 1030 p.m. on the 19th, a 41-year-old male moved a blockade and tried to cross a flooded bridge over the Perkiomen Creek between Upper and Lower Providence Townships. His vehicle was swept away. His body was found 1,500 feet downstream the next morning. On the 20th, a 25 year-old man apparently jumped into the Manatawny Creek in Pottstown and drowned. He allegedly had just robbed a convenience store and was trying to run away from the police. There were numerous other rescues within the county including a stranded school bus in Lower Moreland Township and two teenagers rescued from the flooded Macoby and Unami Creeks on the afternoon of the 19th. Ninety persons were evacuated from the Bridgeport Towers along the Schuylkill River in Norristown. Twenty persons were evacuated in Collegeville near the Perkiomen Creek. Within the county 280 homes suffered damage, 50 with major damage. In addition, 85 businesses were flooded and three mobile homes were destroyed. Flooding ripped front porches from homes in Upper Providence Township and a Lower Providence Township home had ten feet of water in it. The hardest hit communities were Bridgeport, Collegeville, Lower Providence, Norristown, Upper Providence and Whitemarsh. The Schuylkill River at Pottstown crested at 14.91 feet at 1 p.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 13 feet. It crested at 19 feet in Norristown. The Perkiomen Creek in Graterford crested at 16.26 feet at 9 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 11 feet.

 

“Northampton County endured the combination of both small stream and significant large river flooding. Long lengths of Pennsylvania State Route 611 were closed due to flooding, river debris and suffered road erosion. Most of the significant flood damage occurred along the Lehigh and Delaware Rivers. In Upper Mount Bethel Township, twelve homes were damaged and hundreds were evacuated. Portland within the township was hard hit as all small streams and the Delaware River flooded the town. Roads were filled with silt, mud and river debris. Two houses were damaged by ice chunks. In Forks Township, 50 homes were damaged and about 50 persons were evacuated. In Easton, flooding was severe near the confluence of the Delaware and Lehigh Rivers. Evacuations were ordered for homes near both rivers. All downtown streets and parks were flooded especially along Larry Holmes Drive. About 50 homes (20 seriously) and three businesses were flooded. The city garage was damaged. A half submerged man was rescued from the Lehigh River Saturday evening the 20th. A state of emergency had to be declared to remove gawkers. In West Easton, two homes suffered flood damage and about 20 persons were evacuated. In Williams Township, 13 homes suffered flood damage. The Lehigh River at Walnutport crested at 12.3 feet at 9 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 8 feet. In Bethlehem, the river crested at 16.9 feet at 130 a.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 16 feet. The Lehigh River at Walnutport crested at 12.3 feet at 9 p.m. on the 19th. Flood stage is 8 feet. In Bethlehem, the river crested at 16.9 feet at 130 am on the 20th. Flood stage is 16 feet. The Delaware River at Belvidere Bridge crested at 22.94 feet at 1 pm on the 20th. Flood stage is 20 feet. The river crested at 30.65 feet at Phillipsburg at 4 p.m. on the 20th. Flood stage is 22 feet. For most places the crest along the Delaware was the highest since 1955….

 

“In Philadelphia, flooding along the Schuylkill River caused the worst damage, especially in Manayunk. Main Street in Manayunk was under two to three feet of water with up to 5 feet of water in basements. Kelly, West River and Lincoln Drives were all closed due to river flooding. A mudslide compounded the problems along Kelly Drive. The Schuylkill River in Philadelphia crested at 13.36 feet at Midnight on the 20th/21st. Flood stage is 11 feet. This was estimated as a once in 50 year flood for the river within the city….” (NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Pennsylvania, Montgomery County, Jan 19-20, 1996.)

 

Virginia

 

NCDC: “High dewpoint temperatures melted most of the snow on the ground within 12 hours. The snow pack had a liquid equivalent between 2 to 3 inches. Snowmelt, combined with 1 to 3 inches of rain (some locations received nearly 5 inches), caused the worst regional flooding in over 10 years. River flooding began during the flood/flash flood event along the headwaters of all basins and continued downstream through the 22nd. Crests ranged from 3 to 21 feet above flood stage.

 

“High water caused millions of dollars in damage, closed roads, destroyed homes and businesses, and forced the evacuation of several towns. Four people were rescued by the National Park Service and Fairfax County Fire Department at Great Falls…when they wandered onto the rocks to view the raging Potomac and became stranded. Several kayakers were also rescued while trying the sail the rough waters. Although low-water bridges remained closed, a vehicle carrying three teenagers and one adult dared the high waters of the Hazel River… — and lost. All four perished as the automobile was swept downstream.

 

“Flood waters covered Union Street and the lower part of King Street along the river in Old Town Alexandria…and affected Washington National Airport, but not the runways. The city of Waynesboro…estimated $3 million in damage ($1 million to residential areas; $2 million to businesses). In Rockingham Co… $2.2 million in damage was attributed to the loss of inventory at Hartz Corporation, an apparel manufacturer. High water also caused $70 thousand in damage to Opequon Water Reclamation Facility in Frederick Co….” (NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Virginia, Culpeper, Jan 19-21, 1996.)

 

Sources

 

Gelber, Ben. The Pennsylvania Weather Book. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002. Google preview at: http://books.google.com/books?id=34RKv9fMFo4C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

Lumia, Richard. Flood of January 19-20, 1996 in New York State (Water-Resources Investigations Report 97-4252). Albany, NY:  U. S. Geological Survey, 1998.  Accessed at: http://ny.water.usgs.gov/pubs/wri/wri974252/WRIR97-4252toc.html

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, New York, Cayuga County, Jan 19-20, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5583205

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, New York, Delaware County, Jan 19-20, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at:  http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5545610

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Bedford County, Jan 19, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5569800

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Blair County, Jan 19, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5569804

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Cumberland County, Jan 19, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5569817

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Juniata County, Jan 19, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5569819

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Lycoming County, Jan 19, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5569986

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Snyder County, Jan 19, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5569989

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Virginia, Albemarle County, Jan 19, 1996. Accessed 2-7-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5541089

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, West Virginia, Morgan County, Jan 19, 1996. Accessed 2-7-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5541380

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood [mudslide], New York, Eastern Schenectady County, Jan 19-20, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5553420

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, New York, Schoharie, Jan 19-20, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5553410

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Pennsylvania, Montgomery County, Jan 19-20, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5543255

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Vermont, Western Franklin County, Jan 19-20-1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5554216

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Virginia, Culpeper, Jan 19-21, 1996. Accessed 2-8-2016: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5541122

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Search Results for All Counties in Pennsylvania. All Available Event Types…between 01/17/1996 and 01/22/1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/listevents.jsp?eventType=ALL&beginDate_mm=01&beginDate_dd=17&beginDate_yyyy=1996&endDate_mm=01&endDate_dd=22&endDate_yyyy=1996&county=ALL&hailfilter=0.00&tornfilter=0&windfilter=000&sort=DT&submitbutton=Search&statefips=42%2CPENNSYLVANIA

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. The Winter of ’95-’96 … A Season of Extremes (Technical Report 96-02).  NOAA, NCDC, April 1996, 32 pages. Accessed 2-7-2016 at:  http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/techrpts/tr9602/tr9602.pdf

 

New York Times (Robert D. McFadden). “The Flooding After the Storm: The Overview; Flooding Called Worst in Decades.” 1-22-1996. Accessed 2-8-2016 at: http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/22/nyregion/the-flooding-after-the-storm-the-overview-flooding-called-worst-in-decades.html?pagewanted=all

 

 

 

[1] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, New York, Delaware County, Jan 19-20, 1996.

[2] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, New York, Schenectady County, Jan 19-20, 1996.

[3] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, New York, Schoharie County, Jan 19-20, 1996.

[4] Search dates were Jan 17-22, inclusive. An April 1996 NCDC report notes 19 deaths. Assume that one of the two differences is the heart attack death of elderly woman in Blair Co., when her home was surrounded by floodwater.

[5] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Bedford County, Jan 19, 1996. Notes the woman’s husband, who survived, was driving the truck.

[6] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Blair County, Jan 19, 1996. Notes the young man “was trapped by rising water on the Frankstown branch of the Juniata River. Rescue attempts by jet ski and helicopter failed when the youth was unable to hold onto a rope in the ice cold water.”

[7] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Blair County, Jan 19, 1996.

[8] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Cumberland County, Jan 19, 1996.

[9] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Juniata County, Jan 19, 1996. Notes “Two females and two males in three separate cars were unable to cross Tuscarora Creek between Academia and Pleasant View due to a flooded bridge. They attempted to cross the stream on foot and were swept away.”

[10] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Lycoming, Jan 19, 1996.

[11] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Lycoming, Jan 19, 1996.

[12] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Lycoming, Jan 19, 1996.

[13] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Lycoming, Jan 19, 1996.

[14] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, Pennsylvania, Lycoming, Jan 19, 1996.

[15] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Pennsylvania, Montgomery County, Jan 19-20, 1996.

[16] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Pennsylvania, Montgomery County, Jan 19-20, 1996.

[17] NCDC. Storm Events Database. Flood, PA, Montgomery, Jan 19-20, 1996. Notes the man moved a blockade on the road then unsuccessfully “tried to cross a flooded bridge over the Perkiomen Creek between Upper and Lower Providence Townships. His vehicle was swept away. His body was found 1,500 feet downstream the next morning.”

[18] NCDC. Storm Events Database. Flash Flood, PA, Snyder, Jan 19, 1996. Notes the man “refused to abandon his home during evacuation of people near Selinsgrove. He later attempted to leave by auto and was swept away.”

[19] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Vermont, Western Franklin County, Jan 19-20, 1996. Notes the girl drowned on 19^th “trying to rescue her father when car was swept by water. The father died 2 days later (1/21/96) from injuries and hypothermia suffered from the accident on 1/19/96.”

[20] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Flood, Virginia, Culpeper County, Jan 19-21, 1996.

[21] Timeframe for search was Jan 17-20 inclusive.

International (Puerto Rico and Dominican Republic):     (26)

–26  National Hurricane Ctr. “Active Atlantic Hurricane Season in 1996 Marks Near Record.”

–21  Avila, L. A. Preliminary Report. Hurricane Hortense 3-16 September 1996. 10-23-1996.

–18  Puerto Rico        –3  Dominican Republic

 

Puerto Rico:

—  24  AP. “Puerto Rico digs out from storm.” Orange County Register, CA. 9-14-1996, 21.[1]

–~22  Reuters (Anna Wardenburg). “Weakened Georges headed for Cuba, Florida,” 9-23-1998.

–~21  Timelines of History. Timeline Puerto Rico (webpage). Cites Assoc. Press, 9-10-1997.

—  20  AP. “Town mourns 4 victims of flooding in [PR].” Cedar Rapids Gazette. 9-15-1996, 3A.

—  19  Hurricane City. “Ponce, Puerto Rico’s history with tropical systems.”

—  18  Avila, L. A. Preliminary Report. Hurricane Hortense 3-16 September 1996. 10-23-1996.

—  18  National Hurricane Ctr. “Active Atlantic Hurricane Season in 1996 Marks Near Record.”

—  18 (plus 3 missing). NWS (Bennett). An Overview of Hurricane Hortense and its Aftermath.

—  14  Longshore. Encyclopedia of Hurricanes, Typhoons, and Cyclones (New Ed.). 2008, p.355.

—  12  New York Times. “Puerto Rico Asks for U.S. Aid to Recover from Hurricane.” 9-12-1996.

 

Locational breakouts (partial):

— 4  Guayama. AP. “Town mourns 4 victims of flooding…” Cedar Rapids Gazette. 9-15-1996, 3

Males, 18 and 50; females, 25 and 44.

— 1  Loiza, near Rio Grande River, male. AP. “Hurricanes Imperil Coasts…” 9-13-1996.

— 1  Patillas beach, southeastern PR. Male. AP. “Hurricanes Imperil Coasts…” 9-13-1996.

— 2  Location not noted. Sisters, 8 and 13.[2]

 

Narrative (Summary)

 

Avila: “Hortense became the second category four hurricane and the fourth category three hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale (SSHS) of the season. Hortense was a wet hurricane and most of the damage was caused by its accompanying torrential rains. Hortense crossed the southwestern tip of Puerto Rico and the eastern top of the Dominican Republic as a category one hurricane and the associated floods killed at least 21 people. Hortense moved northward over the western Atlantic and crossed Nova Scotia as a weakening hurricane.” (Avila, L. A. Preliminary Report. Hurricane Hortense 3-16 September 1996. 10-23-1996)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “Hurricane Hortense Slams into Puerto Rico, Killing 8.” 1996. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://www.thefreelibrary.com/HURRICANE+HORTENSE+SLAMS+INTO+PUERTO+RICO,+KILLING+8.-a083966835

 

Associated Press. “Hurricanes Imperil Coasts. Hortense Sets Its Sights on Northeastern States.” 9-13-1996. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://www.spokesman.com/stories/1996/sep/13/hurricanes-imperil-coasts-hortense-sets-its/

 

Associated Press (Ed McCullough). “Puerto Rico digs out from storm.” Orange County Register, Santa Ana, CA, 9-14-1996, 21. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=195153986&sterm

 

Associated Press. “Town mourns 4 victims of flooding in Puerto Rico.” Cedar Rapids Gazette, IA. 9-15-1996, 3A. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=153378430&sterm

 

Avila, Lixion A. Preliminary Report. Hurricane Hortense 3-16 September 1996. Miami, FL: National Hurricane Center, NOAA, 10-23-1996. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1996hortense.html

 

Hurricane City. “Ponce, Puerto Rico’s history with tropical systems.” No date. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://www.hurricanecity.com/city/ponce.htm

 

Longshore, David.  Encyclopedia of Hurricanes, Typhoons, and Cyclones (New Edition). New York, NY:  Facts on File, 2008.

 

National Hurricane Center (Frank Lepore and Stephanie Kenitzer). “Active Atlantic Hurricane Season in 1996 Marks Near Record (Press Release).” Miami, FL: NHC, NOAA, 11-29-1996. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://stormcarib.com/hurr96.htm#tws

 

National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office, San Juan, PR (Shawn P. Bennett). An Overview of Hurricane Hortense and its Aftermath. NWS WFO, San Juan, NOAA, 1-31-2009 update. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://www.srh.noaa.gov/sju/?n=1996_hortense

 

New York Times. “Puerto Rico Asks for U.S. Aid to Recover from Hurricane.” 9-12-1996. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/12/us/puerto-rico-asks-for-us-aid-to-recover-from-hurricane.html

 

Reuters (Anna Wardenburg). “Weakened Georges headed for Cuba, Florida,” 9-23-1998. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y98/sep98/23e2.htm

 

Timelines of History. Timeline Puerto Rico (webpage). Cites Associated Press, 9-10-1997. Accessed 5-1-2014 at: http://www.timelines.ws/countries/PUERTORICO.HTML

 

 

 

 

 

[1] “The death toll in this U.S. territory rose to 24 Friday [Sep 13], when police discovered five more victims of flash floods and mudslides in Puerto Rico and three drowning victims in the Dominican Republic.”

[2] Associated Press. “Hurricane Hortense Slams into Puerto Rico, Killing 8.” 1996.

–40-42  Blanchard tally based on State and locality breakouts below.

—     37  NCDC, NOAA. North Carolina Hit By Frantastic Storm! (website). 1-23-2009 update.

—     37  NWS, Raleigh NC. Event Summary, Hurricane Fran, September 1996.

—     36  Marshall, R. Hurricane Fran in North Carolina, September 5-6, 1996. NIST, 1998, iii.

—     34  Burt and Stroud. Extreme Weather: A Guide & Record Book. 2004, p. 205.

—     34  Mayfield, Max. Preliminary Report: Hurricane Fran, 23 August – 8 Sept. 1996.[1]

—   >30  Associated Press. “Was Fran the worst?” Garden City Telegram, KS. 9-10-1996, p. 2.

—     27  (22 direct, 5 indirect). Wikipedia. “Hurricane Fran.” 4-9-2014 modification.

—     26 (Direct). NWS. Hurricane Fran, August 28-September 8, 1996. 1997, p. ix.

—     24  Legeros.  North Carolina Deadliest Disasters Database.

—     22  The Intelligencer, Doylestown, PA. “Fran leaves 22 dead.” 9-8-1996, A11.

—   >17  Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran claims 17, drenches Virginia.” 9-7-1996, A13.

 

Maryland                   (  2)

— 2  Montgomery Co., Sep 5. Drownings; car swept away by flood water, male and female.[2]

 

North Carolina          (25)

–25  Platt, et al. “Rebuilding…[NC] Coast after…Fran…” Coastal Mgmt. 2002, p. 257.[3]

–24  National Weather Service, Raleigh NC. Event Summary, Hurricane Fran, September 1996.

–24  NCDC, NOAA. North Carolina Hit By Frantastic Storm! (website). 1-23-2009 update.

–23  Marshall, R. Hurricane Fran in North Carolina, September 5-6, 1996. NIST, 1998, iii.

–21  Mayfield, Max. Preliminary Report: Hurricane Fran, 23 August – 8 September 1996.[4]

–19  AP. “North Carolina Still Battles with Fran’s Aftermath.” Post-Standard, 9-11-1996, A4.

–18  Blanchard tally from county breakouts below.

–17  Associated Press. “Hurricane Fran.” Times-News, Burlington, NC, 9-8-1996, D7.

–14  Direct. NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996 (Service Assessment). July 1997.

–12  Direct (fallen trees). RENCI at ECU. Hurricane Fran (website). “Human Impact.” 3-23-2012

—  1  Alamance County, Snow Camp, Sep 5-6. Tree fall onto house (direct); male, 13-14.[5]

—  1  Bladen County, Sep 5. Heart attack; male, 75, “rescue workers could not reach him.”[6]

—  1  Duplin County, Rose Hill,[7] Sep 5. Chimney collapses into house (direct); female.[8]

—  1  Durham County, Bahama,[9] Sep 5. Tree fall onto truck (direct); male fire fighter, 19.[10]

—  1  Durham County, Sep 5-6. Tree fall onto vehicle.[11]

—  1  Johnston County, Benson,[12] Sep 5. Tree fall onto home (direct); male, 70.[13]

—  1  Onslow Co., Sep 5. Drowning (direct); male drove off bridge at North Topsail beach.[14]

—  1  Onslow County, NE of Wilmington, Sep 5. Tree fall onto trailer (direct); female, teen.[15]

—  1  Pender Co., Sep 5. Exposure/hypothermia; female, [16] 72, found on mattress in marsh.[17]

—  1  Pender Co., Sep 5. Apparent drowning; male, 45, found floating, Scotts Hill Marina Basin.[18]

—  1  Pender County, Topsail Beach, body found Sep 6. Drowning, marine soldier, male, 19.[19]

—  1  Pitt County, Sep 5. Vehicular (direct); male driving car hits fallen tree.[20]

—  2  Wake County, Sep 5. Vehicular (direct); car runs into fallen tree, male, 55, female, 67.[21]

—  1  Wake County, Raleigh, Crabtree Creek, Sep 5 or 7.[22] Drowning (direct); male, 17.[23]

—  1  Wake County, Raleigh. Tree fall onto mobile home; female. (RENCI at ECU.)

—  1  Wake County, Raleigh. Tree fall during clean-up; male.[24]

—  1  Wayne County, Sep 5. Vehicular (direct); car runs into fallen tree, male, 22.[25]

 

Pennsylvania              (3-5)

— 4  (2 direct, 2 indirect). Wikipedia. “Hurricane Fran.” 4-9-2014 modification. (No citation.)

— 1  Clearfield County, Morris Twp., Morrisdale, St. Rt. 53, Sep 6. 3-vehicle crash; man, 20.[26]

— 1  Cumberland Co., Sep 6. Drowning (direct), car swept away by flood water; female, 26.[27]

— 1  Perry County, Sep 6. Drowning (direct); flash flood near home, female, 79.[28]

— 2  Philadelphia area, Sep 8. Drownings; male, 73 and female, 70,[29] in flooded basement.[30]

 

South Carolina          (  2)

— 1  Horry Co., ~Conway, Sep 5. Female, 66,[31] swerved vehicle to avoid tree, crashed.[32]

— 1  Williamsburg Co., ~Andrews, Sep 5. Male driving car hits tree that fell onto road.[33]

 

Virginia                      (  6)

— 6  Virginia Department of Emergency Management. Hurricane History (website). 2012.

— 5  Wikipedia. “Hurricane Fran.” 4-9-2014 modification. (No citation.)

— 2  Augusta Co., Sep 6. Drowning; 2 males, 18 and 21, swept away trying to cross bridge.[34]

— 1  Fairfax County, Sep 5-6. Car hits tree which had fallen onto highway; male.[35]

— 1  Highland Co., Sep 6. Drowning; female, 53, attempting to drive across flooded creek.[36]

— 1  Pittsylvania County, Sep 5. Drowning; attempted to drive across flooded road, male, 60.[37]

 

West Virginia             (  2)

— 1  Grant County, Sep 6. Drowning; male drove tractor into flood water.[38]

— 1  Pendleton County, U.S. 220, Sep 6. Drowning; male, 20, drove car into flood water.[39]

 

Cause of Death (Direct — 31)[40]

 

–26 (Direct total). NWS. Hurricane Fran, August 28-September 8, 1996. 1997, p. ix.

 

Drowning                                                                   (14)

–2  MD. Montgomery Co., Sep 5. Drownings; car swept away by flood water, male, female.[41]

–1  NC. Onslow Co., Sep 5. Drowning (direct); male drove off bridge at North Topsail beach.

–1  NC. Pender Co., Sep 5. Apparent drowning; male, 45, found floating, marina basin.

–1  NC. Pender Co., Topsail Beach, Sep 5. Drowning, washed from car; US Marine, male, 19.

–1  NC. Wake County, Raleigh, Crabtree Creek, Sep 5 or 7. Drowning (direct); male, 17.

–1  MD. Cumberland Co., Sep 6. Drowning (direct), car swept away by flood water; female, 26.

–1  MD. Perry County, Sep 6. Drowning (direct); flash flood near home, female, 79.

–2  VA. Augusta Co., Sep 6. Drowning; 2 males, 18 and 21, swept away trying to cross bridge.

–1  VA. Highland Co., Sep 6. Drowning; female, 53, attempting to drive across flooded creek.

–1  VA. Pittsylvania County, Sep 5. Drowning; attempted to drive across flooded road, male, 60.

–1  WV. Grant County, Sep 6. Drowning; male drove tractor into flood water.

–1  WV. Pendleton County, U.S. 220, Sep 6. Drowning; male, 20, drove car into flood water.

 

Exposure/Hypothermia                                            (  1)

—  1  NC. Pender Co., Sep 5. Exposure/hypothermia; female, 72, found on mattress in marsh.

 

Structural Collapse (apparently high wind)          (  1)

—  1  NC. Duplin County, Rose Hill, Sep 5. Chimney collapses into house (direct); female.

 

Tree Falls                                                                   (15)

–12  NC. Tree falls. RENCI at ECU. Hurricane Fran (website). “Human Impact.” 3-23-2012.[42]

–1  NC. Alamance County, Sep 5. Tree fall onto house (direct); male, 14. (NCDC and NWS)

–1  NC. Bladen Co., Sep 5. Heart attack; male, 75, “rescue workers could not reach him.[43]

–1  NC. Durham County, Bahama, Sep 5. Tree fall onto truck (direct); male fire fighter, 19.

–1  NC. Durham County, Sep 5-6. Tree fall onto vehicle.[44]

–1  NC. Johnston County, Benson, Sep 5. Tree fall onto home (direct); male.

–1  NC. Onslow Co., NE of Wilmington, Sep 5. Tree fall onto trailer (direct); female, teen.

–1  NC. Pitt County, Sep 5. Vehicular (direct); male driving car hits fallen tree.

–2  NC. Wake Co., Sep 5. Vehicular (direct); car runs into fallen tree, male, 55, female, 67.

–1  NC. Wake County, Raleigh. Tree fall onto mobile home; female. (RENCI at ECU.)

–1  NC. Wayne County, Sep 5. Vehicular (direct); car runs into fallen tree, male, 22.

— 1  SC. Horry Co., ~Conway, Sep 5. Female, 66, swerved vehicle to avoid tree, crashed.[45]

— 1  SC. Williamsburg Co., ~Andrews, Sep 5. Male driving car hits tree that fell onto road.

— 1  VA. Fairfax County, Sep 5-6. Car hits tree which had fallen onto highway; male.

 

Cause of Death (Indirect, identified – 2-4)

 

Drowning       (2?)

— 2  PA. Philadelphia vic., Sep 8. Drownings; male, 73 and female, 70, in flooded basement.[46]

 

Tree Fall         (1)

—  1  NC. Wake County, Raleigh. Tree fall during clean-up; male.

 

Vehicular       (1)

— 1  PA. Clearfield Co., Morris Twp., Morrisdale, St. Rt. 53, Sep 6. 3-vehicle crash; man, 20.

 

Cause of Death (Not Stated – 8-9)

— 7  NC.[47]

— 1  PA.[48]

— 1  VA.[49]

 

Narrative (Overview)

 

NWS: “Fran was a category 3 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale…when it made landfall on the North Carolina coast near Cape Fear on September 5, 1996. Besides sustained winds of 115 miles per hour (mph), the storm surge and high water marks to nearly 13 feet in some coastal areas of North Carolina and Virginia exceeded those of Hurricane Hazel in 1954, although Hazel was a category 4 storm. Heavy rains created extensive inland flooding from the Carolinas into Virginia, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Additionally, strong inland winds created severe damage and power outages with hurricane-force wind gusts extending to near Raleigh, North Carolina. Hurricane Fran was directly responsible for 26 deaths.

 

“Widespread 5- to 10-inch amounts of rain were recorded over the Middle Atlantic region with 14 to nearly 16 inches in parts of Virginia and West Virginia. The rains brought many rivers in North Carolina, Virginia, and central Pennsylvania to, or above, flood stage. Particularly hard hit were Virginia and North Carolina, where record or near-record river levels occurred at many gage sites.

 

“Fran was the worst recorded natural economic disaster ever to occur in North Carolina. Nearly a half-million tourists and residents were evacuated from the coasts of North and South Carolina. Press reports from Reuters News Service stated that 4.5 million people in the Carolinas and Virginia were left without power.” (NWS. Hurricane Fran, August 28-September 8, 1996 (Service Assessment). Silver Spring, MD: NWS, NOAA, Dept. of Commerce. July 1997, p. ix.)

 

North Carolina

 

NWS: “The effects of Fran on North Carolina were extensive and noticed well inland. The highest wind gust was 137 mph, as noted earlier, in Wilmington. Some 125 miles north in Raleigh, winds gusted to hurricane force. The strong inland winds coupled with saturated ground resulted in several hundred thousand trees being uprooted or broken. This resulted in thousands of homes being damaged by the falling trees. It took more than 10 days for power to be restored in many areas. Schools were closed for a week in the hardest hit counties. Automobile travel was almost impossible the day after the storm due to downed trees and flooding. A full 12 days after the event, 150 secondary roads were still closed….” (NWS. Hurricane Fran, August 28-September 8, 1996 (Service Assessment). NWS, NOAA, Dept. of Commerce. July 1997, p. 10.)

 

Sources

 

AP News Archive. “Body of Raleigh Teen Drowned in Hurricane Aftermath Found.” 9-20-1996. Accessed 4-28-2014 at: http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1996/Body-of-Raleigh-Teen-Drowned-in-Hurricane-Aftermath-Found/id-fc02d92aba4bcbb32d094e39f4bf9418

 

Associated Press. “Hurricane Fran. Bouncing back to be harder.” Times-News, Burlington, NC, 9-8-1996, D7. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=184717188&sterm

 

Associated Press. “Hurricane Fran. Fran claims 17, drenches Virginia.” Times-News, Burlington, NC, 9-7-1996, A13. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=184717142&sterm

 

Associated Press. “North Carolina Still Battles with Fran’s Aftermath.” Post-Standard, Syracuse, NY. 9-11-1996, A4. At: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=28061093&sterm

 

Associated Press. “Was Fran the worst?” Garden City Telegram, KS. 9-10-1996, p. 2. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=135852320&sterm=hurricane+fran

 

Barnes, Jay. North Carolina’s Hurricane History (Third Edition). Chapel Hill and London:  University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

 

Barr, Stephen. “Thousands Flee as Fran Batters Carolinas,” Washington Post, 9-6-1996, P. A1. Accessed 4-28-2014 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/weather/hurricane/poststories/fran.htm

 

Burt, Christopher C. and Mark Stroud. Extreme Weather: A Guide & Record Book. W. W. Norton & Co., 2004, 304 pages.  Google preview accessed 1-1-2014 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=NuP7ATq9nWgC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

Legeros, Mike. North Carolina Deadliest Disasters Database.  8-18-2009 update. Accessed at:  http://www.legeros.com/history/nc/disasters.shtml

 

Marshall, Richard D. (Wind Research Services, Poolesville, MD). Hurricane Fran in North Carolina, September 5-6, 1996 (NIST GCR 98-734). Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, January 1998. Accessed 4-28-2014 at: http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=908722

 

Mayfield, Max. Preliminary Report: Hurricane Fran, 23 August – 8 September 1996. Miami, FL National Hurricane Center, National Weather Service, NOAA. 10-10-1996. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1996fran.html

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. North Carolina Hit By Frantastic Storm! (website). 1-23-2009 update. Accessed 4-28-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/fran/fran.html

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Flash Flood… Pennsylvania…Cumberland…09/06/1996. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5568774

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Flash Flood… Pennsylvania…Perry…09/06/1996. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5568778

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Flash Flood… Virginia…Augusta…09/06/1996. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5571988

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Flash Flood… Virginia…Highland…09/06/1996. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5571989

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Flash Flood… Virginia…Pittsylvania…09/06/1996. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5564076

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Flash Flood… West Virginia…Pendleton…09/06/1996. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5572408

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. High Wind… North Carolina…Bladen…09/05/1996 14:00…09/06/1996 02:00. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5578517

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Hurricane (Typhoon)…North Carolina…Alamance…09/05/1966 17:00…09/06/1996 05:00. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5580042

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Hurricane (Typhoon)…North Carolina…Durham…09/05/1966 17:00…09/06/1996 05:00. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5580044

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Hurricane (Typhoon)…North Carolina…Johnston…09/05/1966 17:00…09/06/1996 05:00. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5580052

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Hurricane (Typhoon)…North Carolina…Pender…09/05/1996 12:00…09/06/1996 02:00. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5578510

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Event Details. Hurricane (Typhoon)…North Carolina…Wake…09/05/1966 17:00…09/06/1966 05:00. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5580051

 

National Weather Service, Raleigh NC. Event Summary, Hurricane Fran, September 1996. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www4.ncsu.edu/~nwsfo/storage/cases/19960906/

 

National Weather Service. Hurricane Fran, August 28-September 8, 1996 (Service Assessment). Silver Spring, MD: NWS, NOAA, Department of Commerce. July 1997. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/assessments/pdfs/franrpt.pdf

 

NYT News Service (Kevin Sack). “In Fran’s wake.” Indiana, PA Gazette, 9-8-1996, A4. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=110410485&sterm=fran

 

Platt, Rutherford H., David Salvesen, George H. Baldwin, II. “Rebuilding the North Carolina Coast after Hurricane Fran: Did Public Regulations Matter?” Coastal Management, Vol. 30, 2002, pp. 249-269. Accessed 4-28-2014 at: http://wcu.edu/WebFiles/PDFs/Rebuilding_after_Hurricane_Fran.pdf

 

RENCI at East Carolina University. Hurricane Fran (website). “Human Impact.” 3-23-2012 update. Accessed 4-28-2014 at: http://www.ecu.edu/renci/stormstolife/Fran/human.html

 

The Intelligencer, Doylestown, PA. “Fran leaves 22 dead.” 9-8-1996, A11. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=26732696&sterm=fran

 

The Progress, Clearfield, PA. “Allport man dies in crash during rainstorm.” 9-7-1996, 1. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=151346632&sterm=fran

 

The Progress, Clearfield, PA. “Two killed by floods in suburban Philadelphia,” 9-9-1996, p. 19. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=151346666&sterm

 

Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran Facts.” “Fran claims 17, drenches Virginia.” 9-7-1996, A13. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=184717142&sterm=fran

 

Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Help” (continued from A1). 9-9-1996, A2. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=184236018&sterm=hurricane+fran

 

United Methodist News Service. “Church works for recovery in wake of hurricanes,” 9-19-1996. Accessed 4-29-2014 at: http://archive.wfn.org/1996/09/msg00046.html

 

Virginia Department of Emergency Management. Hurricane History (website). 2012. Accessed 4-18-2014 at: http://www.vaemergency.gov/readyvirginia/stay-informed/hurricanes/hurricane-history

 

Wikipedia. “Hurricane Fran.” 4-9-2014 modification. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Fran

 

WRAL.com, Raleigh, NC. “Hurricane Fran 10 Year Anniversary” (website). 2006. Accessed 4-17-2014 at: http://www.wral.com/news/local/flash/1106551/

 

Wright, Aliah D. (Associated Press). “Couple who perished in floods would have marked 50^th wedding anniversary,” Gettysburg Times, PA, 9-10-1996, A5. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=12197162&sterm=philadelphia+hurricane

 

 

 

[1] Cites Associated Press reports.

[2] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996).

[3] Cites: North Carolina Disaster Recovery Task Force. Draft Goals and Action Team Reports. Raleigh, NC: Office of the Lieutenant Governor (mimeo), November 1996; “Recommendations for Action” (Feb 14, 1997) Raleigh, NC: Office of the Lieutenant Governor (mimeo).

[4] Cites Associated Press reports.

[5] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. Hurricane…NC…Alamance. Barnes notes the death of “eighth-grader Curtis Wayne Warren in Alamance County.” (p. 203.), A Burlington, NC Times-News report (“Help,” A2, continued from A1) writes that “Curtis Warren, a 13-year-old Snow Camp boy… died Friday morning [Sep 6] after Fran tossed a tree into his second-story bedroom.”

[6] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996. NCDC notes that the heart attack occurred during the peak of the storm and responders could not reach him due to many trees blocking roads. (NCDC. Storm Events Database. High Wind. North Carolina Bladen Sep 5-6, 1996.)

[7] Rose Hill as locality is from Barnes (p. 203) in apparent reference to the death of Marion Rouse.

[8] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996).

[9] Bahama locality is from Barnes, p. 203 who writes “Responding to an emergency call at the peak of the storm, nineteen-year-old Bahama volunteer firefighter Ricky Dorsey was another of Fran’s tragic victims. He was killed when a falling tree landed on his truck as he was driving down Staggville Road, north of Durham.”

[10] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in NWS; NCDC. Storm Events Database. Hurricane…[NC]…Durham.

[11] “Two killed in Durham County, a motorist and a firefighter when a tree fell on a fire truck.” (Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran Facts.” 9-7-1996, A13.)

[12] Benson locality is from Barnes p. 203, in apparent reference to death of Donald Davis from a tree fall into home.

[13] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. Hurricane…NC…Johnston.

[14] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996).

[15] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran Facts.” 9-7-1996, A13. The “teenager” age is from Jay Barnes in North Carolina’s Hurricane History (3^rd Ed.), p. 203, in an apparent reference to the death of Cristina Marie Foust.

[16] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996).

[17] NCDC. Storm Events Database. Hurricane…North Carolina…Pender. Barnes (p. 204) writes: “One of the storm’s more memorable tragedies was that of Georgia Greene. The seventy-five-year-old Surf City woman lived alone in her mobile home and depended on round-the-clock nurses to provide her care. As the evacuation of Topsail Island got under way, Greene refused to leave, stating that she had never left for a storm before. As Fran swept over the island, it demolished her aluminum home, tossing the ninety-pound woman into the raging waters, her mattress beneath her. For hours she drifted through the flooded marsh, enduring the worst of the hurricane’s winds and rains. The following day, she was found by rescue workers, still aboard her mattress and still alive. She was taken to a local hospital but died the following day. Cause of death: hypothermia.”

[18] Appendix C in: NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. Hurricane…[NC]…Pender. Barnes (p. 204), writes that “a Greensboro man was found floating near the damaged remains of the Scotts Hill Marina in Pender County. He apparently had been helping a friend board up his home when he was swept off a deck and drowned.”

[19] “The Marine Corps reported that a 19-year-old soldier from Camp Lejeune, Pvt. Steve A. Sears, of Shirley, Ark., was killed in the storm. His body was discovered on Friday in the Intracoastal waterway near Topsail Beach, N.C., said…a spokesman at Camp Lejeune.” (NYT News Service. “In Fran’s wake.” Indiana, PA Gazette, 9-8-1996, A4.) Another account notes that he was “driving back to Camp Lejeune with two other members of the corps. They took a wrong turn onto the bridge to Topsail Beach during the height of the storm and their car stalled in deep water. One Marine waded away to safety while waves swept the other two off the top of the car. [The other…] grabbed a tree and clung there all night.” (The Intelligencer, Doylestown, PA. “Fran leaves 22 dead.” 9-8-1996, A11.)

[20] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996 (Service Assessment).

[21] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. Hurricane…[NC]…Wake.

[22] This is probably a reference to Jackson Edward Griffin, who drowned Sep 7 while swimming in rain-swollen Crabtree Creek. His body was found Sep 19. (AP News Archive. “Body of Raleigh Teen Drowned in Hurricane Aftermath Found.” 9-20-1996.) Appendix C (NWS) has the date of death as Sep 5.

[23] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. Hurricane…[NC]…Wake.

[24] “After the storm, as the cleanup got under way, Zebulon native Walt DeYoung died while attempting to clear debris from his mother’s home in Raleigh. DeYoung…was deeply gashed on the legs by a falling tree and later bled to death.” (Barnes. North Carolina’s Hurricane History, 3^rd Ed., p. 204.)

[25] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. Hurricane…[NC]…Wayne.

[26] “An Allport man died in a three-vehicle crash last night as the remnants of Hurricane Fran pushed through western Pennsylvania. Dead is Robert L. Abel, 20, who was traveling along state Route 53 in Morrisdale when the accident occurred at 9:56 p.m. According to Dave Scovern, Clearfield County Emergency Management director, the accident occurred at the height of the storm, which swept through Progressland late last night, bringing 2 to 6 inches of rain across the region.” (The Progress, Clearfield, PA. “Allport man dies in crash during rainstorm.” 9-7-1996, 1.)

[27] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1; NCDC, Storm Events Database. Flash Flood [PA]…Cumberland.

[28] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996 (Service Assessment). NCDC notes she “attempted to leave her home surrounded by 4 feet of water.” (Storm Events Database…Perry.)

[29] Ages are from Aliah D. Wright (Associated Press) report “Couple who perished in floods would have marked 50^th wedding anniversary,” in Gettysburg Times, 9-10-1996, p. A5, in reference to Frank and Marie Deal. Report notes: “Frank Deal, 73, did what he always did when the Sandy Run Creek behind his home in suburban Philadelphia spilled over into his basement. He donned hip boots and went down to bail water while Marie Deal, 70, his wife of 49 years, went outside to move the couple’s car. When the retired registered nurse returned around 6:30 p.m. Sunday, she found her husband in cardiac arrest, called 911 and stayed by his side. But the flood waters arrived before help did, and the Deals drowned in their Abington Township basement when a wall of water, six-feet high, came crashing down over them, Montgomery County Coroner Dr. Halbert Fillinger said Monday….”

[30] “An elderly couple in an affluent area northwest of Philadelphia drowned in their basement when it quickly filled with water – their deaths part of the four drownings in Pennsylvania caused by Hurricane Fran.” (United Methodist News Service. “Church works for recovery in wake of hurricanes,” 9-19-1996.) An Associated Press news report noted that “A humid air mass left behind by Hurricane Fran contributed to a storm system Sunday that dumped up to 5 inches of rain in this township in Southern Montgomery County [Abington, PA dateline]…Two people were killed and thousands of home lost power…The bodies of a couple in their 60s were pulled from a flooded basement, McNamara said [Abington police]…” (The Progress, Clearfield, PA. “Two killed by floods in suburban Philadelphia,” 9-9-1996, p. 19.)

[31] Age is from: Stephen Barr. “Thousands Flee as Fran Batters Carolinas,” Washington Post, 9-6-1996, P. A1.

[32] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran Facts.” 9-7-1996, A13.

[33] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran Facts.” 9-7-1996, A13.

[34] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. VA, Augusta, 9-6-1996.

[35] Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran claims 17, drenches Virginia.” 9-7-1996, A13.

[36] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. VA, Highland, 9-6-1996; “A woman in Highland County, Va., died when she tried to cross a flooded creek in an all-terrain vehicle.” (Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran Facts.” 9-7-1996, A13.)

[37] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, C-1 in: NWS; NCDC, Storm Events Database. VA, Pittsylvania, 9-6-1996.

[38] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996 (Service Assessment).

[39] Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1 in: NWS; Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran Facts.” 9-7-1996, A13.

[40] The 31 figure is Blanchard tally based on breakouts below.

[41] NWS. Hurricane Fran, Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996 (Service Assessment). Appendix C: Summary of Fatalities, p. C-1.

[42] We note 11 deaths directly related to hurricane tree falls and one indirect – a tree fall during cleanup.

[43] Appears to be treated as a “direct” fatality in both the NCDC Storm Events Database, and in Appendix C of the NWS Hurricane Fran Aug 28-Sep 8, 1996 Service Assessment in that tree falls during the peak of the storm blocked roads and prevented responders from reaching the decedent.

[44] “Two killed in Durham County, a motorist and a firefighter when a tree fell on a fire truck.” (Times-News, Burlington, NC. “Fran Facts.” 9-7-1996, A13.) Not crystal clear but appears both deaths due to tree fall.

[45] Since this is noted in NWS Hurricane Fran report (Appendix C), we assume it was considered a direct fatality.

[46] “An elderly couple in an affluent area northwest of Philadelphia drowned in their basement when it quickly filled with water – their deaths part of the four drownings in Pennsylvania caused by Hurricane Fran.” (United Methodist News Service. “Church works for recovery in wake of hurricanes,” 9-19-1996.) An Associated Press news report noted that “A humid air mass left behind by Hurricane Fran contributed to a storm system Sunday that dumped up to 5 inches of rain in this township in Southern Montgomery County [Abington, PA dateline]…Two people were killed and thousands of homes lost power…The bodies of a couple in their 60s were pulled from a flooded basement…” (The Progress, Clearfield, PA. “Two killed by floods in suburban Philadelphia,” 9-9-1996, 19.)

[47] This is our assumption. Platt, et al. note 25 hurricane-related fatalities in NC, citing the NC Disaster Recovery Task Force (Draft Goals and Action Team Reports. Raleigh, NC: Office of the Lieutenant Governor (mimeo), Nov 1996 and Feb 1997). We have been able to identify what appear to be 18 individual “direct” deaths. If there were 18 “direct” deaths, and 25 total, then there were seven “indirect,” which we have been able to locate but one.

[48] Wikipedia notes 2 direct and 2 indirect PA deaths, of which we have been able to identify 2 direct and 1 indirect.

[49] The VA Dept. of Emer. Mgmt., on its Hurricane History website, notes 6 VA fatalities, of which we have identified 5 direct deaths, leaving one we have not been able to identify.

–9  ASN. Accident descrip. USAF Lockheed C-130H Hercules, 8-17-1996, E of Jackson Hole

–9  Baugher, Joseph F.  1974 USAF Serial Numbers.  1-5-2012 revision.

–9  Flight Safety Foundation. “Noncompliance With Departure Procedures…” Aug 2000, 1-7.

–9  Pacific Stars and Stripes. “Clinton support plane crashes. Nine killed…” 8-20-1996, 1, 7.

–9  Walters and Sumwalt. Aircraft Accident Analysis: Final Reports. Aviation Week, 2000, 313

–9  Winchester Star, VA. “9 Killed in Military Plane Crash. C-130…” 8-19-1996, 5.

 

Narrative Information

 

ASN: “….Time:                      23:48….

“First flight:                1975

“Crew:                         Fatalities: 8 / Occupants: 8

“Passengers:                Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1

“Total:                         Fatalities: 9 / Occupants: 9….

“Location:                   14.5 km (9.1 mls) E of Jackson Hole, WY

“Departure airport:      Jackson Hole Airport, WY…

“Destination airport:   New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY…

“Narrative:                  The crew failed to monitor the aircraft’s position and flight path relative to high terrain surrounding Jackson Hole Airport. Consequently, the C-130 struck a mountain. The C-130 was flying a presidential support airlift mission.”  (Aviation Safety Network.  Accident Description. USAF Lockheed C-130H Hercules, 1996, March 17, E of Jackson Hole, WY.)

 

Baugher: “Lockheed C-130H Hercules.  1662 (c/n 382-4597, 40th AS) crashed near Jackson Hole, WY Aug 17, 1996 while on Presidential support mission.  All 9 onboard killed.”  (Baugher, Joseph F.  1974 USAF Serial Numbers.  1-5-2012 revision.)

 

Flight Safety Foundation: “At 2250 local time Aug. 17, 1996, a U.S. Air Force (Lockheed) C-130H struck a mountain ridge during departure from Jackson Hole Airport….

 

“The U.S. Air Force Accident Investigation Board, in its final report, said, ‘The crash of Havoc 58 {the call sign for the flight} was caused by crew error.’  The report said, ‘Unfortunately, mountainous terrain in all quadrants and a short runway at high altitude presented too great a challenge to crewmembers accustomed to flying in the flatlands of Texas.’

 

“The report said, ‘The crew…failed to avoid the mountainous terrain ahead.  They were complacent and not situationally aware of their proximity to that terrain.  Visual cues were limited by a dark, moonless night.  Radar information, which would have been showing on the navigator’s radar scope, was not correctly interpreted.  Arrival/departure charts were not studied by the pilot/copilot and were incorrectly interpreted by the navigator.’  The report said that the crew was current and qualified for the mission, and that crew rest was adequate.

 

“The pilot, who held the rank of captain, was executive officer of the 39^th Airlift Squadron at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas.  He had 1,744 flight hours, including 904 flight hours in C-130s.  ‘{The pilot} was an instructor pilot respected by his peers for his excellent flying skills and had been characterized as a ‘by-the-book pilot,’ the report said.  ‘He had completed C-130 instructor school in March 1996.  He had completed the advanced airlift tactical training course in April 1996, where he received instruction and actual flying experience in mountainous terrain’.”…. (FSF 2000, 1.)

 

“The flight from Dyess to Jackson Hole Airport took about three hours and 25 minutes.  The flight crew conducted a visual approach and landed on Runway 18 at 2105.  A passenger – A U.S. Secret Service agent – boarded the aircraft at Jackson.  The purpose of the flight from Jackson Hole Airport to JFK was to transport a U.S. Secret Service communications vehicle….The aircraft was serviced with approximately 14,359 pounds…of fuel, and the 10,000-pound…communications vehicle was loaded….

 

“The report said that the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript…showed that, while preparing for takeoff, the pilots and the navigator failed to plan for the departure….

 

“At 2226:46, the pilot asked the navigator about the terrain off the end of the runway.  The navigator said, ‘It’s pretty much a mountain and valley terrain, rising to seventy-three hundred feet, about a thousand-foot rise, 10 miles (19 kilometers) south of the field.’  The report said that the navigator had misread his chart scale; five nautical miles (nine kilometers) south of the airport, the terrain rose to 7,339 feet….” (FSF 2000, 2.)

 

“The report said that the crew did not discuss obstacle-clearance data or the required climb rate for departure.  ‘It appears that the crew was not aware of the climbout terrain and the obstacles on departure,’ the report said.  The crew had a U.S. Department of Defense Flight Information Publication that included airport information, instrument approach procedures and instrument departure procedures.  The Jackson Hole Airport approach charts contained a symbol – a white ‘T’ in a black triangle – that showed that special departure procedures were published for the airport.  The Runway 18 departure procedures required, in part, an initial climb to 11,000 feet via the 188-degree radial of the Jackson VOR/DME (which is located on the airport), then a climbing left turn to the Jackson VOR/DME.

 

“The report said that Air Force regulations require that ‘if a departure procedure is published for the runway in use at the departure airport, the pilot should review the procedures to be familiar with the location of obstacles….When a SID {standard instrument departure} or radar vectors are used for departure, follow these procedures.  If neither a SID nor radar vectors are available {or} used, the published departure procedures should be used to avoid obstacles unless alternate procedures are used to ensure all obstacles can be safely avoided.’  The report said that the CVR transcript shows that the crew did not discuss the published instrument departure procedures. ‘No one discusses the IFR departure procedures,’ the report said.  ‘No one discusses the fact that, in spite of a VFR (visual flight rules) weather report, there is no moon, and one cannot see the tops of the mountains to the east.’….”  (FSF 2000, 4.)

 

“The aircraft struck a mountain ridge 9.2 nautical miles (17 kilometers) east of the airport.  The initial impact was 500 feet (153 meters) below the ridge on terrain that sloped eight degrees.  ‘The aircraft impacted the ground…at an altitude of 10,392 feet…” (FSF 2000, 5-6.)

 

(Flight Safety Foundation. “Noncompliance With Departure Procedures Sets Course for Impact With Mountain.” Accident Prevention, Vol. 57, No. 8, Aug 2000, pp. 1-7.)[1]

 

Commemoration Event: “A year later in 1997, the community of Jackson, WY, erected a monument to this event in nearby Curtis Canyon.  10 years later, members of the Jackson community wish to remember this tragic occasion, on August 19th and 20th, 2006, by hosting the families of those lost during a commemoration at the monument, a BBQ, and some might also trek to the actual crash location.”

 

“As of April 2009, I have spoken with someone involved in the investigation of the crash that day via his viewing of this website.  While nothing known has changed regarding the circumstances we all know were the cause of this tragedy, he wanted me to know & to pass on to the families and others interested, that good things have come from that investigation.  New devices to monitor terrain (GPWS), both forward and down-looking, have been installed on current aircraft.  The incident has been repeatedly briefed to new crews to this day, to help avoid any mistakes in information regarding civilian airports and local terrain.  Air Force regs., particularly AFM 51-37 (AFMAN 11-217, Vol. 1), have been updated to reflect information & procedures learned as a result of this crash.”  (“Commemoration Event, 8/19/2006 of the 10^th Anniversary of an Air Force C-130 Hercules transport crash while carrying 9 personnel of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Secret Service in support of a visit to the Jackson area by former President Clinton and his family.” 3-29-2010 update.)

 

Walters and Sumwalt: “Investigators learned that at the time of the accident, the Airport Suitability Report for Jackson Hole indicated no special operational considerations for AMC aircraft.  The computerized Airfield Database differed from the ASR, however, in reporting that the airport was suitable for ‘daylight operations only.’ Neither the flightcrew nor the planners were aware of the restriction recently placed on military operations at the airport.” [The author notes, however, that a USAF officer stated that if a waiver had been requested it would have been granted.]

 

Commenting on the USAF placing of blame solely on the crew, the author states:  “…crew error and human error are not exactly the same, although there was plenty of both to go around….It is not known what actions the Air Force took as a result of the parallel but safety investigation [not made public] to prevent similar accidents in the future.  What is known is that they were successful in identifying other issues of real concern, factors that forced the crew to be the last link in the safety chain.  Those areas included:  Inappropriate pairing of inexperienced crewmembers, the frenzied pace of operations and training, disregard of the effects of fatigue when scheduling flight-crews, difficulty in accessing current and appropriate airport/aeronautical information, last-minute scheduling of missions, routinely emphasizing nonflying duties, and the ‘flat-area’ flying mentality of the squadron.  Each of these demonstrated some level of human error, and each played a part in this tragedy.  More importantly, each must be remedied if accidents are to be prevented.  And the prevention of accidents should be the sole reason why accidents are investigated.”

 

(Walters and Sumwalt.  Aircraft Accident Analysis: Final Reports. Chapter 14:  “A lack of teamwork:  HAVOC 58 impacts Sleeping Indian Mountain.” Aviation Week, 2000, p. 313)

 

Newspapers

 

Aug 19, Winchester Star: “Washington — A military cargo plane that accompanied President Clinton on his vacation trip to Jackson, Wyo., crashed late on Saturday night [Aug 17] with nine people on board just after it  took off for New York with presidential vehicles and other gear, military officials said.

 

“Officials at the crash site, a steep mountainside in the Bridger-Teton National Forest, said late on Sunday that everyone on board was killed.  Eight Air Force crew members from Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, Texas, and a Secret Service employee were traveling on the C-130 cargo plane, which was headed to New York City, where President Clinton attended a 50th birthday celebration in his honor on Sunday night.

 

“The cause of the crash is unknown.  It occurred around 10:30 p.m. MDT on Saturday about 15 miles southeast of the Jackson Hole airport in rugged, remote terrain near the top of Sheep Mountain, known locally as Sleeping Indian Mountain, in the Grand Teton range.

 

“It took rescuers more than three hours on foot and horseback to reach the site of the wreckage early on Sunday.

 

“Airport officials in Jackson Hole said they did not know whether the plane was off course because its departure had not been tracked on radar.  There is no control tower at the small airport, which is surrounded by mountains.  Pilots arriving in or departing from Jackson Hole use a common radio frequency to report their positions to each other.  Officials said planes that leave Jackson Hole are tracked on radar by air traffic controllers in Salt Lake City, 178 miles away, but only after pilots clear the Teton Mountain Range at around 13,000 feet.

 

“The cargo plane “just didn’t get that high, as best we can tell,” said Gant Ginter, a commercial pilot based in Jackson Hole. “You can’t pick things up on radar in those mountains.”

 

“Clinton had left by helicopter from Jackson, where he vacationed last week, several hours before the crash.  He flew back to Washington from a larger airport in Idaho Falls, Idaho.

 

“On Sunday, as he left the White House for his birthday party in New York, the president said he and first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton were “very sad and shocked” by the crash.  “There are always significant dangers associated with our armed forces and people in our Secret Service and others who do this work,” Clinton said.  “But this is especially painful to us because they worked for me, they did an invaluable service, and I’m very, very sad about it.”

 

“The Air Force and the Secret Service identified the crash victims as

 

Air Force Capt. Kevin N. Earnest,

Capt. Kimberly Jo Wielhouwer,

2nd Lt. Benjamin T. Hall,

Staff Sgts. Michael J. Smith Jr. and

Michael R. York,

Senior Airmen Ricky L. Merritt and

Billy R. Ogston, and

Airman Thomas A. Stevens, all based at Dyess, and

Secret Service Agent Aldo E. Frascoia, 57, of Washington, D.C.”

 

(Winchester Star, VA.  “9 Killed in Military Plane Crash. C-130 Accompanied Clinton on Wyoming Vacation.” 8-19-1996, 5.)

 

Stars and Stripes: “Jackson, Wyo. – Recovery teams had to hike and ride on horseback Sunday to reach the wreckage of a military cargo plane carrying gear for President Clinton that slammed into the side of a mountain. Nine people aboard were killed.  The four-engine C-130 crashed and exploded in rugged terrain late Saturday night shortly after taking off from Jackson Hole Airport….

 

“A Clinton administration official said the pilot reported mechanical trouble and had started to return to the airport.[2]  But others cautioned against speculating on why the plane went down….

 

“The only pieces of the plane left intact were a piece of the tail section and several wheels, said Keith Benefiel of the Teton County Search and Rescue Team.

 

“Air Force officials from Hill Air Force Base in Utah and from Dyess gathered Sunday and began preparations for an investigation into the cause of the accident. The plane was equipped with voice and cockpit data recorders.

 

“The turboprop-powered aircraft was used to shuttle presidential vehicles.  It apparently was carrying a vehicle used by White House security, not a presidential limousine, officials said.

 

“The plane crashed about 10:30 p.m. about 15 miles southeast of the Jackson Hole Airport, along the northwestern edge of Wyoming about 30 miles south of Yellowstone National Park….

 

The plane slammed into Sheep Mountain, known locally as Sleeping Indian Mountain, in the Gros Ventre Wilderness of the Bridger-Teton National Forest.  The crash site was less than 1,000

feet below the mountain’s 11,300-foot peak.

 

“There are no roads or trails to the scene, and it took recovery crews more than three hours to reach the site.”  (Pacific Stars and Stripes, Tokyo, Japan. “Clinton support plane crashes. Nine killed…Air Force C-130…” 8-20-1996, 1, 7. )

 

Sources

 

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. United States Air Force, Lockheed C-130H Hercules, 1996, March 17, E of Jackson Hole, WY.  Accessed 3-13-2012 at:

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19960817-3

 

Baugher, Joseph F. 1974 USAF Serial Numbers. 1-5-2012 revision. Accessed 3-13-2012 at:  http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1974.html

 

“Commemoration Event, 8/19/2006 of the 10^th Anniversary of an Air Force C-130 Hercules transport crash while carrying 9 personnel of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Secret Service in support of a visit to the Jackson area by former President Clinton and his family.” 3-29-2010 update accessed 3-13-2012 at: http://www.theastrocowboy.com/c130/c130.html

 

Flight Safety Foundation. “Noncompliance With Departure Procedures Sets Course for Impact With Mountain.” Accident Prevention, Vol. 57, No. 8, Aug 2000, pp. 1-7. Accessed 3-13-2012 at: http://flightsafety.org/ap/ap_aug00.pdf

 

Pacific Stars and Stripes, Tokyo, Japan. “Clinton support plane crashes. Nine killed…Air Force C-130…” 8-20-1996, 1, 7.  http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=133907330

 

Walters, James M., Robert Sumwalt III.  Aircraft Accident Analysis: Final Reports. Chapter 14:  “A lack of teamwork:  HAVOC 58 impacts Sleeping Indian Mountain.” Aviation Week, 2000.

 

Winchester Star, VA. “9 Killed in Military Plane Crash. C-130 Accompanied Clinton on Wyoming Vacation.” 8-19-1996, 5. http://newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=158702941

 

 

 

[1] Based on USAF Accident Investigation Board. 17 August 1996, C-130 Aircraft, USAF, S/N 74-1662 (AFI 51-503). 10-21-1996.

[2] There had been no such communication from the plane.