20th Century

—  10  Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland).  Michigan.

—  10  Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Parahawks Skydiving Center 31 Jul 1999

—  10  NTSB. CHI99MA269. October 13, 2000.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB: “On July 31, 1999, about 0825 eastern daylight time, a Beech Model 65-A90, N518DM, operated by the Parahawks Skydiving Center, impacted the ground during climbout from runway 22 at the Marine City Airport (76G), Marine City, Michigan. (All times in this report are eastern daylight time, based on a 24-hour clock.) The pilot and nine parachutists who were on board received fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post-impact fire. The local skydiving flight, which was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, was not on a flight plan, and visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident….

 

A “… witness, a parachutist who was standing near the windsock at the skydiving sandpit which is located north of runway 22, stated that he observed the airplane during its takeoff roll and climb. He reported seeing someone sitting in the copilot seat when the airplane was halfway down the runway. He stated that after the airplane departed the runway, it turned to the right and went behind trees. The witness stated that he then saw the airplane climb above the trees flying wings level for about 3 seconds. He reported that the airplane then entered a steep left bank about 200 to 250 feet above ground level (agl). The airplane continued in a steep left bank for about 5 seconds until it impacted the ground. The witness stated that he could see the entire top of the airplane before impact. The witness reported that he had never before seen the pilot turn left during climbout and that it appeared that the pilot was attempting to return to the airport….

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:  The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed, which resulted in a stall, inflight loss of control, and collision with the ground.”  (NTSB. CHI99MA269.  October 13, 2000.)

 

Sources

 

Aircraft Crashes Record Office (Geneva, Switzerland). Michigan. Accessed 3-9-2009 at:  http://www.baaa-acro.com/Pays/Etats-Unis/Michigan.htm

 

Aviation Safety Network. Accident Description. Parahawks Skydiving Center 31 Jul 1999.  Accessed 3-9-2009 at: http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=43374

 

National Transportation Safety Board. CHI99MA269. Washington, DC: NTSB, October 13, 2000. Accessed at: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X19228

 

 

 

— 13  Blanchard note: I show thirteen, rather than twelve homicides to note there were 13 deaths.

— 13  CNN. “Mourners remember gunman’s wife as soccer mom, Scout Leader, 8-1-1999.

— 12  Blanco. “Mark Orrin Barton.” Murderpedia. Accessed 12-6-2015 (includes victim names).

— 12  Duwe, Grant. Mass Murder in the United States: A History. McFarland, 2007, p. 28.

— 12  Syracuse Herald-Journal, NY. “12 Killed in Massacre.” 7-30-1999, p. 1.

 

Narrative Information

 

July 30, Syracuse Herald-Journal: “Police say stock trader opens fire in Georgia brokerage offices, turns gun on self.  Bludgeoned bodies of suspect’s wife and two children found in aftermath….12 other people injured in Ga. Shooting spree. Notes indicated Barton wanted to kill 3 more people.

 

“Atlanta (Associated Press) – Authorities are piecing together what they know about Mark O. Barton, the 44-year-old father, investor and former murder suspect who walked into two Atlanta brokerages and killed nine people.

 

“Some questions may never be answered:  Barton sped away after the shooting rampage, driving to a suburb where he killed himself Thursday evening as police closed in.  Authorities later said he had killed his wife and two children before committing one of the worst work-place massacres in the nation’s history.

 

“Twelve people were injured, some by bullets and others by their frantic attempts to avoid the killer.  Six remained in critical condition today.

 

“Speculation on a motive has centered on Barton’s work as a day trader, investors who dabble in risky, moment-by-moment changes in the stock market, which dropped sharply Thursday.  But Barton’s family was slain earlier this week and company officials said he hadn’t traded since April at the firm where five of his victims died….

 

“Clues may be found in notes left with the bodies of his family.  Police have not disclosed their contents, except to say that they had found a list indicating Barton had intended to kill at least three more people.

 

“The shooting rampage was the third in the Atlanta area in little more than two months.  It was the latest in a grisly wave of mass slayings at schools and workplaces, and President Clinton today expressed sadness at the bloodshed.

 

“Barton, dark-haired and 6-foot-4, was wearing khaki shorts when he walked into the Momentum Securities brokerage at the Two Securities Centre building in the trendy Buckhead section of Atlanta about 3 p.m. Thursday.  Four people were dead within minutes….

 

“Barton then walked across a busy six-lane road and into the All-Tech Investment Group, a day trading firm in the Piedmont Center building where he had been a client.  Five died there.  Barton, who was carrying a pistol in each hand, at one point reportedly said: ‘I hope this doesn’t upset your trading day.’

 

“Barton came into the office ‘and after speaking with out branch manager, suddenly stood up and for no reason opened fire on the manager and his secretary,’ Jai Ramoutar, director of All Tech, said in a statement released from the company’s headquarters in Montvale, N.J. “This man then went into our main trading room and began indiscriminately shooting the customers.

 

“For hours, the mayor and police did not know where Barton was….Barton eventually showed up at Town Center Mall in Atlanta’s northwest suburbs, where in approached a woman in the parking lot…she was able to run away and contact security….Police were alerted and began pursuing Barton up Interstate 75.  The rampage ended when Barton shot himself as police cornered him at a service station in Acworth, 30 miles northwest of Atlanta and roughly five miles from the mall.

 

“Barton’s first wife – the mother of the children who were slain this week – and mother-in-law were bludgeoned to death in 1993 in Cedar Bluff, Ala.  No arrests were made.  ‘He was the No. 1 suspect all the way through and still was,’ said Richard Igou, the district attorney at the time of the killings.

 

“Barton worked as a chemist before he began trading stocks…

 

“‘He had swings up and down,’ said the mayor.  ‘He apparently was concerned about losses, at least expressed that.’” (Syracuse Herald-Journal, NY. “12 Killed in Massacre.” 7-30-1999, p. 1)

 

July 31, NYT: “Following are excerpts from a letter and the texts of three notes apparently written by Mark O. Barton and left in the Barton home, as read by Chief Jimmy Mercer of the Henry County police and recorded by The New York Times. Mr. Mercer said that the letter was dated July 29, 6:38 A.M., and that he was omitting three telephone numbers of people mentioned at the end of the letter.

 

“The Letter

 

“Leigh Ann is in the master bedroom closet under a blanket. I killed her on Tuesday night. I killed Matthew and Mychelle Wednesday night. There may be similarities between these deaths and the death of my first wife, Debra Spivey. However, I deny killing her and her mother. There is no reason for me to lie now. It just seemed like a quiet way to kill and a relatively painless way to die. There was little pain. All of them were dead in less than five minutes. I hit them with the hammer in their sleep and then put them face-down in the bathtub to make sure they did not wake up in pain, to make sure they were dead.

 

I’m so sorry. I wish I didn’t. Words cannot tell the agony. Why did I? I have been dying since October. Wake up at night so afraid, so terrified that I couldn’t be that afraid while awake. It has taken its toll. I have come to hate this life and this system of things. I have come to have no hope. I killed the children to exchange them for five minutes of pain or a lifetime of pain. I forced myself to do it to keep them from suffering so much later. No mother, no father, no relatives. The fears of the father are transferred to the son. It was from my father to me and from me to my son. He already had it. And now to be left alone. I had to take him with me.

 

“I killed Leigh Ann because she was one of the main reasons for my demise. . . . I know that Jehovah will take care of all of them in the next life. I’m sure the details don’t matter. There is no excuse, no good reason I am sure no one will understand. If they could I wouldn’t want them to. I just write these things to say why. Please know that I love Leigh Ann, Matthew and Mychelle with all my heart. If Jehovah’s willing I would like to see them all again in the resurrection to have a second chance. I don’t plan to live very much longer, just long enough to kill as many of the people that greedily sought my destruction.

 

“The Notes

 

“I give you my wife Leigh Ann Vanderver Barton, my honey, my precious love. Please take care of her. I will love her forever.

 

“I give you Matthew David Barton, my son, my buddy, my life. Please take care of him.

 

“I give you Mychelle Elizabeth Barton, my daughter, my sweetheart, my life. Please take care of her.” (New York Times. “Shootings in Atlanta: The Notes; ‘There Is No Reason for Me to Lie Now…’” 7-31-1999.)

 

Aug 1, CNN: “….Mark Barton, 44, killed his wife with a hammer Tuesday night in her suburban apartment south of Atlanta. On Wednesday, he bludgeoned to death his two children from a previous marriage. He left notes confessing his actions. He fatally shot nine people and wounded 13 others the following day in two brokerage firms in Atlanta’s upscale Buckhead district. Hours later he killed himself when cornered by police, bringing the death toll to 13. The string of murders is the state’s worst mass killing this century. Nine of the wounded remained hospitalized Sunday, three in critical condition….” (CNN. “Mourners remember gunman’s wife as soccer mom, Scout Leader, 8-1-1999.)

Sources

 

Blanco, Juan Ignacio. “Mark Orrin Barton.” Murderpedia. Accessed 12-6-2015. Accessed 12-6-2015 at: http://murderpedia.org/male.B/b/barton-mark.htm

 

CNN. “Mourners remember gunman’s wife as soccer mom, Scout Leader, 8-1-1999. Accessed 12-6-2015 at: http://edition.cnn.com/US/9908/01/atlanta.shootings.02/

 

Duwe, Grant. Mass Murder in the United States: A History. McFarland, 2007.

 

New York Times. “Shootings in Atlanta: The Notes; ‘There Is No Reason for Me to Lie Now…’” 7-31-1999. http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/31/us/shootings-in-atlanta-the-notes-there-is-no-reason-for-me-to-lie-now.html

 

Syracuse Herald-Journal, NY. “12 Killed in Massacre,” 7-30-1999, p. 1. Accessed 2-28-2013: http://newspaperarchive.com/fullpagepdfviewer?img=29520196&sterm=murder+barton

 

1999 — June 4, Speeding car runs light, hits car with 3 retired couples, Boca Raton, FL– 6

–6  Assoc. Press. “Car crash kills six retirees.” News Herald, Panama City, FL, 6-6-1999, p. 3B.

–6  Orlando Sentinel. “Driver In Fatal Collision Imprisoned As Appeals Fail.” 8-1-2003.

–6  South FL Sun Sentinel. “Recklessness Led To Deadly Crash, Statements Say.” 10-21-1999.

 

Narrative Information

 

June 4: “Boca Raton — Three retired couples on their way to the airport ere killed when their car nearly split in half after colliding with another vehicle as the group pulled out of their adult condominium community. ‘We haven’t charged anyone,’ Florida Highway Patrol Lt. Ron Rossow said Saturday [June 5]. ‘We know one of the cars ran a red light.’ Police say the six set out in a Mercury Marquis to go to the airport to drop off ne of the couples and then continue on to dinner Friday night [June 4]. The driver of the Mercury, 66-year-old Neil Marvin, pulled out of Whisper Walk, a gated community in west Boca Raton. As the car turned left, it was struck by a speeding white Mercedes-Benz that hit the driver’s side. The impact sent both cars airborne. The Mercury spun about 100 feet, crossed the median and slammed into a Toyota.

 

“Marvin and the five passengers in his car died at the scent. The three passengers in the back seat were ejected from the car. It was not known if they were wearing seat belts. Police identified the other victims as Paulette Marvin, 68, Samuel Beja, 68, Elaine Beja, 66, Seymour Insler, 73 and Sue Insler, 67.

 

“Robert Carratelli, 42, the driver of the white Mercedes, sustained minor injuries and was treated and released from Delray Medical Center. None of the three passengers in the Toyota were injured….

 

“Whisper Walk residents have complained for years about speeding traffic at the Intersection at the entrance to the community. A traffic light was installed several years ago, but a petition recently was circulating to get a turn signal installed as well. ‘Every week there’s an accident here,’ resident Renee Cohen said. ‘They ought to close this street.’” (Associated Press. “Car crash kills six retirees.” News Herald, Panama City, FL, 6-6-1999, p. 3B.)

 

Oct 21: “Minutes before police say Robert Carratelli ran a red light at nearly 80 mph, crashing into a car carrying three Boca Raton couples and killing all six people, his speeding alarmed another Boca Raton couple, according to documents released Wednesday.

 

“Vincent and Donna Dimarco were driving down Yamato Road that late spring evening when they noticed a Mercedes Benz rapidly approaching from behind and ‘driving like they were going to kill someone,’ Donna Dimarco told officers investigating the June 4 collision. She estimated the Mercedes’ speed at 70 to 90 mph along the four-lane road, which has a speed limit of 55 mph. Moments later, the Dimarcos happened upon a horrific scene where Neil Marvin, 66, and his wife, Paulette, 67; Sy Insler, 75, and his wife, Sue, 68; and Sam Beja, 69, and his wife, Elayne, 66, lay dead.

 

“Florida Highway Patrol troopers determined that Carratelli ran a red light at Gatehouse Drive while driving at least 76 mph. Carratelli’s Mercedes struck the other car as it was pulling onto Yamato….

 

“Another witness, Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Detective Anthony A. Alberti, also reported seeing Carratelli speeding down Yamato Road before the wreck, accelerating and changing lanes to pass a sports car.

 

“The sightings, as related by some of the dozens of witnesses to the crash, are among 150 pages of court documents that detail the state’s case against Carratelli, 42. The Boca Raton-based advertising executive, charged last week with six counts each of manslaughter and vehicular homicide, faces up to 90 years in prison if convicted….” (South Florida Sun Sentinel, Nicole Sterghos Brochu. “Recklessness Led To Deadly Crash, Statements Say.” 10-21-1999.)

 

Aug 1, 2003: “West Palm Beach — Whether he was a reckless driver with deep pockets or a victim of a diabetic blackout, Robert Carratelli is now on his way to prison — four years after causing one of Palm Beach County’s deadliest car crashes. The former advertising executive lost a last-ditch effort Thursday to hold off serving his 15-year prison sentence for the June 1999 crash west of Boca Raton that killed six retirees. Carratelli, 46, had been out on a $150,000 bond as he appealed his vehicular-homicide convictions for running a red light. A pale, dazed-looking Carratelli showed little emotion as Circuit Judge John Hoy ordered Palm Beach County deputy sheriffs to take him into custody….Carratelli’s days of freedom became numbered after the Florida Supreme Court refused last month to consider his appeal.” (Orlando Sentinel (Jon Burstein). “Driver In Fatal Collision Imprisoned As Appeals Fail.” 8-1-2003.)

 

Sources

 

Associated Press. “Car crash kills six retirees.” News Herald, Panama City, FL, 6-6-1999, p. 3B. Accessed 1-11-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/panama-city-news-herald-jun-06-1999-p-13/

 

Orlando Sentinel (Jon Burstein). “Driver In Fatal Collision Imprisoned As Appeals Fail.” 8-1-2003. Accessed 1-11-2019 at: https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-2003-08-01-0308010370-story.html

 

South Florida Sun Sentinel, Nicole Sterghos Brochu. “Recklessness Led To Deadly Crash, Statements Say.” 10-21-1999. Accessed 1-11-2019 at: https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1999-10-21-9910200977-story.html

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

—  11  BAAA. Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 in Little Rock: 11 Killed.

—  11  NTSB. Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB-AAR-01/02). Runway Overrun During…” 2001.

—  11  Planecrashinfo.com.  “1999. Accident Details. American Air…Little Rock, AR, June 1.”

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB: “Abstract: On June 1, 1999, at 2350:44 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 1420, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), N215AA, crashed after it overran the end of runway 4R during landing at Little Rock National Airport in Little Rock, Arkansas.

 

“Flight 1420 departed from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Texas, about 2240 with 2 flight crewmembers, 4 flight attendants, and 139 passengers aboard and touched down in Little Rock at 2350:20. After departing the end of the runway, the airplane struck several tubes extending outward from the left edge of the instrument landing system localizer array, located 411 feet beyond the end of the runway; passed through a chain link security fence and over a rock embankment to a flood plain, located approximately 15 feet below the runway elevation; and collided with the structure supporting the runway 22L approach lighting system.

 

“The captain and 10 passengers were killed; the first officer, the flight attendants, and 105 passengers received serious or minor injuries; and 24 passengers were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 1420 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were the flight crew’s failure to discontinue the approach when severe thunderstorms and their associated hazards to flight operations had moved into the airport area and the crew’s failure to ensure that the spoilers had extended after touchdown. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s (1) impaired performance resulting from fatigue and the situational stress associated with the intent to land under the circumstances, (2) continuation of the approach to a landing when the company’s maximum crosswind component was exceeded, and (3) use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine pressure ratio after landing.

 

“The safety issues in this report focus on flight crew performance, flight crew decision-making regarding operations in adverse weather, pilot fatigue, weather information dissemination, emergency response, frangibility of airport structures, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight. Safety recommendations concerning these issues are addressed to the FAA and the National Weather Service.”  (NTSB-AAR-01/02)

 

Planecrashinfo.com: “The plane was on a flight from Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas to Little Rock, Arkansas. While attempting to land at Little Rock Airport, the flight encountered heavy thunderstorms, rain and strong winds. The aircraft landed fast and hard, skidded off the end of the runway and struck a landing light tower, breaking into three parts and bursting into flames. Crew’s decision to continue the approach despite severe thunderstorms in the area and crosswinds that exceeded American Airlines’ guidelines. The crew did not arm the automatic spoiler system before landing or manually deploy the spoilers after touchdown. Fatigue, the crew had been awake for nearly 16 hours.” (Planecrashinfo.com.)

 

Sources

 

Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives. Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-82 in Little Rock: 11 Killed. Accessed 12-6-2015 at: http://www.baaa-acro.com/1999/archives/crash-of-a-mcdonnell-douglas-md-82-in-little-rock-11-killed/

 

National Transportation Safety  Board. Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB-AAR-01/02). Runway Overrun During Landing, American Airlines Flight 1420, McDonnell Douglas MD-82, N215AA, Little Rock, Arkansas, June 1, 1999. Washington, DC: NTSB, 2001. Accessed at:  http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/AAR0102.htm

 

Planecrashinfo.com. “1999. “Accident Details…June 01, 1999…Little Rock, Arkansas… American Airlines Flight #1420….”  Accessed 12-6-2015 at: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/1999/1999-24.htm

 

 

 

—  22  Epic Disasters. “The Worst Bus Disasters in the United States.” Accessed 1-4-2009.

—  22  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. FARS 1975-2010 Fatality Analysis.

—  22  NTSB. HAR. Motorcoach Run-Off-The-Road Accident, New Orleans, LA, May 9, 1999.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB: “Abstract: On May 9, 1999, about 9:00 a.m., a 1997 Motor Coach Industries 55-passenger motorcoach, operated by Custom Bus Charters, Incorporated, was traveling eastbound on Interstate 610 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The bus, carrying 43 passengers, was en route from La Place, Louisiana, to a casino approximately 80 miles away in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. As the bus approached milepost 1.6, it departed the right side of the highway, crossed the shoulder, and went onto the grassy side slope alongside the shoulder. The bus continued on the side slope, struck the terminal end of a guardrail, traveled through a chain-link fence, vaulted over a paved golf cart path, collided with the far side of a dirt embankment, and then bounced and slid forward upright to its final resting position. Twenty-two passengers were killed, the busdriver and 15 passengers received serious injuries, and 6 passengers received minor injuries.

 

“The ensuing investigation established that the 46-year-old driver possessed a current commercial driver’s license and medical certificate, but suffered from several life-threatening medical conditions of the kidneys and heart. A witness riding in a van behind the bus stated that before the accident, she saw the bus drifting from the left lane to the center lane, then back to the left lane, before finally crossing the center and right lanes and departing the right side of the road. These observations corresponded with the statements of a passenger, who saw the busdriver “slouch down” as if reaching for a soda and then upright himself before slouching down again. The next thing this passenger remembered was waking up in the hospital.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the driver’s incapacitation due to his severe medical conditions and the failure of the medical certification process to detect and remove the driver from service. Other factors that may have had a role in the accident were the driver’s fatigue and the driver’s use of marijuana and a sedating antihistamine.

 

“The following major safety issues were identified in this accident:

 

• Inadequacy of the medical certification process, including the current Federal regulations.
• Absence of a mechanism for identifying drivers who have tested positive for drugs.
• Lack of Federal regulations or standards regarding passive and active occupant protection systems on large buses sold or operated in the United States.

 

• Degraded condition of the guardrail posts along the interstate at the accident site.

”As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, and the State of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development. In addition, the Safety Board is reiterating recommendations from its 1999 bus crashworthiness special investigation report to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.” (NTSB. Motorcoach Run-Off-The-Road Accident, New Orleans,  May 9, 1999.)

 

Sources

 

Epic Disasters. The Worst Bus Disasters In The United States. Accessed on 1-4-2009 at:  http://www.epicdisasters.com/index.php/site/comments/the_worst_bus_disasters_in_the_united_states/

 

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Partial Data Dump of Crashes Involving 10 or More Fatalities, by Year, Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 1975-2009 Final and 2010 ARF. Washington, DC: NHTSA, pdf file provided to Wayne Blanchard, 1-26-2012.

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Highway Accident Report. Motorcoach Run-Off-The-Road Accident, New Orleans, Louisiana, May 9, 1999 (NTSB HAAR-01/01; NTIS PB2001-916201). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted August 28, 2001, 130 pages. Accessed at: http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2001/HAR0101.pdf

 

 

 

 

 

 

–55  NWS, Central Region HQ. Famous Large Tornado Outbreaks in the United States. 2005.[1]

–51  Blanchard tally of State and locality breakouts below.

–47  Mathis. Storm Warning: The Story of a Killer Tornado. 2007, p. 184.

–46  NCDC. Storm Events Database. Search Results for all U.S. States…Tornado…May 3.[2]

–46  National Severe Storms Laboratory, NOAA. May 3, 1999 OK/KS Tornado Outbreak.”

–45  NWS WFO Norman, OK, NOAA. “The Great Plains Tornado Outbreak of May 3, 1999.”[3]

–42  NOAA. “NOAA’s Top U.S. Weather, Water and Climate Events of the  20^th Century.”

 

Kansas            (  6)

–6  State. Blanchard tally from locality breakouts below.

–6  Grazulis, Thomas P. “`Worst’ Tornadoes.” The Tornado Project. 4-26-2000.[4]

–5  NWS WFO, Norman, OK, The Great Plains Tornado Outbreak of May 3, 1999.

Breakout of May 3, 1999 Kansas Tornado Fatalities by Location:

–2  Sedgwick Co., Haysville (19:35). Peck tornado, 19:30-19:55, female, 43, grandson, 1, mobile home.[5]

–1  Sedgwick Co., Haysville (19:35). Peck tornado, 19:30-19:55, elderly man later from injuries. NCDC.

–1  Sedgwick Co., Haysville (19:35). Peck tornado, 19:30-19:55, elderly man, mobile home, S. 75^th St.[6]

–2  Sedgwick County, Wichita (19:43). Peck tornado, 19:30-19:55, mobile home parks. NCDC.[7]

 

Oklahoma      (45)

— 45  National Severe Storms Laboratory, NOAA. Oklahoma tornado Deaths – 3 May 1999.[8]

— 45  OSDH. “Investigation of Deaths…from…May 3, 1999 Tornadoes.” Injury Update, 7-21-2000, p2.[9]

–12  Bridge Creek

—  5  Del City

—  1  Dover

—  1  Guthrie

—  3  Midwest City

—  2  Newcastle

—  5  Oklahoma City (Southeast)

–14  Oklahoma City/Moore (Southwest)

—  1  Perry

—  1  Shawnee

— 41  NCDC. Storm Events Database. Search Results for all U.S. States…Tornado…May 3.[10]

— 41  NWSFO, Norman, OK. Top Ten Deadliest Oklahoma Tornadoes (1882-2009).

— 40  Blanchard tally of locality breakouts below.

— 40  NWSFO, Norman, OK. The Great Plains Tornado Outbreak of May 3, 1999.

— 40  Grazulis, Thomas P. “Oklahoma Tornadoes 1950-2012.” Tornado Project Online. 2015.

–36  Grady County. Grazulis.

—  1  Kingfisher County. Grazulis.

—  2  Logan County. Grazulis.

—  1  Pottawatomie County. Grazulis.

— 38  Grazulis, Thomas P. “`Worst’ Tornadoes.” The Tornado Project. 4-26-2000.[11]

— 36  Brooks and Doswell. “Deaths in the 3May1999 Oklahoma City Tornado…”7-6-2001.

— 36  NWSFO, Norman, OK. Table of Tornadoes Which Have Occurred in the Oklahoma City

— 36  NWSFO, Norman, OK. Violent Tornadoes (F4/F5) in Oklahoma (1950-2008).  2009.

 

— 11  Cleveland County, 6WSW Moore to 4NC Moore, 18:12-18:30, F5. NCDC Storm Events.

Males, 24, 26, 28, 33 and 36; females 4, 26 (outdoors), 30, 36, 89 and 94. In homes.

— 12  Grady County, ~Amber to ~Tuttle, tornado, 17:26. F5.  NCDC, Storm Events Database.

Females, 1, 25, 41, 44, 53, 55, 59, 59, 73; males, 39, 50, and 73.

—   1  Kingfisher Co., 4SSW Dover to 7ESE Hennessey F4 tornado, 20:20-20:38. Female, 46, home.[12]

—   1  Logan Co., 7SW Crescent to 4NE Mulhall. F4 tornado, 20:25-21:20. Female, 76, home.[13]

—   1  McClain County, 8N Blanchard to 4NE Newcastle, 18:00, F4. Female, 40, outdoors.[14]

— 12  Oklahoma County, 4S Del City to 2W Midwest City, 18:30-18:48, F4. NCDC SED.

Males, >1, 62, 67, 80, 86, at homes; males 37, 52, business;

Females, 43, 49, 50, 60, 75, at homes.

—   1  Payne Co., 15W Stillwater to 13WNW Stillwater, F2, 21:20-21:27. Male (direct), 45, vehicle.[15]

—   1  Pottawatomie Co., Shawnee F2 tornado, Valley View Drive. Female, 41, mobile home.[16]

 

Breakout of: National Severe Storms Laboratory. Oklahoma tornado Deaths – 3 May 1999.

 

Age     Location

1.      26        Emerald Springs apartments (near Westmoore HS)
2.        24        Emerald Springs apartments (near Westmoore HS)
3.        94        Emerald Springs apartments (near Westmoore HS)
4.        37        Permanent building (trucking company)
5. 52        Permanent building (trucking company)
6. 55        Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
7. 44        Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
8. 59        Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
9.        41        Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
10. 39 Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
11. 73 Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
12. 73 Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
13. 50 Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
14. 59 Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
15. 25 Mobile home (Bridge Creek)
16. 26 Under Shields overpass
17. 40 Under I-44 overpass
18. 36 Permanent home
19. 3 wks Under the staircase of home (Bridge Creek)
20. 53 Under the staircase of home (Bridge Creek)
21. 36 Bathroom of 2-story home (car fell through roof)
22. 50 In home (OKC)

23        75        In bathtub of Del City home

24. 49 Midwest City home (SE 15 and Sooner Road)
25. 80 Midwest City home (SE 15 and Sooner Road)
26. 33 At home in Moore
27. 60 In home (Del City)
28. 30 In bathtub (permanent home – 15^th & Cavalier)
29. 86 In home (Del City)
30. 28 Permanent home between Penn & Western
31. 43 In bathroom of Del City home
32. 89 In home (Greenbriar Eastlake)
33. 62 In Del City home (Del Aire)
34. 4        Home in Moore
35. 4 mo. In crib at Midwest City permanent home
36. 67 In home Del City.

 

Other Oklahoma tornado deaths

 

37. 41 Mobile home (Shawnee)
38. 45 In vehicle under overpass on I-35 (Perry)
39. 76 Frame home (Abell)
40. 46 Permanent home (Dover)

 

Indirect deaths (all OKC storm)

 

41. 51 Heart attack
42. 23 Burns from candle-started fire.
43. 54 Heart attack
44. 79 Wheelchair dropped down stairs
45. 68 Heart attack

 

Narrative Information — Kansas and Oklahoma

 

NOAA: “Oklahoma/ Kansas Tornado Outbreak, May 3- 4, 1999.  This was the most expensive tornado outbreak in U. S. history. In less than 48 hours, a total of 74 tornadoes touched down across the two states, with as many as four tornadoes from different storms on the ground at once. An F-5 tornado, the strongest on the Fujita Tornado Scale, tracked for 40 miles, skirting south of Oklahoma City through the communities of Moore and Chickasaw. The tornadoes killed 42 people, injured 800, and caused $1 billion in damage, including the destruction of portions of Oklahoma City.

 

“Technology Sidebar: The event proved the effectiveness of the modernized National Weather Service and its improved tornado warning system where the average lead time was 21 minutes (up from an 11 minute average), with some areas receiving more than 30 minutes notice before being hit. NOAA storm researchers estimate that more than 600 people would have died in the absence of warnings. During this tornado outbreak, a mobile Doppler radar on wheels recorded the strongest winds ever measured on earth—318 mph.” (NOAA.  “NOAA’s Top U.S. Weather, Water and Climate Events of the  20^th Century.”  1999.)

 

NSSL/NOAA: “A total of 74 tornadoes touched down across the two states in less than 21 hours. At one point, there were as many as four tornadoes reported on the ground at the same time. The strongest tornado, rated a maximum F-5 on the Fujita Tornado Scale, tracked for nearly an hour and a half along a 38-mile path from Chickasha through south Oklahoma City and the suburbs of Bridge Creek, Newcastle, Moore, Midwest City and Del City. As the skies cleared, the states counted 46 dead and 800 injured, more than 8000 homes damaged or destroyed, and total property damage of nearly $1.5 billion.” (National Severe Storms Laboratory, NOAA. May 3, 1999 OK/KS Tornado Outbreak.”)

 

NWS WFO, Norman OK: “On May 3, 1999, multiple supercell thunderstorms produced many large and damaging tornadoes in central Oklahoma during the late afternoon and evening hours. Some of these storms were killers, including the twisters which moved through and/or near Dover, Shawnee, Perry and Bridge Creek, and the Moore and southern Oklahoma City metropolitan areas. Additional tornadoes also hit areas in south central Kansas, eastern Oklahoma and northern Texas, with over 70 tornadoes being observed across the region. The total tornado count makes this tornado outbreak the largest ever recorded in Oklahoma.

 

“Statistics show that 40 people have died in Oklahoma due to the twisters and 675 were injured. Many homes and businesses have been damaged or destroyed throughout the affected areas with a total damage estimate of $1.2 billion. Five deaths, 100 injuries and heavy damage were also incurred in the Wichita, Kansas metro area.” (NWS WFO, Norman, OK, NOAA.  The Great Plains Tornado Outbreak of May 3, 1999.)

 

NWS WFO, Norman, OK: Oklahoma — Bridge Creek, Moore, Oklahoma City, OK, F5, 583 injured, 36 fatalities.
“This violent, long-lived tornado was the most infamous of nearly 60 tornadoes that struck central Oklahoma during an unprecedented outbreak on this Monday afternoon and evening of May 3, 1999. The tornado was the 9th of 14 tornadoes produced by a supercell thunderstorm during the tornado outbreak. It formed around 526 PM CST about 2 miles south-southwest of Amber, and grew rapidly to monstrous proportions as it headed NE, paralleling I-44. It moved across Bridge Creek and rural parts of northwest Newcastle, causing continuous F4 and sporadic F5 damage. The tornado was estimated to be a mile in diameter in this area.

 

“It weakened to F2/F3 intensity and narrowed to less than 1/4 mile in width as it crossed I-44 and the South Canadian River northeast of Newcastle and entered far south Oklahoma City SW of 149th and May Ave. around 612 PM CST. But it regained F4/F5 intensity and widened again to 1/2 to occasionally 3/4 mile as it moved northeast across south Oklahoma City, entering Moore just west and north of 12th and Santa Fe.

 

“Still moving northeast and still producing F4 and occasional F5 damage, it crossed I-35 at the Shields Blvd. junction and moved into northeast Moore, at which point it weakened slightly to F3/sporadic F4 intensity and began a gradual turn to the left. This turn took the tornado more to the north-northeast as it crossed I-240 between Bryant Ave. and Sunnylane Rd. It crossed southeastern Oklahoma City and entered Del City as an F4 tornado, width 1/3 to 1/2 mile, along SE 44th between Sunnylane and Sooner Rds, and continued north-northeast to the northwestern part of Tinker Air force Base, near SE 29th and Sooner Rd.

 

“Continuing to turn slowly, it moved almost due north but maintained F4 intensity as it crossed I-40 just east of Sooner Rd. and continued north to between SE 15th and Reno Ave. The tornado then weakened rapidly to F0/F1 intensity as it crossed Reno Ave., and at 648 PM CST dissipated about 3 blocks north of Reno between Sooner Rd. and Air Depot Blvd.

 

“Totals from this tornado include 36 direct fatalities (12 in Bridge Creek, 1 in Newcastle, 9 in southern and southeastern Oklahoma City, 5 in Moore, 6 in Del City, and 3 in Midwest City), 5 indirect fatalities during or shortly after the tornado, 583 direct injuries, numerous indirect injuries (too many to count), 1800 homes destroyed, and 2500 homes damaged. The tornado was also the 100th tornado to strike the Oklahoma City area since 1890.”  (NWS WFO, Norman, OK. “Top Ten Deadliest Oklahoma Tornadoes (1882-2009).”

 

NWS WFO, Norman, OK: May 3, 1999  17:60  F5, 36 fatalities, 583 injuries; Grady, McClain, Cleveland, Oklahoma Counties.

 

“This violent, long-lived tornado was the most infamous of nearly 60 tornadoes that struck central Oklahoma during an unprecedented outbreak on this Monday afternoon and evening of May 3, 1999. The tornado was the 9th of 14 tornadoes produced by a supercell thunderstorm during the tornado outbreak. It formed around 526 PM CST about 2 miles south-southwest of Amber, and grew rapidly to monstrous proportions as it headed NE, paralleling I-44. It moved across Bridge Creek and rural parts of northwest Newcastle, causing continuous F4 and sporadic F5 damage. The tornado was estimated to be a mile in diameter in this area.

 

“It weakened to F2/F3 intensity and narrowed to less than 1/4 mile in width as it crossed I-44 and the South Canadian River northeast of Newcastle and entered far south Oklahoma City SW of 149th and May Ave. around 612 PM CST. But it regained F4/F5 intensity and widened again to 1/2 to occasionally 3/4 mile as it moved northeast across south Oklahoma City, entering Moore just west and north of 12th and Santa Fe.

 

“Still moving northeast and still producing F4 and occasional F5 damage, it crossed I-35 at the Shields Blvd. junction and moved into northeast Moore, at which point it weakened slightly to F3/sporadic F4 intensity and began a gradual turn to the left. This turn took the tornado more to the north-northeast as it crossed I-240 between Bryant Ave. and Sunnylane Rd. It crossed southeastern Oklahoma City and entered Del City as an F4 tornado, width 1/3 to 1/2 mile, along SE 44th between Sunnylane and Sooner Rds, and continued north-northeast to the northwestern part of Tinker Air force Base, near SE 29th and Sooner Rd.

 

“Continuing to turn slowly, it moved almost due north but maintained F4 intensity as it crossed I-40 just east of Sooner Rd. and continued north to between SE 15th and Reno Ave. The tornado then weakened rapidly to F0/F1 intensity as it crossed Reno Ave., and at 648 PM CST dissipated about 3 blocks north of Reno between Sooner Rd. and Air Depot Blvd.

 

“Totals from this tornado include 36 direct fatalities (12 in Bridge Creek, 1 in Newcastle, 9 in southern/southeastern Oklahoma City, 5 in Moore, 6 in Del City, and 3 in Midwest City), 5 indirect fatalities during or shortly after the tornado, 583 direct injuries, numerous indirect injuries (too many to count), 1800 homes destroyed, and 2500 homes damaged. The tornado was also the 100th tornado to strike the Oklahoma City area since 1890.” (NWS WFO, Norman, OK. “Violent Tornadoes (F4/F5) in Oklahoma (1950-2008).” 2009.)

 

Brooks and Doswell: “Abstract:  The 3 May 1999 Oklahoma City tornado was the deadliest in the United States in over 20 years, with 36 direct fatalities. To understand how this event fits into the historical context, the record of tornado deaths in the United States has been examined.  Almost 20,000 deaths have been reported associated with more than 3600 tornadoes in the United States since 1680.  A cursory examination of the record shows a break in 1875.  Prior to then, it is likely that many killer tornadoes failed to be reported.  When the death toll is normalized by population, a near-constant rate of death is apparent until about 1925, when a sharp fall begins.  The rate was about 1.8 people per million population in 1925 and was less than 0.12 people per million by 2000.  The decrease in fatalities has resulted from two primary causes: a decrease in the number of killer tornadoes and a decrease in the number of fatalities in the most deadly tornadoes. Current death rates for mobile home residents, however, are still nearly what the overall national rate was prior to 1925 and are about 20 times the rate of site-built home residents. The increase in the fraction of the U.S. population living in mobile homes has important implications for future reductions in the death toll.” (Brooks, Harold E. and Charles A Doswell III.  “Deaths in the 3 May 1999 Oklahoma City Tornado from a Historical Perspective.” Weather and Forecasting, Vol. 17, June 2002, 354-361.)

 

Sources

 

Brooks, Harold E. and Charles A Doswell III.  “Deaths in the 3 May 1999 Oklahoma City Tornado from a Historical Perspective.” Weather and Forecasting, Vol. 17, June 2002, pp. 354-361. Accessed at: http://www.nssl.noaa.gov/users/brooks/public_html/papers/deathhist.pdf

 

Grazulis, Thomas P. “Oklahoma Tornadoes 1950-2012.” Tornado Project Online. 2015. Accessed 12-7-2015 at: http://www.tornadoproject.com/alltorns/oktorn.htm

 

Grazulis, Thomas P. “`Worst’ Tornadoes.” The Tornado Project. 4-26-2000. Accessed 12-7-2015 at: http://www.tornadoproject.com/alltorns/worstts.htm

 

Mathis, Nancy. Storm Warning: The Story of a Killer Tornado. NY:  Simon & Schuster, 2007.

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado Search Results for all U.S. States…May 3, 1999. Accessed 12-6-2015 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/listevents.jsp?eventType=%28C%29+Tornado&beginDate_mm=05&beginDate_dd=03&beginDate_yyyy=1999&endDate_mm=05&endDate_dd=03&endDate_yyyy=1999&hailfilter=0.00&tornfilter=0&windfilter=000&sort=DT&submitbutton=Search&statefips=-999%2CALL

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F4, Kansas, Sedgwick County, May 3, 1999. Accessed 12-7-2015: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5690169

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F5, Oklahoma, Cleveland County, May 3, 1999. Accessed 12-6-2015: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5705286

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F5, Oklahoma, Grady, May 3, 1999. Accessed 12-6-2015: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5705284

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F4, Oklahoma, Kingfisher County, May 3, 1999, 20:10.20:38. Accessed 12-7-2015 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5705860

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. F4 Tornado, Oklahoma, Logan County, May 3, 1999, 20:25-21:20. Accessed 12-7-2015: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5705409

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F4, Oklahoma, McClain, May 3, 1999. Accessed 12-6-2015: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5705285

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F4, Oklahoma, Oklahoma County, May 3, 1999. Accessed 12-7-2015: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5705287

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. F2 Tornado, Oklahoma, Payne, May 3, 1999, 21:20-21:27. Accessed 12-7-2015: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5705410

 

National Climatic Data Center, NOAA. Storm Events Database. F2 Tornado, Oklahoma, Pottawatomie County, Shawnee, May 3, 1999, 20:05-20:20. Accessed 12-7-2015 at: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/eventdetails.jsp?id=5705627

 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “NOAA’s Top U.S. Weather, Water and Climate Events of the  20^th Century.” NOAA News, 12-13-1999. Accessed at: http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories/s334c.htm

 

National Severe Storms Laboratory, NOAA. “May 3, 1999 Oklahoma/Kansas Tornado Outbreak.” March 16, 2009 update. At: http://www.nssl.noaa.gov/news/may3rd/outbreak.html

 

National Severe Storms Laboratory, NOAA. Oklahoma tornado deaths – 3 May 1999 (webpage). Accessed 12-8-2015 at: http://www.nssl.noaa.gov/users/brooks/public_html/okcdeath.html

 

National Weather Service Central Region Headquarters. Famous Large Tornado Outbreaks in the United States. Kansas City, MO: NWS, NOAA, DOC. November 2, 2005 modification.  Accessed 12-7-2015 at: http://www.crh.noaa.gov/mkx/climate/torout.php

 

National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office, Norman, OK, NOAA. “The Great Plains Tornado Outbreak of May 3, 1999.” Accessed 10-11-2009: http://www.srh.noaa.gov/oun/storms/19990503/index.html

 

Oklahoma State Department of Health. “Investigation of Deaths and Injuries Resulting from the May 3, 1999 Tornadoes.” Injury Update (A Report to Oklahoma Injury Surveillance Participants). Oklahoma City: OSDH Injury Prevention Service, 7-21-2000. Accessed 12-8-2015 at: https://www.ok.gov/health2/documents/Tornado_1999.pdf

 

[1] No. 20 of 32 tornadoes listed: “Oklahoma Outbreak, May 3, 1999, Oklahoma, Kansas, 70 tornadoes (50 in OK), largest outbreak in OK on record. 55 deaths, 2000 injuries. Damage $2 billion; 2:00pm-10:00pm.” We have not been able to confirm 55 fatalities. There was a May 4 tornado in Texas near Winfield, killing one, and tornadoes on May 5-6 in Linden, Tennessee, killing three. If included, these would bring the death toll to 55. We do not know if this is how the number of 55 deaths was derived however.

[2] Results show direct tornado deaths in Oklahoma and Kansas.

[3] “A total of 40 people in Oklahoma were killed by the tornadoes on May 3-4, 1999 and another 675 persons were injured…Five deaths, 100 injuries and heavy damage were reported from the Wichita, Kansas metro area.”

[4] “May 3, 1999 7:30 pm 6 dead 150 injured. An F4 tornado cut a half-mile wide swath across Haysville and south Wichita.”

[5] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F4, Kansas, Sedgwick County, May 3, 1999. Notes they were running for shelter.

[6] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, F4, Kansas, Sedgwick County, May 3, 1999.

[7] One was a twenty-seven year-old male, and the other was an elderly male (either 68, 78, or 83).

[8] See breakout below – represents 40 direct and 5 indirect deaths.

[9] “Forty-five persons were killed as a result of the tornadoes. Of those deaths, 40 persons died from direct tornado injuries, one person died from injuries preparing for the tornado, one person died from injuries following the tornado, and three persons died from heart attacks as a result of the tornado.”

[10] “The Oklahoma State Department of Health in Oklahoma City recorded 36 direct fatalities. In addition, 5 persons died of illness or accident during or shortly after the tornado and were not considered in the direct fatality total.” We, do, however, note the five indirect fatalities in our tally.

[11] “May 3, 1999 5:23 pm 38 dead 800 injured. A massive F5 tornado devastated Bridge Creek (10) parts of Moore (8), Del City (5), and Oklahoma City (12).”

[12] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. F4, Tornado, Oklahoma, Kingfisher County, May 3, 1999, 20:10-20:38.

[13] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. F4 Tornado, Oklahoma, Logan County, May 3, 1999, 20:25-21:20.

[14] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. Tornado, Oklahoma, McClain County, May 3, 1999.

[15] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. F2 Tornado, Oklahoma, Payne, May 3, 1999, 21:20-21:27.

[16] NCDC, NOAA. Storm Events Database. F2 Tornado, Oklahoma, Pottawatomie County, Shawnee, May 3, 1999.

— 3  New York Times. “Auto Racing; 3 Spectators Killed at Track,” May 2, 1999.

— 3  St. Petersburg Times. “Major Incidents of Fan Deaths,” June 11, 2005.

 

Narrative Information

 

NYT: “Concord, N.C., May 1–Three spectators were killed and at least nine were injured when they were struck by debris that flew into the stands after a three-car crash in the VisionAire 500 Indy Racing League event tonight.

 

“Spectators sitting in the area where the crash occurred said a tire and suspension parts flew into the stands and struck the spectators. In addition to those killed, an undetermined number were injured, apparently not critically, when they were hit at Lowe’s Motor Speedway. ”In respect to them,” H. A. Wheeler, the speedway president, said of those killed, ”we are calling off the event tonight. Please include them in your prayers.”

 

“John Paul Jr. and Stan Wattles slammed hard into the fourth-turn retaining wall on Lap 61 of the 208-lap event and went spinning down the front stretch, hooking up with the car of Scott Harrington.

 

“The authorities cleared the section of the stands where the carnage occurred and the race was red-flagged while emergency workers tended to the injured. While medical personnel worked, track security employees surrounded them and held up white sheets.

 

“Within minutes of the crash, the three drivers were examined at the infield care center and released, and about 15 minutes later, Wheeler went on the public-address system to tell fans the race was being canceled.” (NYT. “Auto Racing; 3 Spectators Killed at Track,” May 2, 1999.)

 

St. Petersburg Times: “May 1, 1999: Three fans are killed, eight injured at the IRL VisionAire 500 at Concord, N.C. John Paul Jr. and Stan Wattles hit the wall in Turn 4 and spin down the frontstretch. Scott Harrington’s car is collected and debris from the crash flies into the stands.” (St. Petersburg Times. “Major Incidents of Fan Deaths,” June 11, 2005.

 

Sources

 

New York Times. “Auto Racing; 3 Spectators Killed at Track,” 5-2-1999. Accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/02/sports/auto-racing-3-spectators-killed-at-track.html?pagewanted=1

 

St. Petersburg Times, FL. “Major Incidents of Fan Deaths.” 6-11-2005. Accessed at: http://www.sptimes.com/2005/06/11/Sports/Major_incidents_of_fa.shtml

 

 

 

 

 

— 13  NTSB. MAR. Sinking of the Amphibious Passenger Vehicle Miss Majestic…May 1, 1999.

— 13  USCG. Investigation into…Sinking…Miss Majestic…Lake Hamilton…May 1, 1999.

 

Narrative Information

 

NTSB: “On May 1, 1999, the amphibious passenger vehicle Miss Majestic, with an operator and 20 passengers on board, entered Lake Hamilton near Hot Springs, Arkansas, on a regular excursion tour. About 7 minutes after entering the water, the vehicle listed to port and rapidly sank by the stern in 60 feet of water. One passenger escaped before the vehicle submerged but the remaining passengers and the operator were trapped by the vehicle’s canopy roof and drawn under water. During the vehicle’s descent to the bottom of the lake, 6 passengers and the operator were able to escape and, upon their reaching the water’s surface, were rescued by pleasure boaters in the area. The remaining 13 passengers, including 3 children, lost their lives. The vehicle damage was estimated at $100,000.

 

“The Safety Board’s investigation of this accident identified the following major safety issues:

 

. Vehicle maintenance,

. Coast Guard inspections of the Miss Majestic,

. Coast Guard inspection guidance,

. Reserve buoyancy, and

. Survivability.

 

“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the uncontrolled flooding and sinking of the Miss Majestic was the failure of Land and Lakes Tours, Inc., to adequately repair and maintain the DUKW. Contributing to the sinking was a flaw in the design of DUKWs as converted for passenger service, that is, the lack of adequate reserve buoyancy that would have allowed the vehicle to remain afloat in a flooded condition. Contributing to the unsafe condition of the Miss Majestic was the lack of adequate oversight by the Coast Guard. Contributing to the high loss of life was a continuous canopy roof that entrapped passengers within the sinking vehicle.” (NTSB. Sinking of the Amphibious Passenger Vehicle Miss Majestic, Lake Hamilton, Near Hot Springs, Arkansas, May 1, 1999, p. v.)

 

USCG Summary: “On May 1, 1999, at about 1158 local time, the Coast Guard inspected small passenger vessel M/V MISS MAJESTIC rapidly sank in 60 feet of water about 250 yards west of St. John’s Island in Lake Hamilton, near Hot Springs, Arkansas. Flooding of the vessel was not known to those on board before down-flooding over the stern was imminent. The vessel sank in less than 30 seconds after the master recognized the vessel was in distress. The vessel’s master and seven of the twenty passengers escaped from the vessel after it sank and made it to the surface alive. Thirteen of the twenty passengers were found drowned in or near the vessel as it rested on the bottom. The vessel was salvaged, having sustained only minor damage from the sinking.” (p. 1)

 

USCG Findings of Fact:

“1. MISS MAJESTIC was built in 1944 as an amphibious truck (DUKW) for the government of

the United States. (p. 4) ….

 

“3. The MISS MAJESTIC had the following fundamental modifications for passenger service. These modifications are typical for DUKWs used in passenger service, although details vary.

 

1. Installation of 8 rows of school bus type seating, outboard of a centerline aisle for access.

 

1. Installation of a hinge mounted ladder on centerline at the stern, for boarding the vessel.

 

1. Raising and lengthening the canopy, making it high enough to allow persons to stand.

 

1. Installation of roll-up vinyl windows, to provide shelter from the weather.

 

1. Removal of the forward bilge pump and disabling of original bilge piping.

 

1. Installation of 3 electric bilge pumps, all operated with a single switch:

 

1100 gph pump to port of the Higgins bilge pump, discharging near the driver seat.

750 gph pump aft of the port rear wheel well, discharging next to the boarding ladder.

750 gph pump aft of starboard rear wheel well, discharging next to boarding ladder.

 

1. Removal of the drive train serving the after rear axle, including the differential.

 

1. Engine changed to V8 and transmission changed to automatic. (pp. 8-9)

 

“4. In early May 1999, there were about 63 DUKWs across the nation with Coast Guard certificates of inspection for passenger service. They were certificated by seven coastal MSOs and five inland MSOs. The allowed route was typically Rivers or Lakes, Bays and Sounds. Of the ten certificated by MSO Memphis, all operating in Hot Springs, six were owned/operated by Land & Lake Tours and four by National Park Duck Tours. Numerous other DUKWs operate in passenger service, beyond Coast Guard jurisdiction. As an example, there are about 40 Wisconsin Dell Ducks.

 

“5. In early May 1999, a review of the Coast Guard’s marine casualty data for the period 1992 to 1998 revealed only twelve reported casualty cases. Most of the cases involved collisions, allisions, steering failures, engine shutdowns and/or pollution. The three unintentional flooding cases involved a fracture caused by impact with the ground upon launching, a broken leaf spring penetrating the hull, and damage caused by an oscillating propeller shaft. No evidence was found to indicate any substantial casualty record for Coast Guard inspected DUKW small passenger vessels, specifically no deaths or sinkings.

 

“6. The owner of the MISS MAJESTIC, Mr. ……, first started to operate DUKWs in passenger service, in Hot Springs, in 1958. The vessels were first subjected to Coast Guard jurisdiction in the mid 1970’s. The owner does not clearly remember why, but believes it was a consequence of a casualty on another owner’s vessel. In 1982 Land & Lakes challenged and was granted exemption by the United States District Court (Western District of Arkansas) from Coast Guard Inspection based on lack of Admiralty jurisdiction. In 1984, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overturned the ruling. The issue under appeal was the Ouachita River being subject to interstate navigation. The appeals court ruled that the waterway was navigable prior to being dammed and commerce laws therefore allowed the Coast Guard jurisdiction on Lake Hamilton, created by damming the Ouachita River.

 

“7. Mr. ….. has operated DUKWs inspected and certificated by the Coast Guard since the mid 1980s. Once owning 15 DUKWs, Land & Lake Tours owned 12 DUKWs on May 1, 1999, operating only 3 DUKWs at the time due to market conditions. One of these 3 was MISS MAJESTIC, originally named MISS VELDA ROSE when Mr. ….. acquired her in 1962.

 

8. Mr. ….. stated he never envisioned or witnessed rapid flooding of a DUKW in his 41 years of managing DUKW passenger vessels. He never heard of a case where passengers had to evacuate through the windows. He remembers one case where a broken metal band clamp on a boot seal caused flooding but the Higgins bilge pump prevented sinking. He never had a marine surveyor evaluate his DUKWs, including as a condition of insurance…. (p. 9)

 

“10. On May 1, 1999, MSO Memphis had approximately 20 certificated small passenger vessels for which it issued a Certificate of Inspection (COI). Ten of these vessels were DUKWs in Hot Springs. Neither the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI), nor the Chief of Merchant Vessel Safety Branch (the supervisor of marine inspectors) had ever personally inspected a DUKW. Both persons were unaware of any Coast Guard inspection policy documents specific to

DUKWs.

 

“11. Coast Guard regulations applicable to DUKWs in passenger service are found in Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Subchapter T, Small Passenger Vessels, Parts 175-185. Subchapter T underwent a substantial revision in 1996, including the addition of requirements for bilge high level alarms and operating procedures to improve passenger safety. Coast Guard wide inspection policy applicable to small passenger vessels is contained in the Marine Safety Manual, Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars (NVICs), and policy letters issued by the Commandant. In addition to Coast Guard inspection, the DUKWs in Hot Springs were inspected by the State of Arkansas and the City of Hot Springs for safety while operating on land.

 

“12. Coast Guard wide inspection policy specific to DUKWs is limited to one paragraph in the Marine Safety Manual, volume II, chapter 10. That policy deals with air-cooled engines. MSO Chicago and MSO St. Louis have promulgated multiple page local OCMI policy documents specific to the inspection and certification of DUKWs. Prior to May 1, 1999, MSO Memphis had no inspection policy documents specific to DUKW small passenger vessels.

 

“13. The 1991 to 1998 vessel inspection records for the MISS MAJESTIC indicate an absence of recorded deficiencies, with the exception of two items which were documented with a form CG-835 in 1995. The Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Information System (MSIS) product set Vessel File Marine Inspection Log (VFMI) for the MISS MAJESTIC shows no deficiencies were recorded in MSIS from 1985 to 1998.

 

“14. The latest COI for the MISS MAJESTIC was issued on March 11, 1997. The COI is valid for a period of three years, pending satisfactory completion of an annual Reinspection within 60 days of the anniversary of the issue date. The COI limited the vessel’s operation to 250 yards of St. John’s Island and 30 minutes of waterborne operation. The longstanding 30 minute limit was due to the absence of toilet facilities and distress signals on board. The reason behind the longstanding 250 yard limit is not evident from the vessel’s inspection file. The owner stated that the Coast Guard derived the 250 yard limit, for reasons not known to him. For the allowed route, Subchapter T and the COI require life preservers and one life ring buoy as lifesaving equipment.

 

“15. The last annual Reinspection for the MISS MAJESTIC was conducted by CWO3 ….. from MSO Memphis on February 23. 1999…. (pp. 10-11)

 

“30. Land & Lake Tours had no organized or formal training program for its DUKW masters, the only crew on the DUKWs during tours. The only training materials held by Land & Lake Tours was Coast Guard license preparation materials from Houston Marine and drug and alcohol program videotapes. Training was conducted on the job by going with more experienced persons and through informal discussions in the office. Discussions involving Ms. Helmbrecht and Mr. …. or Mr. ….. addressed contingencies. The mechanics would also informally train new drivers on using vessel controls. Applying her experience as a school bus driver, Ms. Helmbrecht developed an operational checklist with Mr. to allow her to do her duties well as a DUKW master. Over time, she became comfortable to the point of not using a written checklist. Her routine before operating a DUKW included checking brakes, lights and hull drain plugs.

 

“31. Land & Lake Tours had no written policy on emergency procedures. No evidence was found to indicate that the emergency instructions required by 46 CFR 185.510 to address fire, heavy weather, and man overboard conditions ever existed. Training consisted of informal discussions in the office. Ms. Helmbrecht had developed a good working relationship with the mechanics, who readily helped her with occasional operational difficulties. Policy amounted to designation of five places on St. John’s Island to exit the water in an emergency, an expectation to rapidly exit the water if the Higgins bilge pump discharged, and an expectation to have the electric bilge pumps turned on at all times while a DUKW was waterborne. Emergency drills were not formally held for the master, the only crew on the DUKWs during tours. However, some unrecorded emergency equipment familiarization was done. Mr. ….. stated that drills were not being recorded, per work list item 1, because corrective actions were focused elsewhere….” (p. 15)

 

“39. On May 1, 1999, Ms. Helmbrecht and 20 passengers arrived at the water’s edge on St. John’s Island, at about 1150 local time. Her passenger ticket count matched Mr. ….. having conversed using the radio. He did not include in his count one young passenger, because Land & Lake Tours did not charge for children deemed to be infants. Land & Lake Tours generally considered children 2 years of age or younger to be infants….

 

“42. Ms. Helmbrecht stated that she often offers parents to put life preservers on children. Arkansas state law requires children under the age of 13 to wear a life preserver at all times while aboard recreational boats. The Coast Guard leaves it up to the master to decide when people must put on life preservers on inspected small passenger vessels, per 46 CFR 185.508. No one donned a life preserver for this tour. Mr. …. never consciously thought about having children wear life preservers during DUKW tours.

 

“45. Approximately seven minutes after entering the water and while rounding Catalina Point, Ms. Helmbrecht felt the MISS MAJESTIC react sluggishly, not very responsive to throttle changes, and list to port. ….. was on a 26 foot long recreational pontoon boat about 60 yards from MISS MAJESTIC’s port quarter. Upon seeing MISS MAJESTIC, he noted her to be exceptionally low in the water. Passenger ….. familiar with recreational boats but not DUKWs, splashed his hand in water over the port side after noticing another passenger being able to touch the water. He looked behind him to see water washing on deck at the last row of seats, the eighth row. He heard passengers at the stern joking about water coming on deck.

 

“46. Ms. Helmbrecht turned around and made eye contact with Mr. ….. She told him to move to the other (starboard) side to compensate for the list. She attempted to turn the vessel slowly toward shore. Mr. ….. and ….. noticed water on the last foot of floorboards, at row 6. Mr. …..stood to move as asked and looked aft again. This time he noted water on deck under the last 2 rows of seats and felt water over his feet at the fifth row of seats. He knew something was terribly wrong and did not sit down on the starboard side. He remembers Ms. Helmbrecht attempting to increase the speed of the propeller. She noticed water on deck at the stern and over the floorboards near rows 5 and 6. Ms. Helmbrecht told the passengers to get off the vessel because it was going down. She opened a valve in the nearby fixed fire extinguishing system, believing the gas might displace water and add buoyancy. Mr. ….. managed to get a few life preservers down from the overhead stowage. He found the preservers hard to remove from the slide out storage containers against the canopy. He gave them to his wife and daughter. The passengers were generally calm, apparently not aware of the distress, or in shock.

 

“47. In less than 30 seconds from the recognition of distress, the vessel down-flooded over the stern and went down by the stern with all 21 persons on board. A notch in the raised coaming had been cut out to provide the aisle between the seats. Down-flooding occurred through the notch at first, although some water may have leaked through a deck hatch on the port side aft of the coaming, under the feet of passengers in that location. The bow paused at the surface for less than five seconds, with the bow nearly vertical. Ms. Helmbrecht had never seen water at passengers’ feet or seen it entering a DUKW before. She had never heard of such occurring to other masters.

 

“48. As the MISS MAJESTIC rapidly sank, passengers floated up under the canopy and forward to the closed windshield. The windshield and forward vinyl windows prevented people from floating free of the vessel, causing them to bump into each other.

 

“49. After the vessel sank, Ms. Helmbrecht and seven passengers managed to swim through open side windows and make it to the surface, despite disorientation in dark waters and being submerged more than a minute. Many of them were not able to get out of the vessel until it was well submerged. Many of the side windows had clear dimensions of about 24 inches in height and 33 inches in length.

 

“50. The MISS MAJESTIC landed in about two feet deep soft silt, on her wheels, about 250 yards from Catalina Point on St. John’s Island. The bow was slightly closer to shore, being uphill

from the stern. The vessel appeared to divers to have rolled backward several feet…..

 

“52. The divers recovered twelve bodies between 1258 and 1545 local time on May 1, 1999. Six deceased passengers were found floating near the driver’s seat inside MISS MAJESTIC. Another six deceased passengers were found scattered about the vessel on the bottom of Lake Hamilton, up to 105 feet from the vessel…. These passengers escaped the vessel alive or floated out of the vessel dead. Garland County Sheriffs lead diver indicated that due to the distance from MISS MAJESTIC that some of the deceased were found, it appears that some of them managed to escape the vessel and tried to swim. He noted that disorientation, darkness and reduced buoyancy with depth affect the ability of people to ascertain the direction to the surface….

 

“54. The divers recovered the body of a thirteenth passenger, that of James Leon Patton, at 0857 local time on May 2, 1999. All thirteen deaths were caused by drowning. Death certificates for James Leon Patton and Lana Jo Berry also indicate asphyxiation caused by drowning.

 

“55. The divers noted zero visibility at the 60 foot depth….

 

“59. MSO Memphis decided to have all DUKW operations in Hot Springs stopped until all DUKW vessels could be specifically examined. However, the owners of both companies in Hot Springs had terminated all tours on their own initiative. Subsequent actions in this matter are separate from this case.

 

“60. On May 6, 1999, Commandant issued a message to all Marine Safety Offices to call attention to inspection issues on DUKWs. Specifically mentioned for scrutiny were water intrusion points, such as shaft housing boot seals.

 

“61. On May 9, 1999, the MISS MAJESTIC was salvaged under the supervision of the U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage. As the vessel was lifted from the water, water drained out of the aft shaft housing where the aft boot seal was found disconnected from the shaft housing. The vessel was briefly examined on the barge and on shore then moved to temporary storage at the Arkansas Air National Guard facility at Hot Springs Airport.

 

“62. Examination of the MISS MAJESTIC revealed the following…:

 

1. Aft shaft housing dislocated, being pushed into the hull forward.

 

1. Aft shaft housing off and in front of the shaft housing support, with deformed housing.

 

1. Hinge assembly for positioning shaft housing removed, mounts ground off.(removal is a common practice with some DUKW owners)

 

1. Welded lap patch on shaft housing where drive shaft rubs when rear end is low. (common location for needing repairs)

 

1. Boot seal metal band clamp in place on boot seal with 42 notches past the screw head.

 

1. The boot seal, when put back on shaft housing with 42 notches past the screw head was

physically loose. (3 turns of the screw were possible and 2 1/4 turns made the clamp reasonably tight. Mr. Woodall felt an in-water test at a boat ramp would likely have indicated the seal loose. He also stated that there existed a good chance the boot seal would have slid off the shaft housing during operation in that tightened condition.)

 

1. No raised ring on aft end of shaft housing as on forward end, for keeping boot seals in place.

 

1. Path for water ingress through shaft housing annulus. (around 3 inch diameter drive shaft, inside a 5 inch diameter shaft housing)

 

1. Key missing from keyway in Higgins bilge pump shaft/chain drive sprocket, gouged shaft.

 

1. Leading edge of 1 of 3 vanes on Higgins impeller broken off and missing, scored housing.

 

1. Higgins strainer housing off of pump housing and in bilge. (strainer housing cracked at set screw intended to hold it on pump housing)

 

1. Higgins strainer screen missing over part of strainer housing.

 

1. Upper edge of Higgins inlet pipe fitting located 5 inches above vessel’s bottom plating….

 

1. Elbow in Higgins discharge piping not held by flexible hose with metal band clamp.

 

1. U-bolt for securing Higgins bilge pump discharge piping elbow missing.

 

1. Variety of steel repairs to hull above rear axles. (steel doublers and inserts)

 

1. Dime size hole in hull above rear axles. (due to wastage of hull plate)

 

1. Electric bilge pumps actual capacity less than rated for no head.

 

1. Electric bilge pump switch in the on position.

 

1. Ring life buoy attached to vessel with bicycle chain and lock, lock open, no lifeline. (chain bought by Bridges, applied by Helmbrecht, in reaction to theft in town. Helmbrecht unlocked the lock before each tour.)

 

1. Hull drain plugs in place, shaft housing drain plugs in place.

 

1. Boot seals stretch about 1.5 inches total when aft axle falls due to lack of wheel contact. (driveshaft is splined to allow axial mechanical motion). (pp. 16-21) ….

 

“Conclusions:

 

“1. The apparent root cause of this casualty was the unchecked flooding of the MISS MAJESTIC

resulting from the aft shaft boot seal dislodging from the shaft housing at the start of waterborne

operation.

 

“2. The contributing causes of this casualty are as follows:

 

1. Boot Seal Installation: The aft shaft housing boot seal came off of the aft shaft housing

when the MISS MAJESTIC entered the water. The drop of the axle accentuated the

elongated geometry along the shaft housing and resulted in greater tension on the boot

seals. The aft shaft housing boot seal may not have come off of the shaft housing if

 

(1) that end of the shaft housing had a raised ring like the one on the front end, and/or

 

(2) the aft shaft housing boot seal metal band clamp was tighter, and/or

 

(3) the aft shaft housing hinge assembly was in place, and/or

 

(4) the rear differential had been in place not allowing the forward axle to drop; and/or

 

(5) the aft seal had been operationally tested in water prior to allowing the vessel to return

to commercial service.

 

1. Operator Experience: Ms. Helmbrecht did not notice the discharge from the forward

electric bilge pump due to the position of its discharge point being hidden from her view

and her focus on being a tour guide. She could not have noticed any discharge from the

aft electric bilge pumps due to the locations of their discharge points at the stern. She

would have noticed any substantial discharge from the Higgins bilge pump discharge

point. The presence of a crew member not engaged as a tour guide would likely have led

to earlier recognition of the unintentional flooding and resulted in fewer lives being lost.

 

1. Higgins Bilge Pump: The Higgins bilge pump did not work because of the missing key

from the shaft keyway. The cause of the key being missing can not be determined. It

likely sheared or fell out upon the pump ingesting a solid object that broke an impeller

vane. An object could have been ingested through the missing section of the strainer

screen. This may have happened during the short operation of the Higgins bilge pump on

April 29, 1999, or soon after flooding started on May 1, 1999. The assorted damages to

the Higgins pump and its attachments indicate it suffered a dramatic shock. If it was

operational, the Higgins bilge pump would likely have been able to keep up with

flooding, or at least allowed time to beach the MISS MAJESTIC. When the Higgins

bilge pump would have begun to discharge, the increase in draft would have been only a

couple of inches. The water in the bilge would not have reduced vessel maneuverability

appreciably, as it did not a few days before when the pump briefly discharged.

 

1. High Level Bilge Alarm: The bilge high level alarms were not installed before the

casualty. Land & Lake Tours failed to understand the recent regulation and failed to install the alarms before the due date and before the casualty….

 

1. Compartmentation: Had the MISS MAJESTIC been fitted with watertight compartmentation or flotation materials, the vessel would have not sunk or sank so slowly that passengers would have had ample time to escape the vessel.

 

26. Passenger Entrapment: Had the windshield and forward vinyl windows been open, most or all of the passengers would have escaped as the vessel sank. External button snaps could not be quickly undone from behind the windshield. The snaps are of a style that often require a concerted effort to release, even from the button side…. (pp. 25-26.)

 

USCG Commandant: “I concur that the cause of the sinking of the MISS MAJESTIC was flooding through the aft drive shaft housing after the boot seal had dislodged from the shaft housing. Contributing factors were: the removal of the aft shaft housing hinge assembly; the inoperability of the Higgins bilge pump; the absence of a bilge high level alarm; the lack of operational testing of recent repairs to the aft shaft boot seal; the lack of adequate written maintenance manuals or procedures; the ineffective oversight of the vessel’s operation by the management of Land & Lakes Tours, Inc.; the vessel operator’s failure to recognize the flooding in a timely manner; the poor communications between the vessel mechanic and the Coast Guard inspector; and, the lack of comprehension regarding the Coast Guard inspection program by Land & Lakes Tours, Inc.” (Commandant Comments)

 

USCG Commandant Response to Recommendations:

 

“….Recommendation 2: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard ensure that every owner of certificated DUKW passenger vessels has a copy of the War Department’s

Technical Manual.

 

“Recommendation 3: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard ensure that

every OCMI certificating DUKW passenger vessels has a copy of the War Department’s

Technical Manual.

 

“Action on recommendations 2 and 3: I concur with these recommendations. Title 46, Code of Federal Regulations, Subchapter T, Subpart B lists the plans and information required to be submitted by an owner for vessel certification. The War Department’s Technical Manual could be substituted for some of the required plans, but due to the modification of many aspects of present-day DUKW vessels, the manual is not always applicable. However, because I consider the War Department’s Technical Manual to be a valuable resource for the owners of these vessels and for Coast Guard vessel inspection personnel, all known DUKW vessel owners shall be notified on how they can obtain a copy of the manual and each Coast Guard Officer-in-Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI) shall be provided a copy of the manual.

 

“Recommendation 4: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard encourage or

require crews to be present at annual inspections of small passenger vessels.

 

“Action: I concur with this recommendation….

 

“Recommendation 5: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard encourage or

require in-water testing of vessel integrity after repairs to the watertight hull and its appendages,

especially for DUKWs and other vessels which do not normally reside in the water.

 

“Action: I partially concur with this recommendation. All repairs conducted in drydock should be tested in drydock and then re-examined after the vessel is afloat. However, repairs to an amphibious craft’s watertight hull or appendages that cannot be adequately tested out of the water should be tested in water. The Coast Guard will consider this recommendation further

under recommendation 7.

 

“Recommendation 6: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard encourage or require the testing of bilge pumps with water at every Coast Guard triennial inspection and annual reinspection.

 

“Action: I concur with this recommendation.

 

“Recommendation 7: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard establish a working group of industry experts and DUKW operating companies to develop a compilation of best practices with DUKWs, with emphasis on drive trains and hull integrity. The compilation of best practices should be made readily available to the public.

 

“Recommendation 8: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard publish  policy on DUKWs to allow OCMIs to reassess vessel survivability in the face of risk of flooding from drive train breaches and obtain an equivalent level of safety to that is intended in 46 CFR Subchapter T. The policy should be made readily available to the public, including state agencies

that regulate DUKWs operating as passenger vessels on state waters.

 

“Recommendation 9: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard publish policy on inspecting unique features of DUKWs, with emphasis on shaft housings and boot seals. The policy should be made readily available to the public, including state agencies that regulate DUKWs operating as passenger vessels on state waters.

 

“Recommendation 10: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard develop policy on the use of canopies and similar structures on small passenger vessels, with specific consideration of the escape provisions of 46 CFR 177.500.

 

“Recommendation 13: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard encourage OCMIs to re-evaluate the need for requiring more than one person in the crew of inspected vessels where a member of the crew is engaged in service as a tour guide. This is especially true on vessels where the operating station is forward of the passengers.

 

“Action on recommendations 7 through 10 and 13: I concur with these recommendations insofar as they relate to DUKW vessels. Commandant (G-MOC) shall convene a group of industry and government experts, including DUKW owners and operators and appropriate Coast Guard personnel, to develop comprehensive guidelines relating to the design, maintenance, operation, and inspection of DUKW vessels. When completed, the guidelines will be distributed to all known DUKW owners and operators, to all known state agencies involved with DUKW oversight, and to all appropriate Coast Guard units. In addition, the guidelines will be available on the Coast Guard’s Internet site.

 

“Recommendation 11: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard re-emphasize the need for MSOs to have complete inspection files, including worklists and a MSIS Marine Safety Deficiency Summary containing all deficiencies found.

 

“Action: I concur with is recommendation….

 

“Recommendation 12: It is recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard consider engaging the Quality Assurance Staff, G-MO-1, to evaluate consistency among MSOs in DUKW

inspection and provide training when needed.

 

“Action: I concur with this recommendation….

 

“Recommendation 14: It is recommended that a copy of this report be provided to all states with state regulated DUKWs used in commercial passenger service and all state boating law administrators.

 

“Recommendation 15: It is recommended that each OCMI be provided with a copy of this report.

 

“Recommendation 16: It is recommended that the National Transportation Safety Board be provided a copy of this report.

 

“Action on recommendations 14 through 16: I concur with these recommendations. Commandant (G-MOA) will provide copies of this report as recommended….” (pp. 6-9)

 

USCG Listing of Deceased (Sep 29, 1999, p. 2):

 

1. James Leon Patton
2. Floye Christine Patton
3. Jennifer Diane Patton
4. Ronald Gene Todd
5. Thomas Cornelius Todd
6. Emily Anne Todd
7. Andrea Marie Beasley
8. Logan Reed Beasley
9. Melanie Lynn McGuirk
10. Danna Lynne Morse-Powers
11. Mary Elaine McGee
12. Vernon Lee Johnson
13. Lana Jo Berry

 

Sources

 

National Transportation Safety Board. Marine Accident Report. Sinking of the Amphibious Passenger Vehicle Miss Majestic, Lake Hamilton, Near Hot Springs, Arkansas, May 1, 1999 (NTSB/MAR-02/01). Washington, DC: NTSB, adopted 4-2-2002, 73 pages. Accessed 12-11-2015 at: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR0201.pdf

 

United States Coast Guard.  Marine Board of Investigation.  Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Sinking of the M/V Miss Majestic on Lake Hamilton, Hot Springs, Arkansas on May 1, 1999 with Multiple Loss of Life (16732/MC99005211). Washington, DC:  Commandant, USCG, Dec 7, 1999, 41 pages. Accessed 12-11-2015: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/docs/boards/dukw.pdf

 

 

–13-15  CO Columbine Review Com. The Report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine. 2001.[2]

—     13  Minshew, Charles. “The worst mass shootings in U.S. history.” Denver Post, 7-20-2012.

–13-15  USFA. Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado. 1999, p. 1-2.[3]

–13-15  Wikipedia. “Columbine High School massacre.” 7-21-2012 modification.

 

Narrative Information

 

CO Columbine Review Commission: “On April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School southwest of Denver murdered 12 fellow students and one teacher in the worst school shooting in U.S. history….” (Governor Bill Owens letter to transmittal to the public.)

 

“The Columbine High School tragedy was the work of two disgruntled seniors at the school, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, who determined to kill as many teachers and fellow students as possible, first, by planting and detonating two 20-pound propane bombs in the school cafeteria and then by shooting survivors fleeing the inferno they hoped to create. When their explosive devices failed to ignite, the two approached the school and killed one student and seriously wounded a second as they ate their lunches on the grass. They then entered the school building and began firing at students leaving the school cafeteria, wounding five students and deliberately executing one of them.

 

“Klebold entered the school cafeteria briefly but did not fire his weapon inside; he returned outside the building and fired at students near the school parking lot, wounding one of them seriously. Meanwhile, a number of students, two school custodians, and at least one teacher fled to the cafeteria from which, in turn, many either fled from the building or climbed stairs to the second-story library; one teacher and a student were wounded when Harris fired a rifle at them through the school’s double glass doors. Emergency calls were made to the 911 number, and teachers urged students in the library to take cover under the tables. Klebold and Harris reentered

the building and fired at students in the main hallway and hallway outside the library, wounding one. They also detonated or left for later detonation a number of pipe bombs . Encountering a teacher, Dave Sanders, they seriously wounded him with a shotgun blast. Sanders bled to death from his wounds before medical assistance was provided more than three hours afterwards.

 

“About 15 minutes into their onslaught, the two entered the library where 56 students, two teachers and two library employees had sought concealment. Within seven-and-a-half minutes, Klebold and Harris killed 10 students and seriously wounded a number of other persons by rifle and shotgun fire; they detonated pipe bombs, although without inflicting severe wounds. Several students were deliberately killed execution-style.

 

“Klebold and Harris fired at police from library windows and received return fire. They left the library and moved to the science wing, where they shot at fleeing students. After returning briefly to the cafeteria, the two perpetrators tried again to explode by gunfire the two propane bombs they had carried earlier into the cafeteria, without success, but managed to detonate smaller bombs, one of which was attached to a container of flammable liquid. The resulting firebomb activated the cafeteria sprinkler system, and soon thereafter the sprinkler and fire alarm

systems were activated throughout the school building.

 

“The final moments of the perpetrators’ lives have not been clearly tracked. Apparently they moved into the office area on the second floor, and then returned to the cafeteria. A surveillance video camera captured their movements there: they seemed to survey the damage to the cafeteria and police activities in the school parking area. From there they went back to the library and exchanged gunfire from the library windows with police who were protecting paramedics rescuing students wounded outside the school building. At about 12:08 p.m., or 47 minutes after the two had commenced their assault, the two turned their weapons on themselves and committed suicide, having left behind them a trail of 13 dead (12 students and one teacher) and many wounded persons. Because the response teams outside the school building were unaware of their deaths, it required several more hours before officers could secure the building, obtain medical attention for the wounded, and collect the dead.” (Columbine Review Commission. The Report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review Commission. May 2001, pp. i-iii.)

 

USFA: “Background….Near midday on Tuesday, April 20, 1999, the staff and students of Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, became targets of yet another U.S. episode of wanton violence. The events of that day shocked the nation as two juvenile offenders carried out a premeditated assault and victimized occu­pants of the school. Thirteen defenseless individuals were slain, and over 160 students and faculty were triaged – 24 with serious injuries. The two offenders, both Columbine High School students, maniacally unleashed an unprecedented terrorist-style assault using numerous semiautomatic weap­ons and nearly 100 improvised incendiary and explosive devices. The latter were designed as antiper­sonnel devices intended to inflict casualties, including harm to responding emergency personnel.

 

“Entering the school building that morning after killing two classmates on the sidewalk, the two students fired their weapons into high-occupancy areas and killed some victims at close range, firing at will, regardless of the victims’ cooperation, the ensuing level of police response, or the risk to themselves. During the assault, the two assailants successfully detonated over 30 improvised incendi­ary and explosive devices, designed to cause numerous casualties. The incendiary devices included glass containers containing homemade “napalm” and various types and sizes of containers holding flammable liquids (gasoline, kerosene, and white gas). The juvenile offenders also deployed vari­ously sized pressurized, flammable gas (propane) cylinders. The explosive devices consisted of pipe bombs of different sizes that were augmented with nails or pellets, or both, duct-taped to the outside so as to increase the shrapnel yield and the number of casualties. Investigators later located over 60 additional undetonated devices in and around the school.

 

“The offenders also outfitted their own vehicles with incendiary and explosive materials that were deployed as car bombs. These vehicles were discovered in the parking lots adjacent to the school, and were intended as secondary devices to harm people fleeing from the building or to compromise first responders. The perpetrators concluded their rampage by committing suicide.

 

“The Nation has suffered other acts of wanton violence, including previous school shootings. However, this incident was notable because the perpetrators intended the attack to be an act of terror that would devastate their school and the community, thereby earning them personal infamy.

 

“The assault at Columbine High School placed enormous demands on fire, EMS, and law enforcement personnel and placed many of them at mortal risk. Within a short period of time, the incident drew a major response from many agencies to an event that, although relatively short-lived, was extremely complex. The potential for collateral injury or death to emergency responders during the incident was substantial….” (USFA. Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado (USFA-TR-128). USFA, FEMA, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 1999, pp. 1-2.)

 

Sources

 

State of Colorado Columbine Review Commission. The Report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review Commission (Honorable William H. Erickson, Chairman). May 2001, 188 pages. Accessed 12-11-2015 at: https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-%20Governor’s%20Commission%20Report.pdf

 

United States Fire Administration. Wanton Violence at Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado (USFA-TR-128). Emmitsburg, MD: USFA, FEMA, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 1999. Accessed 12-11-2015 at: https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-128.pdf

 

Additional Reading

 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “School-Associated Student Homicides – United States, 1992-2006.” MMWR (Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report), Vol. 57, No. 2, 1-18-2008, pp. 33-36. Accessed 12-11-2015 at: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5702a1.htm

 

FBI Critical Incident Response Group (Mary Ellen O’Toole). The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective. Quantico, VA: CIRG, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC), FBI Academy, U.S. Department of Justice. Accessed 12-11-2015 at: https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/school-shooter

 

Lindsey, Daryl. “A reader’s guide to the Columbine report.” Salon. 5-17-2000. Accessed 12-11-2015 at: Reader’s Guide to the Columbine Report

 

Moore, Mark H., Carol V. Petrie, Anthony A. Braga, and Brenda L. McLaughlin (Editors). Deadly Lessons: Understanding Lethal School Violence. Washington, DC: National Research Council, National Academies Press, 2003. Accessed 11-14-2015 at: http://www.nap.edu/read/10370/chapter/1

 

United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education. The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States. Washington, DC, July 2004, 39 pages. Accessed 12-11-2015 at: https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf

 

 

 

 

[1] Two seniors killed 13 people before killing themselves (thus thirteen victims and fifteen total dead).

[2] Twelve students and one teacher killed before two perpetrators committed suicide.

[3] Thirteen victims and two perpetrator suicides.

— 5  Chicago Tribune. “Deadly Blast Called Accidental.” 4-6-1999.

— 5  MI CIS. “Fireworks Safety — Independence Fireworks.” MI OSHA News, 3/3, Fall 1999, p3.

 

Narrative Information

 

Chicago Tribune: “Osseo, Michigan — The explosion and fire that left five people dead at a fireworks company one week ago has been classified as accidental, though the investigation is ongoing, fire officials said Monday. Fire officials said the March 29 explosion at Independence Professional Fireworks Co. near Osseo could have been caused by something as simple as static electricity in the air. Sergeant Ken Hersha of the Michigan State Police Fire Marshal Division said the sweep of the door as owner Robert Slayton entered the building might have been enough to ignite the explosion. ‘It looks like he was just walking in the door, and that’s why he was able to stagger 300 feet away on fire,’ Hersha told The Jackson Citizen Patriot for a story Monday. Slayton died that night in a hospital with burns over 85 percent of his body. Slayton’s wife, Patricia, and three employees died of carbon-monoxide poisoning inside the building. The deadly blast followed a December explosion that killed seven people at the factory.

 

“Although fire officials have said the blast was accidental, they said specifics for both are still under investigation.” (Chicago Tribune. “Deadly Blast Called Accidental.” 4-6-1999.)

 

MI CIS: “On Dec. 11, 1998, seven workers died in an explosion at Independence Professional Fireworks in Osseo, Michigan….A subsequent explosion occurred at the same location Monday, March 29, 1999, killing five more workers, including the owners…..

 

“`This second explosion shows that there was an utter disregard on the employer’s part to protect his workers,” said Wilbur.[1] “These explosions illustrate the need for workplace standards to prevent catastrophic incidents involving highly hazardous chemicals.’….

 

“Under Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act (MIOSHA) rules, manufacturers of explosives have responsibilities concerning the use of explosive chemicals. MIOSHA’s Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (PSM) of 1993 was designed to help prevent catastrophic accidents, when complied with by employers. Company management was made aware of the PSM standard in 1994, but did not implement the life-saving procedures. ‘MIOSHA promulgated this standard specifically because work with highly hazardous chemicals requires stringent and detailed safeguards to protect workers,’ said Wilbur.

 

“ATF, the State Police Fire Marshal Division and MIOSHA all conducted investigations of both explosions. Independence Professional Fireworks voluntarily surrendered its license to ATF after

the second explosion….” (MI CIS. “Fireworks Safety — Independence Fireworks.” MI OSHA News, 3/3, Fall 1999, p. 3.)

 

Sources

 

Chicago Tribune. “Deadly Blast Called Accidental.” 4-6-1999. Accessed 12-21-2015 at: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-04-06/news/9904060255_1_explosion-and-fire-fire-officials-fireworks

 

Michigan Consumer & Industry Services, Bureau of Safety & Regulation. “Fireworks Safety — Independence Fireworks.” MI OSHA News (Michigan Occupational Safety & Health Act), Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 3 & 20, Lansing, MI. Accessed 12-19-2015 at: http://www.michigan.gov/documents/CIS_WSH_minwsf99_27783_7.pdf

 

 

[1] CIS Director Kathy Wilbur.