20th Century

–118 Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). 1982, p. 105.
–118 Forces of Nature. Avalanches. “Case Studies.”
–118 Hilliker, D.H. “March in Rail History,” Railroad Magazine, March 1942, p. 112.
–100 Haine. Railroad Wrecks. 1993, p. 31
— 96 History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, March 1, 1910. Trains Buried by Avalanche
— 96 Holtz 2008.
— 96 Lange. “Train disaster at Wellington kills 96 on March 1, 1910.” HistoryLink.org. 1-26-2003.
— 96 Mapes. “1910 Stevens Pass avalanche still deadliest in U.S. …” Seattle Times, 2-27-2010.
— 96 Nash. Darkest Hours, “Major Avalanches and Landslides,” 1977, p. 642.

Narrative Information

Hilliker: “Snowslide descending from 200 feet above, at portal of cascade Tunnel, Wellington, Wash., caused 118 deaths, including 84 on two stalled Great Northern Trains…March 1, 1910.”
(Hilliker, D.H. “March in Rail History,” Railroad Magazine, March 1942, p. 112..)

History.com: “The Great Northern Railroad’s westbound Spokane Express left for Seattle, Washington, from Spokane on February 23. On February 26, a blizzard in Washington caused high snow drifts in the Cascade Mountains that blocked the rail lines. Despite many workers attempting to clear the tracks, the train was still stuck in Wellington, a small village in King County just past the Stevens Pass, nearly a week later. The area’s telegraph lines had come down in the storm, and there was little passengers or train personnel could do but wait out the storm.

“The Wellington train station was located near the base of Windy Mountain, but had no protective cover. On February 28, weather conditions changed, with temperatures dropping and thunderstorms battering the area. In Idaho, several miners died in an avalanche, and flooding imperiled residents of low-lying areas. At 4:20 a.m. the following morning, with approximately 50 passengers and 75 employees of Great Northern Railroad sleeping in the Spokane Express, an avalanche of snow crashed down Windy Mountain, prompted by a combination of rain, lighting and thunder….

“Charles Andrews, a rail worker and resident of Wellington who witnessed the disaster, described the scene: “White Death moving down the mountainside above the trains. Relentlessly it advanced, exploding, roaring, rumbling, grinding and snapping.” The Spokane Express and a mail train were both thrown from the tracks down a nearby gorge 150 feet deep. The Wellington station was wiped away, though the town’s hotel and store were untouched.

“At the bottom of the gorge, the trains were covered by 40 to 70 feet of snow and debris. Because the telegraph lines were down, the people of Wellington were unable to call for immediate assistance. Despite the risk of further avalanches, many people pitched in to try to dig out survivors; it was not until the night of March 2 that assistance from outside Wellington was able to reach the site. By that time, 23 people had been pulled out alive, most with serious injuries. It took over a week to recover the bodies of all 96 victims of the avalanche, which then had to be moved by toboggan to the rail lines for further transport….

“…new rail lines with protective tunnels were established; the old line is now a popular hiking trail. Lessons were also learned about the dangers of clear-cutting timber on mountains above towns and villages, a practice that was partially responsible for the avalanche.”

(History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, March 1, 1910. Trains Buried by Avalanche)

Holtz: “On March 1, 1910, the deadliest avalanche in the United States’ history swept away nearly 100 lives in the small railroad town of Wellington….A slab of compacted snow, a half a mile wide, broke loose and smashed into the trains below….The avalanche hit with such force that it crushed rail cars….The body recovery effort took months….

“The carnage was so horrendous that people of the day renamed the town Tye…..In late February 1910, two trains became trapped by snow slides near Stevens Pass: The Seattle Express, Train 25, a westbound passenger train out of Spokane, and just behind it, the Fast Mail train, Train 27, the FedEx of its day….The avalanche thundered down at 1:42 a.m. The exact time was determined by the frozen pocket watches of the victims, recovered days later.” (Holtz, “Stevens Pass Train Disaster of 1910,” Herald, March 2, 2008)

Sources

Cornell, James. The Great International Disaster Book (Third Edition). New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.

Forces of Nature. Avalanches. “Case Studies.” Accessed 3-28-2010 at: http://library.thinkquest.org/C003603/english/avalanches/casestudies.shtml#21

Haine, Edgar A. Railroad Wrecks. New York: Cornwall Books, 1993.

Hilliker, D.H. “March in Rail History,” Railroad Magazine, March 1942, pp. 112-113.

History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, March 1, 1910. “Trains Buried by Avalanche.” Accessed 12/07/2008 at: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=tdihArticleCategory&displayDate=03/01&categoryId=disaster

Holtz, Jackson. “Stevens Pass Train Disaster of 1910: History’s Valuable Lesson.” HeraldNet, Everett, WA, 3-2-2008. Accessed at: http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20080302/NEWS01/381908918&news01ad=1

Lange, Greg. “Train disaster at Wellington kills 96 on March 1, 1910.” HistoryLink.org. 1-26-2003. Accessed 4-19-2020 at: https://www.historylink.org/File/5127

Mapes, Lynda V. “1910 Stevens Pass avalanche still deadliest in U.S. history.” Seattle Times, 2-27-2010. Accessed 4-19-2020 at: https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/1910-stevens-pass-avalanche-still-deadliest-in-us-history/

Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Pocket Books, Wallaby, 1977, 792 pages.

–33 Naval Historical Center, Dept. of Navy. “U.S. Navy Ships Lost in Selected Storm…”
–33 US Dept. Navy. “Casualties: US Navy…Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Injured…”
–32 Boston Sunday Post. “Events That Have Made 1910 Illustrious in History.” 1-11-1911, p44.
–32 Boston Sunday Post, MA. “Fleet of Warships Searching for Nina.” 2-13-1910, p. 1.
–32 Lowell Sun, MA. “Hope Abandoned. Search for Tug Nina and Crew…” 2-17-1910, p. 2.
–32 Lowell Sun (MA). “Shipping Disasters: Summary of…Accidents…Last Year,” 3-21-1910.
–31 United States Navy, Naval History and Heritage Command. Nina. 8-13-2015.
–31 Lettens, Jan. “USS Nina (+1919).” Wrecksite.eu.

Narrative Information

US Navy: “Nina, a 4th rate iron screw steamer, was laid down by Reaney, Son, and Archbold, Chester, Pa., in 1864; launched 27 May 1865; delivered at New York Navy Yard 26 September 1865; and placed in service as a yard tug at the Washington Navy Yard 6 January 1866, Ensign F. C. Hall commanding that ship and sister tugs Primrose and Rescue.

“Nina operated as a yard tug for the Washington Navy Yard and Naval Gun Factory through May 1869 and was then converted to a torpedo boat. She commissioned 31 March 1870, Lt. Godfrey Hunter in command, and then sailed for Newport R.I., arriving at the Naval Station 14 April. The ship served as a torpedo boat at Newport through 1883 refitting in May 1884 for special service, and next operated from August to October salvaging the wreck of sidewheel gunboat Tallapoosa sunk in Martha’s Vineyard Sound. From 1885 to 1889, Nina served in various capacities at New York Navy Yard, and then returned to Newport from 1890 to 1891.

“The converted tugboat returned to New York Navy Yard in 1892 to resume her original duties, continuing her yard work and towing services there for a decade. On 8 October 1902, she commissioned as tender and supply vessel to the Torpedo Boat Flotilla during winter maneuvers in the Caribbean. The ship returned to New York 15 March 1903 and decommissioned 6 days later, once again taking up her yard towing chores. Nina was next loaned to the Lighthouse Department to verify aids to navigation near Puerto Rican waters to protect the Fleet conducting Winter maneuvers from October 1903 to April 1904. She recommissioned 9 September 1905 for special service with the Board of Inspection and Survey, Rockland, Me.

“Nina was ordered converted into a submarine tender 28 December 1905. On 25 May 1906, she arrived at the Newport Naval Torpedo Station, and, following a year’s service, was assigned as tender for the 1st Torpedo Flotilla. For the next four years, she served with the Atlantic Fleet’s infant submarine force in its pioneer coastal operations from Newport to Annapolis and Norfolk. From 1 December 1908 to 22 February 1909, she participated in the great Review in Hampton Roads following the return of the Great White Fleet from its globe girdling cruise and joined submarines in exercises off the Virginia coast.

“At 0630, 6 February 1910, Nina departed Norfolk for Boston and was last sighted off the Capes of the Chesapeake in the midst of a gale. She was never heard from again. The warship was declared lost and struck from the Navy List 15 March 1910, the 30 crewmen and one officer on board being listed as having died on that day. Her loss is one of the continuing mysteries of the sea.” (United States Navy, Naval History and Heritage Command. Nina. 8-13-2015.)

US Navy: “Iron screw steamer USS Nina, last sighted off the Capes of the Chesapeake in a gale. 33 drowned. 15 Mar. 1910.” (Navy, Naval Hist. Cent. “U.S. Navy Ships Lost…Selected Storm…”)

Wrecksite.eu /Lettens: “At 0630, 6 February 1910, USS Nina departed Norfolk for Boston…last sighted off the Capes of the Chesapeake in the midst of a gale. She was never heard from again…was declared lost and struck from the Navy List 15 March 1910, the 30 crewmen and one officer on board being listed as having died on that day. It was revealed in 1978 that the USS Nina had sunk near Fenwick Island Shoals, near the state of Delaware on the 6th.”

Newspapers

Feb 6: “Sailed…Nina from Norfolk for Boston…” (Portsmouth Daily Herald, NH. “Navy Orders.” 2-8-1910, p. 4.)

Feb 12: “Portsmouth, Va., Feb 12.–The battleship Louisiana and scout cruiser Salem were sent out today to search for the missing naval tug Nina.” (American Leased Wire. “Warships Searching fro Lost Naval Tug, Nina.” Centralia Evening Sentinel, IL, 2-12-1910, p. 4.

Feb 12: “Washington, Feb. 12.–There is grave apprehension at the navy department that the naval tug Nina has been lost at sea. This tug which is the tender to the third submarine division left the Norfolk navy yard at 6.30 o’clock last Saturday morning [Feb 5] for Boston and has not been heard from since leaving Chesapeake bay. Orders have been sent to the navy yards at Norfolk, Philadelphia, New York and Boston to immediately send vessels to search for her.” (Lowell Sun, MA. “The Navy Dept. Thinks Naval Tug Nina Has Been Lost.” 2-12-1901, p. 1.)

Feb 12: “Washington, Feb. 12…..the naval tug Nina…left Norfolk Sunday [Feb 6] for Boston and has not been heard from since. She carries a crew of 28 men and it is feared they may have been drowned in the storm which is sweeping the coast…” (San Antonio Light and Gazette, TX. “Fear Navy Tug Has Gone Down.” 2-12-1910, p. 1.)

Feb 13: “Government Orders Atlantic Coast Patrolled to Find Mysteriously Missing Tug — 32 Men on Board.

Officers and Crew of Missing Naval Tug Nina

Boatswain John S. Croghan, U.S.N., commanding, Washington, N.C.
John Williams Adams, machinist’s mate, first class, Louisville, Ky.
Sam Brown, ordinary seaman, Newport, Ky.
Frank Joseph Carringtonk, seaman, New Haven, Conn.
Louis Cline, seaman, Tottenville, L.I.
William Joseph Connolly, coal passer, New York city.
Frank Blain Crockett, fireman, first class, Hillsville, Va.
William John Darcey, seaman, Chicago.
Jacob Deadwyler, cabin cook, Philadelphia.
Ferdinand Drace, ordinary seaman, Philadelphia.
Jake Rathbone Eddlestone, ordinary seaman, New Orleans.
Cleveland Ervin, ordinary seaman, Crawford county, Mich.
Otto Albert Faessel, machinist’s mate, second class, Cleveland, O.
Emil Joseph Foster, fireman, second class, New York city.
Clarence Ellsworth Fowler, Chief boatswain’s mate, Washington, D.C.
Harry Edgar Gerhardt, seaman, Philadelphia.
Dudley Clement Hadley, seaman, White Plains, N.Y.
Emil Parkeman, coxswain, Bay City, Mich.
Percy Pitts, fireman, first class, Norfolk, Va.
Antonio Manghir, ship’s cook, first class, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Howard Ladd, fireman, second class, Chicago.
Charles Kathary, chief quartermaster, Hutchinson, Kan.
Charles A. Higginbotham, mess attendant, first class, Rome, Ga.
John O. Hanson, machinist’s mate first class, Greensboro, N.C.
John Schelis, boatswain’s mate, second class, Cincinnati.
George Snipe, ship’s cook, second class, Port Royal, S.C.
Abe Thaler, ordinary seaman, New York city.
Louis A. Troche, chief machinist’s mate, Akron, O.
Teschiyas Tsuchiya, ward room steward, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Rolando Van Dunk, coal passer, Suffern, N.Y.
Roy K. Williams, yeoman, second class, Columbus, Miss.

“The entire nation awaits news of some sort concerning the safety of a navy tug that a week ago this morning left Hampton Roads with 32 men on board, bound for the Charlestown Navy Yard [MA]. The Nina, a schooner-rigged tug of iron construction, built at Chester, Penn., in 1865, is the craft that anxious watchers along the coast sought in vain to sight yesterday. Great war vessels of the national government, gigantic in size compared to the little vessel which they sought, put out to sea from various points yesterday under orders issued from the Navy Department at Washington. The entire coast line from Norfolk to Boston is being gone over in the hunt for the Nina. There are many who believe that she was overwhelmed in the great storm of yesterday morning, while others, including naval officials, hold the view that the craft suffered some accident to her machinery and at the present time is drifting helplessly about at the mercy of the big combers that always follow a great gale.

“From Norfolk the big battleship Louisiana and the fleet scout cruiser Salem were dispatched to patrol the cast as far as Cape May [NJ].

“So far as is yet known the last seen of the Nina was last Sunday morning [Feb 6], shortly after she had left Hampton Roads. She was sighted off Cape Henry by Captain Hand of the tug Savage, who reported the fact upon his arrival at Wood’s Hole yesterday. There was a blinding snowstorm at the time, and the Savage was forced to turn back with its tow of three barges, but the Nina kept on and was soon lost to view.

Searching Whole Coast

“The search from that point [Cape May?] to Nantucket is give over to the collier Culgoa and the tugs Apache and Pontiac, which left New York yesterday.

“Off the Delaware Capes the torpedo boat destroyer Lamson is keeping the vigil that may bring results.

“The collier Brutus and the revenue cutters Gresham and Acushnet are scouting the waters in the vicinity of Martha’s Vineyard for the little tug, and during the afternoon hours of yesterday the gunboat Castine and the collier Cesar left Boston to look about Massachusetts Bay for the missing vessel.

“No search of wider scope in recent years has even been conducted by the government or attracted greater attention. All of the big vessels participating in the search are equipped with wireless apparatus. It was agreed before the departure of this fleet that the shore stations should be kept informed of what transpired. The vessels’ commanders hoped as well t communicate with one another, giving their exact positions and what had been accomplished.” (Sunday Post, Boston, MA. “Fleet of Warships Searching for Nina.” 2-13-1910, p. 1.)

Feb 15: “Today the Navy Department ordered the fast scout cruiser Salem, which is searching the Virginia Capes, to proceed to Winter Quarter and Fenwick Island lightships, a little above Hog Island, off the Virginia shore, to explore the waters in that vicinity. This action was taken as a result of word from the recruiting office at Baltimore that the Merchants & Miners steamship Howard sighted the Nina at noon, Feb 6, nine miles southeast of Hog Island, which is just below the lightships toward which the Salem has been sent. At that time, only a few hours after she left Norfolk, she was heading north-east. A gale from the northwest, with increasing velocity, was tossing the tug about, and the sea and spray were washing over her pilothouse. The Howard passed within one-eighth of a mile of the craft and one man could be seen on the bridge. She was weathering the gale, however, and did not seem to need any assistance at that time.

“The Nina carried whaleboats, oars and other buoyant apparatus on her decks. Running head on in a heavy sea, as she was when last seen, it is considered likely that heavy seas may have penetrated her engine room, put the fires out and otherwise disabled her so that she would toss about as she drifted out to sea, in which case she could probably last until picked up.” (Boston Post, MA. “There Is Still Hope For Tug Nina.” 2-15-1910, p. 2.)

Feb 16: “Boston, Feb. 16 [Wednesday]. Although reported to have been spoken on Sunday off Montauk Point proceeding under sail for this port, the missing naval tug Nina had not put in an appearance here up to early this forenoon. Captain Cummins of the steamer Bayview which arrived at Newport News last night from Searsport, Me., said that he passed the Nina on Sunday [13th] off Montauk Point, L.I., and that the missing craft ought to reach Boston by today. Up to 8 o’clock, however, the Nina had not been sighted off the New England coast by the many lookouts in lighthouses or by passing vessels carrying wireless. Allowing plenty of time, the Nina was due here this morning if she was off Montauk Point Sunday afternoon as stated by the captain of the Bayview. Government boats, including the revenue cutter Gresham and the gunboat Castine, that had been recalled yesterday from the search, were sent out again today to patrol the coast….

“Washington, Feb. 16.–The tug reported to have been spoken off Montauk Point on Sunday by the steamer Bayview and which was thought to be the Nina was the naval tug Apache…” (Lowell Sun, MA. “Nina Not Sighted.” 2-16-1910, p. 4.)

Feb 17: “Washington, Feb. 17.–All hope that the missing naval tug Nina, which left Norfolk, Feb 6, bound for Boston with 21 souls aboard is still afloat, has been abandoned by the navy department and today the warships, which for five days have been searching for the Nina, were ordered to discontinue their hunt.” (Lowell Sun, MA. “Hope Abandoned. Search for Tug Nina and Crew of 32 Discontinued.” 2-17-1910, p. 2.)

Feb 26: “New York, February 26.–Annuities for the families of Uncle Sam’s sailors who have perished in the lost naval tug Nina have been voted by the Navy League of America. This action, taken at a special meeting held at the League headquarters in the Brooklyn navy yard, indicates that the last hopes of news from the missing boat have been abandoned by navy men.” (The Constitution, Atlanta, GA. “Annuities for Families of Victims.” 2-27-1910, p. B-5.)

March 21: “Feb. 6 – United States naval tug Nina, Norfolk for Boston. Unreported. Had crew of 32.” (Lowell Sun (MA). “Shipping Disasters: Summary of…Accidents…Last Year,” 3-21-1910.)

Jan 11, 1911: “February 8 The United States naval tug Nina lost on the voyage from Hampton Roads to Boston with crew of 32 on board.” (Boston Sunday Post, MA. “Events That Have Made 1910 Illustrious in History.” 1-11-1911, p. 44.)

Sources

American Leased Wire. “Warships Searching fro Lost Naval Tug, Nina.” Centralia Evening Sentinel, IL, 2-12-1910, p. 4. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/centralia-evening-sentinel-feb-12-1910-p-4/

Boston Sunday Post, MA. “Events That Have Made 1910 Illustrious in History.” 1-11-1911, p. 44. Accessed 12-30-2018 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/boston-sunday-post-jan-01-1911-p-40/

Daily Press, Newport News, VA. “Naval Tug Nina Lost or Helpless at Sea.” 2-13-1910, p. 1. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/newport-news-daily-press-feb-13-1910-p-1/

Lowell Sun, MA. “Hope Abandoned. Search for Tug Nina and Crew of 32 Discontinued.” 2-17-1910, p. 2. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lowell-sun-feb-17-1910-p-22/

Lowell Sun, MA. “Nina Not Sighted.” 2-16-1910, p. 4. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lowell-sun-feb-16-1910-p-24/

Lowell Sun, MA. “Shipping Disasters: Summary of the Accidents That Occurred Last Year,” March 21, 1910. At: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=61756453

Lowell Sun, MA. “The Navy Dept. Thinks Naval Tug Nina Has Been Lost.” 2-12-1901, p. 1. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/lowell-sun-feb-12-1910-p-19/

Naval Historical Center. “U.S. Navy Ships Lost in Selected Storm/Weather Related Incidents.” Washington, DC: Dept. of the Navy, June 3, 2005. At: http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq102-2.htm

Portsmouth Daily Herald, NH. “Navy Orders.” 2-8-1910, p. 4. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/portsmouth-herald-feb-08-1910-p-4/

San Antonio Light and Gazette, TX. “Fear Navy Tug Has Gone Down.” 2-12-1910, p. 1. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/san-antonio-light-and-gazette-feb-12-1910-p-1/

Sunday Post, Boston, MA. “Fleet of Warships Searching for Nina.” 2-13-1910, p. 1. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/boston-sunday-post-feb-13-1910-p-9/

The Constitution, Atlanta, GA. “Annuities for Families of Victims.” 2-27-1910, p. B-5. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/atlanta-constitution-feb-27-1910-p-13/

United States Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center. See “Casualties: US Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Killed and Injured in Selected Accidents and Other Incidents Not Directly the Result of Enemy Action.” Washington, DC: Washington Navy Yard. Accessed at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/NHC/accidents.htm

United States Navy, Naval History and Heritage Command. Nina. 8-13-2015. Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/n/nina.html

Wreck Site. USS Nina (+1910). Accessed 1-1-2019 at: https://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?15902

— 30 Brooklyn Daily Eagle Almanac 1911. “Casualties, 1910,” p. 551.
— 30 New York Times. “Events That Made the History of 1910…” Jan 1, 1911.
— 24 Berman, Bruce D. Encyclopedia of American Shipwrecks. 1972, p. 207.
— 24 Oakland Tribune (Editorial) CA. “Why is a Life-Saver?” Jan 22, 1910, p. 12.
— 24 U.S. Bureau of Navigation. Merchant Vessels of the United States…1910, p. 407.
— 23 Smith. A Place Called Oregon. The Sinking of the Czarina, Jan. 12, 1910 Coos Bay, OR
— 23 United States Life-Saving Service. 1910 Annual Report.
— 23 U.S. Steamboat-Inspection Service. Annual Report, 1910, p. 13.
— 22 Marshall, Don. Oregon Shipwrecks. Portland, OR: Binford & Mort Pubs., 1984, p. 44.

Narrative Information

Annual Report of the United States Life-Saving Service:

“Not in a quarter of a century has there occurred within the score of the service such an appalling marine casualty as the wreck of the steamer Czarina at the mouth of Coos Bay, Oregon, January 12, 1910.”

“The Czarina was a 1,045-ton vessel owned by the Southern Pacific Co., of San Francisco…. When the disaster chronicled here took place she was on her way from Marshfield, Oregon to San Francisco, with a cargo of coal, lumber, and cement. About 40,000 feet of lumber was stowed on her decks. She carried a crew of 23 men all told, and 1 passenger…

“It may be stated for the information of the reader that Coos Bay is a sinuous body of water approximately half a mile wide and something like a dozen miles long. Beginning at the ocean entrance, it runs easterly for three-fourths of a mile, turns in a northerly direction and keeps nearly parallel with the coast for several miles, then swerves to the eastward again for half that distance and doubles back toward the south for 3 or 4 miles. At its head lies the town of Marshfield. In outline the bay is not unlike a dipper, with the bottom of the bowl lying toward the north. The peninsula of sand that separates it from the ocean is called the North spit. On the inner or bay shore of the spit is situated the Coos Bay Life-Saving Station, 2 miles above the entrance. Near the point of the spit, and overlooking the entrance, the service observation tower and a house that shelters a boat and their equipment designed for the use of the life-saving crew in affording assistance to vessels that get into difficulty on the bar and in contiguous waters.

“The Czarina left port at 11.15 a. m. The trip down the long, narrow bay was uneventful until she made the last turn in the channel and headed straight for the ocean. Then she began to ship water. It was very rough outside. In fact, the condition of the sea was such as to deter the prudent mariner from risking a passage over the bar which the Czarina was about to attempt. Capt. W. A. Magee, master of the harbor tug Astoria, was watching the Czarina as she steamed down the bay, his vantage point being a tower in Empire City, 4 miles above the entrance. He testifies that when she had worked her length beyond the black buoy, where the channel turns towards the ocean, she seemed suddenly to lose headway, stop, and move backward; then there came a momentary lull in the sea, and she went ahead again. To use an expression of the witness, she “seesawed” back and forth for several minutes in the manner described, then swung her head well to the northward, as if she intended to try for a less difficult passage to starboard. Shortly, however, she swung around to the southwest and went unsteadily forward until she brought up on the South spit. Then she blew a distress signal.

“Up to the time of striking the South spit she had shipped 61 breakers by actual count. When she sounded a signal Capt. Magee left the tower, got up steam on his tug, and started down to the bar with the intention of going to her assistance, but by the time he reached the bar she had drifted across it and was working up along the beach northward. He did not therefore attempt to go out. He explains his failure to do so in the following words:

The bar was too rough for us to attempt to cross. After seeing the position of the Czarina I knew that nothing could be done from the outside. A steam schooner was off about three-fourths of a mile from the wreck, standing by.

“It would seem that the master of the Astoria expected that the steam schooner referred to by him would endeavor to assist the Czarina. This vessel, as shown by the evidence, did actually start in to the imperiled steamer, but put off again before getting near her. The schooner, it developed, was herself heavily loaded with lumber, and doubtless became apprehensive that the venture could not be undertaken without great danger to herself. It is also shown that on the following morning, while several of the Czarina’s crew were still in her rigging, another vessel, the steamer Nann Smith, also attempted to approach her from the outside, but abandoned the enterprise on account of the danger involved. Had the Astoria risked the bar and gotten safely offshore, she might, at any time before the Czarina foundered, have been able to drift a line down to that vessel. At least such was the opinion expressed by the survivor, First Asst. Engineer Kintzel.

“It is gathered from statements made by Kintzel that while the Czarina was being buffeted across the bar the boarding seas flooded her engine room and put out her fires, so that when she found herself in the quieter waters beyond she was entirely helpless. On the trip through the breakers the crew had been driven into the rigging, from which position they watched the seas play havoc with the deck load, carrying two of their lifeboats away and smashing another to pieces, thereby cutting off all chance of leaving ship even had an opportunity for launching a small craft presented itself. Once outside, where the water was less turbulent, the vessel rode easier, and the turmoil on deck abated to such an extent that the crew left the rigging and threw over the anchor, the captain hoping by such action to keep offshore until help could reach them.

“But the fulfillment of this hope was denied, and the act mentioned without doubt operated ultimately to bring about the destruction of the vessel and the great loss of life that accompanied it. The Czarina drifted northward, and was soon in the breakers. Realizing what was in store for the crew should the progress of the vessel be interfered with before she came near enough to the beach for the life-saving crew to put a line over her, the captain ordered the anchor chain cut. Some of the sailors attempted to carry out this command, using a hacksaw, but before they could accomplish the task the seas drove them back into the rigging.

“The anchor caught and brought the vessel up when she was still several hundred yards from the beach. Held thus, she had to take the full force of the ponderous breakers, and soon foundered, settling until her entire hull was submerged. The seas now completed the demolition of the deck load, sending it overboard to fill the breaker-swept space between ship and shore and menace the lives of both the sailors and those who would save them, and tossing it up against masts and rigging as if impatient to drive the hapless sailors from their refuge and complete the tragedy. As the rigging was sundered by the thrashing debris, the chilled and exhausted men dropped off singly and in groups to their death in the wreckage alongside. Kintzel was swept overboard about dark with the port rigging of the mainmast. Two or three of his shipmates went with him. He says he exchanged some words with them after finding himself in the water, but soon became separated from them in the gathering darkness. Kintzel was unable to tell much concerning the movements of any of the rest of the crew. His lack of information in this respect, however, is not surprising, as the situation on board was not conducive to accurate observation. He himself had on a life preserver. He was of the opinion that some of the others had them on also. For upward of two hours he was washed about in the furious surf, beaten by wreckage and smothered in the spume of the breakers. Once he was swept almost to the beach, but his strength was too far spent to fight the outward pull of the undertow, and he was carried back to the vessel again. There he managed to get hold of a heavy plank, to which he clung even after consciousness left him. His tenacity eventually saved him, for the plank was swept toward the beach, and a surfman wading out in the dangerous waters with a line tied to his waist discovered him and dragged him ashore….”

“The citizens of the locality…many of whom witnessed the work of the life-saving crew, did not regard Keeper Boice’s generalship as equal to the exigencies of the occasion. Their criticism of his management of the affair found expression in letters to the department from individuals, and in petitions from local commercial bodies the Marshfield Chamber of Commerce and the commissioners of the Port of Coos Bay charging him with failure to exert every effort to effect the rescue of those aboard the Czarina, alleging incapacity as a commanding officer, and asking for a thorough investigation of his conduct….

“The specifications relating to the Czarina, and that charging the keeper with failure to practice regularly with the surfboat are as follows:

• That the said keeper failed in accordance with regulations (sec. 241) to telephone adjacent stations for assistance.

• That said keeper, under regulations (sec. 245), failed to use an extraordinary charge of powder in shooting the Lyle gun, and desisted from said shooting entirely after two attempts.

• That said attempts with the Lyle gun were made at a time when, the tide was about three-quarters high, while at low water the gun could have been placed 100 yards nearer the wreck; but no attempt was made at low water.

• That said keeper, in accordance with regulations (sec. 252), failed to make an attempt to launch the surf boat.

• That said keeper made no attempt to bring the lifeboat to the scene of the wreck, although men were present who would have volunteered in so doing.

• That the keeper had failed for a long time before said wreck to cause his crew to drill in the surf; that is, to launch the surf boat from the beach into the surf.

• That at the time of said wreck the keeper permitted the wives of the crew to be on the beach in the presence of their husbands.

• That said keeper at the time of said wreck displayed no executive ability, and gave evidence to all present of being either incompetent to hold his position or too cowardly to perform his duties…. (U.S. Life-Saving Service. 1910 Annual Report)

Merchant Vessels: Twenty-four dead, no survivors. Listed as “stranded” (grounded) rather than foundered. U.S. Bureau of Navigation. Merchant Vessels of the United States…1910, p. 407.)

New York Times: “Jan 13. – Thirty lives lost in wreck of Southern Pacific steamer Czarina off Marshfield, Ore.” (New York Times. “Events That Made the History of 1910…” Jan 13, 1911.)

Smith: ”The Keeper of the Life Saving Station was charged with failure to fulfill his duties and professional unfitness. He would later resign his position.” (Smith. A Place Called Oregon. The Sinking of the Czarina, Jan. 12, 1910 Coos Bay, OR)

U.S. SIS: “On January 12, 1910, while the steamer Czarina was crossing out over the Coos Bay Bar, en route to San Francisco, Cal., with a cargo of coal, cement, and lumber, she was overwhelmed with heavy seas, and foundered. Twenty-three officers and crew and 1 passenger were lost, with but one survivor, the first assistant engineer of the steamer.” (U.S. SIS. Annual Report, 1910, 13)

Sources

Berman, Bruce D. Encyclopedia of American Shipwrecks. Boston: Mariners Press Inc., 1972.

Brooklyn Daily Eagle Almanac 1911. “Casualties, 1910,” p. 551. Partially digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=nMcWAAAAYAAJ

Marshall, Don. Oregon Shipwrecks. Portland, OR: Binford & Mort Publishing, 1984.

New York Times. “Events That Made the History of 1910…” Jan 1, 1911. Accessed at: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F70A10FC385517738DDDA80894D9405B818DF1D3

Oakland Tribune, CA. “Why is a Life-Saver? [Editorial]” Jan 22, 1910, p. 12. Accessed at: http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=31211430

Smith, Gess. A Place Called Oregon. “The Sinking of the Czarina, Jan. 12, 1910 Coos Bay, OR.” Accessed 1-11-2009 at: http://gesswhoto.com/czarina.html

United States Bureau of Navigation, Department of Commerce and Labor. Forty-Second Annual List of Merchant Vessels of the United States…For the Year Ended June 30, 1910. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910. Google preview accessed 7-14-2018 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=jcDQrscv2roC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false

United States Life-Saving Service. 1910 Annual Report. Accessed at: http://www.ocmuseum.org/shipwrecks/czarina.asp

United States Steamboat-Inspection Service. Annual Report of the Supervising Inspector General, Steamboat-Inspection Service to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1910. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910. 391 pages. Digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=JlgpAAAAYAAJ

–10  Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin…United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1820, p. 58.[1]

 

California                   (3)

–1  Fresno                   Dec 28             Barber, aged 52. Anthrax, septic abscesses and pyemia.[2]

–1  Pomona                 Dec 8               Farmer                         Age 72                        Anthrax

–1  San Francisco       Jan 11              Tannery laborer           Age 24                        Anthrax

 

Colorado                    (1)

–1  La Junta                Oct 2               Ranch foreman            Age 46                        Anthrax

 

Delaware                    (2)

–1  Wilmington           Jan 10             Leather worker            Age 50                        Anthrax

–1  Wilmington           June 4              Leather worker            Age 17                        Anthrax

 

Indiana                       (1)

–1  Pierceton               Apr 1               Law and farming        Age 52                        Anthrax, heart failure

 

Maine                         (1)

–1  Kittery                  Dec 29             Farmer, age 24. Septicemia with malignant pustule.

 

Maryland                   (1)

–1  Baltimore              Dec 2               Mixing animal hair in machines. Age 62. Anthrax; toxemia

 

Massachusetts            (2)

–1  Boston                  Jan 29              Freight handler            Age 34                        Anthrax, septicemia

–1  Holyoke                Aug 20                        Bleach boy in paper mill rag room, age 15. Anthrax; sepsis.

 

New York                  (2)

–1  Elmira                   Jan 2                Tannery carpenter       Age 39                        External anthrax.

–1        “                      Dec 22             Leather co., hide handler. Age 46      External anthrax[3]

 

Ohio                            (2)

–1  Fairport                 Oct 13             None                           Age 4              Anthrax; bowel disease

–1  Jackson                 March 8           Housewife                   Age 68                        Anthrax, septicemia

 

Pennsylvania              (7)

–1  Greensburg           June 29            Paper mill worker        Age 34                        Anthrax[4]

–1  Howe                    July 19             Paper mill worker        Age 52                        Anthrax[5]

–1  Newcastle             Dec 19             Baker                           Age 78                        Anthrax

–1  Philadelphia          Feb 15             Tannery laborer           Age 32                        Anthrax

–1         “                     Aug 8              Not reported               Age 60                        Anthrax/bronchitis

–1  Reading                Apr 22             Cigar maker (female)  Age 49                        Anthrax

–1  Williamsport         March 28         Raw sheep wool worker, 51               Anthrax

 

Narrative Information

 

Bureau of Labor Statistics: “Anthrax is primarily a disease of animals such as cattle and sheep, but is transmitted to man in a number of industrial pursuits. Included among those who have died of it in this country are hide and skin handlers and other tannery employees, longshoremen, wool-sorters, hair workers, brush makers, paper makers, farmers, ranchmen, liverymen, and veterinarians. Among nonfatal cases reported in several States and by a number of hospitals the same groups of occupations are strongly represented. Infection has even taken place in a carpenter, a steam fitter, and a stationary engineer, all of whom worked in tanneries, and in a customhouse official who weighed hides and wool on the docks. In some non-occupational cases the disease has been spread by insects and by pet animals which had been feeding on diseased carcasses, and during the war period the necessary shaving brush appears to have lost its harmlessness and to have caused an alarming number of cases, in military as well as in civil life….

 

“The bacillus of anthrax is one of the largest and most easily recognized of disease-producing organisms, and its discovery about the middle fo the last century marks the beginning of modern bacteriology. The bacillus, however, is not so much to be feared as a cause of disease as the sport, which is so resistant that it is used as a test object for standardizing germicides. The spore can survive for as long as 17 years without nutriment, is easily carried about, and when provided with a favorable environment rapidly germinates and sets up a focus of infection.”

 

“In man contagion commonly occurs through an abrasion of the skin, resulting in the so-called ‘malignant pustule’ or in ‘malignant edema.’ Woolsorter’s disease, or pulmonary anthrax, is a less frequent but almost invariably fatal form of the malady, caused by inhaling dust or particles of hair or wool from diseased animals….” (pp. 5-6)

 

“The most effective American provisions on the subject are contained in joint administrative orders of the Federal Departments of the Treasury and Agriculture, which, beginning January 1, 1917, prohibited the importation of hides, hoofs, wool, hair, or other products from animals affected with anthrax and established detailed requirements for the disinfection of these products if imported from districts where anthrax is prevalent and for th disinfection of conveyances of certain premises. The period during 1915 and 1916 when much laxer requirements were in force corresponded roughly with a period of extremely high anthrax frequency, especially among longshoremen and tannery employees, and the connection would seem to be more than accidental.” (p. 7)

 

Source

 

United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor. Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bulletin No. 267). “Anthrax as an Occupational Disease,” by John B. Andrews, and “Table 6. — Deaths from Anthrax Reported in the United States, 1910 to 1917 {Data drawn from official certificates of death.}.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1920. Google preview accessed 6-4-2018 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=7rRIAQAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=anthrax&f=false

 

 

[1] “Table 6. — Deaths From Anthrax Reported in the United States, 1910- to 1917. {Data drawn from official certificates of death.}.” This number reflects the minimum of anthrax deaths. The authors note they were continuing to receive updates on fatal cases from the Census Bureau and other channels. In addition, given the ignorance concerning anthrax and confusion concerning deaths due to anthrax and other causes, not all death certificates of anthrax victims would have been recorded as such.

[2] Blood poisoning caused by the spread in the bloodstream of pus-forming bacteria released from an abscess.

[3] And general toxemia.

[4] And Septic intoxication (or blood poisoning).

[5] From skinning a dead cow with anthrax.

–12,673-25,000 Blanchard.*

— 25,000 McLaughlin. Public Health Reports. V27, N12, 3-22-1912, p. 424.
— 12,673 Rate per 100K pop. 23.5; 1.6% of deaths. Census. Mortality Statistics 1910. 1913.

* We see a range of the 12,673 reported by the Census for registration areas in 1910 and McLaughlin of the U.S. Marine Hospital Service, who two years later, and apparently with access to additional nationwide information, reported approximately 25,000 deaths, while noting his belief that there were probably more.

Breakout of Fatalities by State (where noted):

State Death Deaths Registration city in nonregistration state
rate

Alabama 119
49.5 66 Birmingham
75.6 39 Mobile
36.7 14 Montgomery

California 19.2 460 Table 4, p. 252.

Colorado 41.9 337 Table 4, p. 252.

Connecticut 14.7 165 Table 4, p. 256.

Delaware 37.7 33 Wilmington

District of Co.23.2 77 Table 4, p. 256.

Florida 74 Table 4, p. 256.
102.3 60 Jacksonville
70.3 14 Key West

Georgia 94 Table 4, p. 256.
50.1 78 Atlanta
24.6 16 Savannah

Illinois 363 Table 4, p. 256. Also Aurora, Belleville, Decatur, Evanston, Quincy.
13.7 300 Chicago
52.0 37 Springfield

Indiana 34.0 919 Table 4, p. 256.

Iowa 15 Des Moines.
1 Charlton. Le Grand Reporter, IA. “Girl is Typhoid Victim.” 12-30-1910, p. 2.

Kansas 117 Table 4, p. 258.
95.5 79 Kansas City
74.9 15 Leavenworth
43.1 23 Wichita

Kentucky 104 Table 4, p. 258. Just four registration cities.
8 Covington
31.7 71 Louisville
32.9 10 Newport
65.7 15 Paducah

Louisiana 31.5 107 New Orleans Table 4, p. 258.

Maine 20.3 151 Table 4, p. 252.

Maryland 40.7 528 Table 4, p. 252.
42.0 235 Baltimore. Ford. “The Problem…Typhoid…Baltimore.” 1911, 351.
155.0 34 Cumberland
86.3 9 Frederick

Massachusetts 12.4 421 Table 4, p. 252.

Michigan 23.7 667 Table 4, p. 252.
— 8 Escanaba The Year McLaughlin. Public Health Reports. V27, N17, 26 Apr 1912, 603.

Minnesota 32.1 668 Table 4, p. 252.

Missouri 269 Table 4, p. 262. (Three registration cities.)
54.4 136 Kansas City
30 St. Joseph
14.9 103 St. Louis

Montana 39.9 151 Table 4, p. 252.

Nebraska 116 Table 4, p. 264.
8 Lincoln
86.7 108 Omaha

New Hamp. 10.7 46 Table 4, p. 252.

New Jersey 14.5 371 Table 4, p. 252.

New York 15.3 1,397 Table 4, p. 252.
556 New York City. Table 4, p. 266.

No. Carolina 57.7 209 Table 4, p. 252.

Ohio 27.5 1,314 Table 4, p. 252.
— 32 Chillicothe Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 268.
— 32 Cincinnati McLaughlin. Public Health Reports, V27, N17, 26 Apr 1912, 584.
–101 Cleveland Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 268.
— 33 Columbus McLaughlin. Public Health Reports, V27, N17, 26 Apr 1912, 585.
— 25 Dayton Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 268.
— 63 Toledo Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 268.
— 46 Youngstown Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 268.

Pennsylvania 24.6 1,892 Table 4, p. 252.
–1,892 State. Freeman. “Case Fatality in Typhoid Fever.” Public Health Rpts. 12-8-1916, 3358.
— 36 Johnstown Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 270.
— 28 McKeesport Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 270.
— 272 Philadelphia McLaughlin. Public Health Reports, V27, N17, 26 Apr 1912, 583.
— 149 Pittsburgh McLaughlin. Public Health Reports, V27, N17, 26 Apr 1912, 581.
— 31 Reading Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 270.
— 17 Uniontown Morning Herald, Uniontown. “Official Facts…” 12-27-1910, p. 2.
— 25 Wilkes-Barre Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 270.

Rhode Island 13.6 74 Table 4, p. 254.
40 Providence Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 272.

So. Carolina 56.0 33 Charleston Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 272.

Tennessee 102 Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 272.
12 Knoxville
27.4 36 Memphis
48.9 54 Nashville

Texas 61 Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 272.
12 Galveston
49 San Antonio

Utah 37.0 139 Table 4, p. 254.

Vermont 14.0 50 Table 4, p. 254.

Virginia 109 Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 272.
130.3 20 Alexandria
68.2 13 Danville
30.4 9 Lynchburg
23 Norfolk
21.9 Richmond

Washington 28.0 324 Table 4, p. 254.
34 North Yakima Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 274.
34 Seattle Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 274.
48 Spokane Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 274.

West Virginia 21 Wheeling Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 274.

Wisconsin 23.3 544 Table 4, p. 254.
37 Ashland Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 274.
172 Milwaukee Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 274.
34 Superior Bureau of the Census. Table 4, p. 274.

Narrative Information

Bureau of the Census, 1910: “Typhoid fever caused 12,673 deaths in the registration area during 1910, the death rate being 23.5 per 100,000 population. Although the number of deaths was only 1.6 per cent of the total number from all causes (805,412), this disease causes a much higher proportion of deaths of effectives, that is to say, men and women at the working ages when they are of the greatest economic importance….” (p. 23.)

“In the foregoing table [in original] rates of 40 or over per 100,000 for any of the years or periods are indicated by bold-faced type This is a somewhat high limit for a disease which is due to neglect of ordinary sanitary precautions and the mortality from which may be taken as a criterion of sanitary inefficiency….

“…the United States is far in excess of those of the majority of European countries. Compared with statistics for European countries and cities with modern sanitation, American rates are excessively high. The rate of the registration area for the year 1910 (23.5) is about the same as that of England and Wales 30 years ago. Some progress is being made, however, the rate for the quinquennium 1906 to 1910 (25.6) showing a marked decrease from that of the preceding quinquennium (32), and certain cities, some of which formerly had high death rates from typhoid fever, show unusually low rates for 1910, although such rates are not lower than those attained by European cities 15 or 20 years ago….” (p. 24.)

“The highest death rates for 1910 were those of Ashland, Wis. (322.6); North Yakima, Wash. (237.6); Virginia, Minn. (234.5); Great Falls, Mont. (201); Cumberland, Md. (155); Warren, Ohio (143.8); Alexandria, Va. (130.3); South Sharon, Pa. (117.8); Sharon, Pa. (117.2); and Billings, Mont. (108.1).

“Special investigations have been made of many of the epidemics of typhoid fever by officers of the United States Public Health Service. In the case of Ashland, Wis., for example, it is stated that the excessively high death rate resulting from the epidemic of 1910 ‘was due primarily, in all probability, to polluted water and poor efficiency of the filter plant.’

“An invariably high annual death rate indicates a condition more dangerous, both to the community itself and to other communities to which infection may be taken than a higher rate occurring only occasionally. The only large cities with rates higher than 40 for a series of years ending with 1910 were Birmingham, Atlanta, Nashville, and Spokane; but several of the minor cities had such rates, notably, Fresno, Cal.; Jacksonville, Fla; Cumberland, Md.; Escanaba and Menominee, Mich.; Duluth, Minn.; Long Branch, N.J.; Cohoes, Niagara Falls, and Watertown, N.Y.; Wilmington, N.C.; Chillicothe and Portsmouth, Ohio; Braddock, Johnstown, and McKeesport, Pa.’ Charleston, S.C.; Petersburg, Va.; and Wheeling, W. Va. …” (p. 27.)

McLaughlin, 1912: “The excessive prevalence of typhoid fever in the United States has been characterized, and not without reason, as a national disgrace….

“It is useless to expect that the dejecta of all persons ill with typhoid fever or cholera will be properly disinfected before reaching the sewers, especially if the contributor is a carrier who shows no signs of illness. It is evident that the surest and most prompt protection against water-borne diseases can be afforded in each case by proper treatment or filtration of the public water supplies. With cholera, we have only the menacing possibility, but with typhoid fever we have the actual existence of the disease in such a high rate of prevalence that the United States suffers seriously by comparison with other civilized countries.

“The average American citizen displays toward sanitary problems a very dangerous apathy. It is difficult to arouse his interest in anything so well known as typhoid fever. Cholera or plague or any scourge which to him suggests a quick and mysterious death will awaken his instinct of self-preservation and arouse him to activity; not so typhoid fever. It has been all about him always, excites no terror, and is viewed indifferently as an inevitable visitation which comes every year and takes its toll from the community. He never asks himself, Is this visitation inevitable? Or, May not typhoid fever be prevented or reduced? Twenty deaths per 100,000 probably represent 200 cases of typhoid fever. Suppose 200 cases of Asiatic cholera occurred in any American city of 100,000 population, would not strenuous activity be displayed and very properly so for the eradication of the scourge? Although the case mortality rate of typhoid fever is lower than that of cholera, yet typhoid fever is transmissible in more ways, is more expensive in its lingering course, and more disastrous in its sequelae than Asiatic cholera. The mental attitude toward typhoid fever, displayed by many physicians and especially health officers, is scarcely more commendable. Their complacency in the face of typhoid fever rates of above 20 deaths annually per 100,000 population is difficult to explain….

“A conservative estimate for 1910 will place the deaths from typhoid fever above 25,000. When we consider that the smaller cities in America have in general higher rates than the larger, that the rural typhoid is high and in many sections higher than the urban, that in the sections not included in the registration area sanitary conditions are probably worse and typhoid fever rates higher than within the area, we are forced to conclude that a general rate of 25 is probably below the actual deaths from typhoid fever per 100,000 population in the entire United States.

“The excess of 18 deaths per 100,000 in the urban population alone shows that we have had in the 50 cities mentioned above, at least, 3,600 deaths and probably 36,000 cases of typhoid fever which were preventable and should never have occurred. For the whole United States the number of cases for each year preventable by methods within our grasp would probably reach 175,000, and the deaths so avoided would total 16,200. In 1909 there were more cases of typhoid fever in the United States than there were cases of plague in India in spite of the fact that India’s population is two and one-half times that of the United States.

“From January, 1907, to October, 1911, there occurred in Russia 283,684 cases of Asiatic cholera. This included the appalling epidemic of 1910. According to a conservative estimate there occurred in the United States during the same period one million and a quarter cases of typhoid fever, or more than 4 cases of typhoid fever in the United States for every case of cholera in Russia. We heard a great deal of the terrible ravages of cholera in Italy in 1910-11; yet in these two years there occurred in Italy about 16,000 cases of cholera, with about 6,000 deaths, and in the United States in the same period we had more than a half million cases of typhoid fever and 50,000 deaths.

“We are accustomed to speak of certain countries as pest ridden, and a residence in them or even a brief visit is considered with apprehension. But do we consider the prevalence of typhoid fever in our own country with sufficient seriousness? The annual 25,000 deaths from typhoid fever do not represent our total loss. At a conservative estimate they are accompanied by a quarter of a million of cases of the disease each year.

“These cases represent an average illness for each individual of four weeks and probably six or eight weeks enforced abstinence from any gainful occupation. The economic loss is appalling, and, computing the value of the lives lost to the community, the cost of medical attendance and hospital care, the loss of earning capacity for many weeks, the decreased earning capacity and impaired efficiency due to sequelae, would reach a sum of not less than $100,000,000 annually.

“To understand fully the menace of typhoid fever, one must remember that it can not be prevented by ordinary personal cleanliness as typhus fever may be prevented, and is not confined to the poor and dirty, but reaches all classes.

“It is not something we have in childhood and consign to history, as scarlet fever or measles, but a disease which attacks the most robust adult individuals during the period of their greatest activity and their greatest economic value to the community. Typhoid fever is a disease against which the individual is helpless, and protection of the individual can be effected only by sanitary control of the entire food and drink supply and the sanitary disposal of human excreta.

“Time will not permit the discussion of the whole problem of typhoid fever transmission, and I shall confine myself to the water-borne typhoid solely. This is done with a full appreciation of the great importance of the other factors in typhoid transmission, viz, milk, control of patients and carriers, contact, flies, and rural typhoid.

“No single measure in reducing typhoid fever on a large scale approaches the effect of substituting a safe for a polluted water supply. As an instance of this wholesale saving of human life, the reduction of typhoid fever in Pittsburgh may be cited. Since the installation of the Pittsburgh plants there has been an annual saving in the city of 400 lives from typhoid fever alone. Installation of safe water supplies in America has not always produced brilliant results, but the failure to reach the low figures attained by the Germans is due principally to three things: First, failure to supply pure water to all: second, imported cases, usually from communities which are typhoid centers; third, existence of insanitary conditions, such as contaminated wells, outdoor privies, and lack of control over milk and excreta.

“As an instance of high rate due to failure to furnish filtered water to all the people, the experience of Pittsburgh is interesting. The filter plant in Pittsburgh was first put in operation November, 1907. But a small portion of filtered water was supplied at first and this was mixed with the unfiltered supply. The amount of water filtered was increased until October, 1908, when the supply of that part of the city between the rivers—about three-fifths of the total population—was filtered.

“The south side, a little less than one-fifth of the entire population, was supplied with filtered water in March, 1909. The former city of Allegheny, recently annexed, is not yet supplied with filtered water. This part of the city includes a population of about one-fourth of the entire city.

“There was a remarkable decrease of typhoid fever in Pittsburgh progressively coincident with the increase of area supplied with filtered water. In spite of all this remarkable reduction two points stand out prominently: First, the rate is still high (1910), and, second, the seasonal distribution suggests water as a prime factor….

“The absolute necessity of a safe water supply—and by “safe” a supply is meant which is safe 365 days in the year—in seeking to rid ourselves of the odium of water-borne typhoid, is obvious. The installation of such a supply, however, has another powerful effect upon the typhoid-fever rate. The existence of a pure public water supply makes possible the elimination of the dangerous shallow well and filthy yard privy. With a contaminated or unsightly public supply a vigorous campaign against the insanitary privy and contaminated well is impossible. The householder is as a rule unwilling to close his well and connect his premises with the public water mains unless the city water appears to be better than that obtained from the well. When water connections have once been made, water closets or other suitable toilet facilities are usually installed as a matter of convenience and the yard privy is no longer needed and its use, therefore, is discontinued.

“The conditions which make disaster possible where the source of public water supply is polluted are two, viz:

1. Failure to purify.
2. Inefficiency of the purification.

“The failure to install a purification plant is usually due to an undue confidence in a water supply which is safe “most of the time.” It is difficult for some officials to understand, without a severe lesson, that it is not sufficient to have a water supply that is safe for 360 or 361 days in the year, and to these officials it seems scarcely justifiable to require expensive purification for the sake of the four or five days in the year during which, due to weather conditions, pollution may take place. Such a supply, with a favorably placed intake, may escape pollution for more than a year. There was no evidence of serious pollution of the water supply of the city of Erie during the year 1909, yet the appalling disaster of January and February, 1911, showed that pollution could take place under certain weather conditions.

“There is also too much confidence placed in unfiltered surface supplies from inhabited watersheds. Even where there is alleged control of the watershed and ample storage, pollution may occur. In regard to unfiltered surface supplies the need of bacteriologic control is very evident. Dangerous pollution may be present only for a few days or for a few hours. This is most likely to be disastrous in time of drought or low water. At such times the diluting effect of the inflow and the purifying effect of storage are both reduced to the minimum. The bacterial count per cubic centimeter is valuable, but the quantitative estimation of B. coli is of far greater importance. A low count does not necessarily imply a safe water, but a low count, coupled with absence of B. coli, may be considered an index of safety.

“The typhoid epidemic in Baltimore 1 in 1910 was coincident with a prolonged drought. The run-off from the watershed of the Gunpowder River was reduced to the minimum. The sewage pollution was thus concentrated and gross pollution was evident upon bacteriologic examination. B. coli was frequently found in 0.1 of a cubic centimeter, and sometimes in 0.01 cubic centimeter samples. When the run-off increased, affording greater dilution and increased storage, the water returned to normal and the typhoid fever dropped to a minimum.

“In Europe surface supplies are almost invariably filtered, and eventually such supplies m America will be treated or filtered.

“Poor filter efficiency is often responsible for disaster in the shape of typhoid outbreaks and may be due to several causes. The slow sand type may give poor filter efficiency when sufficient extra units are lacking, necessitating excessive rates and placing of “green” filters in service. Excessive rates, too little coagulant, insufficient sedimentation capacity, and insufficient storage are common operating and structural faults of the mechanical type. Sometimes a properly constructed plant is struggling with a raw water which has a high bacterial content and even with fair filter efficiency yields an unsafe effluent. Probably the greatest single cause of a poor effluent from filter plants is inefficient operation by unskilled men. It is absolutely essential for good results that bacteriologic examination, including B. coli estimation, be made at least once daily, and in slow sand plants from each unit separately.

“The man in charge must be able to do this. In mechanical filter plants or with hypochlorite plants he must also have the necessary skill to adjust his chemicals with nicety according to the changes in the raw water. With such a man in charge of a properly constructed plant a safe effluent is assured at all times. When struggling with a bad raw water, he will use hypochlorite as an adjuvant with good results. He will study the peculiarities and fluctuations of the constituents of the raw water and adjust his treatment accordingly.

“The most serious defect in sanitary control of our water supplies is the lack of proper daily bacteriologic examination of the water and quantitative estimation of the B. coli content. In some of the lake cities there is proper daily bacteriologic examination of the water supply, but in many of them there is either an imperfect examination or none at all. One city with a slow sand filter plant of three units and a consumption equal to the safe filter capacity of the beds operates these without rest, putting the units in service “green” and with an occasional examination of the water once or twice a month. As a result this city in 1910 had a typhoid-fever death rate of over 300 per 100,000. One large city using unfiltered lake water is so sure that the water is pure that examination is made only occasionally. One of the largest lake cities using an unfiltered supply exposed to sewage pollution makes a bacterial count daily, but restricts its effort to detect sewage pollution to the antiquated and indefinite test of inoculating a guinea pig occasionally with a small portion of a broth culture.

“It is the plain duty of a municipality to provide its citizens with pure water. It is not sufficient to warn against a supply as dangerous and advise its use only for fire, lawn sprinkling, or factory purposes, as at Flint or Saginaw. There are many people in every city who are like children and must be protected even against themselves. The lazy, poor, and ignorant will drink and use the polluted public supply from a convenient tap rather than travel a considerable distance to a pump or buy bottled water which they can ill afford. Neither is it sufficient to have a safe supply for 360 days out of the year, warning the people to boil the water on the other 5 days. The notice to boil the water is based on bacteriologic findings which are 24 hours late. The notice is often ineffective, and by some ignored….” (US PH&MHS. “The Necessity for Safe Water Supplies in the control of Typhoid Fever,” Allan J. McLaughlin, Public Health Rpts. V27, N12, 3-22-1912, 421-429.)

Newspapers

Illinois

Nov 19: “Hoopeston, Ill., Nov. 19. – ‘Typhoid Mary,’ a famous New York medical curiosity, may have a counterpart in a Hoopeston woman, designated as ‘Mrs. X,’ in the official bacteriological report on the typhoid epidemic here. She had typhoid fever in 1886 and has ben assisting in preparing milk, carrying colon bacilli to 66 victims.” (Fairfield Daily Journal, IA. “Carries Fever to Fifty-Six.” 12-29-1910, p. 7.)

Iowa

Dec 31: “(By Iowa Evening Press.) Des Moines, IA., Dec. 31. – Officials of the state board of health today threatened to take charge of the typhoid fever epidemic unless the city board makes better progress. They urge that steps be taken to cut off the sewer at Valley Junction which empties into the Racoon river above the water works.” (Iowa Evening Press. ”State Board May Take Fight in Hand.” Muscatine Journal, 12-31-1910, p. 1.)

Ohio

Dec 24: “A general warning has been sounded all along the valley to boil the river water [Ohio River] for drinking purposes. There is an epidemic of typhoid fever in many of the towns in the section of the valley and most of the sickness is attributed to the water from the Ohio river which is unfit for drinking purposes.” (Steubenville Herald-Star, OH. “Boil the Water.” 12-24-1910, p.3.)

Sources

Bureau of the Census. Mortality Statistics 1910. Eleventh Annual Report. Washington: Department of Commerce (Government Printing Office), 1913. Accessed 3-19-2020 at: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsushistorical/mortstatsh_1910.pdf

Evening Press. “Typhoid Fever at Des Moines.” Waterloo Evening Courier, IA, 12-30-1910, p. 10. Accessed 3-19-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/waterloo-evening-courier-dec-30-1910-p-10/

Fairfield Daily Journal, IA. “Carries Fever to Fifty-Six.” 12-29-1910, p. 7. Accessed 3-19-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/fairfield-daily-journal-dec-29-1910-p-7/

Ford, William W. and E. M. Watson. “The Problem of Typhoid Fever in Baltimore.” Pp. 351-356 in Bulletin of The Johns Hopkins Hospital (Vo. 22, No. 248, Oct 1911). Digitized by Google: http://books.google.com/books?id=zGtNAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=true

Freeman, A. W. (U.S. Public Health Service). “Case Fatality in Typhoid Fever.” Public Health Reports, Vol. 31, No. 49, 12-8-1916, pp. 3356-3358. Accessed 9-9-2013 at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2013823/pdf/pubhealthreporig03379-0006.pdf

Iowa Evening Press. ”State Board May Take Fight in Hand.” Muscatine Journal, 12-31-1910, p. 1. Accessed 3-19-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/muscatine-journal-dec-31-1910-p-1/

Le Grand Reporter, IA. “Girl is Typhoid Victim.” 12-30-1910, p. 2. Accessed 3-19-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/le-grand-reporter-dec-30-1910-p-2/

McLaughlin, Allan J. “Sewage-Polluted Water Supplies in Relation to Infant Mortality.” Public Health Reports, Vol. 27, No. 17, 4-26-1912, pp. 579-612. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=GgE4AAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false

McLaughlin, Allan J. “The Necessity for Safe Water Supplies in the Control of Typhoid Fever,” Public Health Reports, Vol. 27, N, 12, March 22, 1912, pp. 421-429. Digitized by Google at: http://books.google.com/books?id=GgE4AAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=true

Morning Herald, Uniontown. “Official Facts About Uniontown.” 12-27-1910, p. 2. Accessed 3-19-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/uniontown-morning-herald-dec-27-1910-p-2/

Steubenville Herald-Star, OH. “Boil the Water.” 12-24-1910, p. 3. Accessed 3-19-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/steubenville-herald-star-dec-24-1910-p-11/

1909 — Dec 8, PA steamer Clarion fire, lifeboat lost, Lake Erie ~SE Shoal, Pt. Pelee, Can.–15

— 15 Berman, Bruce D. Encyclopedia of American Shipwrecks. 1972, p. 239.
–?15 Evening Times, Sault Ste. Marie, MI. “Vessel Burns…Str. Clarion Destroyed…” 12-9-1909, 1.
— 15 Rock Island Argus, IL. “Fearful Toll Taken in a Blizzard on Lake Erie…” 12-11-1909, p1.
— 15 Swayze. Shipwreck!…Directory of…Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes. 1992, p. 52.
— 15 U.S. Bureau of Navigation. Merchant Vessels of the United States…1910, p. 407.
— 15 U.S. Steamboat-Inspection Service. Annual Report, 1910, p. 12.
— 15 Wreck Site. “SS. Clarion (+1909).

Narrative Information

Swayze: “Clarion. Composite package freighter of 1,712 t. [tons] and 254 ft., launched at Wyandotte, MI, in 1881.

“Lake Erie: The steamer Clarion is well-known because of her unusual cargo. She was upbound with a pair of locomotives aboard when she encountered a heavy gale and was driven north of her chosen course and into the shallows at Southeast Shoal, near Point Pelee [Ontario, Canada].The ship jammed fast and then caught fire and was destroyed. Reports of the number of crew lost vary from 12 to 32, with 15 lost of the 21 aboard being the most reliable estimate. It is not known whether her cargo was recovered.” (Swayze. Shipwreck!…Directory of…Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes. 1992, p. 52.)

U.S. Bureau of Navigation. Merchant Vessels of the United States…1910, 407: Six survivors.

US SIS: “On December 8, 1909, about 7 o’clock p.m., the freight steamer Clarion, when about 1 mile north of Southeast Shoal light-ship, Lake Erie, was discovered to be on fire between decks. Heroic efforts were made to subdue the fire with the steam fire apparatus and fire hose, but without avail. The crew took to the boats, one of which, containing 13 men, was never heard from. One of the crew lost his life in attempting to subdue the fire, and another was lost from one of the lifeboats, making a total of 15 lives lost.” (US SIS. Annual Report, 1910, p. 12.)

Wreck Site: “SS Clarion
Nationality: American
Purpose: Transport
Type: Passenger/cargo ship
Propulsion: steam
Date built: 1881
….
Cause lost: ran aground (wrecked)
Other reasons: fire
Dade lost: 08/12/1909
Casualties: max.15
Builder: Detroit Dry Dock Co., Wyandotte (MI)
Last owner Anchor Line – Erie & Western Transportation Co., Erie [PA}
….”
(Wreck Site. “SS Clarion (+1909).” Entered by Jan Lettens, 2-2-2008; updated by Allen Toney, 12-2-2017. Accessed 11-17-2020.)

Newspaper

Dec 9: “Cleveland, Ohio, Dec. 9. – Two men lost their lives and the fate of 13 others are unknown as a result of the burning of the steamer Clarion near Point Pelee, Lake Erie, early today. Six members of the crew were taken from the Clarion by the steamer L. C. Hanna and brought here, and then rushed to the train for the Buffalo headquarters of the Anchor line.

“All of the crew attempted to leave the Clarion as soon as it was ascertained that she could not be saved. Captain Bell of Ogdensburg and 12 others took to life boats. They are left without food and shelter.

“It is feared that they will either starve or freeze if not drowned in the high seas.

“The survivors say one of the crew fell overboard attempting to get into the lifeboat, but later was taken out of the water and taken with those in the lifeboat. He was wet in a temperature near to zero, but it considered likely that he will survive. The mate was frozen to death. He became overcome by smoke and was exposed to the weather too long before being discovered. An effort was made by the six survivors to enter another lifeboat, but it eluded them. One sailor fell overboard and was drowned in his efforts to save the lifeboat.

“The men were forced to remain on the Clarion. They were later picked up by the steamer L. C. Hanna and brought here. The Clarion is a 1,700-ton steel boat, and was bound from Erie to lay up. The cause of the fire is not known.” (Evening Times, Sault Ste. Marie, MI. “Vessel Burns…Str. Clarion Destroyed…” 12-9-1909, 1.)

Sources

Berman, Bruce D. Encyclopedia of American Shipwrecks. Boston: Mariners Press Inc., 1972.

Evening Times, Sault Ste. Marie, MI. “Vessel Burns. Fate of Thirteen Sailors is Yet Unknown. Str. Clarion Destroyed near Point Pelee, Lake Erie. Two Men Lost Their Lives and Six are Rescued.” 12-9-1909, p.1. Accessed 11-17-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/sault-ste-marie-evening-news-dec-09-1909-p-1/

Rock Island Argus, IL. “Fearful Toll Taken in a Blizzard on Lake Erie…” 12-11-1909, p.1. Accessed 11-17-2020 at: https://newspaperarchive.com/rock-island-argus-dec-11-1909-p-1/

Swayze, David D. Shipwreck! A Comprehensive Directory of Over 3,700 Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes. Boyne City, MI: Harbor House Publications, Inc., 1992.

United States Bureau of Navigation, Department of Commerce and Labor. Forty-Second Annual List of Merchant Vessels of the United States…For the Year Ended June 30, 1910. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910. Google preview accessed 7-14-2018 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=jcDQrscv2roC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false

United States Steamboat-Inspection Service. Annual Report of the Supervising Inspector General, Steamboat-Inspection Service to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1910. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910. 391 pages. Digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=JlgpAAAAYAAJ

Wreck Site. “SS Clarion (+1909).” Entered by Jan Lettens, 2-2-2008; updated by Allen Toney, 12-2-2017. Accessed 11-17-2020 at: https://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?27484

— 38 Calumet News, MI. “59 Lives Lost in Erie Storm.” 12-11-1909, p. 1.
— 38 Mills. Our Inland Seas, 1910, p. 299.
— 36 Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours. 1977, p. 694.
— 36 Swayze. Great Lakes Shipwrecks “M”
— 36 Swayze. Shipwreck!…Directory…Shipwrecks on the Great Lakes. 1992, p. 143.
— 34 Alchem Incorporated. Erie-Ashtabula Shipwrecks.
–31-32 Maritime History of the Great Lakes. Marquette & Bessemer.
— 32 Ludington Record-Appeal, MI. “Big Ferry Goes Down.” 12-16-1909, p. 1, col. 1.
— 31 U.S. Bureau of Navigation. Merchant Vessels of the United States…1910, p. 408.
— 30 U.S. Steamboat-Inspection Service. Annual Report 1910, pp. 12-13.

Narrative Information

Alchem: “Marquette & Bessemer No. 2: Steel steam car ferry of 338 ft sank on 12/8/1909 position unknown. This is another of the long sought lost boats of the lakes. The M&B2 carried a cargo of 30 rail cars loaded with coal and steel. It left Conneaut, Ohio late in the morning with a crew of 33 and one passenger on a routine 60 mile run to Port Stanley, Ontario. As the day progressed the temperature dropped from 40 to 10 deg F and the wind rose to 70 knots from the Southwest in the worst blizzard to strike the lake in years! The following night at 1:30 am several people on shore at Conneaut heard the vessels whistle sounding a distress call. Several people also reported hearing the M&B2’s distress signal off Port Stanley at 3:00 and 5:00 am, a six hour trip from Conneaut in good weather! The vessel was never seen again and likely went down in deep water while steaming for shelter on the lee side of Long Point. A life boat was found days later containing the frozen bodies of 10 crewmen. The bodies of other crewmen continued to drift ashore for months afterwards on Long Point, at Buffalo, and as far East as Niagara Falls.” (Alchem Inc.)

Mills: “In December 1909, the big car transport the Marquette and Bessemer No. 2, with thirty cars of coal, and structural iron piled on top, turned over in the mountainous seas of Lake Erie, and went to the bottom with a loss of thirty-eight lives.” (Mills. Our Inland Seas, 1910, p. 299.)

Swayze, Great Lakes Shipwrecks M:
“Marquette & Bessemer No. 2.
“Type at loss: propeller, steel, carferry, 30 car
“Build info: 1905, American Shipbuilding, Cleveland OH hull #428
“Specs: 338x55x20, 2514 t
“Date of loss: 1909, Dec 8
“Place of loss: midlake, exact location unknown
“Lake: Erie
“Type of loss: storm
“Loss of life: 36 (all)
“Carrying: 32 coal hopper cars
“Detail: Bound [out of] Conneaut, OH for Port Stanley, Ont. on her regular route, she foundered in a powerful gale. Her distress whistle was heard and lights seen on both sides of the lake as she vainly searched for hours for a safe port.”

US Bureau of Navigation: None of the reported crew of 31 survived. (U.S. Bureau of Navigation. Merchant Vessels of the United States…1910, p. 408.)

US SIS: “The local inspectors at Cleveland, Ohio, reported on December 18, 1909, that the steamer Marquette and Bessemer No. 2, left Conneaut, Ohio, at 10:25 a.m., on December 7, 1909, for Port Stanley, Ontario. Heavy gales with snow were blowing for several days after she left, and the steamer was never reported. One of the steamer’s lifeboats, with the dead bodies of several of the crew (frozen to death), was picked up by a tug. This is all that was ever known of this steamer, and the owners report that 30 men were lost.” (US SIS. Annual Report 1910, 12-13)

Wright: Home part, Erie, PA. Contained 30 loaded coal cars. (Wright, Richard. Marquette & Bessemer No. 2. Accessed at Maritime History of the Great Lakes.)

Newspapers

Dec 12, Buffalo Evening News: On December 12 “the State Fish Tug Commodore Perry towed the car ferry’s lifeboat No. 4, containing nine dead bodies, into the port at Erie…all frozen…” (Buffalo Evening News, December 13, 1909)

April 7, 1910, Buffalo Evening News: “NIAGARA FALLS, April 7. – Buoyed up by a life preserver, the body of J. McLeod, master of the ill-fated car-ferry steamer MARQUETTE & BESSEMER, which went down on the run from Conneaut, Ohio, to Port Stanley in the gale of December 10 last, was taken from the water in the forebay of Niagara Falls Power Company late yesterday afternoon. The body was in a very good state of preservation and identification was made easy by papers found in the man’s pockets.” (Buffalo Evening News, April 7, 1910)

May 2, 1910, Buffalo Evening News: “Port Colborne, Ont., May 2. – (Special) – Saturday, R. Scott, a farmer living about a mile east of here, on the Lake Shore road, discovered the body of a man floating in the water near the shore. When the body was brought in it was found to be one of the men lost on the ill-fated Bessemer & Marquette car ferry, which foundered in Lake Erie last fall. One of the ferry’s life preservers was still on the body. The man’s watch and several articles were still in the pockets and from these the body was identified as that of Gene Woods of Conneaut, the engineer of the car ferry.” (Buffalo Evening News, May 2, 1910) The Buffalo Evening News articles were accessed at Maritime History of the Great Lakes.

Sources

Alchem Incorporated. Lake Erie Shipwreck Map “C” and Index. Accessed 1-30-2009 at: http://www.alcheminc.com/asht.html

Calumet News, MI. “59 Lives Lost in Erie Storm.” 12-11-1909, p. 1. Accessed 12-7-2020 at: https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn86086633/1909-12-11/ed-1/seq-1/

Ludington Record-Appeal, MI. “Big Ferry Goes Down.” 12-16-1909, p1, c1. Accessed 12-7-2020: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&dat=19091209&id=FndOAAAAIBAJ&sjid=mUADAAAAIBAJ&pg=6065,1906441&hl=en

Maritime History of the Great Lakes. “Marquette & Bessemer No. 2, (St. S.), 1909, Official No. U202514.” 11/16/2008 at: http://www.hhpl.on.ca/GreatLakes/Wrecks/details.asp?ID=18137

Mills, James Cooke. Our Inland Seas, Their Shipping and Commerce for Three Centuries. Chicago, A. C. McClurg & Co., 1910. Digitized by Microsoft. Accessed 12-7-2020 at: http://www.archive.org/details/ourinlandseasthe00milluoft

Nash, Jay Robert. Darkest Hours – A Narrative Encyclopedia of Worldwide Disasters from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Pocket Books, Wallaby, 1977, 792 pages.

Swayze, David D. Great Lakes Shipwrecks Beginning with the letter M. Accessed 12-7-2020 at:
http://www.boatnerd.com/swayze/shipwreck/m.htm

Swayze, David D. Shipwreck! A Comprehensive Directory of Over 3,700 Shipwrecks on the Great Lake. Boyne City, MI: Harbor House Publications, Inc., 1992.

United States Bureau of Navigation, Department of Commerce and Labor. Forty-Second Annual List of Merchant Vessels of the United States…For the Year Ended June 30, 1910. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910. Google preview accessed 7-14-2018 at: http://books.google.com/books?id=jcDQrscv2roC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_v2_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=&f=false

United States Steamboat-Inspection Service. Annual Report of the Supervising Inspector General, Steamboat-Inspection Service to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1910. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1910. 391 pages. Digitized by Google. Accessed at: http://books.google.com/books?id=JlgpAAAAYAAJ

Compiled by B. Wayne Blanchard, Oct 2008; revised May 2010 and Jan 2020 for website: Deadliest American Disasters and Large-Loss-Of-Life Events. https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

 

—   259   Blanchard.*                                                             

— ~300  Barrett. “Retrospect: We’ve Come a Long Way.” MESA. 1976, p. 17.[1]

— ~300  Rice, George, USGS; in Keenan. Historical Documentation…Coal-Mine… 1963, p. 19.

—   300  Waukesha Freeman, WI. “Events in 1909 Chronology,” Jan 10, 1910, p. 12.

— ~300  (“Nearly”). White/Murphy. “Eight Days in a Burning Mine.” World Magazine, 1911.

—   289  Chicago Daily News Almanac & Yearbook 1910, “Mine Disaster at Cherry, Ill,” p. 405.

— ~260  (“Nearly”). Amer. Red Cross. “The Cherry Mine Disaster…Workers’ Compensation…”

—   259  Cherry Coal Mine Disaster (website). Accessed 1-20-2020.

—   259  dsteffen. “How Regulation came to be…Cherry Mine Disaster–Part II.” Daily Kos, 5-10-2009.⁑

—   259  Groves. “Cherry, Illinois, Mine Disaster: November 13, 1909.” Ideals, 2006.

—   259  I Illinois Library. “Significant Illinois Fires: Cherry Mine Disaster.” Urbana: Univ. of IL

—   259  Illinois Labor History Society. “Story of the Great Cherry Coal Mine Disaster.”

—   259  Keenan. Historical Documentation of Major Coal-Mine Disasters…[U.S.]…, 1963, p19.

—   259  Mine Safety and Health Admin., DOL. Historical Data on Mine Disasters.  2008.

—   259  National Fire Protection Association.  Key Dates in Fire History. 1996.

—   259  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC. Mining Disasters.

—   259  O’Leary. “History Corner: Cherry Mine Disaster of 1909.”  Securitas Magazine, 2003.

—   259  Smith, Roger. Catastrophes and Disasters. Edinburgh & NY: Chambers, 1992, p. 126.^[2]

—   259  State of IL Bur. Labor Statistics. Report on The Cherry Mine Disaster. 1910, p. 7.

—   259  Stratton. The Cherry Mine (St. Paul Coal Company No. 2), Cherry Illinois. Aug 2002, p. 3.

—   259  Tintori. Trapped: The 1909 Cherry Mine Disaster, 2002, pp. 260-269.#

—   259  Wikipedia. “1909 Cherry Mine Disaster.”

 

* We choose to use the tally of 259 deaths noted by most sources, including that of the State of Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics report, which provides a list by name of all the fatalities. We cannot account for the higher numbers since none indicate how the higher number was derived. The Daily Kos writer, noted herein states: “When the decision was made to seal the mine, over two hundred fifty, in fact, still remained below, although rumor and erroneous information put the number far higher, 385 to 400 being reported in many media sources.”

 

⁑ Notes that “One of the rescued minters, Daniel Holafick, the oldest of the rescued survivors, was treated at the scent and went home. He was found dead in his home two days later. He is considered the 259^th, and last victim of the Cherry mine disaster.”

 

# Blanchard: Our count of names listed in section titled: “Victims of the Cherry Mine disaster, including details regarding their survivors, ages, nationalities, positions and wages.” Most of the entries begin with a notation of “Check No.” This is a reproduction of the “Victims” table found in State of IL rpt.

 

Narrative Information

 

Chicago Daily News Almanac: “Through a fire started by hay coming in contact with a torch 289 men lost their lives in the shafts of the St. Paul company’s coal mine at Cherry, Ill., on the afternoon of Saturday, Nov. 13, 1909. Eleven of the victims died in making a heroic effort to rescue the men cut off by the flames. They had saved 185 of the miners and were making their seventh trip in the cage when they were overcome, only one returning to the surface and he dying almost immediately. The names of these eleven men are as follows: John Bundy, Robert Clark, Tom Flood, Dominick Fermento, James Jamison, Alexander Nourberg, James Shears, Harry Stewart, John Azarbinski, Joseph Yearley, Ike Lewis. Other efforts were made to reach the entombed miners, but the fire could not be extinguished without sealing up the shafts and the men could not be reached until all except twenty-one were dead. These twenty-one were rescued after being entombed a whole week. Steps for the relief of the widows, orphans and others left helpless by the disaster were at once taken in various parts of the state and the response to the appeals for help was immediate and generous.” (Chicago Daily News Almanac and Year Book for 1910. “Events of the Year 1909…Mine Disaster at Cherry, Ill.” Chicago Daily News Company, 1909, p. 405.)

 

Groves: “In 1905, the St. Paul Mine Company began mining coal in Cherry, Illinois. Believed to be the largest coal shaft in the United States, the Cherry Mine produced over 1,500 tons of coal a day for its first few years.”  (Groves 2006, Cherry, Illinois, Mine Disaster: November 13, 1909))

 

IL Labor History Society: “One of the worst [disasters] took place on November 13, 1909 in a mine near the little town of Cherry, just a few miles northwest of La Salle, IL…By 7:00 a.m. that morning 481 men and boys had descended the shaft to reach the coal, in some cases more than 500 feet below the surface. It began as a day like any other, except that the electrical system had broken down and the mines were lit the old-fashioned way. Kerosene torches were placed along the walls…

 

“Around lunch time several bales of hay were dropped down the hoist to feed the mules. Forty mules, were stabled underground. Their job was to pull the little cars, which had been loaded with coal by the miners through the tunnels to the elevator hoist….15-year old Matt Francesco and another man pushed one of the cars piled with the hay over to the stable area. They gave it a final shove down the track, and then went on their way. Unfortunately, the car came to rest under one of the open torches. Soon the hay caught fire.^[3] Efforts to move the car out of danger only spread the fire. The heat and smoke became overpowering, as the fire began to spread. At last the signal to clear out the mine was given,^[4] but it was too late for many…. there were 259 men and boys who were never saved despite great deeds of heroism by volunteer rescue teams. Sadly, that heroism was rewarded with death for no less than twelve of the rescuers. They were a hastily assembled team of people from the town who went down in the cage six times, each time dragging more miners to safety. From the seventh trip into the hell below, however, none returned alive….”^[5] (IL Labor History Society.)

 

IL Labor History Society: “Work in the underground tunnels of the early coal mines in Illinois was dark, dirty, and always dangerous….In the early years of mining, there were few safety regulations or procedures required by the State. The mining companies showed minimum concern for the safety of the workers. Replacements could always be found from among the immigrant workers pouring into America from Europe….Since they were paid by how much coal they had dug by the end of the day, miners went about their work in a hurry with little time and attention to safe practices….” (Illinois Labor History Society. “Story of…Great Cherry Coal Mine Disaster.”)

 

IL Labor History Society: “There were tales of unbelievable suffering and endurance. One group of miners, 500 feet underground, had built a wall of mud, rocks, and timbers to block off the poisonous gasses. They were in total darkness with only a pool of water leaking from a coal seam to drink. After eight days of confinement, they could bear it no longer. They tore down the barricade and began crawling through the tunnels. Finally, they heard the sounds of a search party. Twenty-one men still alive from this group were rescued. After 25 days the Cherry mine was sealed….

 

“Impelled by the public outcry over the tragedy, in 1910 the Illinois legislature established stronger fire and safety regulations governing mines. A year later, the State adopted a liability act, which later developed into the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act.”  (IL Labor Hist Society; adapted from article by Steve Stout appearing in the JOURNAL of the Illinois State Historical Society, February, 1979. Vol. LXII, Number 1)

 

Rice: “The Cherry disaster occurred on Saturday after­noon, November 13, 1909. Of all the mine disasters in this country, it was second only to that of Monongah in the size of its death roll. About 300 lives were lost. The exact number had not been determined.

 

“The Cherry mine is located in Bureau County, Illi­nois, near the northern edge of the Illinois coal basin, where the coal measures are deeply overlain with glacial drift. Three seams are penetrated by the two shafts, called locally the First Vein, the Second or Middle Vein, and the Third or Lower Vein, numbering from the top downward.

 

“At the point where the two shafts are sunk the glacial drift is about 80 feet in thickness, although in the vicinity it is often from 200 to over 300 feet thick. The First Vein is at a depth of about 320 feet.  It is a thin, irregular seam in Bureau County, and not mineable in the vicinity of Cherry.

 

“The Second Vein is about 40 feet below the First Vein and is from four to six feet thick. The mine in this seam was developed some four or five years ago, and the workings are quite extensive, covering an ir­regular area of about 240 acres. The farthest work­ings are about three-fourths of a mile from the shaft. The plan of development was by the room and pillar system. About 300 men were employed on the day shift in this seam.

 

“The Third Vein is about 160 feet below the Second Vein, or about 480 feet from the surface. Mining had been started in it only about a year previous.

 

“Entries had been driven around a large block sur­rounding the shafts and longwall workings had been started. There were about 90 working places, but as the work was being pushed, nearly 200 men all told, were employed in this vein on the day shift.

 

“The mine had two entrances, a large hoisting shaft, and a combined air and escape shaft. Both these shafts went to the Second and the Third Vein.

 

“Coal was brought up from the Third Vein to the Second Vein on a single cage in one compartment of the air shaft. The loaded cars were hauled around to the hoisting shaft. The coal was caged with the Second Vein coal and hoisted on large cages, on which the two-ton cars were placed tandem.

 

“A stairway runs from the Third Vein up through the Second Vein to the surface, in one compartment of the air shaft. In addition to this method of escape from the Third to the Second Vein, there was a single cage in the southeast compartment of the hoisting shaft, that could be fastened to the floor of the main cage by a rope, which ordinarily hung from the cage seat at the Second Vein.

 

“The mine was ventilated by a strongly built steel fan with steel plate casing. It was reversible, but as ordinarily used, forced air down the air shaft. The air returned, or up-casted, through the hoisting shaft. At the Second Vein the intake air split, the larger part of it going through the workings in this seam, the other part continuing down the air shaft to the Third Vein workings.

 

“All haulage underground was by mules. There were stables underground in each vein. The Second Vein stable was located about 60 feet away from and parallel with the main bottom.

 

“The main bottoms, the stable and the landing at the air shaft had been lighted with incandescent electric lights up to about a month prior to the fire. Then a breakdown in the lead covered cable caused the use of torches until a new cable was installed. These torches were of a kind often used around naked light mines and consisted of a piece of two inch pipe, about 16 inches long, plugged at one end and reduced down at the other to hold a cotton wick.  Kerosene oil is used in them. Such torches are usually hung to the timbering. When the supply of oil gets low, the torches are tipped down more or less and are apt to drip oil.

 

“In the case of the torches at the air shaft, the evi­dence shows that there were two hung by wires from timbers, one placed on the north side, the other on the south side of the shaft, immediately adjacent to the man-way along the west side of the hoisting com­partment.

 

“At 1:15 p.m., a car, containing six bales of hay standing on end, was sent down from the surface, destined for the Third Vein. When it reached the bottom, it was taken off on the east side and was hauled through the east run-around by a three-mule team. The driver left the car of hay with some empty cars on the siding immediately south of the air shaft and went back to the hoisting shaft, taking six loads of coal and returned again to the air shaft with six empty cars. He testified that when the team stopped, he walked past it and saw that the car of hay, which he had left on the previous trip, was burning.

 

“The coupler boy testified that after the driver had brought the car of hay and empties to the siding south of the air shaft, that the eager and he pushed the car of hay through the man-way up to a point where the torch on the north side of the shaft was hanging. He didn’t notice whether the hay struck the torch, or not. The hay was standing high in the car, and from the evidence, it is probable that the top was higher than the torch. At all events, they had paid no attention to it and had turned and pushed a loaded car, which had just come up on the cage, off same to the south and coupled it to the cars already standing there. When they turned around after coupling up the loaded car, they saw that the car of hay was on fire.

 

“As a result of a careful study of the evidence, the author presents the following probable sequence of evidence.

 

“At 1:15 p.m., the car of hay went down the hoisting shaft and was hauled to the air shaft.

 

“At 1:20 p.m., the car of hay was shoved into a torch on the north side of the air shaft by the eager and the coupler, who, however, did not observe the result. It would appear from the evidence that the torch was low hanging, and while it would clear the empty cars, the bales of hay would project higher. It seems quite probable that the hay struck it and tipped it backward so that the burning oil would tend to run out, and this might explain the suddenness with which the hay blazed up.

 

“It seems probable that the eager, seeing the hay against the torch, pushed the car away from it, to the south side of the shaft, throwing off one burning bale; then finding others ablaze, undertook to push the car to the sump. It also seems probable that the torch which had set the car on fire was removed before the car was pushed past the point where it had hung. When he got the car to the switch, the narrowness in the road increased the draft. Seeing the blaze was going to set the overhead timbers on fire, he decided to send it down to the third vein, where he knew they had a hose and water tap.

 

“About 1:43 p.m., the car of burning hay was dumped down the hoisting shaft.

 

“About 2:05 p.m., the fan stopped and then reversed, making the hoisting shaft the downcast. Conditions at the bottom of the hoisting shaft temporarily very much improved, so that men straggling into the bot­tom had no difficulty in getting to the cages.

 

“About 3:00 p.m., the fan doors burned out; follow­ing which, the fan was stopped.

 

“About 3:00 p.m., the foreman went below to try to reach the Third Vein with the emergency cage. Owing to the fan having stopped, the smoke probably backed up, and the fire getting closer to the shaft through the stable and pump room, he and party were obliged to abandon further attempts, after having brought the emergency cage up once to the Second Vein, so they lowered and disconnected it and then got on the main cage to ascend.

 

“About 3:15 p.m., a loader belled. It seems probable that the cage carrying the others was then ascending. The signals caused it to be stopped and then lowered just after he was driven back by the smoke and heat.

 

“About 3:30 p.m., cage containing the dead bodies reached the top.

 

“About 4:00 p.m., hoisting shaft sealed.

 

“When the wooden doors of the fan conduit burned out, water was played on the superstructures and down the shaft, but the water supply was limited as the mine was more or less dependent on the mine water and mine pumps which were now stopped.

 

“The flames coming up the air shaft heated the steel plate fan and casing red hot, damaging the plates and melting the babbitt^[6] from the boxings. The fan engine was fully protected by a concrete house; the fan con­duit, also of concrete, was not materially damaged. The head frame carrying the sheaves for the Third Vein hoist, while not directly exposed to the blast, was burned so badly that it was removed.

 

“Water was played around the top of the air shaft and down same that evening and night (November 13th) until the active flames were put out.

 

“A pulley was rigged over the air shaft and a rope attached to the air shaft hoisting engine, and a hole broken in the reinforced concrete roof of the fan conduit so that a descent could be made in a small bucket. The Third Vein cage had dropped to the bottom through the burning of the hoisting rope.

 

“At 1:20 p.m., two men, using helmet oxygen rescue apparatus and electric lamps, made the first descent into the air shaft. Signals were given with an auto­mobile horn. They went down only 60 feet; the sheave proved not to be centered so they were hoisted up again. On this being remedied, a second trip was made about 2:00 p.m. This time they got down about 250 feet where it was thought that the shaft lining had broken, as the bucket landed on an obstruction.

 

“A third trip was undertaken about 5:00 p.m., and this time their bucket did not strike the offset and they went to the Second Vein. They found smoke coming out along the roof with considerable velocity. Below the heavy smoke cloud they could see in about ten feet either way, and at the north side could see a fall extending nearly to the shaft. The bucket was so small, and owing to the weight of the apparatus, which is about 40 pounds, in addition to an electric lamp weighing 15 pounds, it was necessary to tie the men to prevent their overbalancing. This prevented any examination of the Second Vein, more particu­larly too, because there was no landing; that is, the bucket swung in a large shaft which went down 160 feet deeper. The automobile horn signals brought no response from within the mine.

 

“About 11:00 p.m., the air shaft was sealed. Next morning, November 15th, the cover was taken off the hoisting shaft. Using helmets and electric lights, two men went down on a cage in the hoisting shaft about 9:00 a.m. They reached the Second Vein. It was so smoky they could not see, but they got about 25 feet from the shaft, in the Second Vein, on the west bot­tom before coming up. The timbering in the east bottom was then standing. It was too smoky to see into the pump room.

 

“The air shaft at this time was covered. It was decided to have the cover removed. The fan was then repaired and slowly started up-casting.

 

“That evening, November 16th, a company of firemen from Chicago arrived, bringing a fire engine with them. It was decided to throw a stream of water with this engine, down the shaft through a hole in the covering. This fire engine discharged about 600 gal­lons per minute.

 

“The following day, November 17th, after a pro­longed conference of State Inspectors and others, it was decided to investigate the air shaft, as the ther­mometer showed that the air in it was of practically normal temperature, although the gases it contained put out the light of a safety lamp. These attempts failed.

 

“That evening, November 18th, the fan was started up-casting, the cover over the hoisting shaft removed, and a stream of water played down from the top by the Chicago firemen. Subsequently, as the shaft be­came cool from the water and from the incoming cold air, the hose was gradually carried down on the cage to the bottom, where an entrance was effected on the west side. Heavy falls of roof had occurred close to the shaft on the east side and in the pump room, en­tirely closing the openings in these directions, and also temporarily blanketing the fires under them. Active flames around the immediate bottom were quickly put out by the powerful stream from the hose most skillfully handled and directed by the Chicago firemen, who rendered splendid service at this critical time. In fact, it is a question if, without their skill and the use of their powerful fire-pump, whether a footing would have been secured at the bottom of the hoisting shaft at this time.

 

“The day following the entrance forced down the hoisting shaft, viz ;—Friday November 19th, a con­siderable number of bodies were recovered from the shaft bottom and vicinity. The mine inside was found to be cool but full of blackdamp, which had to be slowly forced out by the air current. The plan adopted was to clear out one pair of entries at a time. Movements were hampered by the dead bodies of mules and loaded cars. The latter in turn blocked by the dead mules and by falls of roof could not be hauled out without cleaning up the roads, and the situation would not allow this delay.

 

“Owing to the bad air encountered in the mine and the length of time that had elapsed, it was not con­sidered possible that any one who had been trapped in the mine could be alive.  Nevertheless, early in the afternoon of the following day, November 20th, —, who had been appointed to take charge of the underground work, happening to enter the second west entry on the south side, heard a noise, and going in­ward with a shaded light, he was greeted by one of a party of eight men who had been entombed since the start of the fire, and had saved themselves by erecting barricades near the heads of the first and second west entries. They had just made a hole through the barricade in the first west and had come out through the blackdamp to the point where dis­covered. This was a distance of over half a mile that they had to walk past cars and dead mules in the darkness, and in an atmosphere which would not support a light, except near the entrance. These eight were in comparatively good condition and were promptly taken up and given medical atten­tion and nursing in the hospital car. They reported that there were twelve men behind the barricade not strong enough to come out by themselves.

 

“The first men in helmets to reach the barricade in the second west could not get through the small hole, and after working a little to enlarge it, returned to the base. It was very hot, and this added to the diffi­culties of the inexperienced helmet wearers, only two of whom had taken a half hour training. It was nec­essary for the writer to remain at the base to put on, adjust, and take helmets off the volunteers, being the only one with knowledge of the apparatus. In a number of cases, the men were overcome through mishandling the helmets so that they had to be re­vived with the resuscitation apparatus. The hole in the barricade was enlarged by the men in helmets so that they could go through it, and one after another, eleven miners were brought out. Some were sup­ported between two helmet men, and a few were able to come alone on being led.”  (Rice, George S, USGS; in Keenan 1963, pp. 19-21.)

 

State if IL Bureau of Labor Statistics: “The nationality of those killed ranges as follows: [259]

 

Italians, 73;                 [In the original this is in paragraph form.]

Slavish, 36;

Austrian, 28,

Lithuanian, 21;

Scotch, 21;

German, 15;

American, 11;

French, 12;

Polish, 8;

Swede, 9;

English, 8;

Belgian, 7;

Irish, 3;

Greek, 2;

Welch, 2;

Russian, 3.

 

“There are sixteen nationalities represented; 161 were married and 97 were single [258]. There were 607 persons dependent upon them. This large number of people left either destitute or without any means of support attracted the attention and sympathy of the nation. Three of those killed were not employes of the mine but had volunteered their services in rescuing those below and were burned to death on the cage in the attempt. They were: Isaac Lewis, a liveryman; John Flood, a merchant, and Dominic Formento, a groceryman, all of Cherry. They each were married and left a widow and children.” (State of Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics. Report on The Cherry Mine Disaster. 1910, p. 46.)

 

White and Murphy: “The Cherry Mine, located at Cherry, in Bureau County, Illinois, was owned and operated by the St. Paul Coal Company, Illinois, been in operation for about four years, and was considered one of the best mines in the Central Illinois Coalfield. There were two veins, or levels, being worked, and two shafts descended to the upper one of these, which was known as the “Second Vein.” Only one shaft communicated with the lower or third vein, and this fact was in large part responsible for the loss of life in the fire. The latter shaft was called the escapement shaft, and the one which terminated in the second vein was called the main shaft. The men, coal, and waste matter were raised out of the mine on a cage operated by a hoisting-engine in the main shaft, and from the third vein to the second vein on another cage in the escapement shaft, similarly manipulated.” (White/Murphy. “Eight Days in a Burning Mine.” Wide World Magazine, 1911.)

 

White and Murphy: “The mine was then sealed up, so that the fire would die out from lack of oxygen, and all efforts to enter it failed until the following Saturday–one week after the fire had broken out, when a rescue party went below and found twenty men in the second vein who had managed to remain alive, and these were saved. The rest of the miners in both veins, about three hundred in number, were found dead.”  (White, “Eight Days…” 1911.)

 

Coal Age: “Miners of Cherry, where more than 200 miners were killed in a mine disaster in 1909, have given a striking evidence of gratitude for the relief work of the American Red Cross following the mine disaster. Now, after nearly seven years, they have sent to American Red Cross headquarters $3,000 to aid the organization in relief work in Poland.”  (Coal Age.  “Coal and Coke News.” Vol. 9, No. 5, 1-29-1916, p. 225.)

 

Sources

 

American Red Cross. “The Cherry Mine Disaster Leads to Workers’ Compensation Laws.” Museum.

 

Barrett, Robert. “Retrospect: We’ve Come a Long Way.” MESA (Magazine of Mining Health and Safety). 1976, pp. 12-22. Accessed 5-12-2010 at:

https://arlweb.msha.gov/FocusOn/40thAnniversary/MESAArticle.pdf   Accessed 1-20-2020 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=MHts-Nm1T5oC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

 

Cherry Coal Mine Disaster (website). Accessed 1-20-2020 at: http://guitarjourney.tripod.com/cherrycoalminedisaster/index.html

 

Chicago Daily News Almanac and Year Book for 1910.  Chicago Daily News Company, 1909. At: http://books.google.com/books?id=IHgaAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=true

 

Coal Age. “Coal and Coke News.” Vol. IX, No. 5, 1-29-1916. NY: Hill Publishing CO., 1916. Accessed 1-20-2020 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=S4hNAAAAYAAJ&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=true

 

dsteffen. “How Regulation came to be: The Cherry Mine Disaster – Part II.” Daily Kos, 5-10-2009. Accessed 1-20-2020 at: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2009/5/10/729963/-

 

Groves, Adam. “Cherry, Illinois, Mine Disaster:  November 13, 1909.”  Ideals, Illinois Fire Service Institute, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 2006. Accessed at:  https://www.ideals.uiuc.edu/handle/2142/86

 

I Illinois Library. “Significant Illinois Fires: Cherry Mine Disaster.” Urbana: University of Illinois, 11-29-2018 update. Accessed 1-20-2020 at: https://guides.library.illinois.edu/c.php?g=416856&p=2840930

 

Illinois Labor History Society. “Story of the Great Cherry Coal Mine Disaster.”  Adapted from Steve Stout article appearing in the JOURNAL of the Illinois State Historical Society, February, 1979. Vol. LXII, Number 1. Accessed at: http://www.kentlaw.edu/ilhs/cherrymi.htm

 

Keenan, Charles M. Historical Documentation of Major Coal-Mine Disasters in the United States Not Classified as Explosions of Gas or Dust: 1846-1962 (Bulletin 616). Washington, DC:  Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, 1963. Accessed at:  http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc12768/m1/2/

 

Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the United States. Arlington, VA: MSHA, U.S. Department of Labor. Accessed 10-5-2008 at:  http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCT8.HTM

 

National Fire Protection Association. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996. Accessed 2010 at:  http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=1352&itemID=30955&URL=Research%20&%20Reports/Fire%20statistics/Key%20dates%20in%20fire%20history&cookie%5Ftest=1

 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Mining Safety and Health Research..  Mining Disasters (Incidents with 5 or more Fatalities). NIOSH, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2-26-2013 update. Accessed at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/disall.htm

and http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/statistics/content/allminingdisasters.html

 

O’Leary, Margaret (Ed.). “History Corner: Cherry Mine Disaster of 1909.” Securitas Magazine, Nov/Dec 2003, Vol. 2, Issue 6 (Suburban Emergency Management Project). Accessed at:  http://www.semp.us/publications/securitas_reader.php?SecuritasID=

Smith, Roger. Catastrophes and Disasters. Edinburgh and New York: W & R Chambers, 1992.

 

State of Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics. Report on The Cherry Mine Disaster. Springfield IL: State Board of Commissioners of Labor and published by Illinois State Journal Co., State Printers, 1910. Accessed 1-20-2020 at: https://books.google.com/books?id=dR-O2791H8MC&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=true

 

Stratton, Christopher. The Cherry Mine (St. Paul Coal Company No. 2), Cherry Illinois. Springfield, IL: Illinois Department of Natural Resources, August 2002. Accessed 1-20-2020 at: http://www.illinoisarchaeology.com/IDNR/Coal%20Mines/Cherry%20Mine%20ASSR.pdf

 

Tintori, Karen. Trapped: The 1909 Cherry Mine Disaster. NY: Atria Books, 2002.

 

Waukesha Freeman, WI. “Events in 1909 Chronology,” Jan 10, 1910, p. 12. Accessed at:  http://www.newspaperarchive.com/FullPagePdfViewer.aspx?img=53091993

 

White, Thomas and Louis Murphy. “Eight Days In A Burning Mine.” The World Magazine, October 1911.  U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration.  Accessed at: http://www.msha.gov/CENTURY/MAG/MAGCVR.asp

 

Wikipedia. “1909 Cherry Mine Disaster.” 4-5-2009 at:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cherry_Mine_Disaster

 

Additional Reading and Resources

 

Stout, Steve. Black Damp: The Story of The Cherry Mining Disaster (a novel). Utica House Pub. Co., 1979.

 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Illinois History and Lincoln Collections. Edward Caldwell Cherry Mine Disaster Research Collection, 1903-2007 (IHLC MS 515). “Manuscript Collection Inventory.” Accessed 1-20-2020 at: https://www.library.illinois.edu/ihx/inventories/caldwell_cherry-mine-disaster.pdf

 

[1] “The next year, 1909, the Cherry mine fire occurred in Illinois taking about 300 lives.”

[2] Smith incorrectly writes that: “The accident here did not even start in the mine: it began with haybales catching fire near the mine entrance. The flames spread to the shaft timbers and were out of control.” See sources below for description of how hay lowered into the mine to feed mules working in the shafts, caught fire.

[3] A differing account is given by Thomas White, a survivor of the Cherry Mine disaster: “On the day of the calamity there were about four hundred men working in the mine — two hundred and fifty in the second vein, and the remainder in the lower level. About half-past one o’clock in the afternoon a car of hay that was being pushed along a track between the shafts in the second vein took fire from a blazing oil torch stuck in the wall there. The men at work near by, with the carelessness born of long experience with small fires, at first regarded the conflagration without alarm. The car was run to the escapement shaft, and dumped down it to the third vein, where it was thought it would burn itself out on the bottom without igniting the timbers of the shaft. Left thus unheeded, the fire gained a foothold in the shaft before any effort was made to extinguish it. Then the officials and employees lost their heads, and wasted much valuable time in a futile effort to put out the fire, instead of warning the men and getting them out of the mine. Thus it happened that many of the men did not learn of the outbreak until they finished work after three o’clock and came to the shaft to be hoisted to the surface.”  (White. “Eight Days in a Burning Mine,” World, 1911.)

[4] Forty-five minutes after the fire started according to Grove 2006, Cherry, Illinois, Mine Disaster: Nov 13, 1909.

[5] “The cage, with a rescue party of twelve men, made several trips to the second vein, bringing back numbers of miners. At about half-past three, however, it made its last trip. After it had been down for some time, confused signals came to the hoisting-engineer, leaving him in doubt whether or not to hoist the cage. He temporized, and when he finally raised the cage the rescue-party lay burned to death on its floor.” (White, “Eight Days…” 1911.)

[6] “Babbitt metal is most commonly used as a thin surface layer in a complex, multi-metal structure, but its original use was as a cast-in-place bulk bearing material.”  (Wikipedia.  “Babbitt (metal),” Aug 27, 2011.)