20th Century

1947 — July 24, Old Ben No. 8 Coal Mine Gas and Dust Explosion, West Frankfort, IL–  27

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-12-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 

–27  Bureau of Mines. Final Report of Mine Explosion No. 8 Mine; Old Ben Coal Corp. …IL.

–27  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC.  Mine Disasters.

–27  United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Old Ben…”

 

Narrative Information

 

Bureau of Mines:

“Introduction

 

“An explosion, evidently caused when gas was ignited by a spark or arc from a gathering locomotive or by smoking, and in which coal dust was involved, occurred in the No. 8 mine, Old Ben Coal Corporation, located just south of West Frankfort, Franklin County, Illinois, at about 12:35 p.m., July 24, 1947. The explosion resulted in the death of 27 men, of which number 26 were killed by burns, violence, and afterdamp. There were 30 men in the vicinity of the explosion area, and 4 of these men escaped to the surface with the assistance of another workmen. On of the rescued me later died in the hospital. Two hundred and sixty-four men were in the mine at the time of the explosion, of which number 234 escaped to the surface unaided. No attempt to barricade was made, as the explosion covered only a small section and did not affect any other portion of the mine….” (p. 1.)

“General Information

 

“….The mine was considered to be gassy by the Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals, and was classified as gassy by the Bureau of Mines because sampling by the Federal inspectors indicated that methane in excess of 0.25 percent had been found in open workings during all previous inspections. Gas had also been ignited on two occasions previously which resulted in 8 men being killed, 9 seriously burned, and 11 slightly burned. Six certified mine examiners were employed to make preshift examinations of the mine for gas and to observe and inspect for other hazards. A certified face boss was employed to supervise each loading machine crew, and his duties included making on-shift inspections for explosive gas and other hazards.” (pp. 4-5.)

 

“Dust

 

“The mine was exceedingly dry and an excessive amount of coal dust was raised into suspension during mining operations at the working faces, and some fine coal dust had been carried into the abandoned area and deposited on the ribs, roof, and floor by the ventilating current. Watering methods had not been employed to allay the dust at its source, but generalized rock dusting was practiced and the rock dust was kept to within 80 feet or less of the working faces. Bags of rock dust were suspended from timbers in the airways outby the active working area; however, these barriers played little or no part in preventing the propagation of the explosion s only a few of the bags of rock dust had been tripped. The rock dust from the bags that had been tripped was found on the floor immediately below the installation and no evidence of dispersal of rock dust was observed.” (pp. 5-6.)

United States Mine Rescue Association: “….Possible Causes of the Explosion

 

“The possibility of ignition of the methane gas by drills, the loading machine, and cutting machine, can be discounted because none of the machines were in operation at the time of the explosion.  The possibility of ignition of the methane gas by drills, the loading machine, and cutting machine, can be discounted because none of the machines were in operation at the time of the explosion.

 

“The possibility of ignition of the gas by men smoking in the area cannot be disregarded.  Burned match stubs and other evidence of smoking was found in the mine and in the cars of mantrips.  Employees taking part in the rescue work following the explosion deposited matches and smoking materials above ground before re-entering the mine.  During the process of identification of the bodies in the temporary morgue, matches and other smoking materials were recovered from at least seven, and perhaps more of the bodies.

 

“The evidence definitely indicates that employees were smoking underground in spite of the fact that a no-smoking rule was in force.  There is a very good possibility that the ignition of gas was caused by smoking in room 2 inby the 8 north panel, (bodies were found near the face of this room), for it was in this room that explosion forces were observed to be outby, and soot and coke particles were in evidence.  There could have been an accumulation of gas in this room, prior to the explosion, in spite of the fact that no gas was found following this explosion.  It is also possible that gas could have moved into the active working area from the abandoned workings, and ignition of this gas could have been caused by smoking, and the flame could have followed a gas trailer into the abandoned workings….

 

“The possibility that gas accumulated in the abandoned workings and was ignited by (a) spontaneous combustion of mine wastes of gob, or (b) sparks produced by roof falls is supported by the evidence and data collected.  Smoke and fumes were observed at approximately room 7 inby 8 south panel which was indicative of the presence of a fire in the abandoned area.  Whether the fire existed prior to the explosion is of course unknown.  The odor of a gob fire is usually easy to detect, but a fire could have existed from spontaneous combustion of old timbers, rags, or paper waste.  It is also entirely possible for high-temperature sparks to be created by falls of rock and pyrites from the roof.

 

“Conclusions and Lessons Learned

 

“The explosion was caused by the ignition of an accumulation of methane gas and was accompanied, on a small scale, by the combustion of coal dust.

 

“The exact source and cause of the explosion could not be determined and is unknown.  It is believed the source could have been: (a) in the abandoned areas, or (b) in room 2 inby the 8 north panel.  The cause of ignition could have been: (a) spontaneous combustion or sparks caused by a fall of roof, or (b) smoking by personnel.

 

“No data or evidence have been found which indicate the explosion was due to the negligence, or violation of State Mining Laws, by any individual or group of individuals now alive.

 

“The main lessons learned from this explosion are: (a) where active working places are adjacent to abandoned areas, a hazard may be created by accumulations of gas in the abandoned areas.  Abandoned areas should be properly ventilated and examined, or when proper ventilation and examination become impossible the areas should be sealed off from the active working areas.

 

“A ruling to this effect has subsequently been made by the mining board; (b) smoking by personnel in gassy mines is extremely hazardous.  A State law prohibits smoking in gassy mines and the personnel in such mines should not consider it to be their personal right to violate the law and endanger the lives of all personnel in the mine.

 

Official List of The Deceased:

 

  • Clesta Berra, of Herrin, timberman, aged 60 years, married.  He leaves a widow.
  • Herbert D. Bidwell, of West Frankfort, electrician, aged 49 years, married.  He leaves a widow
  • Thomas F. Bower, of West Frankfort, tracklayer…25…married…leaves a widow and…child.
  • J. Martin Childers, of West Frankfort, clean-up man, aged 74 years, married…leaves a widow.
  • Hiram B. Chitwood, of Johnston City, tracklayer…22…single.  He leaves a dependent mother.
  • Peter DeJulius, of West Frankfort, electrician…42…married…leaves widow and five children.
  • Arthur Fritts, of West Frankfort, tracklayer…29…married…leaves a widow and two children.
  • Gustave Gaubautz, of West Frankfort, clean-up man, aged 48 years, married…leaves a widow.
  • Gus G. Grant, of Johnston City, tracklayer, aged 59 years, married.  He leaves a widow
  • George D. Griffith…West Frankfort, asst. mine manager…41…married…leaves widow and child.
  • Willis Hilliard, of Marion, machine man…41…married.  He leaves a widow and six children.
  • Louis Marlow, of Herrin, tracklayer, aged 43 years, single.
  • Thomas McPheron…Johnston City, timberman…64…married…leaves widow and one child.
  • Adolph Nickelvich, of West Frankfort, driller, aged 36…married…leaves a widow and child.
  • Louis F. Owens, of Johnston City machine man…51…married…leaves a widow and child.
  • Thomas M. Palmer, of West Frankfort, triprider…41…single.  He leaves a dependent child.
  • Domenico Pircentini, of West Frankfort, tracklayer…67 years, married.  He leaves a widow.
  • George Raymond, of West Frankfort, clean-up man, aged 60 years, single.
  • John Sebben, of Johnston City, timberman…57…married.  He leaves a widow and one child.
  • Willie Ray Smith, of Thompsonville, driller, aged 46 years, married.  He leaves a widow.
  • Curtis O. Stagner, of West Frankfort, motorman…43…married…leaves a widow and child.
  • Raymond C. Stevens, of Benton, machine helper…32…married…leaves widow and two children.
  • Giles C. Summers, of Benton, tracklayer, aged 46 years, married.  He leaves a widow
  • Horace M. Walton, of West Frankfort, triprider…44….single.  He leaves a dependent mother.
  • Robert W. Wicker, of West Frankfort, clean-up man…62…married. He leaves a widow.
  • James T. Wilson…West Frankfort, machine operator…37…married…leaves widow, two children.
  • John P. Yattoni, of West Frankfort, triprider…32…married.  He leaves a widow and one child.”

 

(United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Old Ben Coal Corporation, Old Ben No. 8 Mine Explosion.”

 

Sources

 

Bureau of Mines. Final Report of Mine Explosion No. 8 Mine; Old Ben Coal Corporation, West Frankfort, Franklin County, Illinois, July 24, 1947. Vincennes, IN: Bureau of Mines, undated. Accessed 10-12-2023 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/1947_Old_Ben_Report.pdf

 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Mining Safety and Health Research..  Mining Disasters (Incidents with 5 or more Fatalities). NIOSH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2-26-2013 update. Accessed at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/disall.htm

and http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/content/allminingdisasters.html

 

United States Mine Rescue Association. Mine Disasters in the United States. “Old Ben Coal Corporation, Old Ben No. 8 Mine Explosion.” Accessed 10-12-2023 at: https://usminedisasters.miningquiz.com/saxsewell/old_ben_1947_news_only.htm

1947 — July 13, Burke Air Transport flies into ground (pilots asleep?), 4M SW Melbourne, FL–14

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-12-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 

–14  Aviation Safety Network. Burke Air Transport crash SW of Melbourne FL, 7-13-1947.

–14  Civil Aeronautics Board. AIR. Burke Air Transport – Melbourne, Florida, July 13, 1947.

 

Narrative Information

 

Civil Aeronautics Board, Accident Investigation Report:

 

“The Accident 

 

“At approximately 0430, July 13, 1947…a DC-3C airplane owned and operated by Andrew J. Burke, crashed 4 miles southwest of Melbourne, Florida. The aircraft was destroyed and of the 36 occupants, 12 passengers and the two pilots were fatally injured.

 

“History of the Flight 

 

“The flight originated in San Juan, Puerto Rico, July 11, 1947, departing at 1445, for Newark, New Jersey. Henry Hein was pilot for the entire flight, however, Roderick MacKinnon, the co-pilot, joined the flight in Miami, Florida, flying to Miami from San Juan at approximately the same time as co-pilot in another DC-3 airplane, NC-79023. The third member of the crew was Maria Riveria, stewardess. Several intermediate stops were made, the first being at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, where additional northbound passengers were taken aboard. The flight then proceeded to Miami, landing at 2235. It was serviced, and at 2354 again took off. The next landing was made at Augusta, Georgia, at 0439, July 12, 1947 After a brief stop there of six minutes the trip continued, and at 0812 the flight arrived in Baltimore where the airplane was fueled to capacity. At 0930, the flight took off for Newark, arriving at Newark at 1035 the morning of July 12, 1947.

 

“In Newark the fuel tanks were filled to capacity, 33 passengers were taken aboard, and at 1845, July 12, 1947, 8 hours after arrival in Newark, the flight took off with the same crew for the return trip to San Juan. A landing was made at Augusta just after midnight, 0013, July 13, 1947, at which time 150 gallons of fuel were taken aboard. At 0134 the flight departed for Miami.

 

“The last communication from the crew was at 0303, the morning of July 13, at which time they reported to the Jacksonville Airway radio that they were at 2,000 feet. One and one-half hours later the aircraft was observed approximately 2 1/2 miles west of Melbourne, Florida, flying southeast at an altitude of from 300 to 500 feet. The engines were heard to sputter and misfire as the aircraft proceeded ahead on a straight course. Altitude was gradually lost, the landing lights were turned on, and seconds later the aircraft struck the ground *** 1/2 miles southwest of Melbourne.

 

“Investigation

 

“No radio contact was made with Melbourne Radio, nor was there any indication that Captain Hein attempted to reach the Melbourne-Eau Gallie Airport. This airport is located 3 miles northwest of the city of Melbourne, and is equipped with a lighted tetrahedron and a revolving beacon. NC-79024 passed 3 miles to the right of this field and crashed approximately 6 miles south of it. Malabar Field could possibly have been used. It was only 2 miles west of the point of the crash, however, this field was not lighted and Captain Hein may not have been aware of its location. The “fasten seat belt” sign over the forward compartment door was never lighted, nor was any warning or instruction given to the passengers to fasten their seat belts. An examination of all safety belts in the aircraft indicated that none, including those in the cock-pit, had been buckled.

 

“Propeller markings on the ground, and gouges made by the engine nacelles indicated that the aircraft struck the ground in nearly a level attitude, and at a very low angle of descent. A great deal of tearing and crushing resulted, however, from the trees and tree stumps which studded the area in which the airplane crashed….Though the fuselage and empennage had been badly torn by tree stumps, all control cables and surfaces were accounted for. An inspection of them indicated no structural failure or mechanical malfunction prior to the time of impact. The flaps and landing gear were found in a fully retracted position….

 

“Maintenance was at first accomplished in Newark and Miami. Two months prior to the accident Mr. Burke transferred this activity to a repair agency in San Juan after which only “turn around” maintenance was done in Newark. The facilities of the repair agency in San Juan were inspected. It was found that no hangars were available, that many parts installed in engines and aircraft were used parts, and that equipment to test spark plugs, ignition harnesses, and other engine and aircraft components either did not exist, or had to be borrowed….

 

“Discussion

 

“Many deficiencies in maintenance and operation have been found in the activities of this particular non-scheduled carrier. These irregularities do not constitute sufficient facts from which to state categorically the cause of the accident. Considerable evidence does exist, however, from which the probable cause can be deduced.

 

“The existence of 70 gallons of gasoline in the right main fuel tank and 30 gallons in the right auxiliary would seem to eliminate the possibility of fuel starvation. The flight actually had sufficient fuel in the two right tanks alone to continue to Miami. Since all fuel strainers were found clean and fuel was present in the lines and the carburetors, it appears unlikely that any difficulties were experienced in the operation of the fuel system….

 

“…this flight was observed flying 2 ½ miles west of Melbourne at 300 to 500 feet. Had the left engine stopped at that time for want of fuel, Captain Hein most certainly would have attempted to obtain additional power from the right engine. Since six spark plugs were defective in that engine, it may have failed to respond to the sudden increase in manifold pressure. Instead of producing full power it may have sputtered and misfired as one of the engines was observed to do by those on the ground.

 

“The most significant facts are that no warning was given to the passengers to fasten their seat belts, and that the crew did not fasten their own. Had the pilot anticipated a crash landing, it could be expected that he would have turned the ‘fasten seat belt’ warning sign on, or would have at least secured himself. It is also significant that 6 miles, or 2 to 3 minutes, before crashing the pilot passed within 3 miles, of an airport equipped for night landing without turning toward that airport or making any attempt to reach it The only possible conclusion to be reached from these facts is that the emergency, regardless of what its nature may have been, came to the notice of the flight crew suddenly.

 

“Had mechanical trouble developed in the vicinity of Melbourne, and had Captain Hein maintained the 2,000 foot altitude he reported having over Jacksonville, he would have had little difficulty in reaching the Melbourne-Eau Gallie airport for an emergency landing. If trouble occurred prior to the time of reaching the vicinity of Melbourne while the flight was cruising at 2,000 feet, ample time would have been available to report the emergency before descending to 500 feet over Melbourne. It appears, therefore, that not only did the emergency develop suddenly, but also that the low flight over the vicinity of Melbourne did not result because of any mechanical difficulty.

 

“An additional factor was present. This is to be found in an examination of the pilot’s and co-pilot’s flying time and rest periods during the course of the flight. They both left San Juan at approximately 1445, July 11, and arrived in Miami 7 hours and 47 minutes later. This flight in itself would normally be considered a full day’s flying. But, within an hour and 20 minutes after landing at Miami, Captain Hein and Mr. MacKinnon took off for Newark, arriving at 1035 the next day. These two pilots had at that time been flying, with the exception of short shops at Ciudad Trujillo, Miami, Augusta, and Baltimore, for a period of 19 hours and 45 minutes. Eight hours after their arrival at Newark, they again took off for San Juan. Certainly, the period of 8 hours in Newark was not sufficient for adequate rest, especially in view of the fact that a considerable part of that time was necessarily expended in caring for the aircraft after landing, eating, and in preparation for the flight South. At 1845, the evening of the same day that they had arrived in Newark, they started back on their return trip, and with the exception of an hour and 20 minutes stop at Augusta, flew until 0430 the next morning, the time of the crash.

 

“In a period of 37 hours and 45 minutes, these two pilots were in the air for more than 23 hours, and had little, if any, opportunity for rest on the ground. There is no direct evidence in the record to indicate that the pilots were asleep, but under such circumstances, it would not be surprising if they were. In fact, it would be more surprising, if while cruising on automatic pilot during the early morning hours, they did not fall asleep.

 

“Many events in the cockpit immediately prior to the crash can only be surmised. Little imagination is required, however, to visualize the pilots sitting in the semidarkness of the cock-pit, fatigued by long hours of flying, actually asleep as the aircraft cruised on automatic pilot, gradually losing altitude. Then, either by virtue of the loss of power in the left engine, or because of the very imminence of the crash itself, they awoke, confronted with an emergency which neither time or immediate available power permitted them to correct. We cannot know what transpired in the cockpit, but all evidence of record indicates this to be the most probable cause of the accident.

 

“Findings

“….

“6. Proper records for the maintenance and the operation of the aircraft were not maintained from the date of certification.

 

“7. The carburetor on the left engine, and 10 spark plugs from both engines were found defective.

 

“8. The aircraft departed from Newark for subject flight with an overload of 2,047 pounds.

 

“9. The pilot and the co-pilot had less than 8 hours rest on the ground in a period of 37 hours and 45 minutes, 23 of which were spent in the air.

 

“10. No contact was made by the flight with any airway radio station to report an emergency.

 

“11. No attempt was made by the crew to land at the Melbourne-Eau Gallie airport, which was equipped for night landing, and located 3 miles east of the aircraft’s flight path, and 6 miles north of the crash.

 

“12. The safety belts for the flight crew were not fastened, nor did the flight crew warn the passengers to fasten theirs prior to the crash.

 

“13. The airplane was observed flying 2 ½ miles west of the city of Melbourne at an altitude of from 300 to 500 feet at which time an engine was heard to misfire. The aircraft lost altitude gradually until it struck the ground in nearly a level attitude.

 

“Probable Cause

 

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilots flying for long periods of time without adequate rest resulting in their inability to remain fully awake and alert.”  (Civil Aeronautics Board. AIR. Burke Air Transport – Melbourne, Florida, July 13, 1947.)

 

Sources

 

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database, 1947. Burke Air Transport DC-3 crash SW of Melbourne FL, 7-13-1947. Accessed 10-12-2023 at:

https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19470713-0

 

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Burke Air Transport – Melbourne, Florida, July 13, 1947 (File No. 1-0071-47). Washington, DC: CAB, 12-9-1947. Accessed 10-12-2023 at: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/33308

 

1947 — June 23, Flooding, Cambridge to Orleans, NE — 13

— 13  Lincoln Journal Star. “12 of the deadliest disasters in Nebraska history.” 6-15-2017.

— 13  Nebraska Dept. of Natural Resources. State of Nebraska Flood Mitigation Plan. 2003, 53.

— 13  Nebraska State Historical Society. Republican Flood of 1935: Nebraska’s Deadliest Flood.

 

Narrative Information

 

Lincoln Journal Star, 2017: No. 9. “1947 Republican River flood, 13 deaths. In June 1947, 8 inches of rain fell in 24 hours in the Medicine Creek basin north of Cambridge, a weather service account of the flood said. The water spilled into the Republican basin, causing flash flooding down to Orleans. ‘Despite residents’ chopping holes in the roofs of their homes to escape the rapidly rising water, 13 people still perished in the area from Cambridge to Orleans,’ the National Weather Service account says. The Medicine Creek Dam was constructed upstream of Cambridge in 1948-49 to help prevent such disasters ever happening again.” (Lincoln Journal Star. “12 of the deadliest disasters in Nebraska history.” 6-15-2017.)

 

Nebraska State Historical Society: “On June 23, 1947, 13 were killed in Cambridge and Orleans. Total damage was estimated at $15 million, largely because 7.5 inches of rain fell in the Medicine Creek watershed. When this flow mixed with the already-swollen Republican flow, it caused it to rise to a record stage in Orleans: 23 feet, 14 feet over flood stage.”  (Nebraska State Historical Society. Republican Flood of 1935: Nebraska’s Deadliest Flood.)

 

Nebraska Department of Natural Resources: “Medicine Creek. June 22, 1947. Cambridge. $15,000,000 [economic losses]. 13 [fatalities]. 250 homes damaged, ‘wall of water 8’ high,’ damage to railroad, roads, and bridges very bad.”  (Nebraska Dept. of Natural Resources. State of Nebraska Flood Mitigation Plan. 2003, 53.)

 

NWS: “During June 1947, flooding was severe along Medicine Creek and the downstream reaches of the Republican River in southwestern Nebraska, along the Elkhorn River in northeastern Nebraska, and along the lower Loup River in central Nebraska. In the Medicine Creek Basin north of Cambridge, rainfall of up to 8 inches occurred in a 24-hour period on June 21-22. As the water spilled into the Republican Basin, flash flooding ensued downstream to Orleans. Despite residents chopping holes in the roofs of their homes to escape the rapidly rising water, 13 people still perished in the area from Cambridge to Orleans. Property damage was extensive (no dollar amount available). This killer flood followed on the heels of the “Great Republican River Flood” just 12 years earlier in 1935. To help prevent such disasters from happening again, the Medicine Creek Dam was constructed upstream of Cambridge. The dam was built in 1948-49 and has provided decades of protection from potential flood waters, as well as meeting vital irrigation needs in the region. Elsewhere more than 6 inches of rain in central Nebraska on June 22 caused floods along the North, Middle, and South Loup Rivers. The Loup River subsequently flooded the low-lying areas of Columbus. Parts of the Elkhorn River basin in northeastern Nebraska also were flooded.” (National Weather Service (David Pearson). Top 5 Nebraska Floods. “Medicine Creek/Republican River Flood of 1947.”)

 

 

Sources

 

Lincoln Journal Star. “12 of the deadliest disasters in Nebraska history.” 6-15-2017. Accessed 7-3-2017 at: http://journalstar.com/blogs/photofiles/of-the-deadliest-disasters-in-nebraska-history/collection_6ae50d55-7d8a-5b6f-b1c3-b0b54cfe84f0.html#8

 

National Weather Service (David Pearson, Senior Service Hydrologist, WFO Omaha). Top 5 Nebraska Floods. “Medicine Creek/Republican River Flood of 1947.” Accessed 7-17-2017 at: https://www.weather.gov/media/gld/1935flood/pdf/Top5NebraskaFloods_for_HQ.pdf

 

Nebraska Department of Natural Resources. State of Nebraska Flood Mitigation Plan. Lincoln, NE: Jan 2003. http://dnrdata.dnr.ne.gov/download/Floodplain/Nebraska-Flood-Mitigation-Plan.pdf

 

Nebraska State Historical Society. Republican Flood of 1935: Nebraska’s Deadliest Flood.  Accessed at: http://www.dnr.state.ne.us/floodplain/mitigation/1935flood.html

 

 

 

 

1947 — Jun 22, tanker Markay vapor explos. loading petrol. products, Mormon Isl., LA, CA–11-12

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-8-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–11-12  Blanchard estimate based on using NFPA estimate of 11 deaths as the low-end of a

  death toll range and Boone and the Coast Guard for the high-end of the death toll range.

–10-12  Boone. Report on the Tankship Markay.  LA Fire Dept. Historical Archive.

              –10  Dead

              —  2  Missing

—  9-12  USCG. Record of Proceedings…Board of Investigation…SS Markay, Vol. III, p. 11.

—      11  NFPA. “The Markay Explosion, Los Angeles Harbor.” Quarterly, 41/2, Oct 1947, p 113.

               –8 crewmembers

               –3 Shell Oil Company “wharfingers” fatally injured.

Narrative Information

Boone: “The Los Angeles Fire Department was faced with a conflagration in the Los Angeles Harbor area of greater proportions than any in its previous experience as a result of an explosion aboard the Tankship Markay at 2:06 Sunday morning, June 22, 1947.  The concussion from the explosion jarred buildings several miles away and huge pieces of steel from the ship’s deck were hurled through the air, damaging adjacent property.

“The vessel which was being loaded at the time with a cargo of petroleum products, instantly became a roaring inferno, releasing great quantities of petroleum products on the surface of the water, which in turn ignited piers and wharfs on both sides of Slip No. 1 where the vessel was berthed.

“The Markay was owned by the Keystone Tankship Corporation and the W. H. Wickersham Company were the Pacific Coast General Agents.  It was known as the T4 type, built in 1942 at a cost of $3,125,000. The vessel has 9 tanks and these are divided into 3 tanks across, except No. 1 tanks which have only the port and starboard tank. They consist of a large center tank and two wing tanks. Cargo tanks have a capacity of 137,500 barrels, Bunker Oil tanks 10,100 barrels, and cofferdam space of 2,600 barrels. Total capacity of all tanks and cofferdam space, 150,200 barrels….It was estimated that the cargo capacity was about 60% complete at time of explosion.

   “The Butane Blend being loaded was similar to Casinghead Gasoline and was said to have a vapor pressure of 21.6. In general, without specifying the various petroleum stocks being loaded, the explosive range can be considered as being 1 1/2% to 7 1/2% by volume of mixtures of vapors with air, with Butane having a maximum of 6% by volume.

“The Markay had tied up at Shell Oil Company Marine Oil Terminal, Berth 166, on Saturday, June 21, 1947, and started loading its cargo. It was scheduled to be fully loaded and to sail for Martinez the following morning. The ship’s complement was 44 men but it is believed that not over half of this number was aboard at the time of the explosion. The First Mate and three seamen were on deck watch and several of the crew members were on duty supervising loading operations. Six members of the Shell Oil Company were on duty at the Marine Oil Terminal. 

“It is generally understood that the No. 4 tanks were being topped off with Butane Blend and No. 5 tanks were being filled with the same commodity. Nos. 6 and 7 tanks were empty; No. 8 tanks were loaded and No. 9 tanks were being loaded. The explosion occurred in the area of No. 5 tanks. Subsequent investigation revealed that cargo tanks Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 port, center and starboard were below the surface of the water, indicating that the contents of Nos. 3, 4 and 5 tanks were burned on the surface of the water. The main deck which formed the tank top over 3 and 4 tanks was rolled forward from the forward end of the bridge section and was laid over the top of the No. 2 cargo tanks. The main deck plating which formed the top of cargo tanks 6 and 7 port, center and starboard, was rolled aft from the bridge section over the top of the No. 8 tanks. A starboard section of the tank top of Nos. 6 and 7 tanks was blown clear of the vessel and landed on the Shell Oil Company property, fully a hundred feet from the Markay. This section was approximately 20′ x 30′ in measurement.  It was noted that the metal in the bridge section was extremely fused and had collapsed, indicating excessive heat. Large size malleable fittings, such as T’s, ells, etc., in many sections of the deck were completely reduced to molten metal.

“The sudden release of gasoline and associated petroleum products spread very rapidly over the surface of the water, involving Berths Nos. 167 and 168, adjacent to where the Markay was berthed. A large oil barge was endangered near Berth 167 as well as the possible spread to the Pacific Borax Plant, which was located adjacent to Berth 166 with entire structure being built on pilings. The burning oil also spread across Slip No. 1, involving Berths Nos. 153 and 154 and endangering Berths 150, 151, 152 and 155. The width of Slip No. 1 was 600 feet; Berths 153 and 154 were involved for a distance of 1,200 feet. The explosion damaged the roof and sprinkler system of warehouse shed located at Berth 153. This was a one-story steel frame and corrugated iron building, 600 feet long. Warehouse shed at Berth 154 was the same construction and about the same size.

“While these warehouses were practically empty, the intense heat developed from the burning gasoline and oil soaked wooden pilings underneath the warehouses, along with inoperative sprinklers, quickly resulted in the unprotected steel in the warehouse bucking. Warehouses at Berths 153 and 154 were destroyed to the extent that it will be necessary to replace them.  It was indeed fortunate that these warehouses were practically empty. A liberty ship operated by the American President Lines had taken on a load of cargo and sailed a short time before the explosion. Otherwise, there would have been no possible chance to have saved the ship or cargo.

“Immediately after the explosion, Acting Battalion Chief R. H. Biegel, in charge of the Harbor area, enroute to Berths 153 and 154, radioed for all Harbor companies to respond and requested Westlake to send as many companies to the fire as quickly as possible; also to notify all responsible chief officers. The number of companies responding to the fire are as follows: (This does not include companies moving to other quarters.) 19 Engine Companies, 3 Truck Companies, 1 Salvage Company, 3 Fire Boats, 2 Boat Tenders, 2 Foam Wagons (not used), 1 Rescue Company and 2 Utility Companies. In addition, 1 Coast Guard and 1 Navy Fire Boat rendered valuable assistance. Long Beach Fire Department and Navy had additional men and equipment available. This was not needed. The Fire Department equipment and personnel were quickly deployed to cover vulnerable exposure points on both sides of the channel. The Battalion Chief covering one side and the Division Commander the other side until the arrival of Chief Alderson, Deputy Chief and Platoon Commander.

   

“The exposure points were as follows: 

   

“At pier-head of Berth 152 to prevent extension to Union Oil Terminal Berth 151.  The possible involvement of Union Oil tanks across Pier A Street and the northerly end of Berth 154 to prevent extension to Berth 155.

 

“On the east side of the slip the exposure of fire extending from Berth 168 to 169. The protection of Shell Oil Terminal facilities and tanks immediately adjacent to Markay and to the east. The cutting off of fire and removal of oil barge at the head of Berth 157, and finally the cutting off of the fire before it reached the Pacific Borax Company and extension to Berth 166.

   

“The water supply on both sides of the ship in general was adequate with the addition of certain companies assigned to draft from the channel. There were slight deficiencies noted on the Pier A street side until the ruptured sprinkler line was shut off. The need for additional hydrants on the Mormon Island side are now under consideration.

   

“The use and value of the radio at a  fire of this magnitude surely demonstrated its value to the department in controlling the movement of companies and in directing of operations.

   

“The manner in which Fire Boats Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were used and operated clearly demonstrated their value, particularly at pier-head of Berth 152 and at bulkhead at Berth 155, to prevent the extension of fire, and subsequent work along entire length of Berths 153 and 154. There is no doubt that they contributed much to prevent the extension of the fire together with the assistance of the Coast Guard and Navy fire boats which operated on the Markay and adjacent wharfs. The Boat Tender batteries and the portable monitors were also used to good advantage….

       

“A number of tankers and cargo ships were moved by tugboat and ship’s crews from adjacent berths which were endangered. Captain of Port, Frank D. Higbee, rendered valuable service in supervising these operations.   

 

“To date, ten bodies have been recovered with two persons still missing–nine from the ship’s crew and three from Shell Oil Company. There were ten persons injured to the extent of requiring hospital treatment.

 

“The Coroner’s inquest was held July 2, 1947.

   

“Cause: Result of a fire and explosion on board the Markay.

“Verdict: Accidental.

   

“Conclusion of the Jury: “The cause of the explosion above mentioned was the ignition of an accumulation of vapors from the cargo tank on the deck of the vessel which became ignited from some unknown cause.

 

“The cargo being loaded at the time of the explosion was a blend of motor gasoline and normal butane, used in the manufacture of motor fuel, having a vapor pressure of about 20 pounds.  Vapor from the cargo were discharged on deck through the ullage holes normally used for gauging and sampling.  Cargoes similar to this have been loaded and transported on previous occasions without accident, and there was no evidence presented negligence or failure to follow all normal safety precautions.”

 

“This report has been delayed while awaiting transcript of the Coast Guard investigation. To date we have been unable to obtain the transcript or the report of its findings.

   

“It was of interest to note in the transcript that the vapors from the Butane Blend were being released in considerable quantities with very little wind to assist in the dissipation of the vapors. The Captain had ordered galleys locked and signs written on paper placed in crews’ quarters to prohibit smoking. One of the crew members testified he was making coffee in the pantry back aft, forward of the mess room, but he had not turned on the electricity for the electric plate.

   

“The actual cause of the ignition of the vapors and explosion probably will never be known. It is most difficult to understand this explosion as it is generally understood where vapors are involved to the extent they were purported to be on the Markay, that even though the empty or partially filled tanks were involved the mixture is said to be too rich, thus not within the explosion range.

   

“As a result of an inspection made by me on June 23, 1947, it was found that a number of tanks of the wrecked vessel contained explosive mixtures and that the vessel was creating a definite hazard in the area. Orders were issued to prohibit unauthorized persons from boarding the vessel and to provide watchman service. This was followed by complete inspection and tests for vapor concentrations on 6-24-47. On that date, identical final notices were served on the W. H. Wickersham & Company, Agents, Keystone Tankship Corporation, and the Shell Oil Company, which read as follows: “Provide continuous guard service on shore and off-shore side at Markay. Immediately make provisions to remove remaining cargo of inflammable liquids aboard Markay which at present is a definite fire hazard.” A supplemental notice was issued to the same firms on June 26, 1947, including the addition to make all cargo tanks and compartments gas-free. The Harbor Department was notified on June 24, 1947 with reference to the notices that had been served on the above named firms.

   

“On June 26, 1947, we received a letter from Lillick, Geary & McHose, attorneys representing the Keystone Tankship Corporation and W. H. Wickersham & Company, notifying us that they had that date abandoned the ship to the United States Army Engineers in accordance with the provisions of 33 United States Code, sections 409, 414 and others.

   

“On June 26, 1947, after receipt of the letter of abandonment of the vessel, we notified the United States Engineers, 751 South Figueroa Street, of the condition of the vessel and recommended immediate provision be made to take care of this condition, as the Tankship Markay in its present condition was creating a definite hazard to the Los Angeles Harbor. As a result of a conference in the office of the Corps of Engineers, War Department, 751 South Figueroa Street, June 27, 1947, arrangements were made to correct the conditions with respect to the hazards on the vessel and the eventual removal of the ship from the Harbor.

   

“On July 8, 1947, we approved the proposed manner of removal of inflammable liquids from the Markay by the Shell Oil Company.

   

“On August 5, 1947, we received a communication from the United States Engineers’ office stating that the work covered in the contract by the Shell Oil Company of removing the cargo had been complied with.

   

“At the present time, the United States Engineers have not let the final contract for the removal of the damaged ship.”

(Boone.  Report on the Tankship Markay.  LA Fire Dept. Historical Archive.)

National Fire Protection Association: “The lessons learned by members of the Los Angeles Fire and Harbor Departments by virtue of their personal inspection of the Texas City disaster, stood them well two months later with the 10,000-ton tanker S.S. Markay exploded in Los Angeles Harbor at 2:05 a.m. June 22, 1947. Caused by ignition of vapors given off during the loading of butane-blended gasoline, the explosion had the immediate effect of involving the congested sections of the industrialized area surrounding Mormon Island…Only by effective implementation of pre-arranged disaster plans was the fire controlled successfully.

Loading of the Markay.

“Immediately after the tanker docked at 1:00 p.m. on June 21st at Berth 167 of the Shell Oil Terminal on Mormon Island, the Master of the vessel was advised that they were going to load the butane-blended gasoline in No. 4, 5 and 6 tanks. This mixture consisted of 31 percent butane and 69 percent natural gasoline and had a vapor pressure of 20.3 lb. (Reid).

“Unusual precautions were ordered to preclude any danger of fire, including prohibiting smoking during loading, prohibiting any cooking in the galley, closing and dogging of all air ports, closing of all watertight doors and the issuance of orders that they remain closed, the trimming of all ventilators on the after-house away from the loading deck, and the closure of engine room skylights.

“At 3:45 p.m. loading operations were started….

Accumulation of Vapors.

“The crew on board the vessel at the time of the explosion was under the command of the Third Mate (serving double shifts for the Second Mate), and testimony from those surviving indicates that extremely heavy vapors were present on the main deck in the vicinity of No. 4 tank’s loading valves starting about 11:00 p.m. The condition was so bad that the Chief Mate (off duty) was forced to leave his quarters amidships soon afterwards, an action which subsequently saved his life. The gaseous condition extended all along the starboard side of the forward main deck and crewmen were forced to seek refuge from the fumes in the shelter deck space while taking turns closing the No. 4 valves and relaying signals for opening the loading valves on the No. 5 tank. The persistency of the vapor condition is attributed in part to the calm (wind 2 miles per hour, westerly) and to the high humidity (84 per cent), which restricted their dissipation by natural means. The source of the vapors was obviously from the ullage holes, plugs not having been inserted in them, since regulations do not require such action except when loading liquefied gases, and these holes are used for gauging (no separate gauging devices being installed).

The Explosion.

“The opening and closing of the shelter deck space doorways (against orders but understandable under the conditions) permitted vapors to accumulate in this and the midship quarters. The core of the explosion, which occurred at 2:05 a.m., was undoubtedly just aft or in the mid-ship house. This conclusion is indicated by the fact that the after bulkhead of this space was blown outward, landing across the loading manifold atop No. 6 tank and by the fact that the upper decks over this part were sagged down over the area from which the bulkhead had been torn.

The Cause.

“The exact ignition source is not definitely known and probably never will be determined with accuracy because of the heavy damages incurred to the vessel and the fact that those on the scene in a position to know were killed. Possibilities include the speed regulators on electric fans in the Officers’ quarters and radio room, the nonexplosion-proof electric light switches in the officers’ quarters, wires believed left exposed following the charging of a spare battery in the radio room, or defective electrical equipment (believed of the explosion-proof type) located on the shelter deck. In any case, despite the heavy vapor conditions no tests were known to be made of the explosive concentrations which undoubtedly existed in many parts of the vessel, and loading operations continued even though crew members were exposed to vapors which could not have been other than injurious to their health.

The Result of the Explosion.

“Eight crew members were killed and three wharfingers [owner or keeper of a wharf] of the Shell Oil Company were fatally injured by the blast, he majority being hurled overboard. Twelve other crew members were injured and nine of these hospitalized. Most of those who were on board the Markay and escaped went down the stern line to safety. Only one man, the operator of an incoming barge, is known to have observed the initial fire and explosion. He stated to the Coast Guard Board of Inquiry that the origin was on the port side of the main deck near No. 5 tank (being loaded) just abaft the midship house. He also observed that burning gasoline immediately spurted out of the vessel and within three minutes the entire width of Slip No. 1 was afire. Flames almost immediately ignited the Shell Terminal dock near Berty 167, the pump house and laboratory, and seriously exposed the Pacific Coast Borax plant located adjacent to Berth 166 and built on exposed wood piling.

“Across the 600 ft. wide slip, Berths 153 and 154 became involved in fire along their 1,200 ft. length within the first few minutes. These flames communicated to the two one-story, steel frame and corrugated iron, sprinklered buildings (each 600 ft. long) used as pier warehouses by the American President Lines. Fortunately these warehouses were practically empty following the earlier evening departure of a cargo vessel from this berth. The intense heat developed from the burning gasoline and oil-soaked wood piling under the warehouses resulted, however, in the buckling of the unprotected steel structural members. The automatic sprinkler systems in the warehouses proper were so heavily damaged by the explosion that they were ineffective. There were no sprinklers for the open substructure area and the fire was only stopped in the center of berth 154 where a transverse bulkhead aided firemen operating from a fire boat which made a daring run from the Turning Basin….” (NFPA. “The Markay Explosion, Los Angeles Harbor.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 41, No. 2, October 1947, pp. 111-115.)

Sources

Boone, Assistant Chief H. R.. Report on the Tankship Markay.  Los Angeles Fire Department Historical Archive. Accessed 8-10-2010 at: http://www.lafire.com/famous_fires/MajorIncident-index.htm

National Fire Protection Association. “The Markay Explosion, Los Angeles Harbor.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 41, No. 2, October 1947, pp. 111-115.

United States Coast Guard. Record of Proceedings of a Board of Investigation convened at 11th U.S.C.G. District, Long Beach, California. To inquire into the explosion and fire aboard the SS Markay at Berth 167, Mormon Island, Los Angeles Harbor, California, at or about 2:06 a.m. on 22 June, 1947. (Finding of Facts, Conclusions, Opinion and Recommendation, Vol. III, Final).

Accessed 10-7-2023 at: https://lafire.com/famous_fires/1947-0622_SSMarkayExplosion/1947-0622_USCG-RecordOfProceedings.htm

1947 — June 14, off-course USAAF B-29 hits top of  Hawks Mountain at night, VT  –all 12

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-12-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 

–12  Aviation Safety Network. USAAF B-29 crash into Hawks Mt., VT. 15 June 1947.

–12  Baugher. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-40049 to 44-70254). Oct 28, 2011 revision.

–12  Times Record, NY. “Officials Identify Soldiers Killed in Vermont Plane Crash.” 6-17-’47.

–12  Titusville Herald, PA. “Army Plane Crash Kills 12.”  6-16-1947, p. 1.

 

Narrative Information

 

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Network, Data, 1947:

“Date and Time           Sunday 15 June 1947, 00:14 LT [local time]

“Type:                         Boeing B-29A Superfortress

“Owner/operator:        64th BSqn / 43rd BGp USAAF [United States Army Air Force]

“Registration:              44-62228

“MSN:                         11705

“Fatalities:                   Fatalities: 12 / Occupants: 12

“Aircraft damage:       Written off

“Location:                   Hawks Mountain, 2 miles NW of Perkinsville, Vermont – USA

“Phase:                        En route

“Nature:                      Military

“Departure airport:      Pittsburgh Airport, Pennsylvania

“Destination airport:   Hanscom AFV, Massachusetts

“Narrative:

….

“Written off (destroyed) June 15, 1947: The flight had originated the previous morning when the plane took off from Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona, for a navigational training mission to the east coast. The plane was scheduled to land at Andrews Field (Later known as Andrews Air Force Base) in Washington, D.C., but due to bad weather was diverted to Pittsburgh Airport where it arrived at 15:07 Local Time.

 

“After refueling, the aircraft proceeded towards Hanscom Air Force Base in Bedford, Massachusetts, where it was to remain overnight before flying back to Arizona the following day. However, the weather grew worse, and with poor visibility and darkness falling the crew became lost, ending up over Vermont instead of Massachusetts.

 

“Shortly after midnight – reportedly at 12:14 on June 15 – the bomber crashed into the southeast side 12 feet below the peak of the 2,098 foot (638-metre) Hawks Mountain and exploded. All twelve men aboard were killed, and to this day the incident remains the worst aviation accident to ever occur in Vermont….

 

“NOTE: B-29 44-6228 lost radar and radio contact at approximately 11:55 pm on Saturday, June 14, 1947. However, some sources list the crash as happening “shortly after midnight”, at around 12:14 am, that is, a few minutes into Sunday, June 15, 1947. Hence both dates are being reported. Contemporary newspaper reports – mostly published early on Monday June 16 – give the latter date.

 

“Crew of 44-62228 (all killed):


1st Lt Robert G. Fessler, pilot,
2nd Lt Wilfred E. Gassett, copilot,
2nd Lt Ceasare P. Fontana, observer,
M/Sgt D. D. Jack, crew chief,
T/Sgt Paul H. Fetterhoff,
T/Sgt Clayton K. Knight,
S/Sgt Oliver W. Hartwell,
S/Sgt Sylvester S. Machalac,
S/Sgt John J. O’Toole,
Cpl Harry C. Humphrey,
Cpl Robert Clark,
Pfc Robert M. Stewart.”

 

(Aviation Safety Network. USAAF B-29 crash into Hawks Mt., VT. 15 June 1947.)

 

Baugher: “Boeing B-29A-70-BN Superfortress….62228 (64th BS) crashed into Hawks Mountain, Vermont in bad weather Jun 14, 1947.  All 12 onboard killed.” (Baugher. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-40049 to 44-70254). Oct 28, 2011 revision.)

 

Newspapers

 

June 15. AP: “Springfield, Vt., June 15 – (AP) – (Sunday) – A “big” plane crashed on the lonely and heavily wooded slopes of Hawk’s Mountain early today, and Civil Aeronautics  authorities reported an Army B-29 was “missing.” The Civil Aeronautics Communications office at Burlington reported the “missing” B-29, but added that neither the departure point nor destination of the craft was known. At Westover Field, Mass. – the nearest large Army air installation — officers said no planes from that field were in the air. 

 

“Fire Chief Myland H. Jordan reported “a big plane flew low across the community” shortly before the crash was reported. It was raining heavily at that time. A few minutes after the plane crossed Springfield — so low, Jordan said, “it shook the windows in the houses” — the night telephone operator at Perkinsville, six miles north of this community, reported “a flash and a crash on Hawk’s Mountain.”….

 

“Jordan said the scene of the crash was one mile northeast of Springfield municipal airport near a mountain ledge which he described as “very hard to reach.” Simultaneously, authorities at Rutland said they had been asked by Army officials to send ambulances and doctors into the Hawk’s Mountain area.” (News and Tribune, Jefferson City, MO. “Another Plane is Down in Vermont.” 6-15-1947, p. 12.)

 

June 15, AP: “Springfield, Vt., June 15. (AP) – A lost Army plane — desperately blinking its lights in a last signal for aid – crashed into the side of lonely Hawks mountain in a driving rainstorm early today and an Army spokesman said “it now looks as though 12 were killed.”

 

“Colonel E. L. Tucker, commandant at Grenier Field, N. H., said the B-29 Super-Fortress had 15 aboard when it left Tucson. Ariz., yesterday, but the passenger list was changed when it refueled at the Greater Pittsburgh airport.

 

“The number of persons aboard when the plane crashed and exploded a few hundred feet from the top of the 2,300-foot mountain was not yet known. Tonight a little more than 20 hours after the crash the Army spokesman said a 12th body had been found by the weary searchers beating their way through uprooted trees and burned underbrush.

 

“The training flight was to have taken the craft to Bedford, Mass., but it was far off its course and had been out of radio contact with Bedford for an hour and a half when it roared out of rain-laden clouds at midnight and circled about this Vermont village at 1,000 feet — or less.

 

“Aviators in the area, including Albert Wheelock, a Civil Air Patrol flier, said that a difference of relatively few feet in its elevation or course — or 20 minutes in time — might have saved the plane.   Swiftly clearing skies a short time after the crash made the cloud-capped mountain tops visible.

 

“Major Miller said it appeared that all the dead except one would be identified. The task of identification of the shattered bodies was made more difficult by the fact that the number of bodies found exceeded the number known to be aboard when the plane left Tucson…. “The explosion must have been terrific. There was quite a load of gasoline aboard,” Major Miller said, “and there was a series of smaller explosions. The whole mountain was lighted up. The men never knew what hit them.”

 

“As the plane lunged from a lowering sky above Springfield, windows in homes vibrated from the thunder of the big engines and many residents rushed out of their houses. After circling twice over this manufacturing village and nearby Perkinsville, the whole sky was lighted by a great flash and the roar of the engines ceased.

 

“Law enforcement officials, firemen, National Guardsmen and others, including Wheelock, sped to the lonely mountain on whose upper slope a dim light marked the flaming wreckage and burning trees and underbrush.” (Titusville Herald, PA. “Army Plane Crash Kills 12.” 6-16-1947, p.1.)

 

June 17, UP: “Davis-Monthan Army Airfield, Ariz. (UP) — The Army today positively identified three and tentatively identified nine of 12 soldiers killed in the crash of a B-29 Sunday at Springfield, Vt. Positively identified were

 

Sgt. John J. O’Toole, Queens Village;

S/Sgt. Oliver W. Hartwell, Wells, Me., and

Pfc. R. M. Stewart, Westover Field, Mass.

 

“Listed as boarding the plane at Pittsburg and thus identified were

 

First Lt. Robert Fellser, Madison, Wis.;

Second Lt. W. E. Gassett, Brockton, Mass.;

Second Lt. Oscar P. Fontana, West Springfield, Mass.;

T/Sgt. Clayton K, Knight, Knoxville, Tenn.;

T/Sgt. Paul H. Fetterhoff, Shreveport, La., and

S/Sgt. S. S. Michalac Summer Hill, Pa.

 

“Boarding at Tucson and presumed aboard when the plane crashed were

 

Capt. Robert Clark, Jamaica Plains, Mass.;

Cpl. Harry Humphrey, Albuquerque, N.M., and

M/Sgt. D. D. Jack, Dalles, Ore.”

 

(Times Record, NY.  “Officials Identify Soldiers Killed in Vermont Plane Crash.” 6-17-1947, 1.)

 

Sources

 

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Network, Data, 1947. USAAF B-29 crash into Hawks Mt., VT. 15 June 1947. Accessed 10-13-2023 at: https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/98631

 

Baugher, Joseph F. 1944 USAAF Serial Numbers (44-40049 to 44-70254). Oct 28, 2011 revision. Accessed 12-25-2011 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1944_4.html

 

News and Tribune, Jefferson City, MO. “Another Plane is Down in Vermont.” 6-15-1947, 12. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=93667955

 

Times Record, Troy, NY.  “Officials Identify Soldiers Killed in Vermont Plane Crash.” 6-17-1947, 1. At: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=40336449

 

Titusville Herald, PA. “Army Plane Crash Kills 12.”  6-16-1947, 1. Accessed at:  http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=105995225

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1947 — June 13, Pennsylvania-Central Air Flight 410 too-low crash ~Lookout Rock, WV–50

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-13-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 

—  50  Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description, Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Flight 410

—  50  Baugher, Joseph F.  1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-30032 to 42-39757). 8-26-2011 rev.

—  50  CAB. AIR. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., Lookout Rock, WV – June 13, 1947.

 

Narrative Information

 

Baugher: “Douglas C-54 Skymaster….32937 (c/n 3112) to civil registry as N88842 (Capital Airlines).  Crashed near Lookout Rock, WV Jun 13, 1947 with Pennsylvania Central Airlines on flight  from Pittsburgh to Washington DC.  Struck a ridge in the Blue Ridge Mountains at 1425 foot elevation.  All 50 onboard killed.” (Baugher, Joseph F.  1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-30032 to 42-39757). 8-26-2011 rev.)

 

Civil Aeronautics Board, Accident Investigation Report:

 

“The Accident

 

“Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Flight 410, NC 88842, crashed near a point known as Lookout Rock, West Virginia, approximately 8 miles Southeast of Charles Town, West Virginia, at approximately 1816 EST, 1 June 13, 1947, while enroute from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to Washington, D C All 50 occupants of the aircraft were killed at impact and the Douglas DC-4 was demolished as a result of the crash and subsequent fire.

 

“History of the Flight

 

“Flight 410 departed Chicago, Illinois, at 1352, June 13, 1947, on an instrument flight plan with its destination Norfolk, Virginia, and with stops scheduled at Cleveland, Ohio, Pittsburgh and Washington. While enroute to Cleveland at 7,000 feet, the flight reported that a delay would be necessary because it was attempting to circumnavigate a thunderstorm in the vicinity of Gosen, Indiana. Approximately 15 minutes later a message was again received from the flight indicating that it was not able to circumnavigate the storm and requesting clearance to proceed under it according to contact flight rules. Thes request was approved by Chicago Airway Traffic Control on the condition that Flight 410 was able to proceed according to contact flight rules (CFR) at an altitude of 2,000 feet. Having received this amended clearance, Flight 410 continued underneath the thunderstorm and arrived at Cleaveland at 1604, the flight having consumed 47 minutes originally estimated by the crew. The flight from Cleveland to Pittsburgh was routine.

 

“The flight departed Pittsburgh at 1724 and at 1753, 29 minutes later, reported over the Flintstone Intersection, 88 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, at 7,000 feet. At 1754 the flight received a message from Washington Airway Traffic Control clearing it to the Herndon Fan Marker to maintain 7,000 feet until further advised. The flight was also instructed that there would be an indefinite delay at Herndon but that approach clearance could be expected no later than 1930, which was approximately one hour and 10 minutes later than its estimated time of arrival. Immediately after receiving this message the flight was given the 1730 hourly weather sequence report for Washington. After acknowledging receipt of the Washington weather report, Flight 410 instructed the company station at Washington to request from Airway Traffic Control a clearance to approach Washington in accordance with contact flight rules on the right side of the west leg of the Arcola radio range. This request was approved by Airway Traffic Control and at 1803 the flight received a message clearing it to the Washington tower to cross the Arcola radio range station at or below 2,500 feet and in accordance with contact flight rules. The flight was advised that if this were not possible it was to hold at 2,500 feet and so to inform Airway Traffic Control.

 

“Prior to establishing its descent the flight was instructed to report when leaving each 1,000-foot level. In accordance with these instructions Flight 410 reported leaving the 7,000-foot level at 1805 and two minutes later another report was received from the flight indicating it was leaving 6,000 feet. The flight reported its position as ‘south of Martinsburg’ at 1808 and immediately thereafter reported that it was leaving 5,000 feet at that time. At 1810 another report was received from the flight, ‘leaving 4,000 feet.’ Three minutes thereafter the flight again reported its progress and indicated it was leaving 3,000 feet. Approximately 6 minutes later the company station at Washington initiated several calls to the flight but, although these transmissions were continued for several hours, no contact was established.

 

“Investigation

 

“Subsequent investigation disclosed that the aircraft had struck a ridge in the Blue Ridge Mountains approximately two miles east of the Shenandoah River…at an elevation of approximately 1,425 feet. The aircraft had struck the broken rock formation with severe impact force in an attitude which was laterally level and in an angle of descent of 2½  degrees. The terrain at the scene of the accident slopes upward toward the east at an angle of approximately twenty degrees, the elevation of the crest of the ridge being approximately 225 feet higher than the scene of the accident….

 

“Inspection of the wreckage indicates that both the flaps and the under carriage were retracted at the time of impact. All control surfaces were accounted for at the scene of the accident, and no failure or malfunctioning of the control systems was disclosed. The damage sustained by the engine and propellers indicated that all four engines were developing considerable power at impact. The settings of the aircraft altimeters were within one-hundredth of an inch of an inch of the altimeter setting of Washington National Airport which at the time was 29.95 inches of mercury.…

 

“Discussion

 

“Inherent difficulties exist in determining the probable cause of accidents of this character. In a collision with terrain in full flight normally all occupants of the aircraft are killed upon impact, the aircraft itself is usually demolished and fire ensues. But the examination made by the Board, though it may leave ‘probable’ cause to some surmise, has brought forth matters of considerable moment.

 

“This accident, as many others, had a final concluding cause but the chain of causation which enabled the final unfortunate event to occur reaches far back. The first of these that can be noted inheres in certain aspects of the existing system of airway traffic control. 

 

“It will be noted that Airway Red 61 was approved for use by the Civil Aeronautics Administration without any publication of a minimum altitude for flight under instrument conditions. Indeed, the whole subject of what are minimum altitudes and who prescribes them was in considerable confusion at the time of the accident. This is evidenced by the fact that a number of witnesses from the Airway Traffic Control Section of the Civil Aeronautics Administration were unable to state who, if anyone, prescribes such minimum altitudes and what effect follows upon their establishment.

 

“The basic minimum altitude for all flying under instrument conditions over all terrain on or off any civil airway is established at 1,000 feet above terrain by Civil Air Regulation 60 23. This requirement will, of course, provide no uniform flight level over any particular route since the height of the terrain will vary. In the Airman’s Guide minimum altitudes for most routes are published, but these minimum altitudes are merely advisory and flight below those altitudes as long as it is 1,000 feet above terrain violates no regulation.

 

“Meanwhile the companies, for operational purposes, establish their own minimum altitudes. The procedure for doing this, thou it does not seem wholly uniform, is to set forth these minimums in the company’s operating manuals and not in the operating certificates. Minimums governing landings and take-offs, however, are included in the company’s operating certificates. The consequences of this differentiation seem, at least, two (a) operating certificates are ‘approved’ by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, operations manuals, though they may be scrutinized by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, are not ‘approved,’ and (b) departure from the operating certificate is a violation of the Civil Air Regulations involving legal consequences, departure from the operations manual of itself is not a ‘violation,’ whatever disciplinary action the company may take against its personnel for such departures….

 

“This series of events involves matters for criticism of three parties. In the first place, the pilot in asking for this clearance was asking for something in violation of company rules. The use of the Arcola range had not been authorized by the company, nor had the pilot been qualified to fly it. However, it must be recognized that in view of the pilot’s exceptionally long experience over this area such lack of qualification is only a technicality. In the second place, the company dispatcher, whose business it is to supervise matters of this character, was totally unconversant with the fact that the Arcola range had not been approved for use by the company and that the pilot had not been qualified to fly it. As a matter of practice, air traffic control clearances are delivered by the company communication station to the pilot and the company dispatcher simultaneously. In this instance the dispatcher raised no question as to the propriety of the captain’s request for the clearance nor to the appropriateness of the provisions of the clearance provided by Airway Traffic Control.

 

“In the third place, the clearance was faulty for many reasons. Under existing instructions Airway Traffic Control is not authorized to give a pilot a clearance below minimums unless requested by the pilot and the pilot must then be advised that the clearance is below the minimum. The minimum that Airway Traffic Control must use is the minimum established by the company. But if no such minimum has been established or is readily available, the controller shall use the minimum published in the Airman’s Guide. If neither of these minimums is available the rule is unclear as to what should be done but in any event CAR 60 establishes the lowest possible minimum.

 

“An examination of the clearance shows that no request for a clearance beneath minimums was ever made by the pilot. All he asked for was a contact clearance. Again, the pilot was never advised that the clearance was below minimums. The clearance was below any standard of a minimum for this airway….

 

“The clearance, in short, authorized the pilot who was then on instruments to descend below 3,000 feet to 2,500 feet or below in order to make contact and go into Washington contact. The clearance, moreover, in essence invited such a maneuver….The clearance thus was faulty and should never have been offered by the controller nor accepted y the pilot.

 

“But the clearance though clearly a contributing cause was not the eventual cause of the accident. It is the pilot’s ultimate responsibility so to operate his aircraft, whatever clearance he receives, to avoid collision with terrain The pilot of this aircraft was familiar with the general characteristics of the terrain between Martinsburg and Washington. Nevertheless he was flying at an elevation of 1,425 feet over terrain that at points rose to greater heights….

 

“The fact remains that the pilot exercised poor judgment in attempting to conduct the flight between Martinsburg and Arcola at an altitude less than 3,000 feet. He was clearly prompted by the desire to come into contact and thus avoid the delay that would be occasioned by having to hold either over Herndon or Arcola. It is patent that he did not establish contact at 3,000 feet, for even though he may have had occasional vertical reference to the ground, he could hardly have had any forward visibility. The testimony of the witnesses indicates clearly that  the aircraft subsequently passed intermittently through low clouds at an altitude below the crest of the ridge and that, immediately before impact, it entered a dense cloud covering the top of the ridge….

 

“Findings

….

“8. The existing company enroute minimum altitude between Martinsburg and Herndon is 3,000 feet for both instrument and contact flight.

 

“9. No enroute minimum altitude between Martinsburg and Arcola had been published in the Airman’s Guide before the route was put into operation.

 

“10. The company had not authorized operations on the Martinsburg-Arcola route, nor published any minimum altitudes governing it.

 

“11. The pilot requested a clearance on the Arcola range contrary to established company operating procedures.

 

“12. The company dispatcher made no effort to determine whether the clearance that was requested and the clearance that was given was in accordance with company procedures.

 

“13. The clearance given was not in accordance with instructions then governing Airway Traffic Control….

 

“16. After entering a cloud which covered the top of the ridge, the aircraft crashed at an elevation of approximately 1,425 feet near a point known as Lookout Rock, West Virginia, and was demolished by impact and subsequent fire.

 

“17. The aircraft struck the ground in an attitude which was laterally level and in a slight descent.

 

“18. No malfunctioning of the primary aircraft structure, the control system, or the power plants occurred prior to impact….

 

“Probable Cause

 

“The Board finds that the probable cause of this accident was the action of the pilot in descending below the minimum en route altitude under conditions of weather which prevented adequate visual reference to the ground. A contributing cause was the faulty clearance given by Airway Traffic Control, tacitly approved by the company dispatcher, and accepted by Flight 410. 

 

Corrective actions:

 

“The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics called a conference of all airlines and of his regional personnel in order to establish enroute cruising altitudes and initial approach altitudes which are completely uniform for all air carriers throughout the United States.

 

“The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics has issued appropriate instructions to Civil Aeronautics Administration personnel prohibiting the issuance of Airway Traffic Control clearances below established minimums.”  (CAB. AIR. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., Lookout Rock, WV – June 13, 1947.)

Sources

 

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database, 1947. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Flight 410 crash into Lookout Rock Ridge, 13 June 1947. Accessed 10-13-2023 at: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19470613-0

 

Baugher, Joseph F. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-30032 to 42-39757). Aug 26, 2011 revision. Accessed 12-14-2011 at:  http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1942_2.html

 

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corp., Lookout Rock, West Virginia – June 13, 1947. Washington, DC: CAB, November 19, 1947. Accessed 10-13-2023 at:   https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjJ9pXQ8POBAxXxFlkFHfYGDZkQFnoECCsQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Frosap.ntl.bts.gov%2Fview%2Fdot%2F33306%2Fdot_33306_DS1.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0bhdIe5_ACA3_-Rv9yFaUW&opi=89978449

 

 

 

1947 — June 1, Tornado, Jefferson County, especially Pine Bluff area, AR                  —     35

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-13-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 

–35  Assoc. Press. “Another Death Brings Tornado Toll to 35.” Hope Star, AR. 3-6-1947, p. 1.

–35  Grazulis.  Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991. 1993, pp. 242 & 929.

 

Narrative Information

 

Grazulis: “AR  JUN 1, 1947 1520 35k 300inj 600y 19m F4. JEFFERSON–Moved E from Sulphur Springs across the south edge of Pine Bluff. Damage totaled $750,000 as tenant homes and suburban homes were swept away. Eleven of the dead were teenagers at a recreational meeting hall on Hwy-15. Eight of the deaths were in rural tenant homes. Sixteen deaths were in Pine Bluff. Up to five people were killed in one home. $750,000.” (Grazulis 1993, p. 929.)

 

Newspapers

 

June 2, AP: “Pine Bluff, June 2 – (AP) – With 33 bodies in mortuaries, Jefferson county officials pushed their search today for an additional 15 persons believed missing after a tornado ripped a 20-mile path south of here, injuring hundreds and leaving hundreds more homeless. Coroner E. D. DuPree, who announced early today 37 bodies had been recovered, said he still believed that was correct, but that some confusion may have resulted from the shifting of corpses among the various establishments. A check of the four mortuaries here showed 18 white persons and 15 negroes.

 

“The majority of the victims were children, including members of a teen-age group attending a meeting in a house where 11 persons were killed. At least 10 white children died.

 

“Searchers began at dawn a careful check of the rain-soaked plantation fields and bayou swamps for additional victims of the twister. Sheriff Garland Brewster said 15 persons were believed missing. One crew blasted a hole in a dike along Barthlomew Bayou into which several house were believed to have been blown, then waded waist-deep in the muddy water hunting for bodies.

 

“The condition of many of the 71 injured at Davis hospital – the community’s only hospital – was critical. Emergency treatment was administered last night to some 200 who were released after treatment. Countless others received on the spot aid for minor hurts.

 

“Estimating that 500 to 1,000 homes were destroyed, Mayor George Steed of Pine Bluff said it probably would be tomorrow before a recapitulation of the storm’s toll would be complete….

 

“The twister bounded along the 20-mile course – 10 miles wide in places – from a point approximately 10 miles southwest of here to a spot in the Arkansas river bottoms about 10 miles southeast of Pine Bluff. Its fringes struck the extreme southern outskirts of this community of 40,000 at the northernmost point of its course, damaging the Pine Bluff County Club house. It bounded over Grider Field, wartime army aviation primary training center, leaving the airport untouched….The storm jumped some small sections along its path but generally devastated the area, twisting huge cypress trees into kindling and entirely eliminating whole pine thickets. Only the foundations – no wreckage – marked the sites of many farm dwellings. Huge strips of metal roofing were wrapped around fallen utility poles. Several small timber bridges across bayous leading from Pine Bluff to the devastated area were blown away and ambulance drivers had to wait removal of trees and logs from the highways to remove some of the injured….

 

“Driving rain and a hail storm followed the tornado to handicap rescuers and add to the misery of the victims. Many injured brought to the hospital were covered with mud which had to be washed off before they could be examined….” (Associated Press. “Tornado Takes Toll. Over 30 Meet Death in Pine Bluff Sector.” The Camden News, AR. 6-2-1947, p. 1.)

 

June 2, AP: “Pine Bluff, June 2 – (AP) – The list of identified dead, revised by Jefferson county (Pine Bluff) officials, in Sunday’s tornado: [We put into alphabetical order and add numbering.]

 

  1. Barbo, Mike.
  2. Browning, Charlotte.
  3. Chambers, Mr. Joe.
  4. Chambers, Mrs. Joe.
  5. Coleman, Sally.
  6. Henderson, Josephine.
  7. Hobson, Mr. H. B.
  8. Hobson, Mrs. H. B.
  9. Horton, Billy Jo, 9.
  10. Horton, Barbara Dean, 3.
  11. Jacobs, Edna, 15.
  12. Jarrett, John L., 14.
  13. Kendall, Fred Jr., 12.
  14. May, Calvin, 15
  15. Miles, Willie Jr., 9.
  16. Nelson, Richard, 16.
  17. Shackelford, Gelona, 50.
  18. Shackelford, Joe, about 50.
  19. Smith, Mrs. Anna May.
  20. Stubblefield, C. W., 16.
  21. Stuart, James, 16.
  22. Tidwell, Mr. E. U. [Union community.]
  23. Tidwell, Mrs. E. U. [Union community.]
  24. [Tidwell child 1 of 5 children of Mr. and Mrs. E. U. Tidwell.[1]]
  25. [Tidwell child 2 of 5 children of Mr. and Mrs. E. U. Tidwell,]
  26. [Tidwell child 3 of 5 children of Mr. and Mrs. E. U. Tidwell,]
  27. [Tidwell child 4 of 5 children of Mr. and Mrs. E. U. Tidwell,]
  28. [Tidwell child 5 of 5 children of Mr. and Mrs. E. U. Tidwell,]
  29. West, Mr. James E.
  30. West, Mrs. James. [Noted in AP of June 3, “Another Death Brings Tornado Toll to 35.”]
  31. West, James F. Jr., 4.
  32. West, Judy, 6.
  33. Witherspoon, Milton, 14.
  34. Young, C. W.”
  35. Unidentified man “whose automobile was plucked from the highway and flung into a cotton field…”[2]

(Assoc. Press. “Death List for Pine Bluff Storm Area.” The Camden News, AR. 6-2-1947, p. 1.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “Another Death Brings Tornado Toll to 35.” Hope Star, AR. 3-6-1947, p. 1. Accessed 10-13-2023 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/hope-star-jun-03-1947-p-1/

 

Associated Press. “Death List for Pine Bluff Storm Area.” The Camden News, AR. 6-2-1947, p. 1. Accessed 10-13-2023 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/camden-news-jun-02-1947-p-1/

 

Associated Press. “Family Of Seven Lose Lives In Quirk Of Fate.” The Camden News, AR. 6-2-1947, p. 1. Accessed 1-13-2023 at:

https://newspaperarchive.com/camden-news-jun-02-1947-p-1/

 

Associated Press. “Tornado Takes Toll. Over 30 Meet Death in Pine Bluff Sector.” The Camden News, AR. 6-2-1947, p. 1. Accessed 1-13-2023 at:

https://newspaperarchive.com/camden-news-jun-02-1947-p-1/

 

Danville Library Obituary Collection [Yell County, AR]. “Tidwell, E.U. (Mr. and Mrs.).” Accessed 1-13-2023 at: http://www.yellcountyobits.org/obittext/obit338.html

 

Grazulis, Thomas P. Significant Tornadoes 1680-1991: A Chronology and Analysis of Events. St. Johnsbury, VE: Environmental Films, 1993, 1,326 pages.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] The notation of the deaths of five Tidwell children in addition to the parents comes from another article same page: “Family of Seven Lose Lives in Quirk of Fate.” Additionally the Danville Library Obituary Collection contains an obituary article noting the Mr. and Mrs. R. U. Tidwell and five children “lost their lives in a tornado stat struck Union and Star City communities near Pine Bluff Last Sunday.”

[2] Died of injuries on June 3rd. (AP. “Death List for Pine Bluff Storm Area.” The Camden News, AR. 6-2-1947, p. 1.)

1947 — May 30, Eastern Air Lines Flight 605 Crash, Near Bainbridge, MD — 53

— 53 Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). Maryland.
— 53 Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Eastern Air Lines Flight 605.
— 53 Baugher. 1943 USAAF Serial Numbers (43-5109 to 43-52437). 11-7-2011 rev.
— 53 Civil Aeronautics Board. AIR. Eastern Air Lines – Near Bainbridge, MD, May 30, 1947.
— 53 Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). 1982, p. 370.

Narrative Information

Baugher: “Douglas C-54B-15-DO Skymaster….17180 (c/n 18380, DO154) to US Navy as ??? 11/45 to Eastern Airlines, Inc. as N88814, side no 708. On May 30, 1947 Flight 605 departed Newark at 17.04h for a flight to Miami with a stop at Baltimore, and climbed to its assigned cruising altitude of 4000 feet. At about 17.41 witnesses saw the aircraft on its approach to Baltimore; enter a steepening dive until it struck the ground at high speed in a partially inverted attitude. 4 crew and 49 PAX fatal.” (Baugher. 1943 USAAF Serial Numbers (43-5109 to 43-52437). 11-7-2011 rev.)

CAB: “Eastern Air Lines Flight 605…en route non-stop from Newark, New Jersey, to Miami, Florida, crashed near Bainbridge, Maryland, about 1741, May 30, 1947, fatally injuring all 53 occupants and demolishing the aircraft….

“Flight 605 carried 48 revenue passengers, one infant, a crew of four, and cargo. An instrument flight plan specifying a cruising altitude of 4,000 feet was filed and approved. The plane was away from the ramp at its Scheduled departure time of 1655 and off the ground at 1704.

“Position reports were made over Metuchen, New Jersey, at 1,000 feet altitude and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, at 4,000 feet altitude, at 1710 and 1727, respectively. The 1727 message included an estimated time of arrival at Baltimore as 1749. No message suggesting trouble was received.

“At approximately 1741 a number of persons in various locations on the ground near Bainbridge saw the aircraft enter a dive which became progressively steeper until it passed from their view behind trees or terrain….

“Impact with the ground was about 2 miles east of Bainbridge, on Amber 7 Airway, in a moderately to densely wooded area with trees 60-70 feet high. The aircraft broke up into a large number of pieces which were strewn irregularly over an area roughly 500 feet long and 150 feet wide with the explosive-like violence common to high-speed crashes….

“The flight was dispatched properly from Newark. The flight crew was currently certificated and qualified over the route. Weather was excellent and did not contribute to the accident. Investigation of the power plants can be summed in the statement that nothing was found to indicate or even suggest that there had been any malfunctioning of any component of any power plant….

“Flight 605 departed Newark (EWR) at 17:04 for a flight to Miami (MIA) and climbed to it’s assigned cruising altitude of 4000 feet. At about 17:41 witnesses saw the aircraft enter a steepening dive until it struck the ground at high speed in a partially inverted attitude.

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a sudden loss of control, for reasons unknown, resulting in a dive to the ground.” (CAB. AIR. Eastern Air Lines – Near Bainbridge, MD, May 30, 1947.)

Cornell: “Fort Deposit, Maryland (Eastern), May 31 [sic.], 1947…..A structural defect in the tail assembly was blamed for the crash.”

ASN: This disaster was the worst aviation accident at the time. (Aviation Safety Network. Eastern Air Lines Flight 605). It was the first aviation disaster with fifty or more fatalities.

Sources

Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). Maryland. Accessed 3/9/2009 at: http://www.baaa-acro.com/Pays/Etats-Unis/Maryland.htm

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation. Database 1947. “Friday 30 May 1947.” Accessed 7-2-2020 at: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19470530-0

Baugher, Joseph F. 1943 USAAF Serial Numbers (43-5109 to 43-52437). Nov 7, 2011 revision. Accessed 12-18-2011 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1943_2.html

Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Board. Eastern Air Lines – Near Bainbridge, MD, May 30, 1947. Washington, DC: CAB, June 30, 1948. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?websearch&site=dot_aircraftacc

Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.

1947 — May 29, USAAF C-54 (DC-4), approach crash near Atsugi Air Base, Japan  — all 41

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-17-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 

–41  Aviation Safety Network. USAAF C-54 approach crash, Atsugi Air Base, Japan, 5-29-1947.

–41  BAAA. “Crash of a Douglas C-54D-5-DC Skymaster near Atsugi: 41 Killed.”

–41  Blanchard estimate.[1]

–40  Assoc. Press. “Airplane Crashes Around The World.” La Crosse Tribune, WI, 5-31-1947, 1.

–40  Baugher, Joseph. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-70686 to 42-91973).

 

Narrative Information

 

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database, 1947:

 

“Date and Time:          Thursday 29 May 1947, 22:45

“Type:                         Douglas C-54D-5-DC (DC-4)

“Operator:                   United States Army Air Force – USAAF

“Registration:              42-72553

“MSN:                         10658

“First flight:                 1945

“Crew:                         Fatalities:   8 / Occupants:   8

“Passengers:                Fatalities: 33 / Occupants: 33

“Total:                         Fatalities: 41 / Occupants: 41 (Cites Baugher as only source, who notes 40.)

….

“Location:                   near Atsugi-NAS – Japan

“Phase:                        Approach (APR)

“Nature:                       Military

“Departure airport:      Seoul-Gimpo (Kimpo) International Airport…South Korea

“Destination airport:    Atsugi NAS…Japan

“Narrative:                   Crashed on approach.”

 

Baugher, 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-70686 to 42-91973):

“Douglas C-54D-5-DC Skymaster….72553 (MSN 10658) crashed on approach Atsugi, Japan May 29, 1947. 40 killed.

 

Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives:

“Date & Time:             May 29, 1947 at 2245 LT [local time]

“Type of aircraft:         Douglas C-54 Skymaster

“Operator:                   USAAF

“Registration:              42-72553

“Flight Phase:              Landing (descent or approach)

“Flight Type:               Military

“Survivors:                  No

“Site:                           Mountains

“Schedule:                   Seoul – Tachikawa

“MSN:                         10658

“YOM:                        1945

“Location:                   Atsugi NAS, Kanto

“Country:                    Japan

….

“Crew on board:          8

“Crew fatalities:           8

“Pax on board:                        33

“Pax fatalities:             33

“Other fatalities:          0

“Total fatalities:           41

“Circumstances:         

 

“The aircraft was performing a flight from Seoul-Kimpo to Tachikawa AFB with several US officers and five civilians on board. While approaching the Tokyo area by night and from the southwest, the crew completed a turn at an altitude of 1,500 meters in marginal weather conditions when the aircraft hit the slope of a mountain located west of the city of Atsugi, about 30 km southwest of Tachikawa AFB. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and burned completely. All 41 occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was 10 km with cumulus and altostratus between 1,000 and 2,500 meters.

 

“Probable cause:

 

“Apparently following an inappropriate flight plan, or maybe due to a lack of concentration or situational awareness, the crew did not check their instruments properly and failed to recognize that they were following a wrong heading to land at Tachikawa AFB. It is possible that strong winds (up to 40 knots at the time of the accident) may contribute to the deviation of the approach path.”

 

Newspapers

 

May 30, AP: “Tokyo, Friday, May 30, (AP) – A four-engined C-54 army courier plane with 41 persons aboard crashed in mountains southwest of Tokyo last night and it was not known today whether there were any survivors. The plane, inbound from Korea, had reported no trouble as it flew northward across the mouth of Tokyo bay, fifth air force announcement said. That was its last radio contact with ground officials. Three airplanes and five ground parties were rushed to the scene west of Atsugi airport, the couriers’ destination and the field where General MacArthur landed to begin the occupation of Japan. Aboard the plane were 33 passengers and a crew of eight, the Fifth air force said. The general headquarters public relations office said a list of passengers and crew could not be released until Tuesday. The announcement said the condition of the plane and those aboard was ‘still undetermined.’ The plane was on a routine courier flight from Kimpo, Korea to Tokyo.

 

“The craft contacted Tokyo by radio at 10:30 p.m., when it was at 9,000 feet elevation over Oshima, the island at the entrance to Tokyo bay.

 

“The crash scene in the mountains is on the line of approach to Atsugi airfield, about 38 miles southwest of Tokyo. Atsugi is a main army base and the field at which American army forces first landed in occupying Japan.” (Associated Press. Army Courier Plane With 41 on Board Crashes Near Tokyo.” Bluefield Daily Telegraph, WV, 5-30-1947, p. 1.)

 

May 31, AP: “….Tokyo – 40 killed when U.S. army courier plane hit a mountain southwest of Japanese capital, Thursday.” (Associated Press. “Airplane Crashes Around The World.” La Crosse Tribune, WI, 5-31-1947, p.1.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “Airplane Crashes Around The World.” La Crosse Tribune, WI, 5-31-1947, p.1. Accessed 10-17-2023 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/la-crosse-tribune-may-31-1947-p-1/

 

Associated Press. Army Courier Plane With 41 on Board Crashes Near Tokyo.” Bluefield Daily Telegraph, WV, 5-30-1947, p. 1. Accessed 10-17-2023 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/bluefield-daily-telegraph-may-30-1947-p-1/

 

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database, 1947. USAAF C-54 approach crash, Atsugi Air Base, Japan, 5-29-1947. Accessed 10-17-2023 at:

https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19470529-3

 

Baugher, Joseph. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-70686 to 42-91973) Accessed 10-17-2023 at: https://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1942_4.html

 

BAAA (Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives). “Crash of a Douglas C-54D-5-DC Skymaster near Atsugi: 41 Killed.” Accessed 10-17-2023 at: https://www.baaa-acro.com/crash/crash-douglas-c-54d-5-dc-skymaster-near-atsugi-41-killed

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Though no source is cited in the BAAA account, more detail is provided than I have located in other sources, leading me to think it probable that the death toll was 41. The very first news accounts from Japan noted that 41 were aboard, and it was not known yet whether there were survivors. Later accounts note there were no survivors.

1947 — May 29, United Airlines 521 crashes and burns during take-off, La Guardia, NY–43

Compiled by Wayne Blanchard 10-9-2023 for upload to: https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–43  Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. United Air Lines 521, 29 May 1947.

–43  CAB. Accident Investigation Report. United Air – LaGuardia Field, NY May 29, 1947.

–43  NFPA. “Recent Fires. May 29, New York, N.Y. Aircraft.” Quarterly, 41/1, July 1947, p68.

 

Narrative Information

 

Civil Aeronautics Board Accident Investigation Report (SA-144):

 

“The Accident

 

“A United Air Lines C-54, NC 30046, Flight 521, crashed while attempting a take-off from LaGuardia Field. New York, at approximately 1905, May 29, 1947. Of the 48 occupants, 43 were killed, four sustained serious injuries, and one, the pilot, received only minor injuries. The aircraft was demolished by impact and partially consumed by fire.

 

“History of the Flight

 

“United Air Lines Flight 521 of May 29, 1947, was scheduled to depart from LaGuardia for Cleveland, Ohio, at 1840. Captain Benton Baldwin, the pilot, reported at 1739 in United’s dispatch office, consulted the company meteorologist, and studied route weather data. He found that thunderstorm conditions existed which resulted from a cold front and prefrontal squall line, located at the time west of the New York area. The flight plan, based on this weather information and prepared by the Captain and his co-pilot, Robert E. Sands, specified instrument flight at 4,000 feet via Newark and Youngstown to Cleveland with Detroit…Michigan, as an alternate….

 

“At 1855 the engines were started, and Flight 521 requested taxi instructions from the tower. Clearance was given to Runway 13,  the wind being reported by the tower as south, variable to southeast, 20 miles per hour. After taxiing out, the aircraft was parked approximately 50 feet adjacent to Runway 18, and, according to Captain Baldwin, the engine ‘run-up’ and ‘take-off check’ was then accomplished.

 

“Captain Baldwin held at this point, approximately six to seven minutes. An unexpected difference occurred between him and Airway Traffic Control with reference to his clearance which had to be straightened out before departure. At 1903 the tower delivered the corrected clearance from Airway Traffic Control.

 

“Meanwhile black thunder clouds and lightning were visible west of LaGuardia. The squall line was breaking then over Hell Gate, some two to three miles west of the field. Air crews hurried to land or take off before being overtaken by the approaching storm….At 1904, United’s Flight 521 advised: ‘Ready for take-off.’ The tower operator asked whether the flight wished to wait out the storm on the ground. Captain Baldwin answered: ‘I’ll take off.’ The tower then advised Captain Baldwin: ‘Cleared for immediate take-off, or hold; traffic on final approach north of Riker’s Island.’ Flight 521 taxied from its parked position, rolled onto Runway 18, and without pause or hesitation accelerated for takeoff. The throttles were advanced. Air speed increased to above 90 miles per hour. Captain Baldwin applied back pressure to the control column, but the ‘feel’ of the controls was ‘heavy,’ and the aircraft did not respond. As the aircraft raced toward the boundary of the field, Captain Baldwin decided to discontinue his take-off. About 1,000 feet from the south end of the runway he applied brakes, ordering the co-pilot at the same time to cut the engines. A ground-loop was attempted by heavy application of left brake. The aircraft, however, proceeded to roll straight ahead. Then, with both brakes locked it continued over the remainder of the runway, crashed through the fence at the airport boundary, and half-bounced, half-flew across the Grand Central Parkway. The aircraft finally came to rest immediately east of the Casey Jones School of Aeronautics, a distance of 800 feet from the end of Runway 18 and 1,700 feet from the point at which brakes were first applied. It was almost immediately enveloped in flames. Only Captain Baldwin was able to escape before emergency fire equipment and rescue arrived. Other survivors, one of them later died, were assisted out of the wreckage within a period of 2 to 3 minutes after the crash.

 

“Investigation….

 

“The aircraft, NC 30046, a C-54B-DC, was completely destroyed. The fuselage was crushed by impact, and partially consumed by fire. All seats, with the exception of the hostesses’ seats, were found detached from the floor. Fire extinguishers were found not discharged and in the proper racks….

 

“Discussion….

 

“…it may be surmised that the plane was overloaded and hence failed to take off. It is true that the plane was overloaded according to the correct calculations for this runway derivable from the approved operating manual for this type of plane with due reference to gradients and obstacles present on Runway 18. But, if the engineers and other experts are to be believed, an airplane loaded to this weight, whatever the legal requirements might be, should have taken off without difficulty from this runway provided that the airplane was functioning normally. And there is not the slightest proof, except one matter later to be mentioned, that the airplane was not functioning in a normal fashion. Nevertheless, the airplane should not have been loaded to this weight for this runway. The fact that it was can be attributed to the miscalculations of United, the lack of any exercise of supervision over the filed weights by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and the failure of Captain Baldwin even to glance at his chart of operating weights prior to take-off on this runway.

 

“Two possibilities remain. The first is simply poor pilot technique by Captain Baldwin. He may, for reasons unknown, have become extremely agitated by the sudden approach of the end of the runway – a suddenness that would not be too surprising in the light of the fact that he had never taken off a DC-4 on this runway before. In the light of that realization he may have decided wrongly to cut power instead of pushing his control forward and grasping for the reserve power that would have made for clearance. But this is only surmise.

 

“A more probable hypothesis is that the gust lock had not been released. Several factors incline towards this conclusion. Due to the gusty character of the winds the gust lock was obviously on when the ship was being taxied to its holding point just off Runway 18. Due to the delay, occasioned partly by the difficulty in securing an appropriate clearance from Airways Traffic Control, the gust lock was probably left on after the pre-take-ff check with the intent that it should be immediately released upon starting the take-off roll. That roll, it will be remembered, was hurried.

 

“As further evidence of this theory the attitude of the airplane during the take-off roll is to be noted. It was some 2500 feet down the runway before the power was out at the order of Captain Baldwin. At that point, even if no wind conditions prevailed, the airplane would have had a speed of 112 miles per hour. At such a speed it could easily have been pulled aloft; certainly its now-wheel should have left the ground. But the nose-wheel did not leave the ground, according to the testimony of all the observers including that of Captain Baldwin….

 

“…Thousands of people daily attempt to start their automobiles with the emergency brake on. Emergency brakes and gust locks are necessities. They cannot and should not be legislated out of existence. Fortunately the consequences of leaving an emergency brake on are not serious; unfortunately leaving a gust lock on is not only serious, it is tragic. It will not suffice for us to say simply that this is a case of ‘pilot error’ and wash our hands of the affair. A better devise than those that now exist of assuring that the gust lock on these airplanes is released prior to the take-off roll is demanded….

 

“Throughout this series of events that in this case produced disaster, one can sense unfortunately too much insistence on speed of dispatch, too much of a tendency to carry loads up to the full amount that the regulations stretched to a bulging point will allow. No one checked Captain Baldwin in his effort to beat the storm. The twenty minute delay in the dispatch of the airplane with the breaking of the squall line predicted exactly as of the time of dispatch was not even communicated to the dispatcher. No responsibility of any character was assumed by that office. The tower, true to its traditions, assumed no responsibility beyond that of traffic separation. The airplane, loaded for the longest runway in traditional dispatching form, was shifted by the pilot to a shorter runway on the assumption that the and component would be sufficient compensation–an assumption that happened to be true.  The need to meet schedules as against a potential delay of an hour or so to wait out a storm determined a take-off under marginal conditions. {pp. 16-17}

 

“Safety, if it is to be achieved, has elements of cost. The line between unsafe and safe operation–whatever regulations or experts may say–is not delineated with the exactness that characterizes Sienese painting[1] or an Ingres drawing. It is possible as in the case of any cliff, to say just where the precipice is, but it is not possible to say just how near one can come to the edge without falling in. Facts that do not respond to slide rules are sometime controlling. Airplanes, as any machine, have temperament and pilots, because they are human beings, possess the same frailty. Allowance in the tightness of operations, in the tightness of formulas, must be made for these. And no such allowances were made. This method of doing things should appropriately be designated as the basic cause of this accident….”  {pp. 17-18}

 

“Findings….

 

“6. The airplane accelerated normally for a distance of approximately 2000 feet [down a 3530-foot runway] to an air speed in excess of 90 miles per hour after which the pilot applied brakes and ordered the co-pilot to cut the engines.

 

“7. After application of brakes the aircraft skidded for a distance of 800 feet to the end of Runway 18, and 1700 feet before coming to rest. It was then almost immediately enveloped in flames….

 

 

“Probable Cause

 

“The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was either the failure of the pilot to release the gust lock before take-off, or his decision to discontinue the take-off because of apprehension resulting from rapid use of a short runway under a possible calm wind condition.” (p. 19)

Supplemental Data

….

“Corrective Action:

 

“This accident has not only been of concern to the Civil Aeronautics Board but also to the President’s Special Board of Inquiry on Air Safety. A close liaison between the two as well as the Civil Aeronautics Administration has been maintained. The corrective action that has been taken thus stems from all three bodies as well as the municipal airport authority.


“1. The Civil Aeronautics Board has amended Civil Air Regulation–so as to eliminate the word “appreciable”. The result is that all gradients must be included in calculating allowable weight limitations on all runways.

 

“2. The Civil Aeronautics Board has promulgated for adoption two regulations (1) a regulation providing for an arbitrary reduction in allowable weight limitations that will take account of temperature as affecting take-off loads; (2) a more permanent but still interim regulation permitting the adjustment of allowable loads to changes in temperature on a more scientific basis.

 

“3. The Civil Aeronautics Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration have instructed their respective staff to reconsider the transport category requirements for take-off and landing both with regard to the formulation of a United States position on these matters for the purposes of international standardization under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization and with regard to increased safety in American domestic and international requirements. This will take time. Some five or six years of effort went into the formulation of the present transport category requirements.

 

“4. The Civil Aeronautics Administration in cooperation with the airlines will work out uniform weight limitations for all runways used by the certificated commercial airlines in the United States on the basis of the revised interim formulas.

 

“5. The Civil Aeronautics Administration has defined and promulgated the definition of winds that are not too unsteady and too variable so as to limit the use of reasonably steady and constant winds as components in the transport category requirements.

 

“6. The Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Air Transport Association are taking steps to indoctrinate pilots more thoroughly in the meaning and use of the transport category formulas.

 

“7. The President’s Special Board has requested the manufacturers of this airplane to redesign several aspects of the gust-lock, so as to provide against its locking during take-off or flight and so as to provide more adequate warning against its being locked at the time of take-off. One design feature has already been completed and is being installed.

 

“8. The President’s Special Board has recommended the installation of lighted wind socks at the ends of all runways utilized by certificated commercial aircraft.  Failure of the municipalities to respond to this suggestion may call for further propulsive action.

 

“9. The municipal authorities of New York City have closed Runway 18 to all four engine aircraft….” (Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. United Airlines, Inc., – LaGuardia Field, New York –  May 29, 1947.)

 

National Fire Protection Association:

“One of the worst aircraft accidents in history from the viewpoint of fire deaths occurred when a scheduled United Air Lines DC-4 crashed on take-off at LaGuardia Field, killing 43 persons. Using the shortest runway on the field (3500 ft.), the four-engine transport, loaded in excess of federal standards, was not able to get off the ground as shifting winds worked to the disadvantage of the pilot. Realizing that the plane was not becoming airborne, the pilot made a vain effort to stop the forward motion by ground looping. The heavy ship struck a 15 ft. embankment at the edge of the field, bounced into the air across an express highway, and crashed in a swampy open field with fire developing instantaneously. The crash was anticipated before it occurred by a fireman on duty at the airport crash station (operated by the New York Fire Department). The alarm was given and equipment reached the scene in 50 seconds….Firemen removed nine occupants in the crucial moments, while the pilot escaped unassisted…Five of those rescued died from burns in hospitals….Preliminary reports indicate that all deaths were caused by burns and suffocation, none by impact injuries….” (National Fire Protection Assoc. “Recent Fires. May 29, New York, N.Y. Aircraft.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 41, No. 1, July 1947, p. 68.)

 

Sources

 

Aviation Safety Network, Flight Safety Foundation, Database, 1947. United Air Lines 521, New York-La Guardia Airport, NY, 29 May 1947. Accessed 10-9-2023 at:

https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19470529-1

 

Civil Aeronautics Board Safety Bureau. Accident Investigation Report. United Air Lines, Inc., – LaGuardia Field, New York – May 29, 1947. Washington, DC: CAB, SA-144. Accessed 10-9-2023 at: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/33304

 

National Fire Protection Association. “Recent Fires. May 29, New York, N.Y. Aircraft.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 41, No. 1, July 1947, p. 68.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1] “The Sienese School of painting flourished in Siena, Italy, between the 13th and 15th centuries.” (Wikipedia.)

«‹ 231 232 233 234›»