Last edit 11-1-2022 by Wayne Blanchard for upload to: http://www.usdeadlyevents.com/
— 21 CAB. Accident Investigation Report. Trans-Luxury Airlines – Elko, Nevada – Sep 5, 1946.
— 21 NFPA. “Recent Fires.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protect. Assoc., V40, N2, Oct 1946.
— 21 Nevada State Journal, Reno. “Elko Crash Kills 21; Tot Escapes.” Sep 6, 1946, p. 1.
— 20 Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description, Trans-Luxury Airlines, 5 Sep 1946.
— 20 Baugher, Joseph F. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-001 to 42-30031). 10-28-2011 rev.
Narrative Information
Baugher: “Douglas C-47A-5-DL….23352 (c/n 9214) to USAAF Mar 13, 1943. To RFC Nov 5, 1945. To civil registry as NC57850 (E W Tabor, operated with Trans Luxury Airlines). Crashed upon landing at Elko, NV. Sep 05, 1946. 20 of 21 onboard killed.” (Baugher, Joseph F. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-001 to 42-30031). 10-28-2011 revision.)
Civil Aeronautics Board Accident Investigation Report. Trans-Luxury Airlines:
“The Accident
“NC-57850, a Douglas DC-3 owned and operated by Trans-Luxury Airlines, crashed 2 1/2 miles west of Elko Airport, Elko, Nevada, at approximately 0132, September 5, 1946 while attempting a landing. One child survived the accident with minor injuries; the remaining 21 occupants of the aircraft were fatally injured and the aircraft was demolished by impact and fire….
“History of the Flight
“The aircraft, hereafter referred to as Aircraft 850, departed Cheyenne, Wyoming, at 2047, September 4, 1946, after a complete crew change, with its destination as Reno, Nevado. It had been cleared by Air Traffic Control under a contact flight rule clearance with 12,000 feet approved as a cruising altitude and with Sacramento, California as its alternate airport. The ground speed of the aircraft between Cheyenne and Rock Springs, Wyoming, was abnormally slow according to computations based on position reports obtained by Air Traffic Control. The pilot reported over Sinclair, Wyoming, at 2140 at an altitude of 12,000 feet and estimated reaching Rock Springs at 2218. However, the aircraft was not reported over Rock Springs until 2254….
“When over Ogden at 12,000 feet, the pilot requested a change of flight plan to land at Elko, Nevada, estimating arrival at Elko in one hour and twenty minutes. Battle Mountain, Nevada, was selected as an alternate airport and the pilot reported 3 hours’ fuel aboard the aircraft. The Salt Lake City Airway Traffic Control Center approved the request for change of flight plan and cleared the aircraft to the Elko Range Station to cruise at and maintain an altitude of 12,000 feet and to request further clearance from Elko radio. This clearance was delivered by Ogden radio at 0005 September 5, 1946, and was acknowledged by the pilot of the aircraft. The pilot reported over Lucin, Utah, at 0035 at an altitude of 12,000 feet. Approximately 25 minutes later Elko radio established contact with the flight and transmitted an Airway Traffic Control clearance to the aircraft as follows: ‘NC-57850 is cleared to Elko Airport for Contact Flight Rule approach. If not possible, maintain 12,000 feet and advise.’ At this time Elko radio advised the pilot that the 0100 Elko special weather report indicated: Measured ceiling at 200 feet, thin broken clouds; visibility 4 miles, light ground fog; wind ENE at 2 miles per hour.
“The aircraft was reported over Elko, Nevada, at 0121 and the pilot stated to the Aircraft Communicator at Elko that he had the field in sight and that he anticipated no difficulty in landing….No further transmission was received from the flight. Elko radio made several attempts to contact Aircraft 850 without success and, at approximately 01333, notified Airway Traffic Control that radio contact was no longer being maintained with the flight….
“United Air Lines’ Flight 16, of September 4, 1946, en route to Salt Lake City on Airway Green 3, was called by the United Air Lines station at Salt Lake City and requested to check the vicinity of Elko for any sign of fire or other indications of an aircraft accident. The time of this contact was 0200, at which time Flight 16 was approximately 5 miles east of Elko Range Station. The Captain of Flight 16 returned to Elko and scanned the area in the vicinity of the airport. On approaching the airport the flight crew of the United Air Lines’ DC-3 observed an intense fire approximately 2 miles west and almost directly in line with Runway 23 of the Elko Airport. This information was transmitted to the United Air Lines’ ground station at Elko, Nevada and Salt Lake City, Utah.
“The fire warden at Elko was immediately notified of the location of the fire and was requested to proceed to the scene of the fire. Personnel from the CAA Communications Station at Elko arrived at the scene of the fire at approximately 0230 and found that the aircraft had crashed near the top [20 feet] of a ridge, the elevation of which was approximately 114 feet above that of the field, and at a point approximately 2½ miles west of the west end of Runway 23 at Eldo Airport. At this time the wreckage was found to burned severely and, with the exception of two passengers, one of whom died shortly afterward, all occupants had been fatally injured in the aircraft.
“Investigation
“….During the late evening of September 4, light smoke was reported within the vicinity of Elko giving indication of a condition suitable for ground fog. By midnight, ground fog was beginning to form in the vicinity, occasionally forming patches on the runway. At the time of the accident, and for thirty minutes immediately preceding, a ceiling was being reported at 200 feet, increasing from broken to overcast during the period. Throughout this period shifting patches of ground fog were observed across the airport. At 0140, shortly after the accident had occurred, the visibility had decreased to 5/8 of a mile, heavy fog covering the entire area. The dense fog condition remained until well into the morning….
“It was impossible to determine the reasons for the apparent delay between Sinclair and Rock Springs [“no other aircraft among a total of thirteen flights experienced as extensive a variation in ground speed.”] However, having consumed approximately 30 minutes longer than had been anticipated in arriving at Ogden and having realized that the fuel supply carried aboard would not have provided a sufficient safety margin in a flight to Reno with Sacramento as an alternate, the captain evidently chose to amend his flight plan to permit refueling at Elko rather than attempt to extend his flight to Reno. None of the passengers aboard was scheduled to deplane at Elko.
“The Weather Bureau Flight Advisory Service at Salt Lake City noticed the report of fog at Elko at about midnight and drew the attention of the air traffic controller to this condition. Salt Lake Air Traffic Control, therefore, advised the aircraft communicator at Elko at 0050 to provide the flight with the latest weather information when transmitting the approach clearance. In accordance with these instructions the Elko communicator advised the pilot of Aircraft 850 at least 15 minutes before the flight reached Elko that the weather conditions had changed from: ‘Sky clear, visibility 30 miles’ to: ‘Ceiling 200 feet, thin broken clouds; visibility 4 miles.’
“….No tower facility is available at Elko Airport. The CAA Communications Station provides aircraft desiring to land at Elko with the latest weather information submitted by a local Weather Bureau observer and the direction of landing is left entirely to the discretion of the pilot. The radio communicator is located indoors in such a position that the approach paths toward all runways are not visible to him, nor is any but a small area of the airport within his range of vision. No means are available to communicate to transient pilots sudden changes in the condition of the airport, such as traffic in the vicinity of and on Elko Airport. With the exception of the information contained in the special weather reports the aircraft communicator was not able to advise the pilot of Aircraft 850 ass to the conditions which existed at the time of approach. The testimony of several witnesses indicated that at thee time of the accident the Airways Beacon, which was located approximately 200 feet from the point at which the aircraft came to rest, was not visible from the airport due to ground fog. However, this information was not available to the pilot.
“Although several local and special reports were made at intervals of no more than 15 minutes in accordance with the most recent directives from the Weather Bureau, the weather observer on duty at the time was not aware of the approach of Aircraft 850 until after the accident had occurred. The weather reports available to the aircraft communicator indicated that the weather conditions in the vicinity of the airport were fluctuating very rapidly. However, no arrangements were made for an ‘on-the-spot’ weather observation concerning conditions along the approach path nor were any requests made for such assistance. The Civil Aeronautics Administration, at stations at which no control tower is located, does not provide personnel for such special services to the itinerant pilot as are normally provided by scheduled air carriers for their own exclusive use.
“Discussion
“It is apparent that the flight plan of the crew prior to departure for Cheyenne was faulty. If complete attention had been given the forecasts of winds aloft it would have been apparent to the crew that a flight to Sacramento at 12,000 feet would not have been possible under the conditions that existed. However, recognition of this fact became apparent in flight when the captain requested a change of flight plan at Ogden, Utah. It is not known why the captain elected to continue to Elko rather than to land at Ogden inasmuch as the terrain in the immediate vicinity of Ogden is more suitable for a night approach. However, at the time he reported over Ogden and obtained his change of clearance to Elko, the weather reports indicated conditions satisfactory for CFR operations into Elko. Pilots for scheduled airlines experienced with night approaches into Elko Airport state that approach procedures for that station require considerable caution in view of the difficulty imposed by high terrain in the proximity of the airport. “It was determined that the pilot had landed at Elko on three occasions prior to the accident. It must be assumed, therefore, that he was aware of the general nature of the terrain in the vicinity of Elko but that he was not sufficiently familiar with the contours in the immediately vicinity of the airport to have avoided the ridge on which the accident occurred unless it were clearly visible to him….
“….Having been informed that the ceiling had been measured at 200 feet, that the bases of lower scattered clouds were at 100 feet, and that there were shifting patches of ground fog in the vicinity of the airport, the pilot elected to attempt an approach. It is probable that this decision was largely determined by the fact that neither refueling facilities nor passenger accommodations were available at nearby fields, such as Battle Mountain, which otherwise were satisfactory for landing.
“It is apparent from the testimony of observers and from the aftercast of the weather conditions at Elko that a fog condition existed over and in the vicinity of Elko Airport at the time of the accident. It is estimated that the ground fog may have extended to an altitude as high as 300 feet above the field. Although the pilot may not have had any difficulty in sighting the airport when over Elko at an altitude of 12,000 feet, the acute angle of reference to the airport during the final approach would have reduced his visibility considerably. It is probable that, at an altitude of at least 200 feet above the field observation, the pilot encountered a fog condition in which he lost visual contact with the field. Under this condition he elected to continue his descent to the runway and in doing so descended to an altitude of approximately 100 feet above the elevation of the field. Inasmuch as the top of the ridge is at an elevation of 114 feet above that of the field, the pilot descended to below the top of the ridge under conditions of extremely poor visibility while on final approach to Runway 5. It was in this descent that the aircraft struck the top of the ridge approximately 2 miles from the southwest end of Runway 5. However plainly visible the field may have been from a higher altitude, it must be concluded that his decision to continue the approach after having lost sight of the airport was contrary to sound pilot judgment.
“Inasmuch as Trans-Luxury Airlines is a non-certificated air carrier and does not possess the dispatch agencies and ground-to-air communications facilities normally operated by the certificated air carriers, the pilot of Aircraft 850 was entirely dependent upon the reports of the Weather Bureau observer transmitted through the CAA aircraft communicator for data concerning weather at Elko. Because no control tower is located at Elko Airport a scheduled air carrier serving Elko has installed its own facilities to mitigate such a difficulty by providing the company aircraft communicator with a portable microphone and extension enable to permit “on-the-spot” observations to be made from a point outside the building for the use of flights approaching the field under unfavorable conditions. No such facility is available for the itinerant pilot or non-certificated air carrier at either Elko or other airports with no control tower….
“Findings
“As a result of the investigation of this accident, the Board finds that:
….
“2. The original flight plan from Cheyene to Reno was deficient in that the fuel carried aboard the aircraft did not provide sufficient margin of safety.
“3. Between Sinclair and Rock Springs, Wyoming, the aircraft was delayed approximately 30 minutes for reasons not determined.
….
“7. Inasmuch as the pilot of the aircraft was able to establish visual contact with Elko when directly over the airport, he elected to attempt a landing.
“8. The pilot established an approach to Runway 5 and descended to an altitude of between 200 and 300 feet above the elevation of the airport at which time he lost visual contact and entered the low stratus overcast which obscured the ridge.
“9. The pilot failed to stop his descent and continued his approach without visual reference to the field, crashing against a ridge 2½ miles southwest of the airport at an elevation of approximately 100 feet above that of the field.
“Probable Cause:
“On the basis of the above findings, the Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s action in continuing a landing approach after having lost visual contact with the airport under conditions of dense ground fog. A contributing factor was the pilot’s unfamiliarity with the terrain in the immediate vicinity of the airport.” (Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Trans-Luxury Airlines – Elko, Nevada – Sep 5, 1946.)
National Fire Protection Association: “An airplane crash, which undoubtedly will produce wide repercussions in the current battle of the so-called ‘non-scheduled’ carriers with the Civil Aeronautics Board’s rulings on safety and flight operation regulations, occurred about 1:17 A.M. on the crest of a hill outside the city limits of Elko. The weather conditions were bad – a thick fog – and the chartered DC-3 was groping for a landing at the Elko airport with twenty-two persons aboard. A mistake in judgment or faulty operating procedures resulted in a crash, followed immediately by fire, which killed all save a two-year-old boy.
“The accident tragically spotlighted the fact that Federal safety regulations differ between the scheduled and non-scheduled operators, and, ironically, that the more restrictive apply to the former, where the pilot experience factor is undoubtedly higher. At this airport, for instance, a United Air Lines plane was forbidden to land under instrument weather conditions unless there was a cloud ceiling of 2500 feet and a visibility of three miles. The non-scheduled plane, however, could legally land under the same conditions with only a 500-foot ceiling and a one-mile visibility, even if the pilot had never landed at the airport previously.
“Investigation has further disclosed that the Civil Aeronautics Administration never established or approved an approach procedure for Elko, despite a hazardous group of mountain ridges surrounding the field. This airport, along with others, had simply been ‘overlooked’ in the periodically published Flight Information Manual, published by the C.A.A.
“While the crash brought these, and other similar regulation deficiencies, to light, it also illustrated the lack of crash fire facilities afforded for the protection of the air traveler. Only the town fire department was available, and they did not respond, since they could not possibly have reached the scene with their heavy municipal apparatus, and the effectiveness of a small booster pump (the only one available) was certainly open to question. A simultaneous false alarm at the other end of town also proved the unrealistic policy of relying on such facilities for crash fire emergencies.” (National Fire Protection Association. “Recent Fires.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 2, October 1946.)
Newspaper
Sep 5, United Press: “Elko, Nev., Sept. 5 (UP) – A twin – engined New York-to-San Francisco trans-luxury airliner crashed and burned on a fog-bound desert mountain during an attempt to land at the Elko airport today, killing all the passengers and crewmen except a two-year-old boy whose frightened sobs amidst the bodies rose over the sound of crackling flames.
“Twenty-one persons, including an infant, were killed. Several of the dead were army or navy servicemen. Elko General Hospital attendants believed the surviving boy will recover from bruises and chest injuries.
“In Washington, D. C., the civil aeronautics administration said the huge airliner was flying in “direct violation” of federal safety rules when it crashed. A CAA spokesman said the ceiling at Elko was 200 feet, with scud clouds at 109 feet. The minimum ceiling under which planes are supposed to land there Is 2500 feet, he said.
“Non-scheduled air carriers were brought under CAA safety regulations Aug. 1. One of the regulations specified that charter carriers must observe the same restrictions on landing in bad weather as scheduled operators.
“Attendants at the Elko hospital reported that the boy’s uncle telephoned from Brooklyn, N. Y., early this afternoon, identifying him as Peter Link. The uncle…gave the child’s age as two. He said his parents, Joseph and Ann Link, were en route with Peter and a six-months-old baby to the west coast. Both parents and the younger child died in the twisted wreckage….
“Ex-Officio Coroner Roy Woods, meanwhile, reported that 20 of the 21 bodies had been identified and that all 21 had been removed to the Burns Funeral Home in Elko….
“Eighteen bodies were recovered outside the ripped-open plane and three were taken from the smouldering inside. Bodies were scattered over a 300-foot radius from the sprawling wreckage, a bare two miles from Elko airport.
“When rescuers approached, they found the injured baby crawling through the sagebrush, crying as he pulled himself painfully over the rough ground.
“Chris Sheerin, editor of the Elko Daily Free Press, and other witnesses said three additional bodies still remained close together, virtually consumed by flames, in the forward sections of the hot plane.
“The plane, piloted by Kenneth Campbell, Bottineau, N.D., contacted the civil aeronautics authority radio operated at Elko at 1:21 a.m. He said he could see the lights to the field – despite the low ground fog – and was coming in for a landing. That was the last radio contact with the plane.
“At 2:04 a.m. a United Airlines plane flying eastward reported to George Sutherland, United’s night manager in Elko, that he saw a fire burning below. Sutherland called Sheriff Charles Smith and with Fire Warden Erwin Lamber, CAA Inspector Shobe Ambler and Mortician Robley Burns, they drove to the mountainside.
“They found the wrecked plane three-quarters of a mile off trans-continental highway number 40. ‘As we approached the flaming plane, said Burns, ‘we found a woman in the brush unconscious but alive. She was later identified as Irene Baralus, Brooklyn, N.Y. She died shortly afterward. ‘Then I told the men do be quiet. I heard a baby crying. He was bawling something awful. I went over and picked him up. He had been thrown clear of the plane and was sitting there on the hillside. His crying was loud enough to be heard over the crackle of the flames.’….
“Airport Manager William Wunderluch said investigation showed the wheels of the plane were down and that both propellers apparently had been turning normally. Some observers believed the pilot may have mistaken a beacon light for one of he main lights of the field.
“It was the second major crash for the charter service Trans-Luxury Airlines within the past 15 days. A DC-3 operated by the company crashed at the Moline, Ill. airport on Aug. 21, killing the pilot and co-pilot. The stewardess and 23 passengers escaped death or serious injury even though some were hurled to the ground from heights of about 10 feet when the plane split open with the impact.
“In today’s crash the fuselage burst open like a split banana when the plane struck….
“Wunderluch reported that the Elko airport had one of the worst ground fog conditions of the year today. He said persons at the airport could hardly see their own field lights….” (Nevada State Journal, Reno. “Elko Crash Kills 21; Tot Escapes.” Sep 6, 1946, p. 1.)
Sources
Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Trans-Luxury Airlines, 5 Sep 1946. Accessed 2-7-2009 at: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19460905-0
Baugher, Joseph F. 1942 USAAF Serial Numbers (42-001 to 42-30031). Oct 28 2011 revision. Accessed 12-9-2011 at: http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/1942_1.html
Civil Aeronautics Board. Accident Investigation Report. Trans-Luxury Airlines – Elko, Nevada – September 5, 1946. Washington, DC: CAB, December 12, 1946. Accessed at: http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?websearch&site=dot_aircraftacc
Also 11-1-2023 at: dot_33276_DS1.pdf
National Fire Protection Association. “Recent Fires.” Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, Vol. 40, No. 2, October 1946.
Nevada State Journal, Reno. “Elko Crash Kills 21; Tot Escapes.” Sep 6, 1946, p. 1. Accessed at: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=9655150&sterm=elko+plane
